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

MORAL AND DEVOTIONAL THEOLOGY

OF THE CHURCH OF ROME,

ACCORDING TO THE AUTHORITATIVE TEACHING OF

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI.

RE-PRINTED IN PART FROM THE "CHRISTIAN REMEMBRANCER."

BY THE

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AUTHOR OF THE 'PRACTICAL WORKING OF THE CHURCH OF SPAIN.'

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CONTENTS.

ADVERTISEMENT.

INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EDITION, BY THE REV. A. C. COXE.

I.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S THEORY OF TRUTHFULNESS.

II.

CERTAIN POINTS IN S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S MORAL THEOLOGY, CONSIDERED IN NINETEEN LETTERS, BY THE REV. H. E. MANNING, AND THE REV. F. MEYRICK.

III.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S THEORY OF THEFT.

IV.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S "GLORIES OF MARY."

V.

AN EXAMINATION OF THE REV. R. I. WILBERFORCE'S CHARGES AGAINST THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND, CONTAINED IN HIS "INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH AUTHORITY."

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE writer has been requested, by persons whose opinion he values, to put together the several articles that he has written on the subject of S. Alfonso de' Liguori's Morality, and to give his name as a guarantee that the charges made in them are not exaggerated. This he has done in the present volume, and he will add, that he is so far from having wantonly aggravated the case against S. Alfonso and the Church of Rome's morality, that he has passed over in silence those parts of the *Theologia Moralis* which would have roused the most intense indignation of the English mind, containing offences of which the author himself, living in the moral atmosphere of Italy, and accustomed to the intellectual examination of cases of morbid anatomy, is clearly unconscious, and in the very commission of which, he doubtless had the best of purposes.

Further assurance that the teaching here reprobated is the teaching of S. Alfonso, and that it is sanctioned by the authorities of the Church of Rome, may be had by the perusal of a little book, called, "What every Christian must know and do," lately published in Dublin at the price of one halfpenny, compiled by the Rev. J. Furniss, Priest of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, and bearing the *Imprimatur* of "Paulus Cullen, Archiepiscopus Dublinensis."

The three first parts of this volume have been already published in America, with the author's full concurrence, though not at his instance. They enjoyed the benefit of being introduced to the American reader, by the Rev. A. Cleveland Coxe, in a preface which, by his permission, is here reprinted.

Trinity College, Oxford,
Feb. 16, 1857.

INTRODUCTION TO THE AMERICAN EDITION.

BY THE REV. A. CLEVELAND COXE.

THE matter of this volume presents a subject of the greatest importance to every family in America. It appeals to Roman Catholics, as well as to others, because it directs attention to facts which few of our Roman Catholic brethren, in the higher walks of life, have allowed themselves to examine. Even more than ourselves, they have the greatest reason to dread the diffusion of principles which are already beginning to cast away all restraints, and to act through the Confessional, upon the consciences of the young and the timid with deleterious effect. Let them know, then, that it is no longer the heretics who sound alarm; nor yet is it merely the Pascals and the Arnaulds of their own communion; it is no longer those only of the Gallican School, disciples of Fleury and Bossuet; but now, at last, even the most extravagant supporters of the Papacy—such men as the Comte de Montalembert and M. de Broglie, who have always fought against the Gallicans, and who continue the contest, are forced to exclaim against the lengths to which their Ultramontane friends, among the clergy, are pushing their crusade against society, and common sense, and the cause of freedom. According to M. de Broglie, the heads of the Church in France are boldly taking the stand, that "the Church is the declared enemy of human reason, of modern society, of all re-

ligious liberty, and of all political liberty." Signs of a similar open warfare are not wanting among us. This work of Mr. Meyrick shows conclusively the received maxims on which it is proposed to operate throughout the world.

To those who are not Roman Catholics, but who have heretofore thought lightly of the dangers to which we are exposed, by the influences which affect society from the multiplication of Roman Catholic schools and colleges, this work will offer many serious reflections. It will show them to what principles their children are likely to be bred in Roman Catholic schools. It will show them how much confidence they can place in their pledges to refrain from attempts on the faith of pupils; and it ought to convince them that even if such a pledge be kept, as to the letter, there are ways of evading its spirit, and of warping the affections and debasing the conscientious scruples of tender minds. Alas! in how many families of our land are the declining years of parents embittered by the wretched consequences of early indiscretion in this respect. The living corpses of their once loving and innocent children stalk through their houses and haunt their very dreams. They have become aliens to every religious sentiment of their parental home—they are foes to its piety, its peace, its love. They make war on its holiest sympathies—they invade domestic festivity, and even the chamber of death, with their sullen disaffection. Their hearts are eaten out by their superstitions—they are slaves to their priests. Fathers and mothers look in vain for the sweet solaces of declining years, and lament with their latest breath the sad results of tampering in the outset of life with dangers which flatter in the beginning, to bite in the end like a serpent and sting like an adder.

This volume shows furthermore, that what was called *Jesuitism* by Pascal, and what he loathed and lashed more unsparingly than any Protestant of his times, is no longer confined to a school of Romish doctors, but has become the authorized teaching of the Roman Church. No Romish priest is allowed to

denounce any maxim or doctrine of Liguori as immoral; and although it may be charitably believed that some of the Romish clergy in America and in other countries, where external influences operate to make them cautious, are afraid to adopt his principles unmodified, yet in order to secure their diffusion, a society of professed Liguorians exists among us, by means of whom the morals that have poisoned Society in South America, are infused into the hearts of our immigrant population. This society, it is believed, is to be found in most of our cities. They name churches after their patron, "St. Alphonsus," (Liguori,) and parade his images before the public eye. Their seminaries flank our very dwellings; their confessional-boxes are set up to neutralize our courts of Justice; and within a short time, the writer of these paragraphs has heard from a Romish priest of this society, the bold avowal of his own readiness to take a false oath in open court on Liguori's principles, and the assertion of a culprit's right to swear himself innocent of the crime of murder, when interrogated by a judge, provided he uses a whisper, or speaks (aside) to the contrary. This fact can be established by competent testimony, if it should be denied; and while such instructions are given to the class of our citizens who are least acquainted with our laws, it may well be asked to what purpose do juries sit, or why are indictments found?

The writer of this introduction has compared many of Mr. Meyrick's quotations with the original Latin of Liguori; and he is obliged to say, that while no injustice is done to the "Saint," his more serious sins against social decency remain to be exposed. Mr. Meyrick is a clergyman in the University of Oxford; and he has felt the difficulty of communicating to an English ear all the defilements of the author whom he has been obliged to handle. It is to be regretted, that mysterious Latin so often breaks the line of argument to an ordinary reader; but a dead language has occasionally been found the only vehicle to which the idea could safely

be confided. That the Romanists have felt the exposure to the quick, is sufficiently evident in the rejoinders of the Rambler and the Dublin Review. If anything were wanting to the complete exposure of the fatal effects of Liguorianism, upon character, where it is allowed to have its way, this is afforded in the melancholy exhibition of his present moral creed, supplied by the late Archdeacon of Chichester. He once knew nothing but the laws of his SAVIOUR, and of the Apostles. To any question as to the *quantum* of a sin, he would have answered—

"——— high Heaven disdains the lore
Of nicely calculated less, or more."

Of lying, he would have said with St. Paul—"Speak every man truth with his neighbour:" of theft—"Let no man defraud his brother in any matter." But he has forgotten his good old English Bible, and the Catechism his mother taught him; and now, with stammering tongue, and with white lips, he finds himself defending a system which erects a tariff of justifiable theft, and which stimulates an evil conscience, by teaching that oaths and words which cheat the ear are not lies and perjuries, if accompanied by whisperings and reservations.

It is to be regretted, that so much professional technicality pervades the correspondence of Messrs. Meyrick and Manning, that the unlearned reader may sometimes fail to see the bearings of the controversy. This is observable in the instance of Mr. Manning's attempt to convict Jeremy Taylor of principles identical with those of Liguori. No one who has ever compared the two authors, would require to be assured that they are as unlike as St. Peter and Judas Iscariot. Taylor may sometimes err, but Liguori habitually balances conscience with pieces of silver. The charge is based on a mere fragment of Bishop Taylor's work, in which he professedly notices exceptional cases, and provides for the stratagems of war, and such conventionalisms as the *not guilty* of a criminal, or the *humble servant* of a letter. Bishop Taylor gives all deception the broad Eng-

lish name of *Lying*, but justifies, in certain cases, such innocent equivocations as are used with sick children, with maniacs, with persons incapable of judgment, and with others subject to the authority of superiors, and to their charitable and prudential discipline. Thus, a husband who should save a frantic wife from suicide, in some great casualty, like fire or shipwreck, by assuring her of the safety of her children, when in fact they had perished, would *tell a lie*, according to Taylor, and yet be justifiable. Such is his opinion, but the Anglican Church has never endorsed it. On the other hand, Liguori lays it down that a lie must not be uttered to save one's own life. Oh, no, not by any means—a lie is always sinful! But then he allows a man to tell truth in a whisper, while he speaks aloud what he means shall be heard! On very slight grounds one may deceive his neighbour, provided he whispers the word *Not;* while he seems to *affirm*, what, in fact, he denies. Taylor, then, excuses the lie which is devoid of *moral* turpitude, in certain great emergencies; but Liguori exacts *material* truth, in order to pander to *moral* villany, in the constant and essential intercourse of daily life. Again, in the case of a man, belonging to a petty co-partnership, who obtains credit as one of the firm of "Smith and Jones," giving the creditor to suppose that he represents eminent bankers of the same names: according to Taylor, his *material* truth is *morally* the worst kind of a lie; but according to Liguori, it is justifiable, and the creditor has no cause to complain, because the words are true. In a word, Taylor's strict definition of a lie obliges him to admit that a lie is not always morally base; while Liguori's ingenious laxity, makes it quite unnecessary that a man should ever depart from *material* truth. If he can say *Not*, under cover of a cough, he may swear to what he pleases! Be it remembered, Bishop Taylor speaks for himself alone; but this beautiful principle of Liguori is certified by Pope and Cardinals to contain "nothing against good morals," and is made the standard of the Romish Confessional throughout the world.

The attempt of such a man as Mr. Manning to degrade Bishop Taylor to a level with Liguori, presents to the mind of the writer the most melancholy evidence, that the *Liguorian code*, in its *very idea*, is productive of results almost as fatal to character as would be the practice of its gross details. When any one has been led to think of morals, not as a system of spiritual development, and growth in grace, calling poor human nature up to the perfect standard of GOD'S requirements, but rather as a system of concession to human corruption, and of sympathy with the evil that is in the heart of man—his character is already degraded; his conscience has ceased to be magnetic with holy fear, or true to the unchanging light of GOD'S holy law, In a genuine system of morals, those exceptions to abstract rules, which spring from extreme cases, from conventionalisms, and from what may be called the *surprises* of conscience, receive a passing notice, but are scarcely observed in the grand development of a good author's enthusiasm for "whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, wherein there is virtue, and wherein there is praise." Beautiful summary of the true subject matter of the ethical philosopher! But in a code like Liguori's, all this is reversed. The exceptions become the laws, and the genius of the "moralist" exhausts itself in lowering the standard of rectitude to human vices and passions, and in constructing evasions of conscience, which may comport with apparent policy. The great drift of Liguori's system is an apology for vice. He neutralizes GOD'S law by sophistical distinctions precisely like those rebuked by our SAVIOUR in the Sermon on the Mount, and in the matter of the Corban. (St. Mark, vii. 11.) Thus evil becomes his good: and his disciples, in the name of morals, are initiated into practical lying, perjury, and fraud.

The most natural inquiry which suggests itself to a good man, in reading the pages of Liguori, is to this effect: *What can be*

the motive for teaching such enormity, in the name of religion? The "Mystery of Iniquity" is indeed incomprehensible; yet what we observe in strictly Romish countries, (in Spain and South America for example,) appears to me to furnish the explanation, as it certainly demonstrates the fact that the religion of the people is the source of their social diseases. Papal Rome, like Rome Imperial, has but one instinct, and that is—Empire. Its undying part is the iron will, by which all humanity must be crushed into subjection. This is a conception which cannot be realized righteously: and by degrees, in working itself out, it has committed itself to the unscrupulous policy of making a league with the evil that is in man. It economizes human vices, and makes a religion out of his sins. Thus, in the Sacrament of Penance, *sins* are made in part the *matter of the Sacrament*, as water is the matter of Baptism; while the confessor becomes to the sinner, as it were, GOD. He shares with Omniscience the darkest secrets of the soul, and becomes invested with some of the supernatural dignity of the Maker. The priest is master of the devotee, and the Pope is master of the priest. The secret sins of individuals, become the chains of nations. and Rome realizes her darling power over the bodies and souls of millions, wherever she can make them act on the principle that vice is no bar to salvation, if only this subjection is complete; and that angelic purity is no safeguard against damnation, in any one that dares to think, or to ask a reason, as to anything the Pope ordains.

It is observable, as one result, that few Roman Catholics have any idea of salvation, as *primarily* a rescue from sin. The one idea is a rescue from eternal fire. The priest is bound to absolve the man who professes mere *attrition*, and not the *contrite* only. JESUS is no longer wanted to save His people from their sins, so long as Mary is at hand to snatch them from hell torment. How deeply this principle eats into the soul, and renders it incapable of spiritual religion, is almost incredible to those who take no pains to study characters. On such matters

few have been better informed than Coleridge, whose keen observation and fixed habits of reflection led him to express himself on this subject as follows: "When I contemplate the whole system as it affects the great *fundamental principles of morality*, the *terra firma* of our humanity; when I trace its operation on the sources and condition of national strength and well-being; and lastly, when I consider its woful influences on the innocence and sanctity of the female mind and imagination, and on the faith and happiness, the gentle fragrance, and ever-present verdure of domestic life—I can, with difficulty, avoid applying to it what the Rabbins said of Cain, that the firm earth trembled wherever he strode, and the grass turned black beneath his feet."

Let St. Alphonsus, then, become the moral teacher of our country, and the same fatal blight must pass over our young life, which has made the republics of South America prematurely old. And let it be remembered that Liguori is by no means the worst of the Roman casuists, but is valued chiefly for his moderation. He is, in fact, a sort of compiler, and while he allows the safety of adopting the worse suggestions of others, he affects for himself a higher character. Accordingly, he is eulogized by his French editor, as presenting the *juste milieu* between the rigorous and the lax, which his Church has stamped as the grand desideratum. Cardinal Wiseman eulogizes his "mild theology" in the same spirit, and volunteers the admission that every confessional in England receives the illumination of his putrescent principles. Can it be doubted that the same is the case in America? Does any one wonder at the increase among us of assassinations, of tumults, and of outrages which cannot be accounted for, or punished?

The Abbé Laborde, in his unanswerable work upon the *Immaculate Conception*, has demonstrated the doctrinal corruptions to which the Pope has committed his followers. It destroys the claim of Papal Infallibility, as conclusively as if it were done in the formulas of Euclid. But it seems impossible to rouse

the ordinary mind to the enormity of a doctrinal fraud in matters concerning the truth of GOD, and thousands excuse themselves from sensitiveness in such matters, under the idea that the learned only are competent to decide such questions. But no such plea can excuse a man for indifference to a question of morals. There is no one not hopelessly depraved, but has a monitor within, which enables him to distinguish between theft and honesty, between candour and falsehood; and I pity the moral cowardice of that man who is content to profess a religion which he dares not carefully examine, when the civilized world is roused by it to a state of profound alarm, in view of its professed principles as to oaths and trusts, as to the morals of priests, and the maxims on which they are to mould the characters of females, and keep the consciences of wives and mothers.

In conclusion, the writer cannot but give expression to the thought which is ever present in his heart, when he compares the social state of England and North America with that of Spain and South America; or whenever he contrasts Taylor and Sanderson with Liguori and Sanchez. GOD be praised for the brave and holy men who reformed the Church of England! The world has not yet acknowledged its debt to those apostolic martyrs, to whom we owe it under GOD, that the language we speak is not degraded by habitual employment in conscientious fraud, and that a gentleman, in our tongue, means above all things the man who scorns to lie. How sublime the wisdom which, while removing the confessional because of its intolerable degradation, led them to provide for the public reading of the Decalogue every LORD'S day in all the congregations of the Anglican Church! How full of blessing their provision, that each commandment should be followed by penitential prayer! But above all, how precious their ordinance for the reading of the Holy Scripture in the vulgar tongue, by which the heavenly teaching of our Great Example becomes the rule of living to every believer. They have set before us as our pattern "the

Lamb without blemish, who did no sin, and in whose mouth *there was found no guile.*" Long may His Sermon on the Mount be our standard in casuistry, and long may the aspirations of the Psalm *Beati Immaculati* (cxix) be the genuine emotion of our heart, when we say in our public worship, "therefore hold I straight all Thy commandments, and all false ways I utterly abhor."

A. C. C.

BALTIMORE, *April* 24, 1856.

MORAL THEOLOGY

OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.

No. I.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S THEORY OF TRUTHFULNESS.

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1855.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S THEORY OF TRUTHFULNESS.[1]

No fairer exponent of Roman teaching can be had than S. Alfonso Maria de' Liguori, as the following facts will show. In 1787 he died. In 1803 the sacred Congregation of Rites decreed, 'that in all the writings of Alfonso de' Liguori, edited 'and inedited, there was not a word that could be justly found 'fault with.' Pius VII. ratified the decree, and proceeded, in less than thirty years after Liguori's death, to his beatification. Monsignor Artico, Bishop of Asti, and Prince Prelate of the Papal Household, published a letter declaring 'that the ex- 'amination of Liguori's work had been conducted with par- 'ticular severity, that his system of Morality had been more 'than twenty times discussed by the Sacred Congregation, and 'that all had agreed *voce concordi, unanimi consensu, unâ voce, 'unâ mente.*' In 1831 Cardinal de Rohan-Chabot, Archbishop of Besançon, propounded the following questions for the oracular response (*oraculum requirit*) of the Sacred Penitentiary:— '1. Whether a Professor of sacred theology may with safety 'follow and profess the opinions which the Blessed Alfonso de' 'Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? 2. Whether a Con- 'fessor should be disturbed for following all the opinions of the 'Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori in the confessional, simply on the 'grounds that the Holy Apostolic See had declared that it 'found nothing in his works worthy of censure?' The answer given to the first question was in the affirmative. Liguori's opinions might be followed and professed with safety. The answer to the second was in the negative. No such Confessor was to be disturbed in his course. This decision was formally signed and dated as issuing from the Sacred Penitentiary on the 5th of July, 1831. Immediately the Cardinal Archbishop

[1] 1. *Theologia Moralis S. Alphonsi de Ligorio, &c.* Parisiis, 1845.
2. *Homo Apostolicus, Auctore D. Alphonso de Ligorio.* Moguntiæ, 1842.
3. *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis S. Alphonsi de Ligorio, Auctore D. Neyraguet.* Liburni, 1851.
4. *A Treatise of Equivocation.* London, 1851.
5. *Cases of Conscience.* London, 1853.

wrote to his Clergy requiring 'that the judgment of Rome 'should be fully adhered to, and that the opinions of the Blessed 'Alfonso de' Liguori should be followed and reduced to prac-'tice, all doubt whatever being thrown aside.' Pope Gregory XVI. confirmed the decree in a few weeks, and in 1839 Alfonso exchanged his title of *Blessed* for that of *Saint*. His life, full of adulation, has lately been published in England with Cardinal Wiseman's approbation; and it was but last year that his *Glories of Mary* were 'cordially recommended to the faithful' by 'Nicholas Card. Wiseman, Archbishop of Westmin-'ster. Given at Westminster on the Feast of Saint Alphonsus 'de' Liguori, 1852.'

Thus we have a Roman Bishop, who has been beatified and canonized, whose works, together with all the opinions in them, have been commended by Cardinals, approved by the Sacred Congregation, and ratified by Popes. Nor has this taken place long ago. Liguori is Rome's last saint, and his teaching is, on Rome's own showing, the latest authoritative exponent of her moral system, put into the hands of her confessors and directors with her special approbation and sanction.

No more need be said to prove that if Liguori's teaching is lax, if it falls short of a high standard, if it is subversive of the plain principles of morality, Rome's teaching is so too. Our present purpose is not to exhibit the most revolting features of his books: the laws of decency would forbid that. Abstaining from all quotations which would have to be veiled under a dead language, we shall confine ourselves almost wholly to the examination of a single question, What is Rome's theory of Truthfulness and of Lying? This lies at the very foundation of morals. Our first extract will contain her doctrine of Amphibology.

'We must distinguish between Amphibology or Equivocation, and Mental Restriction. Amphibology can be in three fashions: 1. When a word has two senses, as the word *volo* means both *to wish* and *to fly*. 2. When a sentence bears two main meanings, as, *This book is Peter's*, may mean that the book belongs to Peter, or, that Peter is the author of it. 3. When words have two senses, one more common than the other, or one literal, the other metaphorical. . . . Thus, if a man is asked about something which it is to his interest to conceal, he can answer, *No, I say;* that is, *I say the word, no.* Cardenas doubts about this, but saving his better counsel, he seems to do so without reason, for the word *I say* really has two senses; it means *to utter* [make use of a word] and *to assert*. We here employ it in the sense of *utter*.'—4. 151.

Simple examples of these three forms of equivocation would be the following:—1. 'While we were making these arrangements *the heir* was present,' meaning *the air* was present. 2. The old, 'Aio te Æacida Romanos vincere posse,' or, 'Mr. H. is a man about town,' meaning, that he is frequently in London. 3. 'Is the grass green?' If you reply 'It is not,' you have told

a lie; if you answer 'No, I say,' you have used an equivocation, because you mean not to deny the fact, but to state that you are employing the word *No*.

'Well then,' continues S. Alfonso, 'it is certain, and held by all doctors alike, that for a good reason it is allowable to use equivocation in these ways which have been explained, and to confirm it with an oath. So say Lessius, Cardenas, and the Salamanca Doctors. The reason is, that thus we do not deceive our neighbour, but, on good reason, allow him to deceive himself; and again, we are not bound to speak according to the understanding of others if there is good reason; and any honest object, such as keeping our goods spiritual or temporal, is a good reason.

'But now, if you have *not* a good reason, is it a mortal sin to swear amphibologically, or with non-pure mental restriction? Viva says so, as well as Toletus, Angles, Armilla, Navarrus; so does Busembaum, together, as he declares, with Layman, Sanchez, and "the common opinion." But he has no right to claim Sanchez, and to call his own opinion the "common" one, for Sanchez follows the contrary, and so do Lugo, Cajetan, the Salamanca Doctors, Soto, Valdez, Prato, Hurtado, Candido, Leandro, and Lessius; and even Busembaum thinks it "probable." This, then, is the "more probable" opinion, and the reason of it is, that in oaths of this kind there are already present truth and justice; good judgment or discrimination is all that is wanting, and the absence of that is only venial. Nor is there anything in what Viva says, that a man swearing in this way calls on God to witness to what is false, for in fact he calls upon Him to witness what is true, *according to his own meaning*, although for good reason he allows the other to be deceived by reason of his carelessness or inadvertence. This must not, however, be done in a trial, or in contracts. It is an inference from the opinion given above, that for swearing in this way, in all cases except trials or contracts, it is not necessary to have a reason of any importance in itself, but any reasonable cause is sufficient, such as to free oneself from a man's troublesome questions which he has no right to ask. Note here, however, first, that you must have a better reason for equivocating with an oath than without it; and secondly, that in proportion as the words give the more occasion for a mistake, the better the reason must be; whence they say, that when words give scarcely any reason for a mistake, like words which are simply equivocal and bear two meanings one equally well with the other, the very lightest reason is an excuse.

'Mental Restriction is of two kinds, one purely mental, which cannot be discovered in any manner by others; the other, not purely mental, which can become known from circumstances connected with it. Purely mental restriction is never allowable, nor an oath with it, as is shown by the three propositions condemned by Innocent XI. . . . On the contrary, it is allowable to use non-pure mental restriction, even with an oath, if it can be discovered by circumstances. This is proved from John vii. 8, where Christ said, "I go not up to this feast," and yet Scripture says that He afterwards went up. He understood "I go not up *openly* (as the Disciples inquired) *but secretly*." . . . This opinion is held in common by Gonet, Layman, Paludanus, Adrian, Soto, Wigandt, Cardenas, La Croix, Holzmann, Sporer, Viva, and the Salamanca Doctors; Collet also has the same opinion, with Vanroy and Boudart, saying, that even the overstrict theologians declare that non-pure mental restrictions are not unlawful, arguing from S. Augustine, who, in his *Book against Lying*, c. 10, says, "Although every one who tells a lie may wish to conceal the truth, yet not every one who wishes to conceal what is true tells a lie." Even the extremely rigid Contensonius agrees, for in explaining the passage in John about Christ's

going up to the feast, he says that Christ used somewhat obscure words, which a man of thought might easily interpret and discover the meaning. S. Thomas favours this view by saying, "that to be silent about the truth, and to express falsehood, are different things." He says, too, "It is not lawful to tell a lie for the purpose of freeing another from any kind of danger; it is lawful, however, to hide the truth prudently under some dissimulation, as S. Augustine says in his *Book against Lying*." The reason of this opinion is, that if it were not allowable to use non-pure mental restriction, there would be no way of lawfully concealing a secret which a man could not discover without loss or inconvenience, and this would be as harmful to intercourse between man and man as lying. The condemnation passed by the pontiff on mental restriction is rightly to be understood of restriction purely and strictly taken, for that alone ought to be called true mental restriction which takes place solely in the mind, and there remains concealed, and can by no means be discovered from outward circumstances.'—4. 151, 152.

We have thus stated the principles of Amphibology or Equivocation, and of Mental Restriction, in Liguori's own words. It will be seen that there are three sorts of equivocation, all of which are allowable, even with the addition of a solemn oath. Accordingly, a man may swear that *the heir* was present, meaning that *the air* was present. He may swear that another person is *a man about town*, meaning that he frequently goes to London. To the question, Is the grass green? he may answer with an oath, '*I say, no*,' meaning, not to deny the fact, but to affirm that he was using the word *No*. Mental restriction, since the days of Innocent XI., is of two sorts, pure, and non-pure. Pure mental restriction is that which, in the nature of things (*ullo modo*) is undiscoverable; non-pure mental restriction is that which, in the nature of things, is discoverable, but which, nevertheless, the person with whom we are dealing does not discover. An example of the first would be the secret insertion of a negative into an affirmative oath, *without any external sign:* an example of the second would be the secret insertion of a negative *in a whisper not observed by the other party*. Thus, 'I swear that I will do it,' with the *mental* insertion of 'not,' meaning 'I swear that I will not do it,' would be pure mental restriction; and, as such, has been condemned by Pope Innocent, and is disallowed by Liguori. But, 'I swear that I will do it,' with the insertion of 'not' *under the cover of a cough*, or with the addition of a 'perhaps' *in an unobserved whisper*, would be non-pure mental restriction, and such an oath might, according to Rome's moral teaching, be taken by a man who had no intention of fulfilling what the other party considered that he had bound himself to perform. We will presently proceed to point out the very grave effects which, on Liguori's own showing, the admission of these and like principles have on all security and good faith in dealings between man and man; on the security of oaths, of vows, of promises, of

evidence; on truthfulness in general. But first we must make a few remarks suggested by the passage which has been quoted.

Three technical expressions are used, the special meaning of which it may be well to recal to our readers' minds. These are 'mortal sin,' 'probable and more probable opinions,' 'common opinion.'

For an act to be sin at all, it must fulfil three conditions. It must be voluntary, it must be free, and its wickedness must be recognised. Those acts which fulfil these conditions are then arbitrarily divided, according to Roman teaching, into mortal and venial sins. For a sin to be mortal, it is required that the consent of the will should be perfect, that the recognition of the intellect should be full and deliberate, and that the *materia*, or thing about which the sin is, should be of a certain 'gravity.' A mortal sin puts a man out of the grace of God, a venial sin does not, but only diminishes the man's own fervour, and is so light a thing that it need never be confessed. What sins are mortal, and what venial, is left to the decision of the casuists. We will not here pause to point out the irreconcilable differences between doctors of greater and less rigidity on so vital a point as this. We may say, however, in passing, in order to show how totally impossible it is that the arbitrary division into mortal and venial can be really maintained, that after pages of patient calculation Liguori is reduced to the conclusion that a theft of 4*s*. by the same individual, and in identically the same state of mind, from a merchant of great opulence, and from a very rich nobleman, is a mortal sin in the first case, and a venial sin in the last; that is, that the first, 'on account of its own grave importance, de-'stroys favour and friendship with God, and deserves eternal 'punishment;' that the other, 'on account of its insignificant 'importance does not take away favour and friendship, though 'it diminishes our fervour of charity, and deserves temporal 'punishment;' that the one 'takes away the principle of spiritual life,' the other is not worth confessing. Again, we find that the sin committed by a nobleman's son in stealing 10*l*. from his father, is a venial sin, but that once to omit attending mass on Sunday is mortal.

Pascal will explain to us the doctrine of Probable Opinions in his own inimitable manner:—

'"The generality of our authors," said the monk, "and, among others our four-and-twenty elders, thus explain it: 'An opinion is called probable when it is founded upon reasons of some consideration. Hence it may sometimes happen that a single very grave Doctor may render an opinion probable.'. . . Hear Sanchez, one of the most famous of our Fathers: 'You may doubt, perhaps, whether the authority of a single good and learned Doctor renders an opinion probable. I answer that it does; and this is confirmed by Angelus, Sylvester, Navarre, Emanuel Sa, &c.'. . . You don't

understand it! No doubt Doctors are often of different sentiments, but what signifies that? Each renders his own opinion probable and safe. We all know well enough that they are far from being of the same mind; what is more, they scarcely ever agree. There are very few questions indeed in which you do not find the one saying Yes, and the other saying No. Still, in all these cases, each of the contrary opinions is probable. And hence Diana says: 'Ponce and Sanchez hold opposite views of it; but as they are both learned men, each renders his own opinion probable.'"

'"But father," I remarked, "a person must be sadly embarrassed in choosing between them!" "Not at all," he rejoined; "he has only to follow the opinion which suits him best." "What if the other is more probable?" "It does not signify." "And if the other is safer?" "It does not signify," repeated the monk; "this is made quite plain by Emanual Sa of our Society, in his Aphorisms: 'A person may do what he considers allowable according to a probable opinion, though the contrary may be the safer one. The opinion of a single grave doctor is all that is requisite.'" "And if an opinion be at once the less probable and the less safe, is it allowable to follow it," I asked, "even in the way of rejecting one which we believe to be more probable and more safe?" "Once more I say, Yes," replied the monk. "Hear what Filiuccius, that great Jesuit of Rome, says: 'It is allowable to follow the less probable opinion, even though it be the less safe one. That is the common judgment of modern authors.' Is not that quite clear?"

'"Well, reverend father," said I, "you have given us sinners room enough, at all events! Thanks to your probable opinions, we have liberty of conscience with a vengeance! But are your casuists allowed the same latitude in giving your responses?" "O yes," said he, "we answer just as we please; or rather, I should say, just as it may please those who ask our advice. Here are our rules." . . . "Well, seriously, father," I said, "your doctrine is an uncommonly agreeable one! Only think of being allowed to answer Yes or No, just as you please! It is impossible to prize such a privilege too highly. I see now the advantage of the conflicting opinions of your doctors. One of them is always ready to serve your purpose, and the other never gives you any annoyance. If you do not find your account on the one side, you fall back on the other, and always land in perfect safety." "That is quite true," he replied, "and accordingly, we may always say with Diana, on finding that Father Bauny was on his side, while Father Lugo was against him: *Sæpe premente Deo fert Deus alter opem.*"'—Letter V.

In like manner Garnet, in the 'Treatise of Equivocation,' lays it down as certain 'that when both opinions are probable, 'a man may without sinne folow either, if it may be done with-'out prejudice of our neighbour,' and 'that it is within the 'compasse of probability, if it have two or three grave autours.'

A 'common opinion' is supposed to be that on which all or most doctors agree. We say *supposed*, because, except on points, where neither obtuseness nor over-subtlety of intellect could fail of coming to the right conclusion, they never do agree; nor is even a respectable majority found on one side or the other. In other words, when their agreement might be of use, it never exists; so irreconcilable are the differences between the strict and the lax schools. No one can read a dozen pages of Liguori without finding that, whatever may be said of Rome's dogmatic

precepts, his dream of anything like certainty in her moral teaching has passed away for ever. This doctor is opposed to that doctor, while the third and fourth agree with neither of them, nor with themselves, and the inquirer of the oracle finds, to his dismay, that he is left with a mass of opinions of all shades of difference, out of which he may take his choice, or his director may choose for him.

We cannot pass over the inferences drawn from the quotations made in the passage which we have extracted without some criticism. These quotations are made from our Lord's words, as related in the Gospels, from S. Augustine, and from Thomas Aquinas. From the first two an inference is drawn that non-pure mental restriction is allowable, and the third is given as favourable to the same view. Let us see if such an inference can fairly be drawn from the words.

'I go not up to this feast,' said our Lord, understanding, adds Liguori, by non-pure mental restriction, 'openly, but I do go up secretly.' An appeal to the words of Him who was and is the Truth, for the purpose of showing that He used towards His brethren a form of expression the effect of which would inevitably be to deceive them, is grating to our moral feelings. If any other hypothesis would satisfy the account in the Gospel narrative, we cannot doubt that it would be the part of reverence to accept it in place of this explanation. Not only, however, are there more natural explanations of the words, but they will not even bear this explanation. Let us turn to the original, and what do we find? Ὑμεῖς ἀνάβητε εἰς τὴν ἑορτήν· ἐγὼ οὔπω ἀναβαίνω εἰς τὴν ἑορτὴν ταύτην ὅτι ὁ καιρὸς ὁ ἐμὸς οὔπω πεπλήρωται. 'Go *ye* up to the feast. *I* am not *yet* going up to this feast, because *my* time is not *yet* fully come.' Accordingly, when it *was* fully come, He went up, and τῆς ἑορτῆς μεσούσης, when the feast was about half over, began to teach. But it may be said that the reading οὔπω ἀναβαίνω is not found in all the MSS. True, in the Codex Vaticanus, the Codex Bezæ, and the Codex Cyprius, the reading is οὐκ ἀναβαίνω. But the authority of these three Codices, important as the first two are, cannot be equal, or nearly equal to that of all the rest; and further, if the reading were οὐκ instead of οὔπω the sense would remain identically the same. To get any other meaning out of the words, the tense of ἀναβαίνω must be changed (for as it stands it cannot avow any intention or purpose of not going up, but merely a present act), and the second οὔπω must also be got rid of—for which there is not the shadow of an excuse in a single MS. '*My* time' says our Lord (ὁ ἐμὸς is used as distinguishing it from that of His brethren who were urging Him to go and manifest Himself at once), 'is not yet fully come;

therefore I am not yet going up [οὔπω], or, I am not at present going up [οὐκ] to this feast.' The οὐκ ἀναβαίνω of the three MSS. combined with the οὔπω πεπλήρωται, equally with the general reading οὔπω, overthrows the unworthy hypothesis that our Blessed Lord was using non-pure mental restriction.[1] S. Augustine, in a sermon on the passage, rejects by anticipation the Liguorian interpretation with indignation and horror. He would sooner believe that Christ was deceived Himself than that He was deceiving others; '*falli enim pertinet ad infirmitatem, mentiri ad iniquitatem.*' But the plain words of Scripture, he continues, show that He was neither deceived nor deceiving. And this he says with the reading '*non* ascendo' before him, and unconscious that the true reading was probably '*nondum*,' which would of course have strengthened his argument.[2] Even if it had been necessary to understand 'not openly but secretly,' what need could there have been of supposing that our Lord was *taking in* His brethren? Even in that case, it would have been more natural to conceive that they understood His meaning, and thus, again, there would be no case of non-pure mental re-

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[1] This case is thus put in the 'Treatise of Equivocation:'—'The words are to be expounded thus: "I will not go upp yet," or, "to this feast," or, "I will not go with you," or, "manifestly as the Messiah, but in secrett;" which is an evident defence of our cause, for the use of such propositions which have somewhat reserved or understoode in the mynde for theire verification . . .

'First we must examine whether in the speech of our Saviour, "Ego autem non ascendo ad diem festum hunc," the word *ascendo* have the force of the present tense or the future; for albeit in some texts it be *ascendam*, yet the best Vulgate edition and all the Greeke have the present tense. Yet, notwithstanding, I say that it hath the force of a future; as if our Saviour had sayed, "Non ascendam," I will not go upp . . . This is a thinge well knowen to the grammarians, who have a certaine figure which they call Enallage, one kynd whereof is Enallage temporum, when one tense is putt for another, whereof we may read in Lynacre and Emanuell's grammar, and such as have written on figures at large . . .

'Secondly, we must determine whether our Saviour sayd, "Non ascendo," or "nondum ascendo;" for if he sayed, "I go not upp yet to this feast, there is then not so great strength in this argument by the force of the words themselves as would otherwise be. Although it be very probable that our Saviour spoke in sort that his brethren understoode that he would not go at all at that feast, insomuch that we may very well take those words, "Nondum ascendo ad diem festum hunc," that he would not go at all at this tyme. And so the argument may still be of force, for he sayed he would not go, and yet afterward he went . . . So that we probably defend that our Saviour used such words (although he sayed nondum) as made them understand that he would not come to that feast, and yet went after, which, if it be so, it skylleth not whether we read *non* or *nondum*. But letting this passe, I saye that albeit in all the Greeke copyes now extant it be, οὔπω *nondum*, and so did S. Chrysostome and Eutimius reade, yet did S. Cirill, a Greeke authour, read enegatively *non*. Also all the Latyn ffathers reade *non*, and therfore the very Heretickes themselves oughte to admitte this readinge, at the least so far forth as to seeke out some sufficient and trewe exposition therof; and all Catholickes are bounde to admitte *non*, because so it is in the Vulgate edition. Then doth it remaine that our Saviour Christe, sayinge that he would not go and going after, did reserve some secret words to make a perfect explycation of his trew meaninge.'—Pp. 37–41.

[2] S. Aug. Serm. 133, vol. v. p. 739.

striction. At any rate, if it had been mental restriction at all, it would not have been *non-pure* but *pure* mental restriction; for the difference between the two we have seen to consist in this, that the last takes place solely in the mind, and can by no means be discovered from outward circumstances; which would have been the case in the present instance: while the first can become known from the circumstances connected with it; which would *not* have been the case in the present instance. Either, then, our Lord's words have nothing to do with mental restriction, which we have shown to be undoubtedly the case, or if they have, they go to justify not *non-pure*, but *pure* mental restriction, which, however, Liguori declares to be never allowable, and Pope Innocent XI. has condemned.

The other quotations may be, for the present, at least, more summarily dismissed. S. Augustine writes, 'Although every one who tells a lie may wish to conceal what is true, yet not every one who wishes to conceal what is true tells a lie.' Most assuredly; for they either speak the truth against their wishes, or they are silent; they do *not* employ non-pure mental restriction, whereby they would tell a lie and pass off a juggle on themselves to boot, vainly persuading themselves that in some way or other the self-juggle made amends for the lie. When such a sentence as the above is brought forward for the purpose of inferring from S. Augustine's authority that non-pure mental reservation is justifiable, we cannot be surprised that the following statement of Thomas Aquinas is tortured into being 'favourable' to the same conclusion:—'To be silent about the truth, and to express falsehood, are different things.' The doctrine of non-pure mental restriction may be fathered on Augustine and Aquinas in virtue of these quotations with as much truth as they might be attributed to any other writer who has happened to make use of the words truth and falsehood in the same sentence. But our author is not remarkable for the pertinency or accuracy of his quotations. In his 'Glories of Mary' he has made innumerable extracts from early writers, 'not only,' as he says, 'for use, but also that they may show the high idea that the 'saints had of the power and mercy of Mary, and the great con-'fidence they had in her patronage.' A critic[1] is obliged to warn his simpler co-religionists that they must not use the book in controversy, for, 'to name but one, and that not the chief cause of 'this unfitness, it is only necessary to mention that S. Alphonsus 'did not scruple to make most important additions to the passages 'which he quoted from the Fathers; and this, though perfectly 'allowable in a book of meditations' (*Populus vult decipi et decipiatur*), 'of course destroys its value as a work of authority in

[1] The Rambler.

'matters of controversy'—because, we presume, a moderately informed opponent might be inconvenient.

What lies at the foundation of the theory of Amphibology is clearly a confusion between moral and material falsehood. The enunciation of a material truth is an assertion concerning a fact, which assertion is objectively true. For example, if I affirm that the sun stands still, I affirm a material truth; if I assert that it moves, I affirm a material falsehood. These affirmations have, of themselves, and as such, no moral character. If I had no intention to deceive in stating that the sun moved, as in common conversation I frequently do—much more if it was my conviction that it did move, as would have been the case before the discoveries of philosophers—I should not have been guilty of any moral obliquity, or be justly charged with moral falsehood. Moral truthfulness, on the other hand, consists in speaking out the honest convictions of the heart. I am guilty of moral falsehood when I say anything with intent to deceive my neighbour. Thus if I assert either that the sun moves or that the sun stands still, with some ulterior object of my own, and with a purpose of deceiving the person to whom I am speaking, I am equally culpable in a moral point of view. It appears, then, that the material truth or falsehood of the thing asserted has no effect whatever upon the moral truthfulness or want of truthfulness of the person who makes the assertion. The moral character of the act, as of all other acts, depends upon the deliberate purpose of the agent. Wherever there is an attempt to deceive, whether by a material truth or by a material falsehood, there is moral falsehood.

But the theory of Amphibology confounds this vital distinction. Its essence consists in being a moral falsehood conveyed by means of a material truth. Romish theologians would try to persuade us that the latter compensates for the former, whereas we have seen that it does not annihilate or remove one grain of its native deformity. That this is what lies at the bottom of systematized equivocation or amphibology will appear at once from the following instances, which we choose at random from Liguori. In his *Homo Apostolicus* he puts the case of a man who has spoken ill of his neighbour, which ill is true, but yet which the speaker ought not to have divulged. What is he to do? 'I am accustomed,' says Liguori, 'to recommend people 'to equivocate, and say, "*I said it out of my own head*," for *all* 'words do come out of the mind, for which the head is taken.'[1] It is a *material truth* that all words do come out of the mouth, or mind, or head, and therefore Liguori thought that the *moral*

[1] Hom. Ap. Tr. xi. 18.

untruth which he puts into the speaker's mouth was annulled. It is difficult for anything to be more grotesque than this, and yet perhaps the other suggestion given in the same case goes beyond it. It is this: S. John (in a place not specified) says that all sin is deceitfulness and a lie: the speaker has done wrong in saying what he has said: therefore he has committed a sin: therefore he has told a lie: therefore he should say, *I made a mistake—I have told a lie.* Thus he is taught to say that the truth which he had spoken was a lie, thereby, of course, telling a lie, while at the same time he lays the flattering unction to his soul that he has been guiltless of any kind of falsehood. Again, the nature of the principle of equivocation is illustrated by the case of a servant saying *Not at home.* Cardenas says that he must put his foot upon a stone, and say that his master is not *here, i.e.* on the stone. Liguori, however, prefers his saying 'He is not *here*,' meaning at the door, or in the window, or in sight.[1] Everybody knows that conventional sayings, such as that under discussion, bear conventional meanings, and are known to bear conventional meanings, and therefore involve no deceit and no moral falsehood. Liguori thinks that because the phrase *Not at home* is materially false, the person who uses it is guilty of a moral falsehood. To escape this evil he suggests an equivocation, which makes the expression materially true, but implies an attempt at deceiving, and involves moral falsehood. So pitiably confused is this model-instructor of confessors and directors on this vital point.

The principle of non-pure mental restriction is the same. In illustration of this we will give an instance, not indeed found in Liguori, but accepted by Roman controversialists as a faithful exponent of their views, and justified as such. As S. Francis of Assisi was one day walking, he was passed by a person whom he recognised. Hardly was this person out of sight, when there came by others in search of him, and asked S. Francis if he had passed by. The saint did not wish to say Yes. His conscience forbade him to say No. What was he to do? He threw his arms into the air, brought his hands together, and in so doing pointed with his finger down his sleeve. Then he answered with a safe conscience, 'He has not passed *this* way.' It was quite true: he had not passed down the saint's sleeve. But was S. Francis therefore guiltless of a moral falsehood because he had contrived to convey that moral falsehood by means of a material truth? Yes, say Rome's casuists, because he used *non-pure* mental reservation. Had he not pointed down his sleeve, it would have been a case of *pure* mental

[1] Theol. Moral. 4. 165.

reservation: but the adroit movement of the finger altogether withdrew the act from this class of sins, and placed it among justifiable and right acts. St. Francis' soul would, according to their system, have become spiritually dead, had it not been for the finger: he would have been 'deprived of God's grace,' had it not been for the finger: he would have 'earned eternal punishment,' had it not been for the finger. But the finger was a talisman. It is a matter of doubt, however, whether it was his sleeve or his ear into which he pointed. 'So it is recorded 'of S. Frauncis,' says the Treatise of Equivocation, 'that beyng 'asked of one who was sought for to death, whether he came 'not that way, he aunswered, putting his hand into his sleeve, 'or, as some say, into his eare, "He came not this waye."'[1]

We believe we have now sufficiently illustrated the principles of Equivocation and Mental Restriction, and shall proceed to their application, under the guidance of S. Alfonso. We have already said that they would subvert all confidence and security in dealings between man and man, and cause utter distrust of all pledges. We will now ask a few questions, to which Liguori shall give the answers, or at least the proofs of the answers. What confidence can we put in assertions? in oaths? in vows? in evidence? Can promises be trusted? Can secrets be secure? In short, can we be justified in believing that acts and words will be in accordance with each other?

We will begin with the question relating to assertions.

'A man who has come from a place falsely thought infected, may say that he has not come from it, namely, (aside) as being pestilential, because that is the meaning of those who guard. Nay, Toletus, Lessius, and a great number of others, quoted by Sporer, allow that he may say that he has not come from it, even though he has passed through an infected place, provided that he is sure that he has contracted no pestilence, because it may be understood (aside) that he has not come in such a way as that danger is to be feared from him. But in this last statement I do not altogether acquiesce.'—4. 159.

The doctrine of probability has shown that Toletus, Lessius, or Sporer are quite sufficient authorities for a person to act with safety upon their opinion. In the Treatise of Equivocation a similar example is given, and there the assertion is represented as confirmed by oath:—

'A man cometh unto Coventry in tyme of a suspition of plague. At the gates the officers meete hym, and on his oath examine hym whether he come from London or no, where they thincke, certainly the plague to be. This

[1] Treatise of Equivocation, p. 50. A marginal reference is given to Simeon Metaphrastes apud Surium, tom. iii. Parsons refers to the same story in his Treatise tending towards Mitigation, and Jeremy Taylor in his Ductor Dubitantium.

man, knowing for certain the plague not to be in London, or, at least, knowing for certain that the air is not there infectious, and that he only ridd through some secure place of London, not staying there, may safely swear that he came not from London, answering to their final intention in their demaund, that is, whether he came so from London that he may endanger their cittye of the plague, although their immediate intention was to know whether he came from London or no. This man, the very light of nature would clear from perjury.'—P. 30.

'Three ways are assigned by doctors whereby a man may restore another's character when he has made public a crime of his which he has committed.... The third is, for the speaker to assert "that he had said what was false, that he had made a mistake, that he was deceived, or that he had lied." And though Soto, Cajetan, Bannez, and Sylvius, say that this way must not be used, thinking that these are real lies, yet "probably" Lugo, Sanchez, Wigandt, Lessius, Roncaglia, Mazzotta, with the "common" opinion, as he says, and the Salamanca doctors, with Villalobos, Trulenchius, Ledesma, Serra, Tapia, Prado, Sayrus, Navarrus, think that the aforesaid words are not lies but real amphibologies; for, as S. Thomas says, "Some sins are called in Scripture falsehoods and lies, as in the fourth Psalm, 'Why do ye love vanity and seek after a lie?' And there is the same in Jeremiah viii. 10, 'From the prophet to the priest they all perform a lie,' *i.e.* sins. In like manner, then, a man who has sinned,' [or done wrong, which the individual in question has, by divulging a truth when he ought not to have divulged it,] 'can well say 'that he has told a lie,' or 'made a mistake.'" So in the case which we have put, we may well, nay, if there is need, we are bound, to make use of such ambiguous words.'—*Theol. Mor.* 4. 992.

'We are not bound, says Cardenas, with Lessius, to answer to the meaning of the man who asks the question, if there is good reason.'—4. 165.

'If a man has received a loan, and afterwards repaid it, he may say that he has not received the loan, understanding aside, so as to have to pay it.'—4. 159.

'Whenever a man is bound to hide another man's disgrace, he may lawfully say, I do not know, namely, (aside) I have no knowledge which is of use for answering: or, I do not know it as a thing which I can declare.'—4. 163.

'If a guest is asked if his dinner is good when really it is bad, he may answer that it is good, namely, (aside) for mortification.'—4. 160.

Utinam his nugis!—We call attention to the following case, and the reasoning upon which it is founded:—

'May an unfaithful wife declare to her husband that she has not committed adultery, meaning (aside) so as to have to tell him? She may equivocally assert that she has not broken the marriage, for it still exists. And if she has sacramentally confessed her adultery, she may answer, "I am innocent of this crime;" because it has already been taken away by confession. So Cardenas, who remarks, however, that she may not make that affirmation with an oath, because the probability of a fact is sufficient for asserting a thing, but certainty is required for swearing it. But it is replied that moral certainty is enough for swearing, as we said above with the Salamanca doctors, Lessius, Suarez, Sanchez, and the common opinion. And this moral certainty of the remission of the sin can be had whenever a person has received the sacrament of penance in a

good moral disposition. But for the question in hand, the Salamanca doctors say, with Soto, that a woman cannot deny her adultery, because it would be *pure* mental restriction. Cardenas, however, admits that in danger of death it is allowable for her to use a metaphor which is common in Scripture, where adultery is taken for idolatry, as in Ezek. xxiii. 37, "That they have committed adultery . . . and with their idols have they committed adultery." Nay, if the crime is really hidden, "probably," with Busembaum, Lessius, Trulenchius, Sanchez, Soto, Sayrus, and Peter of Aragon, the woman may deny with an oath, and say, "I have not committed it," in the same way as a culprit can say to the judge who does not legitimately interrogate him, "I have not committed the crime," understanding (aside) that he has not so committed it as to be bound to declare it to him.'—4. 162.

It thus appears that four answers are allowed to the guilty wife:—1. That she has not broken the marriage. 2. I am innocent of this crime. 3. I have not committed adultery, meaning (aside) I have not been guilty of idolatry. 4. I have not done it (aside) so as to tell you. It will be seen that the first three replies are equivocations, increasing in the intensity of their folly and iniquity, and that the last, without the aside, which only makes matters worse, is a downright lie. The equivocation in the first reply is on the word *broken*. A wine-glass, when it is broken, no longer exists: but the marriage exists, therefore it cannot be broken. The second embodies a principle which we know is of but too universal application in Ireland. The equivocation lies in the word *crime*, as meaning both the act and the guilt of the act. And so, in Ireland, men lift up their heads to heaven and swear that they are as innocent as babes unborn, whilst their hand is still red with their neighbour's blood. They have been absolved—the guilt has been washed away—they are innocent *of the guilt of the murder*, in their own estimation, and therefore *of the murder* according to their equivocating logic. The third reply unites in a novel combination, ingenuity, folly, and profanity, cemented together into a compound of hypocritical mendacity. The fourth reply, putting aside the damaging understood clause, is, as we have said, a straightforward untruth: and we could more easily make allowance for a woman who under such circumstances succumbed to her temptations and told a plain lie, than for one who, equally telling the lie, attempted also to pass off a sophism upon herself by any of the first three methods, and so destroy her sense of the sin of untruthfulness, of which her previous sin had driven her to be guilty.

So much for the value to be put on assertions. Can promises be trusted? Let Liguori speak:—

'We must mark here as certain that no promise binds, although it has been accepted by the other party, if afterwards it becomes impossible, or

very harmful, or unlawful, or inexpedient, and, generally speaking, whenever any notable change of circumstances takes place, so that if it had been foreseen, the promise would not have been made; because a promise is always supposed to be made under such a tacit condition.'—4. 720.

'Three opinions are given, all sufficiently "probable."...The third says that a simple promise does not bind except *sub levi*, because it only binds of good faith, and they prove it from S. Thomas, who teaches that a promise binds only in the way of honour, and not in the way of civil law; that is, in the way of justice, as the Salamanca doctors explain.'—*Ibid.*

'The whole of the obligation commonly depends on the intention of the person making the promise. On this point Sa notices that scarcely any one who makes a promise intends to bind himself, or to give another the right of exacting, unless he adds an oath or makes an instrument, but generally only intends to declare his purpose.'—*Ibid.*

'In case a man has seduced a maiden on false promise of marriage, is he bound to keep the promise, if he is much superior to the woman in birth, and she was aware of the disparity? Palao, Pontius, Croix, Layman, Navarrus, Vasquez, &c. hold that simple inequality is not enough to free the man from his promise of marriage, but that the girl must, besides, have been able to have seen the deceit by other circumstances, for men do very often marry women beneath themselves in rank: but with great "probability" he is excused by Busembaum, Lugo, Sanchez, S. Antoninus, Navarrus, Sylvester, Angelus, Armendarius, and very many others, on the grounds that disparity of state is of itself a reason for prudently doubting the truth of the promise; and if the woman did not doubt, as she ought, that is an accident, and to be imputed to her own carelessness. . . . And in these cases a man is not bound to marriage, although he has confirmed his promise with an oath, as is said by Lugo, Sanchez, S. Antoninus, Sylvester, Cajetan, Soto, Navarrus and very many others. The reason of this is that an oath does not bind except according to the intention of the man who makes the promise.

'But how great ought the disparity to be, to free a man from the marriage? Lessius requires him to be of far higher birth; as that *he* should be the son of an Earl and *she* the daughter of an artizan. But Sanchez, with S. Antoninus and Navarrus, says that a much smaller inequality is sufficient, as that a noble should have to marry a farmer's daughter, or that the man should be considerably the richer of the two, as Sanchez adds with Navarrus, Lopez, Antony of Cordova, Veracruz, and Lessius. For thus speaks Navarrus in his Manual: "He is bound to fulfil his promises, except they should be very unequal in birth, power, or riches; say, that he should be noble and she a farmer's or artizan's daughter." S. Antoninus teaches likewise that he must keep his promise, except their condition in life should be very different; say, that the woman should be a plebeian and the man a noble and powerful.

'But in case the girl is totally ignorant of any disparity, is the seducer then bound to the marriage? Lessius and Busembaum say so "probably," because then the woman could not in any way discover the deception, but still it is "very probably" denied by Lugo, Viva, the Salamanca doctors, Cornejo, Sanchez, Antony of Cordova, Moneta, Peter Ledesma, and Veracruz. The grounds are that the seducer is only bound to what is equal to the injury offered: but the injury offered consists in his not fulfilling what the woman asked: so to repair the injury the man is not bound to give more than the woman asked. Now the woman, not knowing the man's condition in life, only asked that one of the same condition with herself or a little superior should marry her: if therefore a man of much better condition should marry her, he would be giving more than is equal to the injury done,

by giving what she neither asked nor intended to ask: and so he is not bound to marry her, but he does quite enough if he repairs the harm done by giving her a dowry or looking after her marriage.

'The same is the case, according to Sanchez, S. Antoninus, and the Salamanca doctors, if there is fear of great offence or quarrels between the relatives of the contracting parties. In a case where a man's family would feel disgraced by the marriage on account of the disparity of state, I think him to be not the least bound to marry the maiden whom he has seduced, whether his promise was true or whether it was false: for if he promised falsely, we have just proved that he is not bound to the marriage, no, nor to compensation: and if he promised truly, not even so is he bound to marry her, because the promise is *ipso facto* null by being about an unlawful thing, such as a marriage which would be a disgrace to the family.... A promise cannot be valid except it be about a lawful thing, for justice cannot bind to what is unlawful; and so a promise of entering upon a marriage which would disgrace the family is not valid, because it is about a thing which is not lawful.'—4. 644.

The moral blindness and logical acumen with which we are here brought to the Q. E. D. is charming. It is the philosophy of sin. We hope that aristocratical parents will, for their sons' sake, duly appreciate these novel 'privileges of the nobility.' For ourselves we are well content that the right of seducing maidens on promise of marriage, and then refusing to keep the promise, should remain a privilege of the nobles of those countries alone where Rome's religion is professed and Rome's teacher's have sway. Next for promises of secrecy:—

'When you have made a promise without expressly binding yourself to keep the secret to your own detriment, it is certain that you may reveal it, since no one is thought to bind himself to a secret to his grave inconvenience. So say Layman, Roncaglia, Sporer, and Holzmann. But what is to be said if you have expressly promised not to reveal the secret, though it should cost you your life to keep it? Can you then reveal it if in peril of life? Sporer says so, and with sufficient probability, teaching that a man may, in that case, and is bound to do so, because no man is allowed to throw away his own life; and Layman attaches himself to the same view. Some doctors, however, say very "probably," with Lugo, Molina, and Croix, that if you have made the promise, you have a sufficient obligation to keep the secret, even with danger of your life; for it is one thing to throw away life, another to neglect its preservation in order to keep promises.'—4. 971.

Will the sanction of an oath help us? No, for we have already seen that there is nothing wrong in swearing with equivocation whenever we may use equivocation without swearing, Nay, Garnet went further, and solemnly affirmed that it was his opinion, that the speech by equivocation being saved from a lie, the same speech might be, without perjury, not only confirmed by oath, but by any other usual way, though it were by receiving the Sacrament, if just necessity so required.[1] Here are a few cases in which this principle is applied:—

[1] State Paper Office. Quoted in Preface to Treatise of Equivocation, and Lingard's History of England, Reign of James I. chap. i. A.D. 1606.

'A penitent questioned by his confessor about a sin which he has confessed, can swear that he has not committed it, understanding aside, that he has not committed anything which has not been confessed. So say Cardenas, the Salamanca doctors, Sanchez, and Sporer. This must, however, be understood to hold in all cases except when the confessor is justly interrogating in order to learn the state of the penitent.'—4. 157.

'If any man has been forced into a marriage, he can assert before a judge with an oath that he has not contracted the marriage, namely, freely, as was right.'[1]—4. 159.

'May a man, when asked to lend money, swear that he has none, when he has, understanding aside, that he has none so as to lend? The Salamanca doctors and Soto say No, on the ground that this mental restriction cannot be detected from circumstances. But this is only to be understood if the truth can in no way be detected; for if it could be conjectured from any circumstance, as the poverty or indigence of the lender, he may without difficulty understand I have not more than I want, so as to lend.'—4. 163.

'May tradesmen swear that their goods cost them more than they did, understanding aside, "together with some other goods?" Some say they may; but the Salamanca doctors are right in denying it. Yet Croix and Gobat say that "probably" they may, when they do not understand the mere price of the thing, but count into it the expenses of carriage, store, &c.'—4. 164.

'May men proceeding to their doctors' degree swear with equivocation that they have fulfilled some condition which they have not fulfilled, as that they have been engaged for so many years on a certain science, if they are equally fit with the other doctors to proceed? See Tamburini, who answers in the affirmative, and says that there is then a good reason for swearing, lest men who are really worthy should be rejected. But however this may be, it seems a matter more than "probable" to me that men proceeding to their doctors' degrees in Naples do not commit purjury when, as is usual, they write with their own hands, "I declare with an oath that it is the first year, &c." when it really is not; because the words "I swear," or "I declare with an oath," (as we said above with the Salamanca doctors, Bonacina, Sanchez, and Suarez,) is not an oath in itself, unless it is preceded by a question about swearing, and this question at Naples is either not made at all, or is not made about the real oath, but only about the material writing, which, from common usage, does not seem to be counted as a true oath.'—4. 166.

'Is it allowable to swear something false, adding in a low tone a true circumstance? Yes, answer Hurtado and Prado, with others quoted by the Salamanca doctors against Torre. They say that it is enough to make the words true, that there should be some external conformity with the conception of the mind, whether shown by gesture or by a whisper, and the other's not hearing it is a matter of accident. The Salamanca doctors explain it better. They say that it is allowable if the whisper can by any

[1] This example is thus enlarged in the 'Treatise of Equivocation.' 'One being 'convented in the Bishopp's courte because he refuse to take such a one to his 'wyfe as he had contracted with *per verba de præsenti*, having contracted with 'another privily before, so that he cannot be husband to her that claymeth him, 'may answere that he never contracted with her *per verba de præsenti*, under-'standing, that he did not so contract that it was a marriage.'—P. 81.

means be possibly perceived by the other, although its meaning is not caught, but not if it should in every respect remain concealed from him.'—4. 168.[2]

'Toletus says that a man commits a grave sin who uses equivocation when he offers to take an oath without being asked, because *then* he is bound to use words in their common acceptation, having no grounds for equivocating; but with "greater probability," and the "most common opinion," the Salamanca doctors say the contrary; namely, that when there is good reason of necessity or expediency, a man may use amphibologies in swearing, even though he offers to swear without being asked.'—4. 169.

This 'most common opinion of the doctors' overthrows the only defence under which, as we shall see presently, Romish apologists, when pressed with arguments, are able to attempt to shelter themselves, viz. that they are protecting themselves from the aggressor. Here we see that the whole authority of their own Moral Theologians is directly on the other side. The use of equivocal swearing is declared to be not only defensive but aggressive. The next extract cries out for the pen of Aristophanes to lash once more the modern sophists' form of the celebrated 'Η γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.'

'A man who has only outwardly taken an oath, without intending to swear, is not bound, except perhaps on account of the scandal, for he has not sworn, he has joked.'—4. 171.

It was time, as Ranke has observed, for Jansenism to arise, when such sentiments as these could be published; and yet, in spite of the warning of Jansenism, Rome retains them in her codes of morals, awaiting, perhaps, a rougher hand than that of Port-Royal to undertake the work of reform.

'If a man makes a false promise and swears to it, what sin does he commit, and to what is he bound? *Distinguo.* A man may make a false promise with an oath in three ways: 1. Not intending to swear; 2. Not intending to bind himself; 3. Not intending to fulfil the promise.'—4. 172.

Here is a precious 'distinction' to puzzle simple persons' brains: then it is worked out. The man who swears without the intention of swearing, does not commit perjury, but only a venial sin. The man who swears, intending to swear, and not intending to bind himself, also commits a venial sin, and is not bound to keep the oath. *Distinguendum* is a wand of power in the hands of the modern casuists, and works wonders.

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[2] Our readers will recollect Pascal's method of dealing with this doctrine:—'Indeed, father, is that not a lie and perjury too?' 'No,' said the father, 'Sanchez and Filiuccius prove that it is not; "for," says the latter, "it is the intention that determines the quality of the action." And he suggests a still surer method for avoiding falsehood, which is this: after saying aloud, *I swear that I have not done that*, to add in a low voice, *to-day*; or after saying aloud, *I swear*, to interpose in a whisper *that I say*, and then continue aloud *that I have done that.* This, you perceive, is telling the truth.' 'I grant it,' said I, 'it might possibly, however, be found to be telling the truth in a low key, and falsehood in a loud one.'—Letter IX.

'It is certain that it is no grave thing to fail in keeping a small part of what you have sworn; for example, if you have sworn not to drink wine, you commit no mortal sin by drinking a little, because the smallness of the *materia* is an excuse. . . . . You may say the same of a man who takes away only a little from a sum which he had sworn to give to another.'—4. 173.

It seems that we have improved upon the morality of the children of Jonadab the son of Rechab, and have developed since the days of Ananias and Sapphira.

'You are under no obligation if you swear what is bad, or vain, or useless, or, as Cajetan says, indifferent, if it be not dignified by its end, or circumstances connected with it; for an oath cannot be a bond of iniquity, or of vain and idle things to which God does not wish us to be bound. Bonacina and others, according to the "common opinion." '—4. 176.

We must recollect that the judge of what is bad, vain, idle, or indifferent, is the Director, and therefore that no oath of which he disapproves is to be kept.

'Is a man who promises his concubine with an oath not to know another woman bound to keep his promise? Diana says No; but the Salamanca doctors with greater probability say Yes.'—4. 184.

'Is a man who has made a promissory oath to return to prison bound to keep his promise, with a probable fear of death, or very grave unjust wrong? The first opinion says No, because it is an action intrinsically bad to offer oneself to death. So say Navarrus, Manriquez, Vasquez, Pontius, Covarruvias, Tamburini, Reginald. The second opinion with much more probability is in the affirmative, because when the promise had been made, it would be a work of virtue to go back. So Toletus, Suarez, Lessius, and the Salamanca doctors, though they call the first opinion "probable." '—4. 186.

Poor Regulus! We used to admire his conduct, and to think that he had acted gloriously, as we read over and over Horace's spirit-stirring ode when we were at school; but it seems that, in the judgment of Navarrus, Manriquez, Vasquez, Pontius, Covarruvias, Tamburini, and Reginald, he was doing a thing wicked in itself,—and the doctors who maintain the contrary still think it not improbable. Pity that our minds were not imbued with Liguorian morality after the fashion which was some time since proposed in France. Let Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle bow before our modern moralists!

There is another sort of swearing, which we who are accustomed to the Third Commandment and to our Lord's discourses in the Gospels have been inclined to consider wrong;—but away with scruples: 'We must mark that generally men who angrily 'utter words, such as, *By God! By Christ! I will kill you!* 'commit no grave sin, as they are for the most part excused 'on the ground of ignorance or want of deliberation.'—4. 146.

This is sickening work. We will pass over vows which are

treated much in the same way as oaths. But at least it may be thought that, in solemn courts of justice, men will be allowed to give their evidence without this miserable dallying with their consciences and sense of truth: there, at least, they will not be justified in lying. Let us see.

'A witness or defendant, when not legitimately questioned by the judge, may swear that he does not know a crime which he really does know, understanding to himself that he does not know a crime about which he can be legitimately questioned, or that he does not know it so as to give evidence about it. So Cajetan, Sporer, Azorinus, Roncaglia, Sanchez, with Navarrus, Toletus, Valentia, &c. The same is the case if the witness, for some other reason, is not bound to give evidence; for example, if he is himself quite assured that the act committed is without guilt, as the Salamanca doctors and Elbel say; or if he knows the crime only as a secret, and no ill repute has previously got abroad. When, however, the witness or defendant is legitimately questioned by the judge, he must not use any equivocation, because he is bound to obey the rightful precept of his superior. This is the common opinion; and the same must be said about an oath in onerous contracts, because otherwise injury would be done to another. Except in the case of a trial the crime be altogether concealed; for then a witness may, nay *he is bound to say that the defendant has not committed it*, and so may the defendant if there is not half-full proof. So says Tamburini, with the common opinion, because then the judge does not question legitimately.'—4. 154.

Can we any longer wonder at its being impossible to get evidence in Ireland, upon which to convict murderers?

'But it is asked, if a defendant or contractor, who is not permitted the use of equivocation, has deceived by equivocally swearing, can he be absolved without declaring the truth? Some say No, not without "probability;" but with more probability Sanchez, the Salamanca doctors, and Philiarchus say Yes, because by such an oath, which cannot be called perjury, he has not sinned against commutative justice, but against legal justice, and the obedience due to the judge, whose command to discover the truth is only transient, and only lasts as long as he is making the inquiry. Sanchez says the same, also, about a lying witness; and so both of them may be absolved without their declaring the truth. They are, however, bound to make satisfaction in another way, if they can. If they cannot, the Salamanca doctors say that they are bound to discover the truth afresh in the court. But I should even excuse them, if they were altogether unable to make satisfaction either at present or at a future time.'—4. 155.

Our readers will inquire what is the meaning of legitimate questioning on the part of the judge. In the next book Liguori explains his meaning.

'It is certain that a witness is not bound to confess the truth to a judge, when he does not legitimately interrogate; for then he may lawfully answer, even with an oath, that he does not know the crime (aside) so as to be bound to declare it to him. But it is asked, when does a judge question legitimately? The reply is, when there is already half-full proof. . . . When there is this, the crime is no longer said to be secret, and therefore the judge has a right that the witness should declare the truth. So in common, Lessius, Navarrus, and others, with the Salamanca doctors, who observe that no witness is bound to answer in this way, unless repute of the guilt, or half-

full evidence of it, or clear signs of it, be already proved and shown to him by the judge, unless, indeed, it is quite certain that the judge is a good man, and he declares that he is legitimately questioning. . . . A judge does not legitimately question, unless there has previously been notoriety, ill repute, or other half-full proof.'—*5.* 266.

In the same spirit the Treatise of Equivocation explains 'the order of law, which order of law requires these five things:'—

'First, that the party who examineth must be a lawfull superiour . . . Secondly, he must have authority over the person whom he examineth . . . Thirdly, the matter itself must be subject to the judge . . . Fourthly, he must procede according to a just law: for whereas a judge is, as Aristotle calls hym, a living law, as the law itself is a dumb judge; even as the law when it is unjust is no law, so a judge, in the execution of an unjust law, is no judge. Fynally it is very necessary, for the due observation of order of law, that the judge do not proceede against a man to examine hym or call hym into question, but in cases which are publick and manifest, or when great suspicions and presumptions or common reportes, do seem to condemn the partye, or sufficient testimony convince hym, for otherwise it were against the law of nature. For how can there be greater disturbance of commonwealth than to have honest men molested or called into question at any one's fancye? . . . In these cases when order of law is not observed, a man is not only not bound to confesse anything of hymself, but he is also bound to confesse nothing at all, for it were to prejudice hymself without necessity. And no man may prejudice his own fame, or goodes, or lyfe, without at the least a veniall synne, except he be bound thereunto by order of law.'—P. 68.

Liguori continues:—

'Even when legitimately and juridically interrogated, you are not bound to give evidence in the following cases. . . . 3. If notable harm will result to yourself or any belonging to you from your testimony. . . . 6. If the man probably did not commit sin in what he did, either owing to ignorance, or because he took something by way of compensation for a debt, and for doing so was charged with theft. For the judge's intention is to inquire about what is really a guilty action.—*Theol. Mor.* 5. 268.

'Bonacina says that if a witness has sworn to speak the truth, he is bound to speak it on the grounds of justice, because an obligation of justice arises from an oath and promise; but with greater probability Lessius contradicts him, because a witness swearing that he will speak the truth, does not intend to bind himself to declare it on the grounds of justice, but only by virtue of religious scruple.'—*5.* 270.

'Is a witness bound to make restitution for the harm that has ensued, if he has concealed the truth when legitimately questioned by the judge? Yes, say the Salamanca doctors. . . . No, says Molina, &c. . . . But you will say that if a man has, by his lie, hindered another from obtaining a good to which the latter has a right, he is bound to make restitution, and that so the witness is bound to make restitution, because he has hindered his neighbour from getting his rights by saying that he did not know what he did know, which was a lie. But it is replied that this holds when the lie is the positive cause which produces the harm, not if it is only the negative cause. Now, a witness who says that he does not know some true thing which he does know, is only the negative cause of harm; for he puts no positive impediment in the way of the other man's getting his rights, he

only does not remove an impediment in his way, which impediment is defect of proof. This impediment a witness may be bound to remove, from obedience and religious scruple, as we said, or even sometimes from charity, but not from justice, unless it has happened that he has entered into a special compact with that side that he will divulge the truth.'—5. 270.

We are told a little further on, that a witness commits a crime in five ways, one of which is, If he discovers the truth which he ought to conceal. Who would not have expected the very converse of this proposition?—If he conceals the truth which he ought to discover? But what wonder that barefaced lying should be taught and justified, in courts where barefaced bribery is approved? Two extracts on this head, as it is not immediately connected with our subject, shall suffice.

'May a judge take money to despatch the cause of one man before another? Layman says that, looking to natural right, he does not dare to condemn it, because the new obligation which he undertakes is worth payment. The Salamanca doctors, however, more truly say the contrary, because a judge is bound on grounds of justice to be speedy in despatching the causes of all who have an equal right to despatch; unless he should take any extraordinary trouble which he was not bound by his office to take.'—5. 196.

'Does a man commit a sin who offers bribes to a judge, or to his ministers? *Distingue.* If he give without good reason, he commits sin by co-operating in an unlawful receiving, but not if he gives with a reason, namely, to free himself from annoyance which he does not deserve: but he must take care that there is a probable risk of his otherwise suffering manifest injustice; for then it is not a case of corrupting another, but of taking care that his own rights are awarded to himself. So in common, Sanchez, Lugo, Molina, Antony of Cordova, Palao, and the Salamanca doctors, against Ledesma. Nor are the prohibitory laws any objection; for what the laws intend is to provide against men giving money, and so corrupting the judges by bribes, not to prevent them from getting a just sentence.'—5. 212.

Is it strange that the courts of justice are what they are in Spain, in Rome, in Naples? Look at the case of witnesses. The distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate interrogation is enough to destroy all hopes of arriving at the truth. If a man is anxious to conceal the truth, he has only to say to himself that the judge is questioning illegitimately, and then he has no obligation to speak the truth. Even when that door is closed, and he acknowledges the legitimacy of the interrogation, he is still allowed to settle in his own mind whether the fact which he has witnessed was to the individual agent a sin; and if he determines that it was not, he may deny that it was done at all. Then, if he acknowledges that it is a sin, he must ask himself if any one else knows of it; and if it is known to himself alone, *he is bound to lie,* and say that he does *not* know it, or even *that the culprit has not done it.* And when, at last, he is bid to tell

the truth, it is not on the grounds of the sacredness of truthfulness, but on the principle into which Rome resolves every duty —obedience to positive precept. Look again at the litigants; they may bribe almost at pleasure, but must take care (by a direction of the intention, we presume) to be not corrupting the judge, but only getting their own rights. And look at the judge; he may without scruple receive bribes for despatching causes, according to the laxer opinion (which, however, is quite sufficient to justify him in acting,) in virtue of the new obligation into which he has entered—according to the stricter view, on account of any special trouble that he may take. Can degradation be lower? Can rottenness be more loathsome? And this is morality!

We feel that our readers have seen sufficient to be assured that Rome and her casuists have cut away every tie of obligation contracted by assertion, promises, vows, and oaths; that they have done away with all confidence that we could put in the word of their genuine disciples, under whatever sanctions guaranteed; and that, so far as they are able, they reduce society to its elements, where every man's hand is against his neighbour, and each person looks out for a snare concealed behind the specious acts and words of every other.

The line of defence assumed by Roman apologists is uniformly the same. Each man has a right, they say, to act upon the defensive; he has a right to keep guard over the knowledge which he has, in the same way that he may defend his goods; and, as for there being any deceit in the matter—why, soldiers use stratagems in war, and opponents use feints in fencing.[1]

We have already pointed out that the use of equivocation and mental restriction is allowed aggressively, as well as on the defensive, but we will pass that by, and examine this argument on its own grounds as chosen by our opponents. It will be seen that there are two things asserted. The first is, that we may keep guard over our knowledge, and not necessarily give it up to every one who asks questions of us. This is no doubt true, *provided that we use no unjustifiable means for doing so*, in the same way that we may defend our goods, not by every means good or bad, *but only by righteous means*. The second thing asserted is, that all kinds of equivocation and non-pure mental

[1] This is the traditional line of defence, handed down from times past to the present day. Thus in Parsons' *Treatise tending towards Mitigation* we find,—'And here I ask Thomas Morton further what he will say to all the stratagems in 'war, for so much as there may be as well lying in facts as in words, according as 'our S. Thomas and other divines do hold? How will T. M. excuse their strata-'gems, that is to say, policies, deceits, and dissimulations of enemies in wars, from 'lies? Will he condemn all such stratagems as sinful? Why, then, do the Pro-'testant captains and leaders use them?'—P. 290.

restriction are justifiable means, and this is argued for on the grounds that similar measures are taken in war, and its imitation, fencing.

But mark what this implies. No less than that we are living under the curse of Ishmael—that we are always at war with every one about us—that we are fencing—that we look upon our brother-Christians and countrymen as enemies, whom, as in the battle-field or in the gymnastic-room, (where such dealings are expected, and therefore free from culpability,) we may fairly take in by feints, and stratagems, and amphibologies. We are thankful to know that Englishmen do not regard one another in this light; but wherever this state of society does exist, there the natural consequence is lying. In several continental countries this is so. In Spain, for example, the mere fact of asking the simplest question does impose upon the speaker the character of an aggressor and assailant. We have jogged along the roads of Spain, talking amicably and frankly with a chance passenger. Presently, by way of conversation, we have asked a question, *Donde se va?* Immediately there has fallen a cloud of suspicion on the traveller's face: he has curtly replied with the name of some place far from his present direction, and then the conversation has ended; he has pushed on or dropped behind, and would have no more to say. Indeed, it is one of the arts of the guides, by which a good guide is known from an indifferent one, to be ready with a plausible lie in regard to the direction of his master's journey, when questions are asked at the posadas. The reason of this is, that men feel at war with one another. And so in Italy, lying is taught on the grounds that the inquirer must be dealt with by stratagem. The following anecdote is given in a note to the fourth chapter of Cases of Conscience:—

'The Abbate Bricconi was tutor to the son of an English Roman Catholic gentleman of the old school. One day in Rome, explaining the liberty of simulation, he said, "Suppose I am going to Naples, but do not wish it to be known where I am going, and my interrogator has no right to question me, I answer, I am going to Genoa." "*Ma Signor Abbate,*" said the noble English boy, but half a Papist, "*mi pare questo sarebbe una bugia.*" He was called an *impertinente*, and given a good penance.'—P. 77.

It may be that if Liguorian morality spread, (and let us recollect that it is the morality which is taught in every Romish confessional in England and Ireland,) this happy state of war and fencing may be produced here, and then, having generated the evil, Rome's theologians will justify their morality by its existence. How thankful ought we not to be at the prospect of first being reduced from robust health to the diseased state of Naples and Spain, and then of being supplied with a cup of Liguori's mixture to make us better! By a new application of

the Homœopathic system, immorality must be called in to cure the vice which it will itself have caused.

But to return to our text-book. At least it will be thought that sufficient care has been taken for allowing men to lie with a safe conscience, and to break faith without any troublesome scruples, by means of the Equivocations, Mental Restrictions Conditions, Distinctions, Probable Opinions, and other scaffolding, which we have seen provided for them. But this is only the beginning. There may be tender consciences, over which the force of truth may yet hold some sway, and still further provision must be made for their necessities. Accordingly there remain Dispensations, Irritations, Commutations, Relaxations, Cessations, and Remissions. Now, at least, we are safe—now we are quite secure against having to keep our promises, to perform our vows, or to fulfil our oaths.

'In how many ways can the obligation of a vow be removed? In two ways:—1. Without the intervention of any one's authority, and that either by the change of matter, (as if the matter had been before good and became bad or indifferent, or an obstacle to a greater good, owing to a new circumstance, or prohibition, or absolutely or morally impossible,) or by the cessation of the condition on which it depended. 2. By the intervention of human authority, and that in three ways, by Irritation, Commutation, and Dispensation. This is the common opinion. Hence you may conclude, that, although it is by your own fault that the matter has become impossible, useless, &c., yet, since it has become so, the obligation ceases, and it is enough to be sorry for your fault.'—4. 225.

'Dispensation is the absolute doing away with the obligation of a vow, and is made in the name of God. Good reason is required for its validity, such as,—1. The good of the Church, or the common welfare of the republic, and even of a family, or the greater advantage of the man who has vowed. 2. A notable difficulty in observing the vow. 3. Imperfection of act, or levity, or easiness from which the vow proceeded.'—4. 250.

'A sufficient cause for dispensation is danger of transgression on account of the particular indisposition of the person who has made the vow, or on account of the common frailty of man. Great difficulty in the execution is also a sufficient reason, not only if the difficulty was unforeseen, as Sanchez, Palao, and Suarez say, but also if it was foreseen, as the Salamanca doctors think with Leander and Tamburini. . . It is a sufficient reason, too, if the man under the vow is troubled with great scruples. Besides, even if there is no danger of transgression, and no great difficulty in the execution, still it is a sufficient reason if the vow was made immaturely, with too great facility, with imperfect consideration, or without perfect liberty.'—4. 252.

'Those who can dispense are the following:—1. The Pope, with respect to all the faithful. 2. A Bishop, with respect to those under him, but not a parish priest. 3. Regular Prelates, who are exempt, in respect to their monks and novices. . . . By privilege from the Pope, the confessors of the Mendicant Orders, subject to the permission and regulation of their superior.'—4. 256.

'A Prelate seeing, and not contradicting when he easily can, seems to give a dispensation, says Sa.'—4. 254.

'How can the obligation of oaths be taken away by means of irritation, dispensation, commutation, or remission? . . . If an oath cannot be kept without common damage, or be about a contract forbidden by law, in truth such oaths do not require relaxation, as they are null in themselves. But suppose they *are* valid, they can be relaxed by the Church, and under the name of the Church come not only the Pontiff, but also Bishops, Chapters while Sees are vacant, and others with Episcopal jurisdiction, and also confessors with a delegated faculty of dispensing in vows, for they can also relax oaths of this kind.'—4. 192.

Illustrations always make us realize abstract propositions in a way which we otherwise find difficult. We will, therefore, take a supposed case, and see how these principles would work. Let us suppose that some hundred gentlemen have been admitted to certain privileges on the condition of binding themselves by oath to act in a particular way in connexion with a certain subject. Let us further suppose, by way of clearness, that such privileges were, sitting and legislating in the Houses of Parliament, and that the condition which they have sworn to observe was, that they should do nothing to the detriment of the Established Church of England and Ireland. Having pictured such a case to ourselves, let us also suppose the same gentlemen, who have taken this imaginary oath, to be zealous and earnest persecutors of the said Established Church in parliament and out of parliament; let us suppose them to be straining every nerve for its overthrow and utter destruction. Let us go so far as to conceive by a stretch of imagination that such language as the following might be found in their mouths:—'Enormous abuse,'—'Incubus on the country,'—'Hideous injustice,'—'The levelling of which will alone give peace to Ireland,'—and other phrases of a similar nature. Having made these imaginary suppositions, let us further suppose that these gentlemen were called upon before the bar of their own consciences, or the outraged public opinion of their fellow-countrymen, to justify their actions and their words, and to show how they were in accordance with the solemn oaths which they had sworn. Would S. Alfonso de' Liguori's principles of Morality, sanctioned as they are in the fullest manner by an authority invested with the halo of infallibility, in which these gentlemen are bound to believe,—would the principles which we have been drawing out be such as they might shelter themselves under in their hour of trial? Let us draw up the curtain, and we may have the following scene:—

Judge, loquitur.—'Gentlemen, you are charged with a want of good faith, and you must sit down under this imputation, unless you can free yourselves from it by appealing to the rules laid down in S. Alfonso's "Moral

Theology," which I am bound to hold sacred and sufficient to justify you, provided you can show that your conduct has been in accordance with them.'

Culprit 1.—'I used a word which would bear two meanings.' Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 2.—'I used a sentence which would bear two meanings.' Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 3.—'In replying to the question put to me, I used the formula, *I say, No*, and confirmed it with an oath, meaning that I swore that I was making use of the word *No*.' Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 4.—'I used non-pure mental restriction.'—*Judge.* 'Are you sure that it was not pure mental restriction, which is a thing not allowable?' 'Quite. Indeed, my well-known abhorrence of the Establishment would in itself be a sufficient circumstance from which a prudent man might gather that I did not intend what I swore, (4. 643;) but, to make sure, I whispered something which no one overheard so as to understand.' (4. 168.) Acquitted.—4. 151.

Culprit 5.—'I took no oath at all: I only swore externally, and therefore I took no oath, I joked. 'Η γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος.' Acquitted.—4. 171.

Culprit 6.—'I took no oath: I only said *I swear*, and this was no oath because no question preceded it.' Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 7.—'I took no oath: I only said, *I declare with an oath*, and that is no oath, for the same reason.' Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 8.—'I took no oath: for from common usage the material writing or speaking does not seem to be counted a true oath.' Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 9.—'I did swear, though falsely: but I had a good reason for it, lest I, a worthy person, should be rejected.' Acquitted.—4. 166.

Culprit 10.—'I swore without the intention of swearing, and that is only a venial sin.' Acquitted.—4. 172.

Culprit 11.—'I swore intending to swear, but not intending to bind myself, and that is only a venial sin.' Acquitted.—4. 172.

Culprit 12.—'I conscientiously object to the oath, and therefore am under no obligation from it. An oath cannot be the bond of iniquity.' Acquitted.—4. 176.

Culprit 13.—'I consider it a useless oath, and therefore I am under no obligation from it. An oath cannot be a bond of vain and idle things to which God does not wish us to be bound.' Acquitted.—4. 176.

Culprit 14.—'I think it to be about an indifferent matter, and therefore I am not bound by it.' Acquitted.—4. 176.

Culprit 15.—'I am not bound by the oath, because the greater part of my colleagues do not act upon it.' Acquitted.—4. 180.

Culprit 16.—'I hold the oath to be obsolete, and therefore am free from the obligation of observing it.' Acquitted.—4. 180.

Culprit 17.—'I considered the object to which I swore good at the time, but now I think that circumstances have made it unlawful.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 18.—'I considered the object to which I swore good at the time, but I think that it has now become idle.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 19.—'I think that it has become a hindrance to a greater good.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 20.—'I consider that it is better that it should be omitted than fulfilled.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 21.—'I swore, but I have changed my oath into a work clearly better and more pleasing to God.'—*Judge.* 'But had you not sworn something to the good of others? God does not wish man defrauded.'—

Culprit. 'No, it was to the harm of others, not their good.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 22.—'I swore, but the state of the case has become notably changed, and therefore I am not bound to keep my oath.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 23.—'The end proposed by the oath was doubtless the advantage of religion and of the commonwealth; now I think that the observance of the oath has become useless for this end, and therefore I am not bound by it.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 24.—'I took the oath, but I can't keep it.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 25.—'Nature and the Doctors teach that every oath is taken under this condition, "Saving the rights of my Superior." The Pope being my Superior, I am bound to save his rights, and so far as the oath interferes with his rights it must give way.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 26.—'I should lose my character in Ireland if I kept it.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 27.—'I should lose my seat and that would be grave damage.' Acquitted.—4. 187.

Culprit 28.—'The oath was in illicit matter, and therefore, *ipso facto*, null.' Acquitted.—4. 644.

Culprit 29.—'The oath cannot be kept without common detriment.' Acquitted.—4. 192.

Culprit 30.—'I have received a dispensation.'—*Judge.* 'On what grounds was the dispensation granted?'—*Culprit.* 'On the grounds that the good of the Church, and consequently of the commonwealth, was against my keeping the oath.' Acquitted.—4. 192.

Who shall bind Proteus? Who shall tie to truth and fair dealing men who can have recourse to Rome's casuistry as often as their consciences become uneasy?

But, for purposes of illustration, we need not have recourse to cases which may be considered imaginary. The 'Treatise of Equivocation,' which we have placed at the head of our article, supplies us with the same principles; and the events connected with it tell us how those principles were applied by their authors and defenders. This treatise, published from a MS. in the Bodleian two years ago, has scarcely attracted so much attention as it deserves, regarded as a literary and historical document, apart from its controversial bearings. It was well known that such a treatise had existed, and that it was the authorized manual, employed, not without provocation, by the missionary priests and others in England, during the latter part of the reign of Elizabeth. It had been produced by Sir Edward Coke, in the trial of Garnet and the other conspirators in 1604. 'And here,' says the authorized 'Report of the Proceedings,' 'was shown a book, written not long before the queen's 'death, at what time Thomas Winter was employed into Spain, 'entitled *A Treatise of Equivocation*, which book being seen and 'allowed by Garnet, the superior of the Jesuits, and Blackwell, 'the arch-priest of England, in the beginning thereof Garnet

'with his own hand put out these words in the title, *of Equivo-*
'*cation*, and made it thus, *A Treatise against Lying and Fraudu-*
'*lent Dissimulation*, whereas, in deed and truth, it makes for
'both; *Speciosaque nomina culpæ Imponis Garnette tuæ.* And
'in the end thereof Blackwell besprinkles it with his blessing,
'saying, "Tractatus iste valde doctus et vere pius et Catholicus
'est. Certe S. Scripturarum, Patrum, Doctorum, Scholasti-
'corum, Canonistarum, et optimarum rationum præsidiis planis-
'simè firmat æquitatem æquivocationis. Ideoque dignissimus
'est qui typis propagetur ad consolationem afflictorum Catholi-
'corum et omnium piorum instructionem."' Morton, Bishop of Durham, wrote a systematic reply to it in 1606, in his *Full Satisfaction.* Dr. Robert Abbott, in his *Antilogia*, in 1613, and Henry Mason, in his *New Art of Lying*, in 1624, discussed its principles. Parsons in his *Treatise tending to Mitigation*, in 1607, spoke of it as 'a certain Catholicke manuscript treatise, made in defence of Equivocation, and intercepted by them:' and Casaubon gave an account of it in his *Letter to Fronto Ducæus.* But where was the Treatise itself, which had once made such a stir in the world? Nobody knew, and it was generally supposed to be lost. A hue and cry was raised for it by an anonymous inquirer in *Notes and Queries;* and, near the end of the year 1850, it was found in the Bodleian Library among the Laudian Miscellaneous MSS. The way in which it got there is curious. The occasion on which it was first made *publici juris* is thus recorded by Sir Edward Coke, in a manuscript note on the first leaf of the Treatise. 'This book, containing sixty-one
'pages, I found in a chamber in the Inner Temple, wherein Sir
'Thomas Tresham used to lie, and which he obtained for his
'two younger sons. This 5. of December, 1605. Edw. Coke.
'*Os quod mentitur occidit animam.*' After having been produced at the trial, as mentioned above, it was laid up in the State Paper Office. In 1612, it was borrowed from thence by Archbishop Abbott, and lent by him to his brother, the Regius Professor of Divinity in Oxford, who was at that time composing his *Antilogia versus Apologiam Andreæ Endæmon-Joannis pro Henrico Garneto.* A memorandum of the State Paper Office, which has been accidentally preserved, notices that the Archbishop, in restoring the other papers which had been delivered to him, had omitted to send back the Treatise. Thus it came into Laud's possession, when he succeeded Abbott at Lambeth, and was by him given with other papers to the Bodleian Library.

The author of the work is unknown. Abbott, in the polite language of the controversy of his day, styled him quietly, 'Sacerdos quidam Sathanæ.' Casaubon says that it was written 'ab eruditis Pontificiis in hoc regno.' It is corrected for the

press by Garnet, approved by Blackwell, and defended by its apologists, not on the plea of the exigency of the times,—this is very noticeable,—not on the plea of the exigency of the times, but on account of the righteous nature of the doctrine which it propounds.

The object of the book is twofold: first, to justify Southwell in having instructed a witness that she might conscientiously affirm on oath, in a court of justice, that she had not seen him in Bellamy's house, although she had been in the constant habit of meeting him there, provided that, at the time of taking the oath *I have not seem him*, she said to herself, *so as to tell you of it;* and secondly, to provide an authorized system for evading the truth, without being guilty of what the Church of Rome considers to be a lie.

The first chapter lays down the principle, that an oath ought to fulfil three conditions to be a lawful oath: it must be sworn in truth, in justice and judgment.[1] The premiss seems far enough away from the conclusion which is to be reached; but the space is very quickly bridged over. It is clear that, if an assertion is true, the same assertion confirmed by an oath is likewise true: if, therefore, there is no deficiency of truth in the assertion, *I have not seen him*, with the aside, *so as to tell you*, when nevertheless I have seen him,—in that case the oath confirming that assertion is not wanting in truth. The point, of course, is to prove that such an *assertion* is truthful. For this end propositions are divided into four kinds:—

> 'The first is a mental proposition, only conceived in the mynde, and not uttered by any external signification...The second is a vocal proposition, as when I utter these words with my mouth. The third is a written proposition, as if I should set down the same in wryting. The last of all is a mixt proposition, when we mingle some of these propositions, or parts of them together; as in our purpose when, being demanded whether John at Style be in such place, I knowing that he is there indeed, do say nevertheless "I know not," reserving or understanding within myself these other words, "to the end for to tell you." Here is a mixt proposition containing all this—"I know not to the end for to tell you." And yet part of it is expressed, part reserved in the mynde. Now unto all these propositions it is common that then they are trewe when they are conformable to the thing itself; that is, when they so affirm or deny as the matter itself in very deed doth stand. Whereof we inferre that this last sort of proposition, which partly consisteth in voyce, and partly is reserved in the mynde, is then to be adjudged trewe, not when that part only which is expressed, or the other only which is reserved, is trewe, but when both together do contain a truth.—P. 8.

We will not pause to point out the puerile confusion here exhibited between material truth and moral truthfulness. Our

[1] Jer. iv. 2.

object is rather to show the contents of the book, than to undertake so superfluous a task as that of refuting it. The third chapter consists of a 'metaphysical consideration,' proving that such mixed propositions are true propositions, and that 'their 'veritye is not to be judged according to that which is uttered 'in words severally, but according to the words and some other 'thing understood or reserved.' The fourth is an appeal to authority. David used mixed propositions; for he said that the wicked should not rise again in the judgment, which is 'a false and heretical proposition,' unless he reserved something in his mind. Our Saviour used them; for He said that whatsoever He had heard from his Father, He had made known to His disciples: and that whatsoever two faithful persons should ask, it should be done; and that He was not sent but unto the lost sheep of the house of Israel; and that Jaïrus' daughter was not dead, but asleep; and that His disciples could not go where He was going; and that the Son knew not the day of judgment; and that He was not going up to the feast. S. Paul used them; for he said that no man had seen or could see God; and yet 'Moses, as most holy fathers do affirme, and our blessed Ladye, 'as most schoolmen hold, and S. Paul hymself before that time, 'saw the very essence of God.'

This is quite enough for the first purpose which the Treatise was to serve; and so in the three last chapters, we are brought triumphantly to the conclusion, that such an oath as that which Southwell taught Miss Bellamy to take, is wanting neither in truth, nor in justice, nor in judgment. It is not wanting in truth; for 'an oath of an equivocal proposition is a trewe oath, 'because of the truth of the proposition alone—because of the 'doctrine of the fathers—because it skylleth not that the pro-'position is conceived as false—because in every oath there is 'understood this condition, that I will do so far as it is lawful—'and because, in not meaning to perform the oath in the imme-'diate sense of the judge, I have no contrary meaning to the 'principal meaning and intention which he hath, *or should have.*' It is not wanting in justice; for 'when the partye which is ex-'amined is asked that particular question, *Was he there?* what 'hyndereth that he may not say *No?* Not his oath; for that 'falleth not upon that question, being an unlawful question. 'Then it is only the lye; and being hurtful to nobodye, the 'most that these canonistes can make of it is but an officious 'lye, which is but a small veniall synne, and rather to be in-'curred than the other, of prejudicing so highly our neighbour. 'And yet, if he did equivocate, meaning *No, to tell you,* then 'was it no lye at all, and it was but an equivocation not sworn; 'for the oath, as I said, did not nor could fall upon that question:

'so that it is an equivocation very far from perjury.' It is not wanting in judgment,—that is, it may be taken without rashness or indiscretion; for 'so long as there is, in the sense of that which I swear, veritye and justice,'—which has just been proved,—'I may without all rashness swear in this manner, so 'ofte as, having the fear of God before my eyes, I probably 'repute that either my own just profitt, or of my neighbour, or 'the honour of God, doth so require.' The conclusion is as follows:—

'So that all allow this speech, *I will answere whatsoever I knowe*, meaning, *for to tell you*. If they will not admit that limitation, then, according to Bannez, they are bound to understand it, notwithstanding, in all his answeres. But, for further direction of the partye examined, if the oath be ministered generally, let hym admit the oath with this intention, that he will answere directly and truly, and (if so they urge hym) without all equivocation, so far as he is assured, without all doubt or scruple that he may or is bound. And if they make hym swear that he hath no private intention, or secret meaning, let hym swear it also with that very same secret understanding, that he hath no such meaning—to tell them. And with this general meaning at the beginning, when he took the oath, let hym not doubt but he shall be safe from all perjury, although he answer truly to nothing, because in these cases he is bound to answer directly to nothing, Yet, for to save hymself from lying, (which, notwithstanding, were but a very veniall synne in these matters, and of far less account than, perhaps, many other synnes which he hourly committeth,) let hym use some reasonable kynds of equivocation, as he may easily learn of the wiser sort; that is, let hym speake some words which may satisfye the hearers, and, with some other words which he conceiveth, may make a trewe sense. And let hym assure hymself, that by no way he can sinne more heinously in these matters than to disclose that which is indeed, whether he have sworn it or no. But if he had no intention of equivocation at the first when he took the oath, yet let hym persuade hymself, nevertheless, that he is not bound by his oath to do anything which becometh not an honest man; and so, if he equivocate in the particular question, he synneth not at all. If he tell plain lyes, without any true sense reserved, those do not so much offend God with their falsitye, as He is wont to reward such fidelitye, as we read in the midwives of Egypt, and in that honest harlot, if so we may call her, Rahab, to whom God hymself showed special favours. Fynally, if he be urged to swear the truth of some particular matter, let hym intend to tell the truth—so far as he is bound. If *to do* any particular unlawful matter, if it be such a thing as may be well interpreted, and not to tend to any scandal or dishonour of God, let hym swear it with equivocation, but not meaning to do it. If it be scandalous, or manifestly contrary to Christian duty, he must needs refuse it, as hath been declared before.'—P. 103.

Thus Southwell's good faith is vindicated, as well as 'the 'practice which was common in all Christian courts, and in all 'politicke governments, before these accusers or their great-'grandfather Luther was born, when the world was governed 'with as great piety, justice, and learning, as these scrupulous 'persons will ever establish in this realm, though they use never 'so great diligence.' The Treatise would not, however, be com-

plete in its character of a manual, if it contained no more than this. There are other ways, besides this method of mental restriction, (here called equivocation,) 'whereby, without a lye, a trewth may be covered;' and these must be enumerated. The first of these answers to Liguori's first form of Amphibology, 'where a word hath many significations, and we understand it 'in one sense which is trewe, although the hearer conceive the 'other which is false. . . . . The like whereunto were, if one 'should be asked whether such a stranger lodgeth in my house, 'and I should answer, *He lyeth not at my house*, meaning that '*he doth not tell a lye there, although he lodge there.*'[1] The second is, 'when unto one question may be given many answers; we may yeeld one, and conceale the other.' The third corresponds with Liguori's second form of Amphibology, where 'the 'whole sentence which we pronounce, or some word thereof, or 'the manner of poynting and dividing the sentences, may be 'ambiguous, and we may speak it in one sense trewe for our 'advantage.' Thus, 'it was not reprehensible, in one which 'had just cause, to say his father's name was Peter or Paul, 'because the Apostles are the spiritual fathers of the worlde;' and, 'so if one should say to a theife, *Juro tibi numeraturum me* '200 *aureos*, the word *tibi* may be joyned with *juro*, or with '*numeraturum*. In like manner a man may cunningly alter 'the pronunciation, as if, according to the Italian manner of 'pronunciation, a man should say *tibi uro* for *tibi juro*, which 'two examples Bellarmine bringeth in his Dictates, 2. 2. q. 89. 'ar. 7. dub. 2., as also before (adds Garnet) q. 69. ar. 2. 'dub. 2.'

'To these three ways of concealing trewth by words, if we add the other of which we spoke before,—that is, when we utter certain words which of themselves may engender a false conceit in the mynde of the hearers, and yet, with somewhat which we understand and reserve in our myndes, maketh a trewe proposition.'[2]—then shall we have four ways how to conceal a trewth without making a lye.'—P. 52.

And what effect had these doctrines on the moral conduct of their promulgators and recipients? Take the case of Garnet himself. Casaubon recounts how he acted upon his principles at the time of his own trial. During his imprisonment,

[1] P. 49. A similar case is given in p. 29. 'If I be asked whether such a one be in my house, who is there indeed, I may answer in Latin, *Non est hic*, meaning that he eateth not there, for so doth *est* signifye.'

[2] Other examples of this mental reservation, besides those already given, are the following: '*Non feci*, I did not,' understanding '*ut dicam tibi*, that I may or ought to tell you;' or, 'I did it not, yesterday.' '*Non habeo*, I have it not,' understanding, 'for to give you.' '*Dabo*, I will give you an hundred pounds,' understanding, 'if I fynd it in Cheapside.'—P. 31.

he had been in the constant habit of holding communication with Hall or Oldcorne, who was confined in an adjoining chamber. The words which passed between them were overheard, and many facts were in this method elicited. After a time, Garnet was charged before the Lords of the Council with having held these conferences. He put a bold face on the matter; and, although warned not to equivocate, denied it upon his soul, 'reiterating his denial,' as the Earl of Salisbury said, 'with so many detestable execrations, as it wounded the hearts of the Lords to hear.' It was told him that Oldcorne had confessed the fact, upon which the wretched man 'cried the Lords' pardon, and said he had offended, *if equivocation did not help him.*' Again, take the case of Francis Tresham, to whom this identical Treatise which is now in the Bodleian belonged. During his examination, he had admitted Garnet's complicity in the mission of Winter to Spain. A few hours before his death he wrote a paper, and signed it with his name, declaring that he had made his previous statement only to avoid ill-usage; and that, 'upon his salvation, it was more 'than he knew that Garnet was privy to the sending of Thomas 'Winter into Spain;' and 'that he had not seen Garnet for six-'teen years before, nor never had letter nor message from him.' This was wholly false, as all but Liguorians and their predecessors count falsehood. Garnet acknowledged his constant intercourse with him; and on being asked by Lord Salisbury 'what interpretation he made of the testamental protestation of 'Tresham,' replied, 'It may be, my Lord, he meant to equivocate.' 'This,' says Sir Edward Coke, in a letter to Lord Salisbury, 'is the fruit of equivocation, the book whereof we 'found in Tresham's desk—to affirm manifest falsehoods upon 'his salvation, *in ipso articulo mortis.* It is true that no man 'may judge in this case, for *intra pontem et fontem*, he might 'find grace; but it is the most fearful example that I ever 'knew.'[1]

The exhumation of this Treatise gives an opportunity of examining an interesting question,—how far the Theory of Truthfulness, taught by Rome at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is the same as that which she teaches in the nineteenth. Our extracts from S. Alfonso de' Liguori will have shown that, in spirit, they are identically the same. In form they differ, but only to this extent. There is a greater boldness and shamelessness two centuries ago; a greater consciousness that all the world is not prepared to accept such principles in

[1] State Paper Office, Criminal Trials, vol. ii. p. 102. Quoted in preface to 'Treatise of Equivocation.'

their nakedness now. There is a *naiveté* and a heartiness then, which is exchanged for doggedness of assertion now. But more than this. In the interval between the publication of the 'Treatise of Equivocation' and the 'Theologia Moralis,' there lived Innocent XI. Innocent XI. of the house of Odescalchi, was a Pope meek and mild in manner, but firm and high in purpose. In his opposition to Louis XIVth's encroachments on the spiritual power, he found himself fighting side by side with the Bishop of Pamiers and others of the Jansenist party. A man of uncompromising and inflexible integrity in his private life, he naturally leant towards the Jansenist codes of morality, and had little sympathy with the system which, twenty years before he had been raised to the pontificate, Pascal had held up to scorn and indignation. Accordingly he made short work with many a darling proposition, which had been enshrined in such books as are represented by Herman Busembaum's *Marrow of Moral Theology* and other works of 'the Society.' Regardless of the long line of logical argument on which they rested, regardless of the ingenuity and authority of their supporters, Innocent acted on the instincts of a human heart, and unsparingly condemned propositions as soon as they touched upon practice, without venturing—or deigning—to grapple with the subtle train of dialectic on which they were speculatively founded. Accordingly, on the subject of Mental Reservation, we find the three following propositions 'condemned by Innocent XI:'—

'I. If anyone, either alone or in the presence of others, either asked or of his free will, either for amusement or for any other reason, swears that he has not done something which he really has done, meaning in his own mind something else which he did not do, or another way from that in which it was done, or any other added circumstance which is true, he in fact tells no lie, and is not perjured.

'II. There is good reason for a man's using these amphibologies, as often as it is necessary or useful, to protect himself, or his honour, or his property, or in order to perform any kind of virtuous act, so that the concealment of the truth is then counted expedient and desirable.

'III. Whoever has been promoted to a magistracy or public office by means of a recommendation, or by bribery, may take the oath required by the king's mandate, with mental restriction, without respecting the intention with which it is exacted, because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime.'[1]

It must have been a hard thing for the under-workers to bear, when the master-builder came in and struck down the crowning-stone, for the support of which they had erected their work. However, *ingenium res adversæ nudare solent.* 'Il Papa biancho' is no match for 'Il Papa nero;' and Jansenism has always been

[1] Quoted in Theol. Mor. 4. 152.

worsted in its conflicts with Jesuitism. The Moral-Theologians set to work, and it soon appeared that Innocent XI. might have spared his pains: he only gave one triumph more to casuistical ingenuity.

Given the problem, how to retain a certain practice, and at the same time to pay outward respect to a Papal decree forbidding it, the method to be adopted is the following:—Take the thing condemned, and divide it into two species, distinguished from each other by a distinction without a difference: assume that the Papal condemnation applies to either one of these species, but not to the other: range everything which you wish to do under the uncondemned head, whatever you have no temptation towards under the other: the result will be the conclusion desired. Thus, the Pope condemned Mental Restriction: immediately Mental Restriction is divided into two kinds,—Pure Mental Restriction, and Non-pure Mental Restriction. There is no moral difference between them; but the Papal condemnation is declared to be confined to the former, and so the old practice goes on as securely and merrily as ever. Morally speaking, the present system, dogmatically enunciated, differs in no essential point from that of Garnet, Tresham, and Blackwell.[1]

Very different is the doctrine of S. Augustine, to whose authority, as well as to the example of our Lord, we have seen that S. Alfonso had the hardihood to appeal. We will now offer our readers a specimen of the teaching of the great Doctor of Hippo on this point. It may be that Liguori will have done his cause little good by appealing to the uncompromising Moralist of the Early Church. He may,

[1] This general method of dealing with condemnations is well illustrated in the case of clerical hunting. The steps are as follows:—1. Clerical hunting is forbidden in general terms. 2. The Doctors understand in common, that this prohibition applies only to clamorous hunting, which takes place with a noise. 3. Neither does it apply to all clamorous hunting with a noise, but only to frequent clamorous hunting with a noise. 4. Neither does it apply to all frequent clamorous hunting with a noise, but only to frequent clamorous hunting with a noise, which is scandalous or very expensive. 5. Sporer, Molina, Cajetan, and Sa, say that merely for hunting, without any adjunct, a clergyman is not easily to be condemned of mortal sin. 6. Layman, Lessius, Sa, Valentia, &c. think that such hunting may be altogether blameless, if it is rare and moderate, or from necessity or for exercise. 7. A modern author, who has written a book called "Instructions for New Confessors," says that non-clamorous hunting for the sake of honest recreation is perfectly allowable, and that, canonically, clamorous hunting is not, according to the more common opinion, a mortal sin, except with the adjuncts of contempt or contumacy. Monks are forbidden clamorous hunting more strictly. They are only allowed, without grave sin, to go out two or three times a-year, in case they can do so without giving scandal, or making a great noise.—(Theol. Mor. 4. 606. Hom. Ap. 10. 72.)

perhaps, serve to point out that Rome admits of development in morals as well as in doctrine: that as what was once rejected as false is accepted as true after the decree of a Pope; so what was rejected as immorality by S. Augustine has been made moral by the decision of the casuists. 'How do you 'manage,' asks Pascal, 'when the Fathers of the Church hap- 'pen to differ from any of your casuists?' 'The Fathers,' is the reply, 'were good enough for the morality of their own 'times, but they lived too far back for that of the present age, 'which is no longer regulated by them but by the modern 'casuists. . . . . At their advent S. Augustine, S. Chrysostom, 'S. Ambrose, S. Jerome, and all the rest, so far as morals are 'concerned, disappeared from the stage.'

The treatise of S. Augustine, to which reference was made, is that which he wrote against Lying. We will now shortly draw out the principles there laid down. We shall feel like a man who has left behind him the fogs and malaria of a reeking morass, and risen to the healthy atmosphere of mountain scenery. S. Augustine has written two books on the subject of Lying, and has many passages on the same subject interspersed amidst his voluminous writings. It is observable that he nowhere makes a distinction between lying and equivocating. Equivocating is in his estimation lying, and the same definition includes Amphibology and Mendacity. 'The double heart' is, according to his teaching, the source of the accursed thing, and any man 'who has one thing in his mind, and enunciates another by words or any sorts of signs,' is guilty of the sin. Word-jugglery is a thing unknown to him, for the sage of Hippo was too wise to be deceived himself, and too honest to deceive others by such a transparent fallacy as that which lies at the bottom of the justification of equivocation. What is the use of a word? To represent to others a conception existing in our mind. If, then, the word which we use represents to the person to whom we speak, not the conception which we have in our mind, but something else, the assertion involved in the proposition containing that word is really two assertions. Thus, in the case given above, 'the heir (air) was present,' is of course two assertions, one materially true, the other materially false: again, the proposition, 'The moon is light,' contains two assertions, one materially true, viz. 'the moon is not obscured,' the other materially false, viz. 'the moon is deficient in weight,' and so every proposition with an ambiguous word contains really two assertions. Now the fact of these assertions being *materially* both true, or both false, or, as is generally the case, one true and the other false, is not of the slightest value with regard to the moral act of the person speaking. If we persist in making

use of a proposition thus containing two assertions, one of which is true, viz. that which the words signify according to our acceptation, and the other false, viz. that which we know the words signify in our neighbour's acceptation, we are simply and absolutely guilty of moral falsehood. It is not to be wondered at, then, that in S. Augustine's writings no distinction is drawn between equivocating and lying, because equivocating and lying are morally identical.

The following passage will show how clearly his philosophic mind saw that moral truthfulness in the speaker did not depend upon the material truth or falsehood of the thing spoken. It is not directly upon equivocation, but upon a kindred kind of lying:—

'A man is deceived when he thinks what he says to be true, and it is really false: a man lies, when he thinks something to be false and says it as though true, *whether it be really true or false.* Mark the addition which I have made. Whether it be really true or false, yet, if a man thinks it false and asserts it as true, he lies, *for he is aiming to deceive.* What good is it to him, that it is true? He thinks it false, and says it is as though it were true. True it is *in itself*, what he says, *in itself* it is true: *to him* it is false. What he is conscious of and what he speaks are not the same: he thinks within himself that one thing is true, and utters another as though it were true. *His heart is double, not single, he does not bring out what he has there.* The double heart has long since been reproved, "Deceitful lips . . . dissemble in their double heart." Ps. xii. 2. What is deceit? When one thing is pretended and another done. Deceitful lips are when the heart is not single.'—*Serm.* 133. vol. v. p. 739.

In his books *De Mendacio* and *Contra Mendacium*, S. Augustine enumerates eight sorts of lying. Every one he rejects uncompromisingly. He denies that we may at any time be guilty of moral falsehood under whatever temptation we may be. The sin of the tongue in violating veracity is as great, he says, as the sin of the hand in theft or in murder, or, at least, we are no more justified in committing the former than the latter. He discusses all the examples of apparent falsehood in the Old and New Testaments, to which those who had a theory of lying appealed in his days as they do now, and concludes that 'for 'the examples which are brought forward out of the Holy 'Scriptures, either they are not falsehoods, but are supposed to 'be such by not being understood; or, if they are falsehoods, 'they are not proposed as objects of imitation.' He does not shrink from meeting difficult cases. He puts the very same case which we have before had with respect to S. Francis of Assisi. The bright thought of pointing down his sleeve had not, however, then arisen, and not even S. Augustine's sagacity could suggest it. Leaving that ingenious device to be recommended by saints of a more modern date, he solves the question in this

fashion. Suppose that a man flies to a spot for refuge, and you see where he conceals himself; you are questioned about him: are you to lie? Your answer should be, 'I will not betray, and I will not lie.' But the question may be put in such a form that mere silence, or saying that you would not tell, might betray him, and you could avert his danger by a falsehood. Your answer should be, 'I know where he is, but I will never show the place;' for if you refuse to answer whether or no he is in a certain place, you will rouse certain suspicion with respect to that place; but by prefacing your answer by a confession of your knowledge of his whereabouts, you may turn away the attention of the inquirer from any particular spot, and make him press you to discover the object of his search; and if for your fidelity and humanity you have to endure suffering, your conduct will be not only free from blame but praiseworthy. This is the substance of his solution of the difficulty.[1]

Now we can perfectly conceive the possibility of a case arising in which the two virtues of veracity and charity might so clash as to make it, at least, pardonable to deflect somewhat from the rigid observance of the former. S. Augustine does not admit such a possibility. 'You must not destroy your own soul,' he replies, 'for any supposed good of your neighbour, spiritual or temporal.' And yet it is to S. Augustine that Liguori refers in justification of his Equivocation and non-pure Mental Reservation, which, according to S. Augustine's definition, are merely forms of expressing a Lie.

With like hardihood S. Augustine is quoted in the Breviary as addressing the Blessed Virgin with the title of 'The only Hope of Sinners,' although the Sermon in which such words occur is known by every one of moderate attainments to be spurious, and is excluded from S. Augustine's works by the Benedictine editors. The value of truth, for truth's sake, is a thing apparently unappreciated and inappreciable by the Romish theological mind, in so far as it is Romish or distinct from Catholic. In one passage in this very treatise S. Augustine seems to have had before his eyes, by a prescient anticipation, the race of Salamanca doctors, Bonacinas, Escobars, and Liguoris. 'And there are among them learned men,' he cries, 'who actually lay down rules and fix limits when a man ought, 'and when he ought not, to commit perjury! O fountains of 'tears, where are ye? Where shall we go? Where shall we 'hide ourselves from the wrath of Truth, if we not only do 'not guard against lies, but dare over and above to teach perjury?' And here is a warning which may not be amiss at present in England.

[1] De Mendacio, cap. 13.

'This, again, is a most miserable thing: even those who are just become our converts don't know how to believe us; for, on their suspecting that we are lying to them about the Catholic dogmas too, so as to be concealing something or other which we think true, you would be sure to say, "I acted in that way, then, in order to catch you;" but what will you answer when the other says, "And how am I to tell that you are not doing the same now in order not to be caught by me?" Will any one be persuaded that a man who will lie in order to catch another, will not lie in order not to be caught himself? See you not the tendency of this pestilential thing? It tends to make every one a justifiable object of suspicion to every one else, us to them, they to us, brother to brother. And so while the Faith is taught by falsehood, the result is rather that we have no faith in any one.'—*Cont. Mend.* cap. 4.

In short, we are reduced to that pleasant state of war and fencing on the plea of which Rome defends her Equivocation and non-pure Mental Reservation.

Thus we see that there is some difference between the *Theory of Truthfulness* held by Modern Rome and that held by the Ancient Church. We must now compare the teaching of England's Moral Theologians on the same point. Bishop Sanderson, whose works we are glad to learn are about to be re-issued from the University Press,[1] has left behind him Lectures delivered in Oxford on the Obligation of Conscience, and on the Obligation of Oaths. We will make a few extracts from the latter of these works, in order to show the difference in principle between the teaching of a manly straightforward English mind, nurtured in the University of Oxford, in the bosom of England's Church, and that of a warped, however devout, Italian conscience, such as Liguori's, whom Rome has honoured with her beatification and canonization.

'An oath,' says Bishop Sanderson, 'is a religious act in 'which God is called to witness for the confirmation of some 'matter in doubt.' The main division of oaths is into assertory and promissory; the first having respect to what is present or past, the second to what is future. We take our extracts from an old translation of the year 1655, which professes to have been made by the special command of King Charles I. and revised by the royal hand.[2]

'Whosoever sweareth, obligeth himself *ipso facto*, to manifest truth in that which he is about to say, whether it be in a matter past or present,

[1] This has now taken place. They have been collected and edited under the careful and learned superintendence of the Rev. W. Jacobson, D.D. Canon of Christ Church, and Regius Professor of Divinity.

[2] It is more than probable that this translation was not only revised, but also made by King Charles himself.—See the Preface to Dr. Jacobson's Edition of Bishop Sanderson's Works, p. x.

by an assertory, or, in a future matter, by a promissory oath. And hitherto this obligation is alike common to both kinds, so that if in either of them the words of the party swearing do not agree with his mind, he becometh guilty of the breach of his duty, and thence also, by a necessary consequence, obnoxious unto punishment. But in the promissory oath, besides this obligation, which falls upon the conscience of the party swearing, and is common to it, and the assertory *quatenus juramentum*, there is another further obligation proper and peculiar to it, *quatenus promissorium*, which falls upon the matter of the oath: by virtue whereof the promissory party swearing is bound not only in present to intend to do that which he sweareth, *that his words may agree with his mind*, but also to endeavour, for the future, as much as in him lieth, to fulfil that which he hath sworn, *that his deeds may agree with his words;* that is, he obligeth himself not only barely to promise that which he really intendeth, but also further obligeth himself to perform all that which he hath promised by oath.'—P. 30.

Again :—

'Whosoever bindeth himself to the performance of anything by so sacred a bond, is wholly bound by the religion of his oath, both in his mind seriously to intend, and as far as lieth in his power willingly to endeavour that he may faithfully perform whatsoever he hath promised, *without fraud, double-dealing, or simulation*. . . .As to the guilt of perjury, especially at the bar of conscience, it matters not much which way an oath be broken, openly or covertly, *that* being a symptom of a profane, *this*, of a deceitful heart; both which, *except fraud be worthy of a greater hatred*, are equally abominable unto the most holy God, who loveth the single in heart and truth in the inward man. . . .Men rest secure, absolving themselves from all guilt and fear of perjury, and think they have excellently well provided for themselves and their consciences, if, during the act of swearing, they can make any shift to defend themselves, either, as the Jesuits do, with some equivocation or mental reservation, or by forcing upon the words some subtle and unnatural interpretation; or if, after they have sworn, they can find some loophole or artificial evasion, whereby such art may be used with the oath that, the words remaining, the sense may be eluded with some sophism, and the strength utterly lost. The ancient Christians did not acknowledge this kind of theology, nor the sounder heathens this moral philosophy. Far otherwise Augustine said, "They are perjured who, preserving the words, deceive the expectation of those to whom they have sworn."'—Pp. 37, 40.

Further :—

'Be it so, that a form of speech appears not by the words themselves, nor by the common estimation of men to be an oath; nevertheless, if a man using such a form, either through mistake think himself to have sworn, or *through some deceitful intention would be thought to have sworn*, that form, though it be not really and in itself an oath, will have nevertheless, as to that man, the full obligations of an oath to all effects; and if he violate his faith so given, he is guilty at the bar of conscience, not only of falsehood, but of perjury. . . .Deceitfulness in the will doth not excuse from obligations, because it is most just that an impious and fraudulent man should fall into the pit which he digged for his neighbour, and that his feet should be caught in the snare which he set for another.'—P. 176.

These extracts will show the spirit of Bishop Sanderson's Treatise on Oaths.

We will now request our readers to recal to mind Liguori's doctrine of Amphibology. There are three kinds of equivocation, it will be remembered; equivocation by means of an ambiguous word—equivocation by means of a double-edged sentence—equivocation by means of such a phrase as *I say, No.* All these kinds of equivocation are justifiable and right when employed for a good reason, and all of them may be used with the sanction of an oath. Now let us compare the Bishop of the English Church with Rome's Bishop:—

'The second case is of an oath when the words, according to their common signification, are clear enough, but the party swearing, having no will to bind himself in that sense, intendeth another, whereof the words by reason of some ambiguity are not altogether incapable, and industriously concealeth his meaning in such sort as that the auditors understand one thing, he another. This is that *verbal equivocation* which, amongst some other casuists and scholastics, the Jesuists especially maintain and practise. . . . As if a Jesuit apprehended should swear that he was a *smith*, meaning that his name was *Smith*, or an apprentice, commanded to tell where his master is, should swear that he *died* a month ago, meaning that he then *dyed* stockings. . . . The Jesuits so vigorously defend this equivocation, that J. Molanus, Professor at Louvain, justifieth the murder of John Huss, perpetrated against the public faith engaged unto him for his safe-conduct, for this reason, that the conduct undertook for *his safe coming*, not for the safety of *his return*. And now let Jesuits confidently complain of the great injuries done them, whilst we say that they hold faith not to be kept with heretics; for if this be to keep faith, they need not much trouble themselves, with whomsoever it is contracted, whether it ought to be kept or broken. . . *Our result is, that the party swearing after this manner both sinneth in his equivocal oath, and is, notwithstanding that tacit equivocation, bound in conscience unto the performance of his promise in that sense which the words yield of themselves, and are, without constraint, apt to beget upon the minds of others. Unless he act accordingly, he is not guiltless of perjury.*'—P. 192.

That he may not appear only to make assertions, or to declaim, he adds his reasons:—

'First, an oath, as we have laid down, ought to be most simply and effectually understood, unto which simplicity this artifice of industrious ambiguity is repugnant. 2. It is a great profanation of the name of God to invoke Him, as witness and searcher of hearts, to attest the truth of words which agree not with the heart of the party swearing; for what were this, if not, as far as lieth in man's power, to make God, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, an impostor and patron of base dissimulation? 3. Equivocation is contrary to the very institution and nature of an oath, whose chief use is to be *an end of strife and controversy*, and to give as certain security in uncertain things as human nature is able to afford, it being *expediendarum litium maximum remedium*. But that certainty which we seek in an oath is lost in equivocation, for what certainty can there be in his answer whose meaning is uncertainty? Nor are controversies thus ended, but aggravated. 4. The party so swearing deludeth his neighbour and knowingly deceiveth, contrary to the precept, *Ne jurat in dolo*, and to the ancient form, *Si sciens fallo*.'—P. 195.

Rome's canonized Bishop teaches, as we have seen, that non-

pure mental reservation is allowable in assertions and in oaths. Contrast England's Bishop :—

'The third case allied to this is that of Mental Reservation, which the Jesuits defend with the same reasons, and define with the same qualifications, as verbal equivocation. For as, in that, by wresting the words pronounced into another sense, so, in this, by some addition not pronounced but conceived in the mind, the party swearing eludeth the interrogatory. So they say *a Priest*, if he be examined by an heretical magistrate whether he be *a Priest*, may answer that he is no *Priest*, meaning of *Bacchus*, or *Apollo*. And an adulterous wife, if she be questioned of adultery by her jealous husband, may swear unto him that she committed not adultery; meaning, not to the end to tell him. The like they hold in promissory oaths; that a traveller, to save his life, may swear to give money to a thief, though he never intend it, provided that when he sware, "I will give thee so much," he understood, *if I owe it thee*, or *if thou demand it before the magistrate*. But as this mental reservation is built on the same sand with verbal equivocation, so is it destroyed at the same dash; for it rooteth all faith and assurance out of men, makes God an impostor, is deceitful unto our neighbour, perverteth the use and end of oaths, setteth open a great gate to all kinds of lies and perjuries, and is so much worse than equivocation as more difficult to be prevented. For equivocation foreseen or suspected may be prevented by such diligent explication of the words as may leave no loophole of ambiguity. But no human art or providence, if men will be juggling, can prevent this reservation. Jesuits and Priests, reserving unto themselves the liberty to reserve anything, are not afraid, with a serious brow, to take our oath of allegiance, though penned with such accuracy of words as leaveth no hold for cavil nor way of escape. Yet that very clause where, in express words, they promise that they will faithfully observe all that has gone before *according unto the tenour of the words pronounced by them, and according to the plain and natural sense and true intent of these words, without any equivocation or mental reservation whatsoever*, they understand at the same time with this reservation—*to wit, that I will tell you.*'—P. 198.

The two methods of dealing with a promissory oath made to a robber, are characteristic of the two theologians. 'You need not pay,' says Liguori, 'if you have used an equivocation in making your promise; but if you have forgotten to do so (*si oblitus uti æquivocatione jurâsti*), you must.'[1] 'You must pay,' says Sanderson, 'because you have made a contract, and derived benefit from it, and called God to witness to your good faith.'

A few more contrasts will be worth selecting :—

'Titius, who promised to marry Berta when she was rich, is not bound to stand to his oath when she has fallen into poverty; having sworn to her

[1] Theol. Mor. iv. 174. This is stricter than some teaching which has been propounded. Pascal gives us another step. 'Our doctors,' replied the Jesuit, 'have taught for the benefit of those who might not be expert in the use of these reservations, that no more is required of them, to avoid lying, than simply to say that they have not done what they have done, provided they have in general the intention of giving to their language the sense *which an able man would give to it.*'—Letter IX.

when in good health, he is not bound to her when she has fallen into infirmity; having sworn to her in good repute, he is not bound to her in ill repute: . . . for the promise does not hold in that case.' 'In case Caius should swear to take the widow of Titius to wife, believing her, though poor, to be rich, he must take her; this error rendereth not the oath invalid, and the like is to be said of oaths of the like kind.'—*Theol. Mor.* 4. 180. *Obl. of Oaths*, p. 134.

We need not say that the first case is Liguori's, the second Sanderson's.

Cardinal Cajetan and Bishop Liguori declare, as we have seen, that there is no obligation to keep an oath which has been made about an indifferent thing. Bishop Sanderson teaches that it is wrong to take such an oath, but that when it has been taken it is binding. He gives his reasons, the chief of which is, that whether a thing is weighty or trivial makes no difference with respect to truth and falsehood; and in spite of the opinion of the Romish casuists, which he supposes to have been held mainly for the purpose of supporting the distinction of mortal and venial sins, 'a leaven with which they have foully 'corrupted the whole lump of moral theology,' concludes that 'he ought not so to have sworn, but, having sworn, he ought to 'fulfil his oath.'

It is no grave sin, teaches Liguori, to use such expressions as *By God! By Christ! I will kill you!* These principles are carried out in practice. The *Mon Dieu* of the Frenchman, the *Jesus* of the Spaniard, are proverbial; the Italian expletives are not less common, though not so much confined to one species. When remonstrated with, the swearers are always ready with the excuse that they were speaking inconsiderately, and without deliberation: this is the very excuse given in Liguori's Moral Theology. Profane swearing is a habit to which Englishmen also, to our shame, are addicted; but mark the difference in the teaching of England's Moral Theology:—

'The cause whence such kinds of oaths are derived,' says Sanderson, 'is either a vicious habit, contracted by a long and pernicious custom, which habit is the fruit and mark of a profane if not atheistical heart, or some exorbitant perturbation of the mind, as excessive anger, intemperate joy, with which, whilst the mind boils, the mouth foameth to the dishonour of God.' . . . 'Tearing the sacred and dreadful name of God with profane lips, and oaths, both without fear and punishment; . . . but I would not be carried away with the tide of grief and indignation. . . . 'A man, through some transportation of anger, love, or other passion of a perturbed mind, or through delight in sin and impious custom of swearing rashly and without judgment, besprinkleth his discourse with oaths. Which vice, in respect both of the heaviness and frequency of the sin, I could wish were more often and vehemently reprehended in sermons, as I see it was diligently and sharply done in his time by the most devout man John Chrysostom, lest, by the just judgment of God, "through oaths the earth mourns," and

the Lord swear in his wrath that he will not hold them guiltless who so contemn his dreadful name that they fear not to invoke his most sacred Majesty as witness.'—Pp. 103, 130, 260.

One more contrast. We have seen that Liguori gives an almost unlimited power of getting rid of the obligation of oaths by means of Dispensations, Commutations, Irritations, Cessations, and Relaxations. Sanderson, allowing the fitness of Irritation, Cessation, and Relaxation, and admitting the propriety of Dispensation, *in the sense* of an exemption from a law by favour of the lawgiver, yet, *so far as oaths are concerned*, totally rejects both Dispensation and Commutation. To dispense with oaths, he argues, is impossible; *because* the obligation of an oath is of Divine natural law, and God has granted to none the power of dispensing with the law of nature, of which He alone is the Author—*because* the existence of a dispensing power destroys that security which is the chief end of oaths, 'for he unto whom 'the oath is made can have no assurance, if the promise of the 'party swearing may be dispensed with, that it should ever be 'fulfilled'—*because* the oath gives a right to the person to whom it is sworn, and therefore its dispensation must be either needless or unreasonable; 'needless and superfluous if it be done 'with his consent to whom the oath was made, if against it, un-'reasonable and unjust—*because* obligation is entered into towards God as well as towards men; and even supposing the last could be taken away, 'yet would it be insupportable presumption that 'dust and ashes should arrogate unto itself authority to take 'away the obligation whereby man is bound to God as witness 'and revenger'—*because* human dispensation is a matter only of external judicature, whereas 'he that claimeth to dispense with 'oaths, assumeth unto himself Divine power, and seateth himself 'on the bench of internal judicature.'

'It is worthy of consideration,' he continues, 'first, that either the cause is manifestly just, why a thing promised by oath ought not to be performed (as if it be impossible, dishonest, or any way unlawful), and then the party swearing may of his own authority, nay ought, without waiting for dispensation from the Pope, or any other, to retract the thing sworn; for when there is no obligation, the conscience is free and needeth no dispensation; or secondly, that no just cause appeareth why the oath should not be kept, and then it must be kept, and he who either asketh or granteth dispensation, sinneth, because the obligation, which neither can nor may be removed by human power, remaineth; or lastly, that the thing is doubtful, and it appeareth not, by reason of difficulties on both sides, whether the party swearing be bound to the performance of his promise, and then it will be profitable to consult with pious and prudent men, skilful in the Divine law, and to resolve with their advice what is most expedient. In which matter, seeing knowledge is more requisite than power, I understand not why the Pope should be fitter than another man, unless it were certain that the Pope excelled other men in prudence and piety.'—P. 239.

He does not hesitate in his conclusion :—

'Wherefore I conclude that neither pope, nor prince, nor synod, nor senate, nor ecclesiastical nor secular superior, hath any right to dispense with leagues, contracts, oaths, or to absolve any man from that bond wherein, before the dispensation granted, he was engaged.'—P. 241.

We have compared the systems of modern Rome, of primitive antiquity, and of reformed England, with respect to truth and falsehood, good faith and bad faith. There is one other authority to which we must refer, though only in a few words. Our review would not be complete without a glance at the *Theory of Truthfulness*, as laid down by the more than Moral Theologians, Moses, David, Solomon, the Prophets, and the Apostles. Thus speak Moses and Solomon :—

'If a man vow a vow unto the Lord, or swear an oath to bind his soul with a bond, he shall not break his word, he shall do according to all that proceedeth out of his mouth.' 'When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it, for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee, and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin unto thee. That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform, even a freewill offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy mouth.' 'Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain.' 'When thou vowest a vow unto God defer not to pay it, for he hath no pleasure in fools: pay that which thou hast vowed. Better is it that thou shouldest not vow than that thou shouldest vow and not pay.'—*Numb.* xxx. 2; *Deut.* xxiii. 21; *Exod.* xx. 7; *Eccl.* v. 4.

And so David :—

'Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing. The Lord will abhor both the bloodthirsty and deceitful man.' 'For there is no faithfulness in their mouth.' 'Who shall dwell in thy holy hill? . . . He that sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not . . . he that hath clean hands and a pure heart, who hath not lifted up his soul unto vanity, nor sworn deceitfully.' 'Deliver my soul, O Lord, from lying lips and a deceitful tongue.'—*Ps.* v. 6. 9; xv. 4; cxx. 2.

Jeremiah depicts the state of war and fencing to which we may be reduced, and Zechariah the means of escaping from it :—

'Oh that I had in the wilderness a lodging-place of wayfaring men;
That I might leave my people and go from them!
For they be all adulterers, an assembly of treacherous men;
And they bend their tongues like bows, for lies;
But they are not valiant for the truth upon the earth;
For they proceed from evil to evil, and they know not me, saith the Lord.
Take ye heed every one of his neighbour, and trust ye not in any brother:
For every brother will utterly supplant, and every neighbour will walk with slanders.

And they will deceive every one his neighbour, and will not speak the truth:
They have taught their tongue to speak lies and weary themselves to commit iniquity.
Their tongue is as an arrow shot out: it speaketh deceit:
One speaketh peaceably to his neighbour with his mouth, but in his heart he layeth wait for him.'—*Jer.* ix. 2.

'These are the things that ye shall do:
Speak ye every man the truth to his neighbour:
Execute the judgment of truth and peace in your gates:
And let none of you imagine evil in your hearts against another;
And love no false oaths, for all these are things that I hate, saith the Lord.'—*Zech.* viii. 16.

S. Paul warns, and S. John threatens:—

'Wherefore, putting away lying, speak every man truth with his neighbour.'—*Eph.* iv. 25.

'But the fearful, and unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers and sorcerers, and idolaters, *and all liars*, shall have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone.'—*Rev.* xxi. 8.

It is not from want of other matter, as we stated at the beginning, that we have confined ourselves to one subject. Liguori is prolific in material. For example, we might have examined his Theory of Theft, according to which we find that no sin of theft can be mortal unless a certain quantity is stolen; that to steal 3*s.* or 4*s.* from a very opulent merchant is a mortal sin, from a very rich nobleman venial—that a wife may support her previous children out of her husband's goods against his will, and spend anything under the twentieth of his income on alms and gifts—that a nobleman in extreme distress may steal if he is ashamed to beg—that a servant may compensate himself by 'taking' if his salary is too small—that a rich man's son may steal 12*s.* from his father at any time without grave sin—that a monk's sin in stealing anything under 16*s.* from his monastery is only venial—and that a great nobleman's son commits only a venial sin whenever he steals from his father anything under or equal to 10*l.*

We might have pointed out the omissions as well as the commissions with which the book is chargeable. We might have shown the doctrinal corruption interspersed and taken for granted throughout. We might have submitted to our readers' scorn such ludicrous sentiments as Azorius's and Bonacina's, that a mother may wish for her daughter's death if the latter is too ugly to get married.[1] We might have held up to the just indignation of all Christians, and all men, the detestable arguments

[1] Hom. Apost. iii. 53.

(supported by the authority of Bonacina, the Salamanca doctors, Barbosa, Suarez, Hurtado, Henriquez, and the *common* voice of the casuists in opposition to Lopez and Farinaccius) to prove that the penalty of deprivation annexed to the commission of a sin too heinous to be named, is not incurred by Romish Priests unless they are in the constant habit of the sin: *requiritur ut actus sodomiæ sit frequentatus sive usu continuatus, ut ait Navarrus; hoc enim importat verbum,* exercentes, *in Bullâ expressum:*[1] whence Liguori draws the conclusion that, so far as penalties are concerned, 'a man who commits the act once or twice is excused.'

But we have selected the one subject of truth and lying because it lies at the foundation of all morality. When once the virtue of veracity is undermined, the whole character is ruined, and nothing can be the consequence but blindness of the moral eye and confusion of moral sentiment. From this blindness and confusion arises an adoption of principles, and specific application of those principles, in which we can only hesitate whether the shocking or the grotesque is the most prevailing element; for that which is morally wicked is always intellectually ludicrous, if we are at liberty to look at it in the latter light.

Untruthfulness is a phenomenon which is found in a remarkable degree in all the southern nations of Europe, and, we fear it must be added in Ireland, while the northern nations are in general comparatively free from it. Thoughtful minds have often sought for an adequate hypothesis by which to account for this phenomenon. We believe that our pages will have suggested one to some minds, and confirmed it to others. When S. Philumenism is put in the place of manly faith[2]—when all duties are merged in the one duty called by the specious name of advancing religion—when men and women put the entire direction of their souls out of their own hands into the absolute control of others, in spite of the nature which God has given them—when those who have the control of the consciences of others are supplied (and supplied by an authority which they hold infallible) with a system of moral principles and rules in which truth is flagrantly violated, good faith sapped, and the obligation of oaths reduced to a trick of words, with which a hair-splitting sophist may play like counters—what can we expect but the very phenomenon which we find existing? The lock and the key answer to each other admirably.

English Romanists, we are aware, profess indignation when

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[1] Theol. Mor. iv. 471.

[2] See 'The Practical Working of the Church of Spain,' p. 353; and the Rev. Dr. Scott's 'Twelve Sermons, Appendix.'

the charge of bad faith is brought against them. That they are saved, to a great degree, from the blight which has fallen on their co-religionists, by means of the counteracting influences amongst which they live, we readily allow. Still, even in England, things which we cannot forget have forced themselves to the light. The Gawthorn case, the Carré case, the De Col case, and many others, could, we venture to assert, have occurred only amongst Romanists. If, however, they are really anxious to prove their good faith in the face of their fellow-countrymen, let them exert themselves to get this work of S. Alfonso de' Liguori, with its lying Theory of Truthfulness, condemned by the rulers of their Church. Until this is done, we must be pardoned if we believe their word—because they are Christians—because they are men of honour—because they are Englishmen; not because they are—but in spite of their being—Romanists.

APPENDIX.

THE RAMBLER, AND THE DUBLIN REVIEW.

Two replies to the above article have appeared: one in the 'Rambler,' of April, 1854, and the other in the 'Dublin Review,' of January, 1855. The first is short, readable, irascible, and abusive; the last long, unreadable, temperate, and dreary. We will answer them separately.

The object of the Rambler seems to be rather to relieve his own mind, than to argue and by argument to work conviction in his reader. The article was written, we suppose, for those who already sympathized with the writer, and were not, therefore, likely to look very closely to the meaning of words, the truth of statements, and the force of reasoning, with which they already agreed. In ourselves it has created a kindly feeling of amusement, for there is a *bonhommie* in the midst of its abusive epithets, and a bravery in mis-statement, and an apparent disregard whether or no conclusions follow from premisses, which totally disarms indignation, and substitutes a smile for a remonstrance. For example, 'To the recklessness of a retained 'accuser he adds the dishonourable artifices of the crafty advo-'cate.' (p. 310.) And why these hard words? Because we have quoted a passage from Pascal's Provincial Letters, and reviewed *A Treatise of Equivocation* in the same article with S. Alfonso. But the Rambler shall give his reasons in his own words. After the sentence which we have quoted, he continues:—

'He *professes* to charge Rome with immoral teaching on the ground that she has sanctioned the work of S. Alphonsus; but when he comes to details, he mixes up extracts from other writers, as authoritative exponents of Roman morality, to which no shadow of sanction was ever given, which were put forth from a source actually condemned by the Church, or even rest upon no alleged authority whatsoever. Of all the writers in the world, Pascal is selected as the expositor of Catholic doctrine. We might as reasonably fasten upon the *Record* newspaper as the expositor of the views of Dr. Pusey. An anonymous Treatise on Equivocation, some three hundred years old, but whose existence was only lately discovered, is freely quoted by way of proof of what the Catholic Church now authoritatively instructs her children to believe as the undoubted word of God; merely because certain phrases used

by the unknown casuist sound uglier in the British ear, than anything to be extracted from the works of the Saint. So, too, a story about S. Francis is detailed, confessedly "not found in Liguori," but (says our truth-seeking Reviewer) accepted by Roman controversialists as a faithful exponent of their views, and justified as such. What, we may well ask, has all this to do with S. Alphonsus Liguori, or with the casuistry authorised by the Church of Rome? or what right has Garnet to appear in any such connection? The artifice is transparent. The object is to confer an appearance of *learning* on the writer's dissertations, and to convince the hesitating Protestant reader, that Catholic theologians are one and all a band of deceivers—traitors to God and foes to men. To this incidental illustration of the wickedness of Catholic casuistry, we shall therefore allude no further. Whether the authors of the propositions here attributed to them were right or wrong, neither we nor any other Catholics are bound by them. The principles, moreover, on which they must be judged, are identical with those on which S. Alphonsus bases his opinions, and in handling the latter they will be in reality fully discussed.'—p. 311.

First for Pascal: the Equivocation, or Mental Restriction, by which it is stated that we have 'selected Pascal as the expositor 'of Catholic doctrine,' and so 'charged Rome with immoral 'teaching,' for extracts 'which were put forth from a source 'actually condemned by the Church,' is delicious. We *have* quoted Pascal (p. 7,) but it has been as the *exposer*, not as the *exponent* of Roman teaching. Whether *expositor* is an equivocal word which bears both meanings, and the Rambler used it in one sense, meaning his readers to understand it in the other, we don't know. Certainly to charge Rome with having adopted the high, the pure, the lofty, the severe morality of Pascal and the Jansenists as her own, or to 'mix up extracts' from Pascal 'as authoritative exponents of Roman morality,' was a thing which we have neither done, nor should dream of doing. Our charge against Rome is, that she has deliberately adopted and sanctioned that system of morality, against which, in the name of Morality, Truth, and Righteousness, Pascal and Port-Royal struggled, prayed, preached, argued, and declaimed.

It is creditable, however, in the Rambler to have acknowledged, that there is as great a divergence between schools of theologians within the Church of Rome, as between 'the *Record* 'newspaper,' and 'Dr. Pusey.' We have known this, but it has been frequently denied.

Then for the 'anonymous treatise.' This is of course the writing 'to which no shadow of sanction was ever given.' That can hardly be said with truth, when the highest Roman Catholic authority then existing in the realm of England, gave it his Imprimatur, on the ground that it was 'very learned, truly pious, 'and Catholic . . . and therefore most worthy of being printed 'for the consolation of afflicted Catholics, and the instruction of 'all the pious.' (*Supr.* p. 31.) Then we are told 'that it is freely

'quoted, by way of proof of what the Catholic Church *now* 'authoritatively instructs her children to believe, as the un-'doubted word of God.' By the Word of God *we* mean the Bible, and we never said that the Church of Rome taught her children to believe the 'Treatise of Equivocation,' like the Word of God. And further, we never quoted the said Treatise in proof of what the Roman Church *now* authoritatively teaches. On the contrary, we drew an elaborate comparison between the teaching of the seventeenth century and of the nineteenth century, as exhibited respectively in the Treatise and in S. Alfonso. (*Supr.* p. 36.)

'The artifice is transparent.' So transparent as to be no artifice at all. But the Rambler does not seem to be quite sure of the purpose of 'the artifice;' for first he says that it is to pass off what is not authorised as authorised; and then he says it is to confer an appearance of learning on the writer's dissertation. Being unconscious of 'the artifice,' we are unable to give the Rambler the information which may set him right on this point. But 'the principles,' it seems, after all, on which these quotations 'must be judged, are identical with those on which St. 'Alphonsus bases his opinions, and in handling the latter they 'will be in reality fully discussed.' Then why was the Remembrancer a reckless retained accuser, and a dishonourable crafty advocate, for comparing and considering in the same paper two systems of Truthfulness, which, according to the acknowledgment of the Rambler, are 'identical' in principle, and the handling of one of which necessarily involves 'the full discussion' of the other?

Again: there is a most amusing account of the doctrine of Probable Opinions. 'Briefly stated, and *divested of techni-'calities*, it amounts to this . . . "Consult a friend or two on your 'difficulty. Don't go to a simpleton, or a prejudiced man, or a 'fanatic, or a man of paradoxes; but *go to one or two persons of 'integrity*, who have experience and good judgment, who will see 'the thing in its clear light, unbiassed by any personal preferences, 'and act without scruple on their advice,"' &c. (p. 335.) We presume here that by the word *technicalities*, the Rambler means (by help of one of the modes of Equivocation, or of Mental Restriction) *the substantial characteristics* of the system. For only so are his words true. The doctrine of Probable Opinions, *divested of its substantial characteristics*, may be as he represents it; and this, perhaps, is what he meant by *divested of technicalities*. If not, the last sentence which we extracted should run thus, instead of as the Rambler has written it, 'Go to *twenty 'or thirty Moral Theologians, or a book containing their opinions*, 'and act without scruple on *the advice of any one of them, that*

'*may be most convenient to you.*' And this gives a somewhat different complexion to the matter.

There are other passages about '*the devices* by which truth may be lawfully concealed' (p. 325,) and 'the Italian mode' of Equivocation, 'which has *little attraction* for the English mind,' and '*the vast variety of Equivocations*' which are 'theoretically 'permitted by Catholic theologians' (p. 332,) and the sad loss sustained by Anglicanism in 'possessing no code of definitions 'on the subject of lying and Equivocation' (p. 325,) which it would be interesting to examine if we had space.

Where the Rambler argues, his argument is curious. Being unable to deny that our extracts were genuine, or to point out any unfairness in the manner in which they are quoted,[1] there

[1] The only attempt of this kind which is made, is so silly that we have not thought it worth while to alter the passage on which the Reviewer has fastened, as containing an 'equivocation of the most startling audacity,' 'dishonourable,' 'unjustifiable,' 'wilful deception,' and thereupon applied to us the titles 'Scribes,' 'Pharisees,' 'hypocrites,' &c., and all the other epithets which the *accusatoria necessitas* furnishes. It is the passage at the foot of p. 5. The purpose of the extract is to give, in Liguori's words, an explanation of what Mental Restriction is, and the list of the casuists who approve of it. Accordingly we extracted only such parts as were conducive to this purpose, omitting, and at the same time *marking that we had omitted*, two passages, containing respectively Innocent XIth's. three propositions, and an assertion that Mental Reservation was employed by our Lord in S. Matt. xxiv. 36. 'Of that day and hour knoweth no man, neither the angels, nor the Son, but the Father.' This assertion is totally untrue, but it would have occupied several pages to have given the true meaning of that difficult text, involving a discussion of His two Natures, which would have been foreign to our purpose, and all that we were then doing was 'stating the principles of Mental Restriction,' and showing what it was according to the showing of its advocates. We, therefore, did not meddle with the exposition of that text; but, instead, placed the recognized marks of having omitted one or more sentences. Hereupon the Rambler declares that we made 'a distinct assertion that we had quoted *the whole* passage,' whereas we made no such assertion; but, on the contrary, made it clear in the conventional manner that we had only quoted a part of it. And he triumphantly suggests, that the reason why we did so, was that S. Matt. xxiv. 36 undeniably justifies Liguori's doctrine. Well! let us see if it does. Liguori maintains that after the words *nor the Son*, our Lord said to Himself, by non-pure Mental Restriction, *so as to tell you*. As we have said, it would take too long to discuss in what relation or character it was that the Son was ignorant of that Day. Here we will only show that the case does not help S. Alfonso and his apologists. The Rambler says, 'It is impossible to deny that when our Blessed Lord said, "Of that day and hour knoweth no man, neither the angels in heaven, *nor the Son*, but the Father," *He used an equivocation which the disciples were certain not to penetrate.*' Liguori does not bring the words forward for the sake of proving *Equivocation*, nor is he 'arguing in favour of *Equivocation.*' He brings them forward in order to justify *Mental Restriction*. It is a mistake, then, in the Rambler to have employed the word Equivocation instead of Mental Restriction—a mistake, indeed, which runs through the article. Then, supposing that the answer justifies any kind of Mental Restriction, which of the two species does it justify? The Rambler answers, 'It is impossible to deny that He used an equivocation, *which the disciples were certain not to penetrate.*' Then it was not a non-pure Mental Restriction, but a pure Mental Restriction which was employed, and this is condemned by Innocent XI. and forbidden by Liguori. Innocent's condemnation of non-pure Mental Restriction has entirely cut away the argument which a bold dealing with the text was previously able to constitute. It was not

were but two courses open to him, either to deny the authority of the book, or to justify its teaching. The dilemma was unpleasant, and we can feel for the Apologist's difficulty in making up his mind what to do. But we were scarcely prepared for what he does do. He takes both courses: first, he sacrifices S. Alfonso for the sake of truthfulness, and then he sacrifices truthfulness for the sake of S. Alfonso; thereby displaying a spirit of self-immolation with which we had not expected him to be animated. 'We refuse *in limine*,' says the Rambler, 'to be held responsible, as Catholics, for any of the private 'opinions expressed by S. Alphonsus.'[1] This would be intelligible ground if it were not that (1) the Rambler does make himself responsible for his opinions, and (2) every Roman Catholic *must* be responsible for them. He reaps the benefits, such as they are, of having an approved system; and he must not hope to avoid its disadvantages. No Roman Catholic dares say that any one of the instances of untruthfulness, or (for example) the doctrine of seduction, taught in the passages which we have extracted, is immoral: he must maintain that there is nothing in them contrary to good morals. Consequently, it is idle for him to cry out that he won't 'be held responsible.' He is, and must be responsible; and to urge that he may hold other opinions as well, is simply irrelevant. If Dr. Newman should dare to condemn as immoral the opinion that a man may answer *I say, No*, to a question put to him, meaning in his own mind no more than that he is using the word *No*, but intending his auditor to understand that he has denied his question,—Dr. Newman would be so far a 'bad Catholic,' and in open rebellion against the authority of his Church.

But if the Rambler, while retaining his theological position, cannot be allowed the unhappy satisfaction of sacrificing S. Alfonso, he may, and must, sacrifice truthfulness instead. He defends his doctrine of Equivocation and Mental Reservation.—What that doctrine is our readers have seen. The Rambler's account of it is curious. He says that 'it amounts to this: 1. 'We are never allowed to tell a lie. 2. We are not always 'obliged to tell everybody the whole truth. 3. When we have 'a sufficient reason for not telling it, we may use equivocal

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true, but yet it might be made to appear plausible to persons whose moral natures did not revolt from attributing such an act to Him who is the Truth, that our Lord made use of *pure* Mental Restriction. That he was using *non-pure* Mental Restriction is not even plausible. Yet the old argument is handed on from writer to writer as though Innocent had never spoken.

[1] Strictly speaking, there are no 'private opinions' of S. Alfonso, because they have all been approved by the Roman Church. It may be, therefore, that the Rambler meant nothing by this sentence, and was only equivocating. We can't say; but we will suppose that this is not the case.

'words, which conceal the truth, but do not deny it. 4. But 'if the *equivocalness* is not ordinarily felt and known, so that 'the second meaning exists only in my mind *purè mentalis*, I 'cannot use it.' (p. 324.) It will be seen that this fourth proposition is wholly untrue, in so far as it pretends to be an account of S. Alfonso's teaching, and is an edition prepared for the English taste and market. For proof of this we must refer to pages 6, 12, 13—to the answers put into the mouth of the guilty wife in p. 15—to the permission to swear what is false, provided that you whisper something that nobody understands in p. 19, and other instances found *passim*. The Reviewer has thrown overboard S. Alfonso's principle, which is, that you may be guilty of moral untruthfulness in deceiving your neighbour, provided you do not do so by means of material untruth, and adopts a totally different principle, viz. that you may use equivocal expressions to conceal your meaning, when those expressions are ordinarily known and felt to be equivocal, *i. e.* when they are of no use at all for concealing your meaning, and are not in any practical sense equivocal. Liguori, on the contrary, discards an equivocal phrase as soon as its 'equivocalness' has become 'ordinarily felt and known,' and invents another to take its place. (Hom. Ap. Tr. xi. 18.)

One more specimen from the Rambler, and we will pass to the Dublin Review:—

'One chief safeguard laid down by theologians against the abuse of Equivocation, lies in the fundamental axiom, that we may not equivocate to a person, whose relation to us is such, that he has a right to know the truth. The relation of a parent to a child, of a master to a servant, of a judge to a witness, of a physician to a voluntary patient, even (say) of a bankrupt's creditors to a bankrupt, is quite different from that of persons who are *in a condition of perfect equality*, and who are bound by no peculiar engagement to one another . . . St. Alphonsus all along presupposes that the person *whom we design to mislead*, is one who has no kind of right over us, and who, therefore, ought to be prepared for equivocal replies, and to be content to be thrown on his own wits for discovering the precise truth.'—(p. 331.)

First, we will consider this passage on the hypothesis that it is true. It will be seen what is the consequence of being 'in a 'condition of perfect equality' with our neighbour upon the Liguorian theory. It is that 'we must be prepared for equivocal 'replies,' that we must 'be thrown on our own wits for discover-'ing the precise truth,' of what our brother says to us, and that our brother may 'mislead' us, and 'design to mislead' us. Happy state of Christian confidence, and generous trustfulness, where heart rests on heart, sure that its guilelessness will not be betrayed, safe in the sacred relationship of 'equality' and brotherhood! The spirits of the sons of Ishmael would rejoice

over it! But it is an improvement upon Ishmaelitism, for the Ishmaelites had their hands directed against every man, except their brethren, but here the very reason for 'misleading,' 'designing to mislead,' 'being thrown upon our wits,' &c. is, that we are 'in a condition of perfect equality' bound together by the bond of Christian and human unity, 'equal' members of the Church of Christ, and the family of men. Bishop Taylor maintains as an axiom that men as men 'have a right to truth;' 'for there is in mankind an universal contract implied in all 'their intercourses, and words being instituted to declare the 'mind, and for no other end, he that hears me speak hath a 'right in justice to be done him, that as far as I can, what I 'speak be true; for else he by words does not know your mind, 'and then as good and better not speak at all.' (Duct. Dub. 3. 2. 5.) But according to the Liguorian doctrine, as interpreted by the Rambler, 'the right,' which exists, would be, not that we should be told the truth by the speaker, but that the speaker should be allowed 'to mislead' us; and we have no 'right to 'truth' from him, unless we are 'bound by some peculiar engage-'ment' to him.

But, secondly, it is not true that according to Liguori this privilege of 'misleading,' and 'designing to mislead,' our neighbour, (to use the Rambler's language,) is confined to those persons only who are 'in a condition of perfect equality,' and in no peculiar 'relation,' such as parent and child, master and servant, &c. A wife, we imagine, is in a special 'relation' to her husband. That our readers may see whether or no she may equivocate, and what equivocations she may use, in addressing her husband, we must ask them to look back to p. 16. A penitent is in such a relation to his confessor; at p. 19, it will be seen that he may equivocate in the act of confession. The relation of a witness to a judge, is one specially named by the Rambler, as giving 'a right to know the truth:' at p. 22, 23, it will be seen that a witness need *not* tell the truth to a judge, and that under some circumstances he is bound to lie. A nun is in such a relation to her Episcopal Visitor, but yet she is 'excused from telling the truth,' at the moment when she is subject to Visitation. (Theol. Mor. v. 57. Christian Remembrancer, Oct. 1854, p. 445.)

We may pass on to the Dublin Review.

The Dublin Reviewer considers that we have 'given both 'scandal and pain to many readers, who wished to look with 'kindly feelings upon the Catholic Church,' and that 'the whole 'question between Rome and England is for ever with some put 'into a nutshell,' and that our article 'is of so mischievous a

'character,' that it is necessary for him to review it. He does not, however, pour out the abuse which makes the staple of the Rambler's article. The Dublin Review is grave enough, so grave, that we doubt if there is likely to be any other person except the writer, the editor, and ourselves, who have read it throughout. We, however, have read it, and on reaching the end of it, we found an assertion that 'our charge had been 'denied.' As the whole article seemed intended to be a justification of the theory of Equivocation Amphibology and Mental Reservation, not a denial of its being taught, we were surprised at this assertion, and looked back to see what was denied. Was it denied that the extracts were taken from S. Alfonso? No. Was it denied that they were taken fairly and correctly? No. Was it denied that S. Alfonso, and with him the Church of Rome, taught the doctrine of Amphibology and Mental Reservation, as contained in these extracts? No. Then what was denied? The Reviewer has denied (1) that such teaching is immoral, (2) that we have rightly understood and explained the nature of Equivocation. We will consider both these points, and the second of them first.

Supposing that it were true that we had misunderstood and misexplained Equivocation, would that justify Liguori? We have given his own words, and every person may judge for himself whether they teach truthfulness. But it is not true, and the ponderous words heaped up by the Reviewer in proof of it, crumble to pieces as soon as an attempt is made to analyze them. 'By equivocation,' says the Reviewer, 'is meant a 'word or proposition representing more than one meaning .... 'Mental restriction is a sentence, the wording of which, regarded 'in itself, represents a false meaning.' (p. 345.) The Reviewer might just as well say that thinking is a book. Equivocation, Mental Restriction, and Thinking find their expression in a proposition or propositions, sentences, and books; but they are not themselves that by which they are expressed.

The Reviewer's theory of what Equivocation is, when translated into ordinary English, comes to this. There are, as Raynaudus says, two precepts, one which forbids to lie, the other which commands to tell the truth. The first is of universal application, therefore lying is universally forbidden; the second is not of universal application, therefore—what? The only conclusion that follows is, that we may refuse to answer under some circumstances, when applied to for information on a point with which we are acquainted. Instead of this conclusion the Reviewer draws the inference, that Equivocation is justifiable—why? Because, says he, it does not offend against the negative precept, but only against the affirmative precept, which is not

of universal application: and the method by which he makes out that it does not offend against the negative precept, is the following. He makes the precept forbidding falsehood to be the correlative of 'man's first right with reference to moral 'truth, *The right to true language.*' Now Equivocation does not offend against *true language*, for true words, in one sense, viz. *materially* true words, are always used by it. Therefore, argues the Reviewer, it does not offend against the precept forbidding falsehood. It is evident that his fallacy lies in the manner in which he has expressed 'man's first right with reference to moral truth.' It is not 'the right *to true language*,' but (as expressed by Bp. Taylor in the passage quoted above) '*to truth*,' and against this Equivocation does offend, although against the former it does not, because its essence consists in being a moral untruth conveyed by means of materially *true language*.

'We are told,' says the Reviewer, quoting our words, 'that '"wherever there is an attempt to deceive, whether by a '"material truth, or by a material falsehood, there is moral false-'"hood." We were not likely to forget this fact, since it is con-'ceded to the full by our theologians, although some of them 'maintain with S. Thomas, that the special malice of a lie, *as* '*such*, is to be sought from the intention of saying that which is 'false.' (p. 354.) Whether or no, this is 'conceded to the full' by S. Alfonso, our readers may see by referring to p. 12, and to Hom. Ap. Tr. xi. 18. It is ridiculously untrue, and indeed, could not be otherwise than untrue in the mouth of any maintainer of Equivocation, from the very nature of Equivocation itself. Let a man analyze Equivocation, and he will see immediately that this is the case: or let him examine Liguori's instances in p. 4, and p. 15, and he will come to the same conclusion. The distinction between deceiving your neighbour, and allowing your neighbour to be deceived, by your words, is, as explained by Roman Theologians, a pure subtlety, resting on the convenient doctrine of the direction of the intention.

2. The Reviewer denies that S. Alfonso's teaching is immoral. He must do so: he cannot help himself, for unlike the Rambler, he has acknowledged that it is the teaching of his Church. 'It is not true that the Church has adopted the theory of S. 'Alphonsus, but that S. Alphonsus has never departed from the 'theory of the Church.' (p. 328.) But whether such denial will serve to whitewash Liguori, or to sink the Review and the party that it represents, in estimation, we must leave to our readers to judge. The Reviewer must deny that the famous *No, I say* artifice is immoral, (*Supr.* p. 4,) that the ἠ γλῶσ' ὀμώμοχ' principle is immoral (p. 20,) that the whispering device is im-

moral (p. 19,) that false-witness in a court of justice is immoral (p. 22,) that the falsehoods put into the mouth of the adulterous wife are immoral (p. 15,) that the doctrine of seduction as laid down, p. 17, is immoral. Nay, he enters on the examination of this latter point at length, and gives it his unqualified approval, though he acknowledges that his English readers may consider 'these distinctions,' as 'nothing but miserable subterfuges, loop-'holes of escape for the aristocratical [or rich] libertine, tortured 'out for him by the obsequious casuist of Rome.' (D. R. p. 394.)

That the Reviewer considers Equivocation justifiable is apparent, not only from his teaching, but his practice. We have one example in the very page to which we have just referred. Liguori having proved that neither a nobleman nor a rich man, who has seduced a maiden on promise of marriage, is bound to fulfil his promise by marrying his victim, proves further that he is not bound even to make her any compensation, because, says the Reviewer, 'she ought to look upon the injury which she 'has received, as a just punishment for her own carelessness and '*levity of conduct.*' By this last expression every English reader would of course understand, that in punishment for her sin, arising from her lightness of character, she could claim no redress. Liguori meant nothing of the kind. The levity, or carelessness, of which he is speaking, is not *levity of moral conduct*, but the carelessness by which the victim failed to discover that her seducer did not mean what he promised, when he said that he would marry her.

Again in the next page, 'What the writer in the Christian 'Remembrancer affirms as to the right allowed in [R.] Catholic 'countries to the nobility to seduce maidens, under the promise 'of marriage, and then refuse to keep the promise, comes to this. '1. That the nobility have no more right than other men to 'seduce maidens, and are equally bound to keep their promise, '*whenever they can do so without sin.*'

Here, by a Mental Reservation (we suppose), the Reviewer has failed to mention that, according to Rome's teaching, they *never can do so without sin*, and, therefore, *never* have to keep their promise.

'2. A woman cannot claim redress from any man on the 'ground of having been deceived, if *she can justly be considered* '*as having lent herself to the deception, or allowed herself to be* '*easily duped.*'

Here the Reviewer has in like manner failed to mention, that, according to Rome's teaching, *every such woman may be justly considered, &c.* and, therefore, that *no* such woman can claim redress.

'3. Some theologians maintain that the woman cannot claim 'a high marriage, if at the time of making the contract, she 'only contemplated a low one.'

Here the Reviewer has in like manner failed to mention that the opinion of these theologians, is more than sufficient to justify *every high-born or rich libertine*, in refusing to fulfil his contract. 'Some theologians,' are Cardinal De Lugo, Viva, the Salamanca Doctors, Cornejo, Sanchez, Antony of Cordova, Moneta, Peter Ledesma, Veracruz, and Saint Alfonso de' Liguori, while the only two that are mentioned on the other side, are Lessius and Busembaum.

Again: there is apparently an Equivocation contained in the words, 'under *the seal* of secrecy' (p. 383,) and in the explanation of 'legitimately questioned,' '*i. e.* under the conditions 'prescribed by law' (p. 351,)—meaning, not the law of the land, but the law laid down by the Moral Theologians. These, however, are but trifling and natural consequences of the principle which is being maintained.

When the Reviewer condescends to apologize in place of justifying, his defence is the following: 'The society for which 'St. Alphonsus wrote is Italian, and his theology is, conse-'quently, to a great extent, shaped to suit the moral exigencies 'of that people, and presupposes all their customs and con-'ventionalities. It is scarcely possible to imagine two cha-'racters more widely different, than the Italian and English, 'nor any two less capable of judging one another.' (p. 333.) We have seen several attempts of this kind lately made, to represent uprightness and truthfulness as *a curious national peculiarity*, like red hair, or an aquiline nose, instead of a Christian virtue. The Reviewer puts an objection into the mouth of his 'Pro-'testant countryman.' 'I am willing to grant that the Italian 'may be *naturally less truthful* than the Englishman, but how 'does this fact excuse your Church? You have said, truly 'enough, that the moral progress of a nation is in proportion to 'the standard of excellence instilled into the mind by education: 'now, from whence does the Italian get his education ex-'cept from the Church? Is it not, then, in her power to 'make truthfulness so much the standard of excellence, as to 'counteract the *natural tendencies* of the people? Why, then, 'is so little prominence given to this virtue in the works of your 'theologians?' Such is the objection which the Reviewer is able to conceive brought forward by his 'Protestant countryman.' Now for the answer to it. 'This mode of reply shows an igno-'rance of *the grand fact, that* [*R.*] *Catholic morality is supernatural* '*and not natural*, and that the teaching of the [Roman] Church 'has a distinct end and object-matter, and, consequently, is based

'upon distinct principles as compared with the teaching of nature.' (p. 333.) This is, we acknowledge, '*a grand fact.*' We admit that the morality of the Church of Rome is '*not natural,*' and is based upon distinct principles from that morality which befits human nature. What supernatural beings it may be suited for, we cannot say, though possibly the expression 'Father of lies' might lead us to conjecture. At any rate, it confessedly has a distinct end, object-matter, and principles, from the teaching of nature; from such morality, that is, as we find in Bishop Butler, and every great and true Moralist. This is, we allow, *a grand fact.* Possibly it is sufficient to account for that *natural want of truthfulness*, which the Reviewer acknowledges to exist in Italy, and which is found in every country where Rome has full sway.

One word in conclusion. The Redemptorist Fathers have promised England and Ireland the blessing of an English Edition of S. Alfonso's Works. But there is one portion of his writings which they refuse to translate, viz. his Moral Theology. Why is this? It may be replied that it is only meant for Priests. Very good: but why should that which is meant for Priests, be veiled from the profane eyes of laymen? If it is good for the first, why should it be harmful to the last? There is one portion of it, indeed, which we should shrink from seeing in a vulgar tongue. Let the parts referring to Purity be kept—if kept they must be—enwrapped in double folds and concealed in a language ordinarily unread. But why should the rest of the six octavo volumes be kept likewise hidden from the common gaze? If the morality inculcated in them is high and pure, they will raise the standard of morals in those that read them. If they are not translated with his other works, Englishmen will judge that the Editors did not dare to unveil the deformities contained in them, lest they and their system alike should be overwhelmed with an outburst of indignation, on the part of those who wish to see morality taught, which *is* suitable to the 'nature' which God has given to man, and *not* a system 'based upon distinct principles,' with 'a distinct end and object-matter.' They will judge that the reason why these volumes are alone withheld from view, is the same as that which Cicero tells us prevented the mysterious books of the Roman Law from being divulged: *quæ, dum erant occulta, necessario ab iis qui ea tenebant petebantur; postea vero, pervulgata atque in manibus jactata et excussa, inanissima prudentiæ reperta sunt, fraudis autem et stultitiæ plenissima.*

John and Charles Mozley, Printers, Derby.

MORAL THEOLOGY

OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.

No. II.

CERTAIN POINTS IN

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S MORAL THEOLOGY,

CONSIDERED IN NINETEEN LETTERS,

BY THE REV. H. E. MANNING,

AND THE REV. F. MEYRICK.

LONDON:

J. AND C. MOZLEY, PATERNOSTER ROW;

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mind of the agent. With respect to the last, he maintained that Liguori's theory of Equivocation was incompatible with Truthfulness. The Rev. H. E. Manning objected to both these positions, and the following morning left a volume of the *Homo Apostolicus* at the house at which the conversation had taken place, requesting the Rev. F. Meyrick to read certain chapters, and offering "to explain any difficulties that he might have, if he would write to him on the subject." In consequence of this request and proposal, the Rev. F. Meyrick wrote the first letter, which, it will be seen, refers to the points which had been under discussion.

The correspondence took place, it is believed, without any kind of ill-feeling on either side, and is now published with the assent of both parties, as a contribution towards a subject which is deservedly beginning, more and more, to draw attention towards itself—the Moral Theology of the Church of Rome.

July 26, 1855.

LETTER I.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Blickling, July 15, 1853.

My dear Sir,

You were kind enough to leave the volume of Liguori, containing the passages of which we had been speaking, and to offer to explain any difficulties that I might have about them.

Would you, then, kindly tell me if the following is Liguori's theory of theft, as laid down in Tract x. cap. 2? That a certain quantity of matter is required to make theft a mortal sin—that this quantity is greater or smaller according to the state of the owner from whom the theft is made—that in the case of a beggar, a sufficient quantity is one real, of a labourer, two reals, of an artizan, three reals, &c. of a nobleman, one scudo, &c.? Might not, then, a theft of the same amount be a mortal sin if the owner were a commoner, a venial sin if the owner were a nobleman? And is not the guilt of the act made to depend upon something external, not upon the frame of mind of the agent?

Again, would you explain the assertion that a wife may support her previous children out of her husband's goods against his will, and spend something under the twentieth of his income on alms and gifts.—Tract x. 2. 33. And that a nobleman in extreme distress may steal if he is ashamed to beg.—x. 2. 15. And that a servant may compensate himself for a salary remarkably too small.—vii. 3. 10. And that a rich man's son may steal from his father three scudi, without grave sin. And that a prince's son commits only a venial sin if he steal from his father anything under fifty scudi.—x. 2. 32. And that a monk is guilty of only a venial sin if he steals any sum less than four scudi from the monastery. In what manner can these cases be reconciled with the principles of morality with which they seem to conflict?

On the subject of Amphibology and Truthfulness, I should like to have pointed out the difference between falsehood and non-pure mental reservation.—v. 2. 15. Are not the conditions of an oath such as would make it unnecessary to keep almost any oath?—v. 2. 18. Is not the same true of vows?—v. 3. Does not the easy bestowal of dispensations take away all security for the observance of pledges? Can promises be counted important? —x. 2. 127. or secrets secure?—xi. 3. 9. Does "ex capite meo hoc erui, æquivocando, quia omnia verba e mente, pro quâ accipitur caput, procedunt," or "'mentitus sum,' quia omne peccatum est fallacia et mendacium," mend the moral untruth? Are any one of the four answers put into the mouth of an unfaithful wife truthful? 1. Non fregisse matrimonium. 2. She had not committed adultery, because she had not committed idolatry. 3. Innocens sum ab hoc crimine. 4. Non commisi. Is a seducer on promise of marriage not bound to keep his promise (although the victim did not know of any disparity) because he is longè nobilior?—x. 3. 93.

I am, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

LETTER II.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

25, Chapel Street, Grosvenor Square, July 20, 1853.

My dear Sir,

As it is S. Alphonso who is on his trial, it is just that he should be allowed to speak for himself in his own words. I will therefore begin by referring to the principles which he presupposes in the chapter De Furto.

In the Treatise de actibus humanis et peccatis, (Tract iii. c. 2. 4.) he says, "Peccatum mortale est illud quod privat hominem divinâ gratiâ quæ est anima vitæ, et ideo dicitur mortale. Veniale est quod non privat gratiâ, sed minuit caritatem, &c."

If this distinction be really admitted, I believe most of the supposed difficulties will disappear.

According to Catholic Theology, a soul in mortal sin is spiritually dead. Although in the mercy of God it still continues to be the subject of *actual* grace, it is deprived of *habitual*, or *sanctifying* grace; and is thereby under the power of eternal death. Mortal sin deprives the soul of the grace of charity, i. e. of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, by which it is united with God; and the loss of this grace separates the soul from God.

A soul separated from God, if it depart this life without reconciliation, so far as we know, must be separated from God everlastingly. Therefore mortal sin incurs eternal punishment.

Venial sin, though in the order of sin it be less than mortal, yet, in the order of evils, is the greatest of which man is capable, except only mortal.

Its effects are, that it—1. diminishes the grace of charity; 2. displeases God; and 3. prepares the soul for greater sins, and incurs punishment only less than eternal.

May I ask you to tell me before we go further, whether you believe the effects of mortal sin to be such as S. Alphonso states? This seems to me to be the first and necessary step in the matter we have in hand. When I know your mind, I shall be better able to go on.

Believe me, my dear Sir, yours faithfully,
HENRY E. MANNING.

LETTER III.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Blickling, July 22, 1853.

My dear Sir,

Thank you for yesterday's letter. I am not at all inclined to quarrel with S. Alfonso for saying that there are some sins which would deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, and some which, though displeasing to God, diminishing grace, and preparing for greater sins, yet have not so deadly effects as the first. If the sins which have the first effect are called mortal, and those which have the last are called venial, I should not care to dispute the term; but I cannot think that it follows as a consequence upon this, that all sins may be divided into, as it were, two heaps; and if you commit one belonging to this heap, that it is mortal; to that, that it is venial. On the contrary, I should conceive that two acts, identically the same in their external features, would be either one or the other, according to the disposition of mind in which they are done.

I was not aware that venial sins were considered "to incur punishment only less than eternal." In that case (if it includes the punishment of Purgatory,) I wonder that they are not considered necessary matter for the "Sacrament of Penance." In using the words, "order of evils," as distinct from sin, I presume you mean material evils.

I do not yet quite see how you propose to apply your remarks to the Theory of Theft.

I am, dear Sir, yours faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

LETTER IV.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

25, Chapel St. Feast of S. James, 1853.

My dear Sir,

I have to thank you for your note, which I received on my return to London to-day.

The reason why I wished to ascertain our agreement as to the nature and effects of mortal and venial sin was, because it would remove the possibility of supposing that when S. Alphonso says that a monk who steals four scudi from a monastery commits a venial sin, he intends to say that he commits a trifling sin.

Such a sin, though venial, offends God, diminishes grace, prepares the soul for greater sin, and incurs temporal punishment. It is, therefore, in the eye of the Church very grave, though it fall short of being mortal.

I believe if this were borne in mind we should have fewer difficulties as to the Moral Theology of the Catholic Church.

Every sin, therefore, how light soever it may appear to be, incurs, according to Catholic doctrine, the consequences above-stated.

So that, in my belief, the Catholic Church judges even a venial sin to be more grave than opponents of her Theology judge many a mortal sin.

We may now go on to the other principles presupposed by S. Alphonso in his chapter on Theft.

In the same Treatise, (iii. ch. 2.) he lays down the following conditions.

"Pro certo habendum, ut dictum est num: 2. peccatum, ut sit imputabile, debere esse voluntarium, et ut *Voluntarium* sit peccatum mortale debet esse *pleno consensu* patratum. Itaque 1. requiritur plena et perfecta *advertentia*, ad malitiam objecti, &c."

This is the principle which runs throughout his whole Theology, both in this and in his larger work. Indeed there is not a moral Theologian, so far as I know, who has ever spoken otherwise, except those who, holding a more strict judgment, taught that a virtual "advertentia" is sufficient.—Sect. 25.

You will see, therefore, that the criterion by which the diversity among sins is determined, is strictly the interior frame of mind in the agent.

And this will be the more evident by examining the condi-

tions under which mortal sins may become venial, or venial sins may become mortal, namely, the absence or presence of a malicious intention, or "advertentia ad malitiam objecti." But this we may examine, if need be, hereafter.—(Treatise iii. c. 2. p. iv. 67. 68.)

S. Alphonso goes on to examine the matter more fully in all the sections which relate to invincible ignorance, not one of which is intelligible except on his own principles, namely, that the internal and voluntary state of the agent is the criterion of sinfulness in the act. The sum of all he gives in these words: "*Tria* requiruntur ad peccatum mortale, *gravitas materiæ*, plena *advertentia* intellectus, et prefectus *consensus* voluntatis, &c."—s. 67.

It may be asked, then, why he gives a sliding-scale of ducats and scudi for rich and poor, &c. Certainly not to make the quantity of the theft the sole criterion of the sinfulness of the agent.

But most plainly because the *amount* of the theft, in relation to the person wronged, is one chief point in determining the amount of malitia in the thief.

Therefore he goes on to say, (Sect. 67.) "Et 1, quoad materiam, ejus gravitas consideranda est non solum *in se*, sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento."

In his Treatise on Theft, he applies these principles as follows:—

In the first Section, (Tract x. c. 2. p. 5.) he defines theft to be, "Occulta et injusta rei alienæ ablatio, invito rationalibiter domino."

Under all circumstances, and in every form, theft is a sin differing only in this, that it either deprives, or does not deprive, the soul of grace and spiritual life; either incurs, or does not incur, the death of the soul.

In the second Section he goes on to consider the "quantitas furti," and "gravitas materiæ." And he at once says two things which are sufficient to render impossible the idea that he measures mortal and venial thefts by an arbitrary external test.

First, he says, that to steal a tailor's needle may be a grave matter, because of the wrong done to our neighbour, and, therefore, because of the "malice" of the agent.

I do not transcribe the words as you have them. Punct. xi. sect. 22. Ad judicium, down to "omissionem."

The other is, that when he begins to speak of the "diversas dominorum qualitates," he avowedly says that all such judgments depend "a sapientum æstimatione," and that "opiniones communiores," are "intrisecè probabiliores."

It is obvious that in this he is only suggesting the way in

which the amount of wrong done, and the amount, therefore, of malice in the doer, may be estimated. And you are at liberty to adopt, or not, his suggestions as to what is grave, or what is not grave, in the matter of theft. The liberty which he leaves to us we need not deny to him. In his judgment of the state of people among whom he lived, such hints as he gives seemed to him to be an approximation to a just estimate.

But I have already made this letter longer than I intended. I should be glad to know any point in it which you may desire to discuss further before we go on.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
HENRY E. MANNING.

LETTER V.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Monteviot, Aug. 24, 1853.

My dear Sir,

I am sorry to have delayed writing so long, but till yesterday I was unable to open my books since my last note.

If I do not mistake, your letter contains and enlarges on three propositions. 1. That venial sins are not trifling sins because classed as venial. 2. That gravitas materiæ has nothing to do with making a sin mortal, but is only a circumstance from which you can judge whether the frame of mind of the agent was such, that he sinned mortally. 3. That the quantitas furti, in like manner, is not one of the conditions of a theft being mortal, but a sign by which we may judge of the malice of the agent, which malice is the cause of the theft being mortal.

1. I am afraid that I scarcely follow your argument when you say, that it follows that venial sins cannot be confounded with trifling sins, *because* they diminish grace, &c. *All* sins, it appears to me, have, according to S. Alphonso's teaching, those effects. No sins, therefore, can be trifling *things;* but *of* sins I presume that some might be trifling *relatively to others*, though not trifles in themselves. One of the evils of dividing all sins into mortal and venial, appears to me to be the likelihood that men will put all mortal sins on one level, all venial sins on another level. In case they do this, the latter are pretty sure to be considered lightly of, inasmuch as they include some sins which, relatively, *are* light. Liguori, too, speaks of venial sins as "quod *ob suam levitatem* gratiam et amicitiam non tollit, &c." And asserts that they "do not diminish God's love towards us,

but only ours towards God." At any rate, sins classed as mortal must be far graver than those classed as venial; and, consequently, a servant's theft from his master, or a monk's from his monastery (within the bounds,) must be far less a sin than, say, omitting to hear Mass on Sunday.

I should have been inclined, therefore, to think that while no sin is a trifle, yet that the division into mortal and venial sins did naturally and legitimately lead people to consider the latter as *relatively* trifling, and on the same level with one another as trifling, the more inasmuch as they have not to be confessed.

2. If I have rightly stated your opinion on this point, I agree with it; but I cannot find it in Liguori. On the contrary, I find there distinctly stated that there are *three* things necessary for mortal sin: advertentia—consensus—gravitas. I do *not* find that two things, advertentia and consensus, are necessary and sufficient, and that there is another thing, gravitas, by which a third person may judge whether the two first existed in the agent. When three conditions are given, "quorum si *unum desit*," the thing does not exist; it appears to me vain to say that one of these three is not a condition, but only a sign, whereby we may know the existence of the two first. Ob *aliquem* horum defectum, mortale fieri potest veniale.

But I do not understand the meaning which you assign to the words *advertentia ad malitiam objecti.* You seem to translate them by "a malicious intention;" and I observe that, in one place, you put a comma after the word *advertentia.* Now *malitia objecti* can, I presume, have nothing directly to do with the *malice of the subject;* but the phrase, *perfecta advertentia malitiæ*, or, *ad malitiam*, must mean a perfect recognition of the badness of the thing. That this may be connected with malice in the agent, I admit; that it is the same thing, I cannot hold. On the contrary, it appears to me that this doctrine of *perfect* advertence leads, when pressed, to most fearful consequences, as shown by Pascal in his 4th Provincial Letter. It seems directly to lead to the consequence, that if a man has but destroyed his sense of right and wrong, he cannot do wrong, i. e. by a confusion of *ignorance of right* with *ignorance of fact*, to teach that if a man is thoroughly ἀκόλαστος, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin,—while the second condition, *perfectus* consensus voluntatis, teaches, that if a man is only ἀκρατής, he cannot be guilty of mortal sin,—then who can be?

This, however, is by the way. What I want to make out is, that even though *advertentia ad malitiam objecti* did mean malicious intention, still that two men, in identically the same state of mind, with the same advertence and the same consent, would, according to S. Alphonso's teaching, be guilty, the one

of a venial sin, the other of a mortal sin, according as the quantity of the thing which they had stolen (if it was a matter of theft) were more or less. In this case, "the diversity among sins" cannot be said to be "determined strictly by the interior frame of mind of the agent." You say that the truth of this last statement will become the more evident by examining the conditions under which mortal sins may become venial, or venial sins may become mortal; namely, the absence or presence of a malicious intention, or, "advertentia ad malitiam objecti." Putting aside the question of the meaning of these words, it is clear that the whole force of the argument here rests in the absence or presence of a malicious intention being the *sole* condition of mortal sin becoming venial, and venial mortal; but there are others, and among these is *Ex parte materiæ, si hæc sit parvi momenti.*

3. I cannot agree with the definition of Theft. *Rationabiliter* is a word which appears to me to have no place there. In whose judgment is the possessor to be reasonably unwilling for his goods to be taken away? his own? or the taker's? (I must not say thief's,) or the director's? Nor can I agree with the Communist doctrines laid down in cap. 1. and pushed out so hardily to the justification of stealing or taking. But what we have at present to do with is, the *quantitas furti.*

You say that he has not "given his sliding-scale of ducats and scudi to make the quantity of the theft the *sole* criterion of the sinfulness of the agent." No; but that does not seem to me to meet the point.

He does teach that a certain frame of mind, *advertentia* and *consensus*, the one *plena*, the other *perfectus*, are necessary for mortal sin. That I perfectly allow; but he adds, that these are not enough—that the sin is not yet mortal without a certain *quantitas*. Consequently, the mortality or veniality of the sin does depend upon the 6*d.* more or less; *plena advertentia, perfectus consensus* and 2*s.* 6*d.* being a mortal sin; *plena advertentia, perfectus consensus* and 2*s.* being venial.

You give two reasons whereby you say that it is disproved that S. Alphonso makes the quantity the measure of the sin; or, as I would correct it, *in part* the measure of the sin. These are, the tailor's needle, and the appeal to the judgment of the wise. I cannot see the connection between these and the inferences you draw from them. Doubtless the first proves that he considered the quantity necessary for a mortal sin legitimately altered according to the condition in life of the sufferer; but this never was denied. And the second seems to me to mean nothing but that different Doctors differ in their tariffs; and, therefore, to get at a right tariff, their judgments

must be compared, which, accordingly, he proceeds to do. I do not see anything about "the malice of the agent;" "the amount of malice in the doer estimated by the amount of wrong done." The essence of the sin, or, at any rate, one ingredient in the essence of the sin is, as he says, "the quantity of harm done to our neighbour."

It seems, then, undeniable that S. Alphonso says, that if a man steal 5*s*. (say) with full advertence and perfect consent, from a nobleman, he has committed a venial sin; from a commoner, he has committed a mortal sin. You say that the amount has shown that he was acting maliciously in one case, and not in the other. This S. Alphonso does not say, so far as I can see, nor can I see how it *does* prove it.

Again S. Alphonso says, that if a man steal 5*s*. (say) with full advertence and perfect consent, from a nobleman, he has committed a venial sin; if 5*s*. 6*d*. a mortal sin. Yet you say that the amount is no criterion of the sinfulness of the agent. Then what is? for this is the sole difference in the two cases.

I am afraid that we may perhaps not agree on all the points here discussed, but I hope, nevertheless, that you will go on to the other points mentioned in my first letter.

I am, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

LETTER VI.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

Errwood Hall, Buxton, Sept. 8, 1853.

My dear Sir,

Your letter of August 24th, reached me on Friday last. Since then, until to-day, I have had no time to write.

My direction until the 20th of this month, will be Kingstown, Dublin; after that for a week, Carstairs House, Lanark.

Many thanks for your note which came yesterday, and prevented my sending this letter to Scotland.

Our last two letters lead me to hope that we are nearer to an understanding.

Towards the end of your letter you say, St. Alphonsus "does teach, that a certain frame of mind 'advertentia' and 'consensus,' the one plena, the other, perfectus, are necessary for mortal sin. That I perfectly allow; but he adds, that these are not enough; that the sin is not yet mortal without a certain 'quantitas,' consequently the mortality, or veniality of the sin does

depend upon the 6*d.* more or less; plena advertentia, perfectus consensus, and 2*s.* 6*d.* being a mortal sin; plena advertentia, perfectus consensus, and 2*s.* being venial." . . . . . "Again, St. Alphonso says that if a man steals 5*s.* (say) with full advertence and perfect consent, from a nobleman, he has committed a venial sin, if 5*s.* 6*d.* a mortal sin. Yet you say that the quantity of the theft is not made the criterion of the sin. Then what is? For this is the sole difference of the two cases."

From these two pasages I fear you have hardly had time to study the treatises to which I referred you, and I believe that if you will sufficiently examine the meaning of the words which, in your last letter, you translate "the badness of the thing," you will answer your own case; and perceive the difficulty to be of your own making.

In Tract iii. c. i. s. 19. St. Alphonsus says, "Quæritur 1. Unde *actus humani* desumant suam bonitatem et malitiam? Respondemus (quicquid dicant alii) quoad *materiale*, desumunt ab *objectis*, et ab eorum *circumstantiis*. Quoad *formale*, sive quoad *moralem* bonitatem et malitiam, a *virtutibus* quibus conformantur, aut adversantur."

Again, Punct. iv. s. 67. "Quoad materiam, ejus *gravitas* consideranda est non solum in se, sed etiam ex *circumstantiis*, *ex toto*, et *ex fine intento*."

You are aware that in this shorter work, St. Alphonsus takes for granted that they who use it have already studied Moral Theology, and are familiar with all that is implied in the terms. He pre-supposes especially a knowledge of his own larger work on Moral Theology.

In the full treatise, de actibus humanis, which you will there find (Lib. v. sect. ii. 36.) he says, "Theologi vocant principia moralitalis ea ex quibus fit, ut aliqua actio sit bona, vel mala, vel indifferens. Tria reconsentur hujus modi principia, *objectum*, *finis*, *circumstantiæ*. . . . . .

"Objectum a quo actus accipit essentialem et primariam malitiam est illud circa quod versatur actus moralis; et primo et per se attingitur ab ipso actu: sic res aliena est objectum furti. . . . . Deus est objectum omnis actûs. Tale objectum non consideratur physicè.

"XXXVIII. Alterum principium moralitatis est finis, non intrinsecus operis, quod coincidit cum objecto, sed extrinsecus operantis, qui quatenus conveniat vel disconveniat cum regulis morum, dicitur bonus, vel malus moraliter. . . . .

"XXXIX. Tertium moralitalis principium sunt circumstantiæ quæ dare solent actui aliam bonitatem vel malitiam accidentalem."

Among "circumstances" he places Personæ, as one, "quæ sæpe addit novam speciem malitiæ."

From this you will see,

1. That "gravitas" does not mean only "quantitas furti," as you seem throughout to assume: but as St. Alphonsus expressly says, the gravitas of a sin is to be considered and estimated, "non solum in se, sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento."—Sect. 67.

2. That the objectum peccati is twofold, *material* and *moral*. That in theft, the material object is "res aliena," the moral object the law of God.

3. That sin being "Dictum, factum, vel concupitum contra legem æternam," "in hoc consistit *tota formalis malitia peccati*," namely, in the offence against the Divine law. Sect. xxii. which explains what he says in Sec. xix. already quoted, namely, that the formal or moral malitia of sin arises from its repugnance to the virtues to which it is opposed.

4. That consequently the "malitia objecti," signifies the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine law.

Let us apply this to the cases of theft as you put them.

1. The *gravitas* materiæ signifies not only the *quantity* of money, but the extent to which the Divine laws of justice and charity have been violated.

2. In order to estimate this, St. Alphonsus says, you cannot consider the matter only, but must include circumstances, the whole of the action, and the end intended.

Therefore it is simply in contradiction to his express teaching to say, that he takes *quantity* alone as the test of mortal and venial sin.

You seem to have misled yourself throughout by supposing "gravitas" and "quantitas" to be convertible terms. And by not distinguishing between the "material" and "formal" object.

Unless therefore the 6*d*. more or less, in your supposed case, added "novam speciem malitiæ," the two acts, with the same advertentia and consensus would, according to St. Alphonsus, be morally equal.

For instance:

1. To steal 2*s*. from one person, and 2*s*. 6*d*. from another, the advertentia, consensus, circumstances, and whole action being the same, or the difference inappreciable, the guilt of the two thefts, according to St. Alphonsus, would be inappreciable.

But to steal 2*s*. from a rich man might be venial, while to steal 2*s*. 6*d*. from a poor man might be mortal, not because of the 6*d*. more or less, but because of the difference of the outrage done to the Divine laws of justice and charity; and of

the new species of malice, added by the circumstances, the person, and the whole complex of the moral act, in quo "consistit tota formalis malitia peccati."

And this difference in the moral act and object renders the supposition of the sameness of the state of mind in the agent a case morally impossible.

This letter is sufficiently long, and I will send what remains by another post. I would ask you to oblige me by sending any remarks you wish to make on these points separately, as it seems to me that we have been embarrassed by some irrelevant matter.

I have already, I believe, twice expressed my willingness to examine all the points you wish; and I meant what I said. All I ask is, that we may do it as the subject demands; otherwise it would but waste your time and mine, and do worse than no good.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
H. E. MANNING.

LETTER VII.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Trinity College, Oxford, Sept. 15, 1853.

My dear Sir,

I have to thank you for two letters which have reached me here, and to which I will reply, as you ask me, separately.

The questions in the letter of Sept. 8th, seem to be these:—1. What is *malitia objecti?* 2. What is *gravitas materiæ?* 3. What is *quantitas furti?* You say that I have misunderstood them.

Before entering on this examination, I would urge that the first should be kept apart from the others. Whatever *malitia objecti* does mean, whether "malicious intention," as you said in your previous letter, or "badness of the thing," as I translated it, or "the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine Law," as you say in this letter, the question is a totally distinct one from "What is *gravitas materiæ?*" I say this because you appear to me to have laid down premises with regard to *malitia objecti*, and drawn conclusions with regard to *gravitas materiæ* and *quantitas furti. Advertentia ad malitiam objecti* is condition 1, *Gravitas materiæ* is con-

dition 3 of the mortality of sins. Unless the third can be resolved into the first, as you attempted in your previous letter, the question of the meaning of condition 1 is, as I said, a bye-question with regard to the matter in hand, which is an objection, not to condition 1, but to condition 3.

1. What is *objectum?* S. Alfonso answers: "That about which the act is." He gives instances: "The property of others" is the *object* of "theft." "God" is the *object* of "love." You have written here, "Deus est objectum omnis actûs." This is to me wholly unintelligible. If "God" is the *object* of "theft," then truly *object* is used in a sense to me perfectly novel; but on looking both in the Theologia Moralis and the Homo Apostolicus, I find, not "omnis actûs," but "actûs amoris." You have no doubt, therefore, made an error in transcribing the passage. This is a thing, of course, most easily and naturally done; but, at the same time, with the passage itself the argument founded upon it must fall—which appears to be that God's Law is the *moral object* of all acts; and hence its violation the *formal object* —not cause, but object—of all bad acts.

I have read the Treatise on Human Actions carefully, and find it laid down that human actions are moral so far as they are in accordance with right reason in their *object*, in their *end*, and in their *circumstances;* that the most important of these is the *object*—that this object is that about which the moral act is —that as the object is good or bad, so the act is essentially good or bad—that the object may be good, bad, or indifferent—that it is good if in accordance with right reason, bad if the contrary, indifferent if neither in accordance nor in disagreement. That this is unphilosophically expressed, is acknowledged in the next paragraph, but it is clear what it means—viz. that a *malum objectum* is a "thing" about which an act is, which "thing," being in itself not in accordance with right reason, gives the character of *malitia* also to the act.

How, then, was my translation of *malitia objecti*—"the badness of the thing"—wrong? It does not differ materially from that which I have now worked out from S. Alfonso—viz. "the non-accordance with right reason (malitia) of the thing about which the act is (objecti)." It is certainly nearer to it than either "the malice of the agent," or "the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine command." On this point, then, I would conclude that whatever argument you rested in your previous letter on "advertentia ad malitiam objecti," meaning "the malice of the agent," must fall to the ground. In this letter of Sept. 8th, on comparing your quotation from Tr. iii. 1. 19. Unde actus, &c. with the assertion that the *objectum peccati* is twofold, material and

moral, and "in hoc consistit *tota formalis malitia peccati*," it appears to me that you make "*malitia objecti*," "*malitia humani actûs*," and "*malitia peccati*," all the same thing. Now, inasmuch as the *malitia objecti* is the main cause of *malitia humani actûs*, which *actus* thereby becomes *peccatum*, it would not be worth noticing this, were it not that I think the division into *material* and *moral*, *material* and *formal* belongs more rightfully, in the sense in which you use it, to the goodness and badness of the act, than to the mere object. "Form" always meaning "that which makes a thing to be what it is," the *formal badness of an act, or of sin*, would doubtless consist in "its offence against the Divine Laws," or "its repugnance to the virtues to which it is opposed;" but a *formal* OBJECT can only be that which makes an object to be the object of the act of which it is the object. And so S. Alfonso uses the word—e. g. "The material object of Faith, i. e. that thing which we are bound to believe, is God: the formal object of Faith, i. e. the motive, on account of which we are bound to believe what is revealed, is God's veracity."—iii. 4. Again, in the case of Hope, "The material object, i. e. that thing which we ought to hope for, is eternal happiness . . . the formal object, i. e. the motive on account of which we are bound to hope, is either God's mercy, omnipotence, promise, or goodness."—iii. 21. And Charity, "The material object of Charity is primarily God . . . the formal object, God, so far as He is infinite Goodness, as He is the aggregation of all perfections, or infinite perfection."—iii. 24. The formal object, then, is that which makes the material object to be the object of the act. It has nothing whatever to do with goodness, or with badness—with the Law of God, or with the violation of His Law. I cannot, therefore, think that I have "misled myself by not distinguishing between the material and formal object," as though the latter had to do with an observance or violation of God's Law, which we see that it has not. On the contrary, you must excuse me for thinking that you have confounded *formale objectum* with *formalis malitia peccati*.

2. You say that I have confused *gravitas materiæ* with *quantitas furti*. What, then, is *gravitas materiæ*? Perhaps the best way of discovering will be, to examine the other passages in which S. Alfonso uses the phrase, or its correlative, *parvitas materiæ*. The very fact of *parvitas* being the word contrary to *gravitas*, points to what it means.

"Is *parvitas materiæ* allowed in the transgression of a promissory oath, so that a man who promises to give *some little thing*, if he really has the intention of giving when he swears, and afterwards does not give, only commits a light sin? A very

probable opinion says No. . . . A no less probable, nay, perhaps a more probable one, says Yes. . . . It is certain that if you only do not keep *some little* of that which you have sworn, it is not grave; e. g. if you have sworn not to drink wine, you do not commit a mortal sin by drinking *a little*, because then *parvitas materiæ* is an excuse. . . . You may say the same of a man who only takes away *a little* from the sum which he has sworn to give to another."—iv. 174. Here, then, the *materia* is grave or small, according as the *quantity* is greater or less.

In the matter of labouring on Sunday, "it is asked, what is *gravitas materiæ?* Some say the third part of a day, . . . others, one hour, . . . others, two hours, . . . others, two hours and a little over, . . . Croix concludes two hours and a half."—iv. 305. Here, then, the *materia* is *grave* or *small*, according as the quantity of time is greater or less.

On fasting. "You must confess whether you have taken a notable quantity once or often, for it is perfectly probable that, in this, *materiæ parvitas* excuses from mortal sin, as if a sick man's servant or a cook tasted a little meat. Pasqualigo says that half an ounce is *materia parva*, but this is deservedly rejected by the Salamanca Doctors, who say that *materia parva* is only the eighth part of an ounce."—iv. 1029. Here, then, the *materia* is *grave* or *small*, according as the quantity eaten is greater or less.

"What is *materia parva* in omitting to say office? Azorius, &c. hold that a man commits a mortal sin who omits half, or, as others say, a third of 'a small hour,' because such part is notable *materia* with respect to that hour; but, with greater probability, this is denied by Lessius, &c. because, though that part is notable in respect to the small hour, yet it is light in itself, and in respect to the whole office, whence, on the point of *gravitas materiæ*, the *quantity* of the whole office is to be regarded, and not that of each hour. So Palao, &c. say that it is light matter to omit less than the whole of a small hour. And so Elbel, &c. say that, owing to *parvitas materiæ*, a man would not commit a grave sin who should omit the whole of Vespers on Easter-eve. . . . Sanchez, &c. well conclude that that is universally considered *parva materia* that does not mount up to the *quantity* of one whole hour."—v. 147. Here, then, *materia parva* is a small *quantity*, *materia gravis* a large *quantity*, *gravitas* and *parvitas* materiæ depending upon quantity.

In saying Mass. "In this, Doctors admit *parvitas materiæ* to excuse from mortal sin, and, where there is reason, from venial sin, as if the Mass be terminated a little before day-break, or begun a little after midday; but in assigning such *materia*, they differ mightily. Azorinus fixes for *gravis mate-*

ria twenty minutes, Layman, half an hour," &c.—vi. 346. Here, then, *materia gravis* is a large quantity of time; *materia parva*, a small quantity.

"In talking with nuns is *parvitas materiæ* allowed? De Alessandro thinks not, but the common opinion is on the other side. Writers, however, differ in fixing what is *parva materia* in such talking. Ciera thinks a *few words*. Merolla, *ten words*. Diana, the *length of a miserere and a little more*. Quarti, a quarter of an hour; nor is Quarti's opinion condemned by Clement IXth's Decree, for the only opinion there condemned was, that a quarter of an hour and half a quarter was *materia parva*," &c. vii. 236. Here, then, *materia gravis* is a greater *quantity* of time, *materia parva* a smaller *quantity*.

It is useless to quote more; the principle is as plain as daylight. According as the *quantity* is more or less, the *materia* is grave or small, and accordingly the sin mortal or venial. Why should it be otherwise in the case of theft? It is not. In theft, too, the *materia* is grave or small, according to the *quantity* stolen; but there is this difference from other cases, that here the quantity is not, as elsewhere, absolute, but relative, and so S. Alfonso teaches: "What is materia gravis in theft is worth here elucidating more clearly. Whatever some say," (viz. Navarrus, who fixed five farthings, (half a real) and others who fixed £2. (ten gold pieces) for all alike,) "Doctors are agreed, and it cannot be denied, that to determine the *hujus materiæ quantitatem*, the same quantity cannot be assigned absolutely for all, but it must be measured relatively to the circumstances of the person, thing, place, and times." Whether the quantity is relative or absolute is a wholly subordinate question, it is still quantity which makes the *materia* grave or light; quantity of what is stolen in a case of theft; quantity of time in the case of talking to nuns, and so on, but always quantity.

Having thus re-asserted the position which you have denied, I am bound to show that your arguments are not such as to prove the contrary. I do not think this difficult, for,

a. You start with a false assumption, viz. that gravitas *materiæ* and gravitas *peccati* are the same thing. Thus, "you will see," you say, "that *gravitas* (*materiæ* is not expressed but must be understood) does not mean only quantitas furti, as you seem throughout to assume, but as S. Alphonso expressly says, the *gravitas of a sin* is to be considered and estimated," &c. He does not say *gravitas of a sin*, but *gravitas materiæ*. Again, in your letter of September 9th, you say, "he lays down the rule, that in estimating the *gravitas peccati* one element is the quantitas furti." He lays down no special rule about *gravitas peccati*, but about *gravitas materiæ;* and it is observable, that what he calls

gravitas materiæ in his larger work, in the corresponding passage in the Homo Apostolicus he calls *quantitas furti*. These are his words; "To estimate when *quantitas furti* amounts to mortal sin, the *quantity* must be considered not only in itself, but relatively to circumstances," &c. Is *quantitas* only *one element* of *quantitas?* The same thing runs through your letters; but the distinction between *materia* and *peccatum* is a very important one, for it is *gravitas peccati* which includes "the extent to which the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity have been violated," not the *gravitas materiæ*.

b. You argue that gravitas materiæ is not the same (in the specific case) as quantitas furti, because S. Alfonso says that materiæ gravitas is to be estimated "non solum in se sed etiam ex circumstantiis, ex toto, et ex fine intento," which you afterwards thus explain. "The gravitas materiæ signifies not only the quantity of money, but the extent to which the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity have been violated. In order to estimate this, S. Alphonso says you cannot consider the matter only, but must include circumstances, the whole of the action, and the end intended." That *gravitas materiæ* does mean the extent to which the Divine Law has been violated—apart from the notion that mere quantity does violate more (a thing which, of course, implies that quantity *is* the test of the mortality of actions, which you started with denying,) is, if what I have argued above holds, an error arising from the confusion of *objectum formale* with *formalis malitia peccati*, and of *gravitas materiæ* with *gravitas peccati*. That which is to be estimated, then, is not the violation of God's Law, but the gravity or amount of the matter in hand, whether that matter be time, other people's property, or anything else. This matter, he says, must not be estimated solely *in se*, that is, as he expresses it in his Theologia Moralis, *absolutely by itself*, but (α) *ex circumstantiis*, that is, as he again says, relatively to such circumstances as *persons* which may make matter absolutely and by itself light, to become grave, as 6*d.* is absolutely by itself light, but relatively to a very poor man, grave—(β) *ex toto*—not, I conceive, as you translate it, "the whole *of the action*," but the whole *of the amount* concerned, whether money, time, or anything else, as illustrated by the example, that if a man has vowed to give 4000 scudi, it is venial not to give three of them "etsi talis pars, *absolute in se spectata* sit notabilis, *comparatione tamen totius*, morali judicio non valde videtur æstimanda (γ) *ex fine intento*, i. e. relatively to the purpose in hand, "ad quem si parum facit, levis est, gravis autem si multum," ii. 56.

The meaning, then, of this sentence would be, that the amount necessary for mortal sin was relative, not absolute. This does

not the least interfere with my argument. You have to prove the propriety, 1, of such a condition at all as *gravitas materiæ;* 2, of such gravitas materiæ being relative, not absolute; (a point which, granted the first, I should not dispute;) 3, of a *scale* being drawn out of such relative gravity; 4, of the special scale adopted by S. Alfonso.

Bournemouth, Sept. 20th. Having been travelling in Northamptonshire and elsewhere for some days, I have been unable to finish this letter till to-day. I have now to thank you for your note of the 13th, making the correction which you will see that I have anticipated. Of course you are prepared to give up the superstructure built upon the error.[1] I have two more remarks to make still, in comment, on your letter.

1. You write, "Unless the 6*d.* more or less in your supposed case added 'novam speciem malitiæ,' the two acts with the same advertence and consent, would, according to S. Alphonso, be morally equal." Now, as he distinctly says that they are not equal, and you only leave one condition under which they can be unequal, you, of course, intend that condition to be taken, viz. that the 6*d.* additional adds "novam speciem malitiæ." You hold, therefore, that there is some new *circumstantia* which has added another accidental malitia to the act. This circumstantia can only be the difference in *persona*, or the mere difference in *quantity*. You cannot mean the difference in *persona*, because that would not cover the first case of 2*s.* and 2*s.* 6*d.*, or the third case of 5*s.* and 5*s.* 6*d.* where the *persona* is the same, but only the second, which you have not quoted. You must, therefore, mean the additional quantity. Now the very thing which you began with denying, is, that the quantity of the thing stolen is made (granted advertence and consent) to constitute the difference of mortality and veniality between the two acts of theft; and now you argue that the additional 6*d.*, not only "auget malitiam intra eandem speciem," but also "addit novam speciem malitiæ." In this you go beyond S. Alfonso, for he classes *quantitas furti* under the head of circumstances, "speciem tantum aggravantes"—ii. 34; and excludes it from the class of circumstances, "speciem mutantes."—vi. 468.

[1] The following is the note referred to:—

Sept. 13, 1853.

My dear Sir,

In the quotation from St. Alphonsus's larger work in my last letter but one, I trusted my MS. notes, not having the book with me, and wrote "omnis actûs" instead of actûs amoris." I have not been able to refer to the original till to-day.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
H. E. Manning.

2. You say, "To steal 2*s.* from a rich man might be venial, while to steal 2*s.* 6*d.* from a poor man might be mortal ..... morally impossible." You have unnecessarily aggravated the invidiousness of the case; it should rather have been 2*s.* from a richer man, and 2*s.* from a poorer man, or 2*s.* and 2*s.* 6*d.* from the same man; but passing that by, that the case *might be* venial, and *might be* mortal, I should not dream of denying; but then, on the other side, to steal the 2*s.* 6*d.* *might be* venial, and to steal the 2*s.* *might be* mortal, according to the frame of mind of the agent. It is not a question of *might be*, but of *is*, nor can you fairly start with a *might be*, i. e. a contingency in your premiss, and arrive at a *morally impossible*, i. e. a necessity in your conclusion.

That conclusion is remarkable. That it is morally impossible that a man could, with the same state of mind, steal 2*s.* and 2*s.* 6*d.* either from different persons, or from the same person, when that person is in such a position as that, with respect to him, 2*s.* is materia parva, 2*s.* 6*d.* materia gravis. However you account for this *necessary difference* of state of mind, whether because in the latter case "greater outrage is done to the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity," or because "a new species of malitia is added," or because "the whole complex of the moral act" is altered, it is only throwing back the difficulty a step further. Why and how is greater outrage done to the Divine Laws by the theft of the additional sixpence? Why and how does the additional sixpence add a new species of malitia? Why and how does it alter the complex of the moral act? One answer, it appears to me, can alone be given, because quantity is made the criterion between greater and less sins, even to the extent of making it (advertence and consent presupposed,) the distinctive feature between a mortal and a venial sin.

I remain, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

LETTER VIII.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

Errwood, September 9, 1853.

My dear Sir,

I understood you in London to say, that St. Alphonsus lays down a scale of supposed mortal and venial sins in the matter of theft from Commoners and Noblemen. The last illustration given was, the stealing half-a-crown from Lord L. or from myself.

Twice in your letters you put the same case of theft from a "Commoner," or a "Nobleman:" in one place underlining the words.

You do not suppose that St. Alphonsus goes by a sort of Red Book, or by a list of the Lords and Commons, as if title were the rule of his estimate.

Have you not been misleading yourself by this illustration? St. Alphonsus says nothing of Commoners and Noblemen in the sense of the cases you proposed.

He takes, as you correctly stated in your letter of July 15, the classes of poor who beg, poor who labour, persons who have means of their own, artizans, traders, upper classes, noblemen included, royal persons, &c.

It is manifest that his scale is formed on the diversities of lot, as to substance, from want to wealth, in the widest and fullest sense, and takes it as the measure of *susceptibility of injury*.

His scale rests upon the same moral truth as the Parable which Nathan spoke by inspiration; and in another aspect, of the commendation of our Divine Lord bestowed upon the Widow's mite.

To put cases of Noblemen and Commoners, unless they involve this diversity of condition, and the consequent degrees of susceptibility of injury, is irrelevant. If they do involve this difference, I do not know how any Christian can deny the conclusion.

For instance:

To steal 5s. from a Nobleman, may be a very light injury.

To steal 5s. from a Commoner, who earns his bread by hard labour, may be a very grave injury.

And the *formalis malitia* of the act, according to St. Alphonsus, would vary accordingly.

In the scale given he lays down the following general rules:

1. That the poor who live on alms, as the old, sick, destitute, &c., are more susceptible of injury by theft, than poor who can earn their living: that poor who can earn their living are more susceptible of injury than those who have means of their own, and so on.

2. That in proportion as the injury inflicted is greater, (advertentia and consensus always pre-supposed,) the violation of the opposite virtues of justice and charity is greater, and the *formalis malitia* of the act is greater likewise.

3. That in estimating the *gravitas peccati*, one element is the *quantitas furti*, which, he says, is to be considered, "non solum in se ipsâ, sed etiam respectu *personarum, temporis*, et loci," (sec. 22) by which he brings into the estimate the whole moral or formal malitia of the act. And after giving the instance of the tailor's needle, he says, "Et ita etiam potest esse grave

(saltem contra caritatem) furari rem tenuis pretii, si dominus magnam pænam subiturus esset ob illius omissionem." If you will consider these words, you will hardly ask, "If quantity is not made the criterion of the theft, then what is?"

I suppose no one will say that all thefts, from the greatest to the least, deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, nor that no theft whatsoever does so. Some, therefore, do, and some do not.

And it is necessary for souls to discover for themselves, or by the help of their pastors, what is their state before God.

To ascertain this is as difficult as it is vital, and all that we can do, is to use the best criteria we can.

St. Alphonsus, therefore, says,

1. That in trying to ascertain the guilt of thefts, the points to be estimated are—
   1. The advertentia.
   2. The consensus.
   3. The Gravitas Furti.
2. That the gravitas furti consists formally and morally in the violation of the divine laws of justice and charity.
3. That to estimate this violation, we must consider not only the quantity stolen, but the circumstances of the case, the person, the time, the place, &c.
4. That this estimate can only be made by the judgment of the prudent and experienced, who are familiar with the condition of their own countries and people. It is not that doctors differ in their tariff from self-sufficiency, but that men of sense, judging in different countries, and for different classes of people, in different conditions of society, necessarily give various decisions.

St. Alphonsus says, the "opinions which are more commonly received" are "intrinsically more probable," showing that the whole subject matter is one on which rules can be given only in general.

To treat it, therefore, as an appraisement of sins by shillings and sixpences, is not to object to St. Alphonsus, but to misunderstand him.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
H. E. MANNING.

LETTER IX.

Rev. F. Meyrick to Rev. H. E. Manning.

Bournemouth, Poole, Sept. 24, 1853.

My dear Sir,

In your letter of July 25th, the scope of your argument was, I believe, that quantitas furti was not one of the conditions of a theft being mortal, but a sign by which we could tell "the interior frame of mind of the agent;" "the conditions under which mortal sin may become venial, or venial sin may become mortal, being the absence or presence of a malicious intention, or advertentia ad malitiam objecti." *Advertentia ad malitiam objecti*, therefore, combined, doubtless, with *consensus*, was, according to this theory, the cause of the mortality of a sin, and *gravitas materiæ* was only a sign by which its existence might be known. In my reply of Aug. 24, I pointed out that advertentia ad malitiam objecti could not mean malicious intention—that gravitas materiæ was distinctly stated by Liguori to be a condition, without which a sin was not mortal; and that the reason why it would be natural in him to make a certain quantitas a necessary condition for theft, was, that he taught that the essence of the sin, or, at any rate, one ingredient in the essence of the sin, was, "the quantity of harm done to our neighbour."

In your letter of Sept. 9, the whole scope of the argument is, that in proportion as the injury inflicted upon our neighbour is greater or less, the sin is greater or less; and, therefore, that quantitas, both absolute and relative, is a necessary condition of a theft being mortal. I may consider, therefore, that you have abandoned the ground which you first took up as untenable, and adopted a position which, I allow, is more in accordance with Liguori's teaching. It remains to examine whether this theory, which adopts and justifies the principle of *quantitas furti*, will do better than the previous one, which, made as though it were not there at all, or, if there, could be resolved into something else.

As to the supposed difficulty of "nobleman" and "commoner," on which you seem to imagine that I have a misconception, I have understood the term "nobleman" just as you do. The reason why I chose it more than others, was, that it was a more comprehensible class than some of the others, and because we had begun originally with the mention of that class. His scale in the Theologia Moralis is apparently

	s.	*d.*
With respect to those who beg, ...	0	5
With respect to those who work, ...	0	10
With respect to mechanics, ...	1	0
With respect to the moderately rich, ...	1	8
With respect to the absolutely rich, or very opulent merchants, ...	2	6
With respect to very rich noblemen,[1]	5	0
With respect to a very rich community, ...	7	6
With respect to kings	10	0

It would not be difficult to find fault with the relative proportions here laid down, but as my objection is to scales being laid down at all, and to any kind of amount being definitively fixed as a necessary condition of mortality, I do not choose to take such low ground as that of objecting to any special scale. It will be seen, however, that this scale bears out my original assertion, that, according to S. Alfonso, the theft of 2*s.* 6*d.* from Lord L. would have been venial, and from yourself, mortal, if committed at the same time and place, and with identically the same degree of malicious intention towards each. I am aware that you have denied the possibility of the existence of an equal degree of malice in cases where the sufferers have not about the same amount of wealth, but I believe that I have disproved that position in my last letter. Indeed, it appears to me that it only requires to be stated nakedly, in order to disprove itself.

To come to the main question now at issue.

Is the harm done to our neighbour the formal cause of the sinfulness of theft in such sense as, that, with the increase of harm done, the sinfulness of the act of theft increases in like ratio? This is plainly the foundation on which you rest your arguments in your letter of Sept. 9, as shown by your saying that, according as 5*s.* was a very light or very grave injury, "the *formalis malitia* would vary accordingly." And again, "that in proportion as the injury inflicted is greater . . . the formalis malitia of the act is greater likewise."

Now it is obvious to remark on this,

1. That it is not very high morality. There is teaching of a more exalted character to be found among heathens, e. g. Horace:

> "Nam de mille fabæ modiis si surripis unum
> *Damnum* est, *non facinus*, mihi pacto lenius isto."

2. That it is a lawyer-like fashion of measuring crime

[1] The epithet is omitted in the Homo Apostolicus, but is doubtless meant.

more adapted to a criminal code of a state, than a method of computing sinfulness on the principles of religion and pure morality.

3. That if the principle were carried out, it would be very difficult for a clerk in the Rothschilds' firm, or a servant in Lord Westminster's household, to be guilty of a mortal theft, for their masters are not easily "susceptible of injury" by moderate losses.

4. That a man finding a purse containing 5*s*. and wilfully appropriating it, would be ignorant whether he had committed a mortal or venial sin—whether, that is, God's grace was withdrawn from him, and his soul spiritually dead, or whether he had but sinned in a way sufficient not to diminish God's grace towards him, but only his own affection towards God.

But I maintain that the amount of harm done to our neighbour is not the formal cause of the sinfulness of theft.

"Sin," says S. Alfonso, "is defined by S. Augustin and S. Thomas. 'A thing said, a thing done, or a thing coveted, against the Eternal Law.' The words, 'against the Eternal Law,' are used, because in this consists the whole formal badness of the sin." Now God has written the moral law in our hearts, and the positive law in His Word: "Thou shalt not take that which is not thine to take." This is the law of Justice in one of its forms. As soon, therefore, as anyone has knowingly and wilfully taken that which was not his to take, he has broken the Divine Law of Justice. The act of the sin of Theft is complete. Whether the thing was worth more or less, whether more or less harm has been done to the owner, are, I acknowledge, points of importance; but they are further points; they do not once come into consideration as elements constituting the essential sinfulness of the act of theft, but only as adding, it may be, an additional malitia to it.

"Circumstances," says S. Alfonso, "either add a new kind of badness to an act, or aggravate its badness." Such a circumstance is the more or less injury inflicted by the theft. A man sees 6*d*. before him, and covets it—he knows that God's Law of Justice, and His positive Law founded upon it, forbids him to appropriate it, and that consequently he shall be acting against His Law in appropriating it; nevertheless, in spite of this knowledge, he wilfully chooses, for present gratification, to appropriate it. The sinfulness of the act is perfect, and yet not a thought of the amount of harm done to another has entered into the mind. *As an act of theft*, it is as sinful as if the sum had been £100. It is true that if it had been £100, and that £100 had been the hard-earned savings of a poor man, and his all, *another offence* would be added to the sin of theft. And something of this sort

is the case in the Parable of Nathan, to which you refer in justification of the tariff. The act of Theft, or rather, Rapine, would have been perfect, had the rich man taken a lamb from another rich man; but his having taken it from a poor man, added an additional offence; that this poor man had no other lamb but one, was a further aggravation; and that he loved it as a daughter, added still more the sin of cruelty; but the sin of theft, or rapine, was perfect without these additional aggravations.

Any real application in your other Scriptural example—the Widow's Mite—totally eludes my grasp. It goes to prove, certainly, that the same amount may be regarded large or small, relatively to the means of the different owners. But no one denied that. My objection is not to gravitas materiæ *being relative*, but to *gravitas materiæ*, and after that, if need were, to a scale, and to S. Alfonso's special scale.

To return to the subject of the essence of the sinfulness of Theft.

I would conclude that the formal cause of the sinfulness of Theft is the knowing and wilful transgression of God's moral Law of Justice, "Thou shalt not take that which is not thine to take;" and His positive Law, "Thou shalt not steal." That the formal cause of a certain kind of aggravation, or certain other kind of sinfulness, sometimes joined with the sin of Theft, is the violation of God's Law of Charity, which, in one of its shapes, would be embodied in such a formula as, "Thou shalt not do damage to thy neighbour;" and the positive Law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." But the harm done to our neighbour, which is the violation of the Law of Charity, is an accident to the *sinfulness* of Theft, though a most frequent, if not constant, consequent upon the *act* of Theft. In short, the essence of the sinfulness of Theft consists in the violation of God's Law of Justice and direct command—the essence of something else usually united with it, and aggravating it, consists in the violation of God's Law of Charity and direct command. But Theft is in itself a mortal sin, without any accidental aggravation and addition.

The case might be illustrated by that of murder. The formal sinfulness of murder consists in transgressing the Law of God written in our hearts and in His Word.—"Thou shalt not take another's life." "Thou shalt do no murder." The sin would be a perfect sin of murder, although good, rather than harm, should come to the sufferer. The harm done to the sufferer adds another sinfulness to the already mortal sin of murder.

Therefore, "the *formalis malitia* of Theft" does not "vary

according as the injury is very light, or very grave;" it only has an additional malitia added to it in the latter case.

You write, "I suppose no one will say that all thefts, from the greatest to the least, deprive the soul of sanctifying grace, nor that no theft whatsoever does so. Some, therefore, do, and some do not." Assuredly; and not only would some acts be mortal, and some not mortal, but an act the very same in all its external features might be mortal, or not mortal. But there is an ambiguity in the words *greatest* and *least* which might have reference either to the amount involved, or to the sinfulness of the act. The amount stolen would have nothing to do with the difference, whether the amount were absolute or relative. The character of the act would depend wholly on the state of mind out of which the act sprang.

Again you write, "S. Alfonso says, that in trying to ascertain the guilt of thefts, the points to be estimated are, 1. the advertentia; 2. the consensus; 3. the gravitas furti." This is the same confusion of words, and consequently of things, as that which I pointed out in my last letter. The third point is not *gravitas furti*, but *gravitas materiæ*, or *quantitas furti*. So above you have spoken of *gravitas peccati* in place of *gravitas materiæ*. There is a further risk of confusion from this use of the word *furti*, for it is in itself an ambiguous word. It may mean "the thing stolen," as it does in the phrase, *quantitas furti*. It may mean the "whole act of theft," as you would make it here.

If any proof were wanted in addition to that which I gave in my last letter, to show that quantitas furti is, in the specific case, the same as gravitas materiæ in the general, it might be taken from this passage. The heading in the Theologia Moralis is, "What is *gravis quantitas* with respect to diverse kinds of persons?" The corresponding heading in the Homo Apostolicus is, "Concerning *materiæ gravitas* with respect to diverse kinds of persons." Of course the subject of both is the same. Again, the discussion of *materia gravis* in the Homo Apostolicus at once begins with, "To estimate when *quantitas furti* amounts to mortal sin."—Hom. Ap. Tract x. Punct. 2. S. 22.

Gravitas furti is not the third point to be estimated, but *gravitas materiæ*, or *quantitas furti*; *furti*, in the last phrase, meaning "that which is stolen," in the first, "the whole act of theft." Now "*gravitas furti*" may perhaps "consist formally and morally in the violation of the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity," but "*gravitas materiæ*" does not. It is not, therefore, "this violation" which has to be estimated by the sliding-scale, nor, as you say above, "the gravitas peccati, in which quantitas furti is one element," but the quantitas itself. "To estimate," says S. Alfonso, "when the *quantitas furti* amounts to mortal,

the quantity must be considered not only in itself, but also relatively to persons, time, and place." These last words, you say, "bring into the estimate the whole moral or formal malitia of the act. I have already shown that they do not, but that they only imply that quantity is legitimately calculated relatively to circumstances, not simply and absolutely in itself, as half a real, or ten gold pieces. This accounts for the tailor's needle and the "rem tenuis pretii."

That the estimate of the necessary quantitas should be said to depend on the judgment of the wise, appears to me very natural, because these "wise" are the directors of conscience and the moral theologians themselves. And, besides, we know that grave authors have the privilege of making matters probable: the more, then, that you want probability, the more you must count up the Doctors' opinions. Thus he says, "To make a just measurement of this gravity, the Salamanca Doctors say rightly, that the authority of the wise contributes greatly, quorum major auctoritas, in hoc puncto, mihi videtur majorem constituere probabilitatem." "*Therefore*," he continues, "I have diligently taken care to get together here the different opinions of Doctors, and, not to make quotations too often, I will here mention together all the authors that I have looked at. They are Lessius, &c. &c."

The "sapientes," then, are not "the experienced who are familiar with the condition of their own country," so much as the moral theologians and casuists, and the *opiniones communiores* would not so much mean "commonly received" by mankind as "generally agreed upon" by casuists, according to the technical sense of *opinio communis*. And Liguori's object, in referring to them, is not so much to conclude "that the whole subject matter is one in which rules can be given only in general," as to gather his materials for drawing out his own scale.

The reason why there is such an amount of difference in the different Doctors' scales is an unimportant question, but I should have thought that a more probable reason than that which you assign, was, that they were an attempt at calculating how much the expenses of different classes amounted to in a day, for it seems that "Doctors in common say, that that is grave matter in theft which would be enough for any one to keep himself and his household for a day, according to his condition in life—in which, as Croix, Sporer, Gomez, and others, well remark, not only food, but dress and lodging are also computed." This calculation would, of course, be difficult.

But this is a minor point. On the main subject I think that I am justified in concluding, so far as we have gone as yet,

That—whereas "advertentia ad malitiam objecti" does *not*

mean "malicious intention in the agent;" whereas "gravitas materiæ" can *not* be resolved into "advertentia ad malitiam objecti;" whereas "formale objectum" is *not* the same thing as "formalis malitia objecti," and, consequently, does *not* mean "the whole complex, material and formal, including the violation of the Divine command;" whereas "gravitas materiæ" is *not* the same as "gravitas peccati," and, consequently, does *not* "include the extent to which the Divine Laws of Justice and Charity have been violated;" whereas, the fact of the materia being not absolute, but relative, does *not* "bring into the estimate the whole moral or formal malitia of the act;" whereas "the formalis malitia of theft," as such, does not "vary according as the injury" done is "light or grave;" that you have not yet advanced a step in disproving what you undertook to disprove, viz. that (advertence and consent presupposed,) the quantity of what is stolen is made the criterion of a sin of theft being mortal or venial; so that, in a given case, it would depend on the 6*d.* more or less, whether the sin committed, "owing to its gravity, destroyed grace and friendship with God, and earned eternal punishment, took away habitual grace and brought death to the soul;" or whether, "owing to its lightness, it did not take away God's grace and friendship, although it diminished the fervour of our affection towards Him, and earned temporal punishment, and without hurting the principle of spiritual life, viz. grace, introduced into the soul a languor which was easily cured and easily obtained pardon," without requiring to be confessed.

I am, my dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

LETTER X.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

25, Chapel Street, Grosvenor Square, Oct. 13, 1853.

My dear Sir,

I returned to London at the end of last week, and lose no time in thanking you again for your two last letters.

The question before us is whether the teaching of St. Alphonsus be as follows: that the distinction between mortal and venial sin, in the matter of theft, depends upon the quantity stolen, and that the guilt of the act is made to "depend upon something external, *not upon the frame of mind of the agent.*"

In remarking upon the arguments you have offered in support

of this statement, I pointed out, in my letter of September 8, that you seem to me to misconceive the meaning of St. Alphonsus in two points. 1. In not distinguishing the meaning of objectum. 2. In supposing "gravitas materiæ," and "quantitas," to be convertible terms.

Your last letters, if I rightly understand them, confirm me in this supposition.

The teaching of St. Alphonsus on these two points is as follows:

(1.) First, as to the meaning of objectum.

He lays down that human acts derive their goodness or badness materially from their objects and circumstances, and formally from the virtues to which they are conformed or opposed. —Tract 3, c. i. 19.

The meaning of this is given with great clearness by Scavini, who avowedly represents the teaching of St. Alphonsus. He says:—

"Duæ solent moralitatis species indicari, bonitas nempe atque malitia: bonitas consistit in ipsâ conformitate actionis humanæ cum morum regulis: malitia in ejusdem conformitatis defectu." . . .

"Sub duplici autem respectu considerari potest bonitas et malitia moralis: objective et subjective: *objective* spectata est *ipsa actionis conformitas vel discrepantia* in se, et in ipso objecto considerata independenter ab agentis voluntate: hoc dicitur bonitas vel malitia materialis: *subjective* vero accepta ea est quæ *in ipsa voluntate agentis* consideratur et libere ab eo volita est, atque bonitas vel malitia formalis solet in Scholis appellari." —Diss. i. c. iii.

When St. Alphonsus says "objectum furti" is "res aliena," he means not only property, but the property of another encompassed by the law of justice. The objectum, therefore, is not only the material thing, but the moral object constituted by its relation to the regulæ morum. The meaning, therefore, of "advertentia ad malitiam objecti" is this.

The objectum furti is res aliena, in which, apart from the act of taking it, there can be no "malitia" at all, inasmuch as it is "semper bonum, bonitate entis."

The malitia objecti, therefore, is primarily the malitia of the *act* of taking the property of another, thereby violating the law of justice.

But this would be only malitia *materialis* if done *inadvertently*.

The "Advertentia ad malitiam" adds further the consciousness of the agent, that in taking the property of another he is violating the law of justice, and that consciousness constitutes the malitia formalis.

The whole phrase, therefore, signifies a consciousness in the agent of the malitia moralis of the *act* of stealing.

And, therefore, throughout the discussion respecting "advertentia," St. Alphonsus uses, as equivalent to the phrase in question, the following forms, "advertentia . . . malitia *actûs*," "malitiam *actionis* cognoscere."—sec. 25. "Suspicionem malitiæ *actûs*," "malitiam suæ *actionis*."—sec. 26.

If, therefore, by "badness of the thing," you meant the moral badness of the action, there is, I hope, no difference between us.

The meaning of St. Alphonsus is, that a man does not commit a mortal sin unless he is conscious of the moral badness of the act he perpetrated.

And this makes the guilt to depend upon the internal frame of mind in the agent; and the guilt is greater as the badness of the act of which he is conscious is greater.

2. Next, as to the meaning of "gravitas materiæ," St. Alphonsus uses the three following phrases.

(1.) Gravitas *peccati*, by which he intends the guilt of the whole sin, including all its constituents of advertentia, consensus, and gravitas materiæ.

This, therefore, signifies the material or formal malitia of the complete act.

(2.) Gravitas *materiæ*, by which he intends one of the three constituents of mortal sin.

The gravitas materiæ is to be estimated, he says, non solum in se, but also in its circumstances, which are at least seven, as given in the barbarous line:

"Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando."

And lastly, in relation to its end, which, he says, is "finis, non intrinsecus operis," "sed extrinsecus operantis."

(3.) Quantitas, by which he intends one of the seven circumstances which fall under the category of quid.

The distinction, therefore, between "gravitas materiæ" and "quantitas" is evident.

1. Gravitas expresses the moral quality of the act as a whole, viewed objectively, with all its circumstances and end.

Quantity is only one of those circumstances.

2. Gravitas materiæ may exist with a quantitas notably small. "Auferre acum sartori potest esse materia gravis."

3. The same "quantitas" would, according to St. Alphonsus, be mortal or venial if stolen from a rich or a poor man, because of the gravitas materiæ in the latter case.

The instances of breach of promissory oaths, &c. proceed on the same principle.

The gravitas materiæ of breaking a promissory oath, consists in the extent of the malitia objectiva materialis of the action by which the law of justice is violated.

The gravitas materiæ in breaking fast, consists in the extent of the violation of the law of obedience.

The gravitas materiæ of omitting to recite the Divine office, consists in the extent of the violation of the virtue of religiŏn.

The extent, or quantity, of the material act is one of the circumstances which aggravate, i. e. increase the gravity of the matter.

And the extent of the malitia materialis, together with advertentia and consensus, determines the extent of the malitia formalis.

Condition 3, namely, "Gravitas materiæ," is not *resolved* into condition 1, namely, Advertentia, but the whole "materia gravis" is the object of which the advertentia of the agent takes cognizance. And that advertentia, with consent, constitutes the formal malice of the agent.

The formal malice of an agent who consciously sins "in materiâ gravi," is, ipso facto, greater than that of one who sins "in materiâ levi."

And it is this greater degree of formal malice which distinguishes mortal from venial sin.

St. Alphonsus, therefore, does not make that distinction to depend on something external, as quantity, and "not on the frame of mind of the agent."

On the contrary, he teaches that "materia gravis," without this frame of mind, would not constitute mortal sin: and that "levis materia," with a certain frame of mind, would become mortal, *i. e.* ex contemptu Dei.

This is evident from the whole of his Theology.

1. First, from the Treatise on Conscience, at the outset of his work. He says,

"Licet conscientia in omnibus divinæ legi conformari debeat, bonitas tamen, aut malitia humanarum actionum nobis innotescit, prout ab ipsâ conscientiâ apprehenditur."—s. 1.

2. Again, from his teaching respecting "conscientia dubia."

"Nunquam esse licitum cum conscientiâ practice dubiâ operari; et casu quo aliquis operatur, peccat, et quidem *peccato ejusdem speciei et gravitatis, de quo dubitat:* quia qui se exponit periculo peccandi, jam peccat, juxta illud: 'Qui amat periculum in illo peribit.'—Eccle. iii. 27. *Quare si dubitat, an illud sit mortale, mortaliter peccat.*"—s. 22. "Si dubitat esse furtum furti peccat."—H. Ap. In. c. ii. 13.

Here is absolutely and only the inward state of the mind of the agent as constituting mortal sin.

3. The whole treatment of "ignorance," as excusing transgression, is founded upon the same principle.

He says, "quamvis factum sit de se mortale," "si nullum peccatum committere intenderet, nullum quidem committeret."—Tract 2, c. iv. 171.

4. The modes by which mortal sin may become venial, and venial sin mortal, all depend upon the formalis malitia of the agent, on his inward state or the end intended.

5. Lastly, he teaches that the guilt of sin is so consummated by the *internal act*, that the external act adds no new essential malitia, but only an accidental.

And this accidental malitia consists in making the *internal act worse*, more intense, or more lasting.—De actib. hum. xl.

The sum of his teaching is,

1. That the guilt of sin consists formally in the subjective frame of mind in the agent, i. e. in the malitia formalis.

2. That the distinction of mortal sin is made by the greater degree of that subjective and formal malitia.

3. That, as a general rule, the objective and material malitia coincides with and indicates the extent of the subjective and formal malice.

4. That one of the many circumstances which aggravate or diminish the "gravitas materiæ," and therefore, the formal guilt of the agent who consciously commits any given act, is quantity.

This, I believe, will be found to be the teaching of St. Alphonsus.

In answer to the second letter, I would observe that St. Alphonsus has protected himself from the imputation of taking low grounds by the fact that he everywhere teaches that theft is a violation of the divine law of justice.

The commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," stands in the second table among those which regulate our duty to our neighbour.

It is most accordant, therefore, with the divine law, to dwell on the injury inflicted upon our neighbour in the matter of theft.

He that offends in one point is guilty of transgressing the whole: every "injuria contra proximum," is also "injuria contra Deum."

I do not, therefore, see the necessity or the justice of a large part of your remarks on this point.

In respect to every conceivable case in which the circumstance of quantity can apply, one rule is laid down: namely, that unless the quantity be "notabiliter aggravans," it cannot constitute mortal sin.

In the case of 2*s.* 6*d.* from Lord L. or from anyone towards

towards whom the wrong would not be appreciably different, the difference of the malitia materialis, and formalis, would likewise be inappreciable.

The same is true of thefts committed against the same person, until they coalesce into an amount which constitutes an appreciable "gravitas materiæ."

It is, then, not the "quantity," but the malitia materialis and formalis of the action, which constitutes the mortal sin.

For he who wilfully commits what he knows to be a graver sin, is, ipso facto, in a different frame of mind from him who believes himself to be committing a less sin.

The scale given by St. Alphonsus is not to be applied arithmetically, but morally.

And objections drawn from sixpences are like the fallacy of asking, If 500 grains make a heap, why will not 499?

It is obvious that Moral Theology does not pretend to mathematical scales of quantity: and that it judges of the malitia of acts *in the agents*, and by the frame of their mind, as it bears upon the whole subject-matter of the action.

On the 25th I expect to start for Rome, and our correspondence will then have this restriction—that we must be content with a single sheet. A double letter costs the fatal sum of 2*s.* 6*d.*

Let me, therefore, my dear Sir, ask of you a favour. The doctrine you ascribe to St. Alphonsus, if I rightly understand it, is contrary to natural and revealed morality, and to the Theology of the Church.

It is no light thing to say this of any servant of our Lord, living or departed. I truly believe that we shall all have to answer for many such sayings.

I do not ask you to accept my statements of St. Alphonso's meaning, but I would ask you to verify your interpretation by examining the works of other moral Theologians, who avowedly quote and follow him.

Such books as Scavini's and Gury's are easily to be got in London. My copies are at your service if you will. The older writers, as Laymann, Antoine, &c. are, no doubt, at Oxford. I feel persuaded that this would be better than any correspondence.

Believe me, my dear Sir, always,
Yours faithfully,
H. E. MANNING.

LETTER XI.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Newbattle Abbey, Dalkeith, Dec. 26, 1853.

My dear Sir,

The Term being now over, I have more time to write a reply to your letter, which I said in my note I should probably not find an opportunity of answering in the midst of Oxford work. If I shall express myself without circumlocution, I trust that you will consider that I do it, not from disrespect to yourself, but, on the contrary, because compliments are unnecessary between us.

I must begin by correcting your statement of the question between us. My assertion is not *simply* "that the distinction between mortal and venial sin, in the matter of theft, is made to depend upon the quantity stolen," but that an act of theft, committed knowingly and wilfully, is not, according to Liguori's theory, therefore a mortal sin, unless the thing stolen be also of a certain quantity, or amount, or value. Some words of mine, which you transcribed in your letter of Sept. 8, express my meaning clearly: "S. Alfonso does teach that a certain frame of mind, advertentia and consensus, the one plena, the other perfectus, are necessary for mortal sin. *That I perfectly allow.* But he adds that these are not enough, that the sin is not yet mortal without a certain quantitas." So far, then, as your arguments in your letter of Oct. 13, prove that S. Alfonso's theory is not that *amount alone* constitutes the difference between mortal and venial sin, so far I agree, and have agreed from the beginning, so far as they go to make out that it is not the rule that a certain amount is a necessary condition, without which the act is not mortal sin, so far, I fear, we are still at issue.

I have never objected to either of the two first conditions, *advertentia ad malitiam objecti*, or *consensus voluntatis*, but only to the third, *gravitas materiæ*. The chief questions about *objectum* have been, (1.) a matter of translation, whether your three translations of *advertentia ad malitiam objecti*, (α) "presence of a malicious intention;" (β) "the whole complex, both material and formal, including the violation of the Divine command;" (γ) "a consciousness in the agent of the malitia moralis of the act," are preferable to that which I have given, "a recognition of the badness of the thing," which "thing" I explained to be, "the thing about which the act is;" in S. Alfonso's words,

"Objectum est illud circa quod versatur actus moralis et primò et per se attingitur ab ipso actu," 2, 4, 36. And further, (2.) I have questioned the correctness of your position that *malitia objecti, malitia humani actûs, malitia peccati,* are in such sort identical as that *malitia objecti (formalis)* is the same as *formalis malitia peccati.* But these questions, having reference to condition 1, not to condition 3, are bye-questions, and I will therefore omit them at present, and proceed to "gravity of matter."

The ground is somewhat narrowed by our having now come to an agreement as to the distinction between *gravitas peccati* and *gravitas materiæ.* As long as one of us identified gravity of matter with the gravity of the sin, and the other with notable quantity, which has hitherto appeared to be the case, there seemed little chance of agreement. I hope, however, that you will excuse me for saying that I cannot but think that, even now, you have made the distinction between gravity of sin and gravity of matter only in word, and that immediately that you compare gravity of matter with quantity, you speak of gravity of matter as though it were gravity of sin.

The object of my present letter will be to make out three things, 1. That your explanation of *gravitas materiæ* is incorrect. 2. That gravity of matter is constituted by the quantity of the particular matter in hand. 3. That even though there should be any amount of distinction between gravity of matter, (in the general,) and quantity of what is stolen, (in the particular,) yet that such distinction would be of no assistance to your argument, because S. Alfonso distinctly lays down, not only that gravity of matter, but, specifically, that quantity of what is stolen, is a necessary condition, without which a sin of theft is not mortal.

1. Your explanation of *gravitas materiæ* is incorrect. You say, "The distinction between gravitas materiæ and quantitas is evident. Gravitas expresses the moral quality of the act as a whole, viewed objectively, with all its circumstances and end."

First, as to theft.—S. Alfonso says, "Doctors agree that, in theft, that is grave matter which is enough for a man to support himself and his family with for a day, counting not only food, but clothes and lodging." Therefore, in theft, "that which is enough for a man to support himself and his family with for a day, counting not only food, but clothes and lodging," is "the moral quality of the act as a whole, viewed objectively, with all its circumstances and end." Again, "In assigning gravis materia, authors use different names of coins." Therefore, in assigning "the moral quality of the act," &c. "authors use different names of coins." Again, "with respect to beggars, I

suppose that a carlino, (according to the note = 5*d.*) or less, is grave matter." Therefore; "with respect to beggars," "5*d.* or less," is "the moral quality of the act, viewed objectively, with all its circumstances and end." Again, for the sin to be grave, twice as large a *materia* is required in several thefts made at different times, as in one theft committed at once; if, for example, 1*s.* 6*d.* is wanted for a single theft, 3*s.* is needed for several small thefts. I presume, therefore, that double as much "moral quality" is required. "But this," Liguori adds, "only holds provided the thief had not originally the intention of taking possession of grave matter (*accipiendi gravem materiam*)." Is it possible that a man could have spoken of "taking possession of grave matter," if by grave matter he had meant a moral quality, or an act of a certain moral quality?

Next, as to working on Festivals: he says that *parvitas materiæ* excuses, and then asks this plain question, "What is, in this, *gravitas materiæ?*" Now, does he answer this question by saying that it is "the moral quality of the act as a whole, viewed objectively with all its circumstances and end?" or does he say that it "consists in the extent of the malitia objectiva materialis of the action by which the law of obedience or religion is violated?" No, he says that it consists in being *two hours.* "Quæritur quænam, in hoc, sit gravitas materiæ. Aliqui canonistæ ponunt pro materiâ gravi tertiam partem diei . . . alii unam horam . . . alii ponunt pro materiâ gravi duas horas . . . alii duas et aliquantulum plus . . . alii tres horas . . . and then follows the communior et probabilior sententia, 2 *or* 2½ *hours.*

As to fasting, you say that "Gravitas materiæ in breaking a fast consists in the extent of the violation of the law of obedience." S. Alfonso says, (Lib. iv. 1029.) that the Salamanca doctors are right in saying, that, in fasting, half an ounce is *materia gravis.* Therefore, "half an ounce" is "the extent of the violation of the law of obedience."

As to omitting to say office.—You say that "The gravitas materiæ of omitting to recite the Divine office consists in the extent of the violation of the virtue of religion." [You twice use the phrase, "the gravitas materiæ OF." I find no such phrase in S. Alfonso, and it may mean something very different from "IN." I presume that you mean by it, "gravitas materiæ IN omitting," &c.] S. Alfonso says that that is *parva materia,* which is less in quantity than one of the 'hours.' Consequently, the length of one of the hours is *materia gravis.* Consequently, the length of one of the hours is "the extent of the violation of the virtue of religion."

As to talking with nuns: It is argued that any time under twenty-five minutes is *materia parva;* therefore, anything above

twenty-five minutes is *materia gravis*. Half-an-hour, then, is *materia gravis;* half-an-hour, then, is "the moral quality of the act as a whole, viewed objectively with all its circumstances and end."

I believe that I have made out the first point, that your explanation of *gravitas materiæ* is incorrect, i. e. that by it you mean one thing, and S. Alfonso another. I believe that I can also show the reason of the difference, viz. that you still argue as though gravity of matter were gravity of sin—though in a different manner from before.

In your letters of Sept. 8 and 9, you put *gravitas peccati*, without hesitation, in the place of *gravitas materiæ*, as bearing the same meaning. In the letter of Oct. 13, you assume the identity of *gravitas materiæ* with *malitia objecti*, as explained by yourself; at least, I gather so from the following statements.

a. You say that "malitia objecti is primarily the malitia of the act, [of taking the property of another,] thereby violating the law of justice," "being only malitia materialis if done inadvertently." This, I suppose, is the same thing as "the moral quality of the act viewed objectively," &c.

b. In the next instance it is clearer: "The gravitas materiæ [of (in) breaking a promissory oath,] consists in the extent of the malitia objectiva materialis of the action, by which the law of justice is violated." Here you use the very same phrase for expressing *gravitas materiæ* as that which you had used for *malitia objecti*, with the words "extent of" added.

c. "The extent or quantity of the material act, is one of the circumstances which aggravate, i. e. increases the gravity of the matter; and the extent of the *malitia* materialis, together with advertentia and consensus, determine the extent of the malitia formalis." Here the word *malitia* has no place except on the supposition that *gravitas materiæ* and *malitia materialis* are the same.

d. In p. 9 of your letter you use "objective and material malitia" for *gravitas materiæ*.

In the arguments then employed in the letter of Oct. 13, you seem to identify the three following phrases,—*gravitas materiæ*, *malitia objecti*, *malitia materialis*. But surely *malitia* has here crept in quite improperly, gravity of matter having nothing to do with material *badness*, (else how could such phrases as I have quoted. e. g. *accipiendi gravem materiam*, have been used?) but only with amount of matter. Nor do you seem to me to be consistent on this point, for, immediately after having thus introduced *malitia* into the signification, you say that "the whole materia gravis is the *object* of which the advertentia of the agent takes cognizance;" but if it is the *object* simply, it cannot

be the *badness of the object* likewise. I would conclude that gravitas materiæ no more means *malitia* materialis than it means gravitas peccati, but that

2. Gravity of matter is constituted by the quantity of the particular matter in hand. You use three arguments to the contrary.

(α.) You rest great weight upon the sentence which declares that gravitas materiæ is to be considered non solum in se, sed etiam ex circumstantiis. You translate ex circumstantiis "*in* ITS circumstances." This translation does not seem to me to bear out the author's meaning. On referring to the Theologia Moralis from the Homo Apostolicus, I find that St. Alfonso expresses what circumstances he means; and they are not *the circumstances of the matter*, (such as quantity might be,) but external circumstances, as "the common good," "avoiding scandal," &c.; or again, they might be such circumstances as "persons," "time," and "place," which may make matter which is, in itself, light, to be, relatively to them, grave. This, then, is nothing else than what I have acknowledged and maintained throughout—that S. Alfonso regards gravity of matter as relative, not absolute. In Lib. vi. where he speaks of quantity as an aggravating circumstance, it is not as an aggravating circumstance *of the materia* (or, as you say, as "increasing the gravity *of the matter*") that he describes it, but *of the peccatum.*

Acknowledging, therefore, that quantity is a circumstance which aggravates the *sin*, I cannot find that it is a circumstance, and "only one of the circumstances, of the gravity of matter," and, for that reason, distinct.

(β.) "Gravitas materiæ may exist with a quantitas notably small—auferre acum sartori, &c. True; but so also may notable quantity, i. e. quantity which is "in seipsâ," notably small, may, "respectu personarum," be notably great, and constitute *gravitas materiæ.* (H. A. x. 22.) This, then, again is nothing else than that S. Alfonso regards gravity of matter as relative, not absolute—*not* a proof that quantity does not constitute gravity.

(1.) "The same quantitas would be mortal or venial if stolen from a rich or a poor man, because of the gravitas materiæ in the latter case." This is answered in the same way as before. Instead of the reason which you assign, I would substitute, because, in the latter case, the quantity would be, relatively, notably great, and so constitute, relatively, grave matter; in the former, relatively, small, and so constitute, relatively, light matter. I cannnot think that these three arguments prove that "quantitas is one of the seven circumstances of gravitas materiæ, which falls under the category of quid."

In affirming that gravity of matter is constituted by quantity,

the proposition that I wish to maintain, is the following: that wherever there is, relatively speaking, notable quantity of the specific matter in hand (money, time, or otherwise,) there is gravity of matter, and that there cannot be gravity of matter without, relatively speaking, a notable quantity.

In support of this assertion, I would refer first to the long induction which I made in my letter of Sept. 16. It will not be necessary here to repeat it, but I may say that that induction is exhaustive. In every case of *gravitas materiæ* described by Liguori, that *gravitas* is constituted by a certain *quantitas*. I think no exception can be pointed out. This, if not a proof that it is always so constituted, is something little less than proof. And full proof seems to me to be given by S. Alfonso's using the terms *materia gravis*, and *notabilis quantitas*, as convertible. Thus (to give one out of many instances,) Theol. Mor. c. i. dub. 2, "Quæ sit *quantitas notabilis* ad mortale peccatum, ix. 526. Quæ sit *quantitas gravis*, &c, ix. 527. Id clariùs elucidatur." What is? Of course, what is *quantitas notabilis* or *gravis*. But what are S. Alfonso's words? 527. "Quoad hoc punctum, tam scitu necessarium, nempe quænam sit *materia gravis* in furto, operæ pretium est plura hic elucidare." Then, in his estimation, *materia gravis in furto* is the same thing as, or is solely constituted by, *quantitas furti notabilis*. The same inquiry, "quæ sit *quantitas gravis*" in Theol. Mor. is thus expressed in the Hom. Ap. "De *materiæ gravitate*." Then *quantitas gravis*, and *gravitas materiæ*, bear the same meaning—and *materiæ gravitas* is nothing else than *materiæ gravis quantitas*, the same *quantitas* being regarded *gravis* or *levis*, according to circumstances.

3. But this need not be proved for the settlement of the question in hand. Even though *materiæ gravitas* should mean "the moral quality of the act," &c. yet you will not say that *quantitas furti* bears the same meaning. But Liguori says that a certain quantity, (not only *gravitas materiæ*, but *quantitas*,) differing according to the means of the person from whom the theft is made, is necessary for a theft to be mortal. And this quantity is either 5*d.* or 10*d.* or 1*s.* or 1*s.* 8*d.* or 2*s.* 6*d.* or 5*s.* 0*d.* or 7*s.* 6*d.* or 10*s.* according to circumstances. Whether, then, this quantity is *materiæ gravis*, (as he seems to me plainly to assert,) or whether it is not, still no theft is mortal unless what is stolen is equal to 5*d.*, 10*d.*, 1*s.*, 1*s.* 8*d.*, 2*s.* 6*d.*, 5*s.* 0*d.*, 7*s.* 6*d.*, 10*s.* And this at once brings me back to what I set out with, viz. "that *advertentia* and *consensus* are not enough; the sin is not yet mortal without a certain *quantitas*," or, as I expressed it in my letter of Sept. 24, "that *(advertentia and con-*

sensus being presupposed,) the quantity of what is stolen is made the criterion of a theft being mortal or venial."

I would willingly add some remarks on other parts of your letter, if the length of my letter allowed it, but as you have warned me that the post office does not admit of *gravitas materiæ*, or *notabilis quantitas*, in letters without grave damage to the recipient, I must, without further criticism, sum up as follows:—

1. S. Alfonso says distinctly that a certain quantity (*5d.*... 10*s.* according to circumstances,) must be stolen, else the theft is not mortal: therefore I conclude (though, indeed, it is more a re-affirmation of what he has said than a conclusion,) that, according to his teaching, full *advertentia* and perfect *consensus* are not enough to make an act of theft mortal, but that the amount taken must be of a certain extent. This is the real point at issue between us—whether it is so, or is not so, and, if it is so, whether it is right. In your letter of Sept. 9, I thought that you admitted that it was so, and that the scope of that letter was to defend it on the principle that the greater injury done, when much was taken, made the sin to be greater, and so mortal. *Now* I cannot understand whether or no you do admit it, but it appears to me that we have gone back from the question, Is it right? to, Is it the case?

2. I maintain—but the proposition may be kept apart from what has just gone before—that when the thing stolen is of a certain value, then that that quantity constitutes *materia gravis*.

3. I maintain that your explanation of *materia gravis* is incompatible with S. Alfonso's use of the word.

I would add that I heartily agree with your final sentence—"It is obvious that Moral Theology does not pretend to mathematical scales of quantity, and that it judges of the malitia of acts *in the agent*, and by the frame of their minds, as it bears upon the whole subject-matter of the action." And it is for this very reason that I object to *gravitas materiæ* and scales of quantity.

I am sorry to say that I have not had an opportunity of getting Scavini conveyed to me from London. Vasquez and Filiutius I have looked at, and they seem to bear out my views. Thank you sincerely for your warning against speaking evil. I hope, however, that you will excuse me for saying that that appears to me to be beginning from the wrong end—that I must judge of persons by principles, not of principles by persons.

I am, my dear Sir,

Yours very sincerely,

F. MEYRICK.

LETTER XII.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

Rome, Feb. 4, 1854.

My dear Sir,

Many thanks for your letter of Dec. 26th. I should indeed be most happy to find that I have misunderstood your meaning, and need hardly say that, if I have done so, it has been unconsciously.

It will be well, therefore, to re-state what I supposed you to maintain.

1. In your first letter, dated July 15, last year, I find the following, as your view of S. Alphonsus' teaching, and as a re-statement of what you said in the conversation which gave rise to this correspondence.

"That a certain quantity of matter is required for a theft to be a mortal sin: that the quantity is relative to the state of the owner, from whom the theft is made: thus, that in the case of a beggar, a sufficient quantity is one real; of a labourer, two reals; of an artizan, three reals; of a nobleman, one scudo, &c. If this is so, might it not be the case that a theft of the same amount would be a mortal sin if the owner were a commoner, and a venial sin if the owner were a nobleman? And is not the guilt of the act made *to depend upon something external, not upon the frame of mind of the agent?*"

In that letter there is no mention of "advertentia," or "consensus," or "advertentia ad malitiam objecti."

There is nothing to imply that these conditions were to be understood.

The last words of the question are negative, and exclude the internal "frame of mind of the agent;" which, according to S. Alphonsus, is the proper seat of advertentia and consensus.

In my replies I pointed out these omissions.

In your letter, dated St. Bartholomew's Day, I find your meaning re-stated as follows:—

"What I wish to make out is, that even though 'advertentia ad malitiam objecti' did mean malicious intention, still that two men *in identically the same state of mind*, with the *same* advertentia and the *same* consent, would, according to S. Alphonso's teaching, be guilty, the one of a venial, the other of a mortal sin, according as the quantity of the thing they had stolen (if it were a matter of theft) were more or less."

That is to say, advertentia and consensus being as a common

quantity in mortal and venial sin, the only difference is the quantity of the matter stolen.

And at the end of the same letter I find these words:—"Yet you say that the quantity of the theft is not made the criterion of the sin. Then what is? For this is the sole difference of the two cases."

Or, in other words, they differ in "something external," and not in "the frame of mind of the agent."

I have pointed out that, according to the teaching of S. Alphonsus, the case supposed is impossible.

1. Because the essential malitia of all sin is constituted by the internal state or frame of mind of the agent.

2. Because the greater or less degree of essential malitia, so constituted, determines the difference between mortal and venial sin.

3. Because "plena advertentia," and "perfectus consensus," terminating upon a more extensive malitia, *quoad materiale*, necessarily constitutes a more extensive malice, *quoad formale*, i. e. in the frame of mind of the agent.

For the man who, with full advertence and perfect consent, commits a more extensive violation of the laws of justice and charity, is, *ipso facto*, more malicious than the man who, with full advertence and perfect consent, commits a less extensive violation of those laws.

For instance. If a man, with full advertence and perfect consent, should steal a farthing from a rich man, will anyone say that his internal frame of mind is the same with that of the man who should steal "the two mites, which make a farthing," from the poor widow?

Or, the man who should steal a handful of meal from one who has abundance, is he in the same frame of mind with the man who should steal the same quantity from the woman of Sarepta, a widow, in poverty, in a time of famine, with a son depending on her for food?

Or, supposing that one man should steal a half-handful of meal only, and the other a half-handful and one of the "two sticks," would it be the stick, and not the internal cruelty of the agent, which would aggravate the formal malice of the act?

According to S. Alphonsus, the malitia is aggravated by the circumstance, not of persons only, but "respectu personarum temporis et loci," &c.; and the subjective malitia corresponds in degree with the objective.

If the gradations are morally (not mathematically) inappreciable objectively, they would be likewise inappreciable subjec-

tively. If the malitia be notably aggravated, it would be mortal; if not, it would not be mortal, and therefore venial.

In reply to your remarks on the statements of my last letter, I see no need of adding more than the following references.

1. For the true sense of "objectum" and "advertentia ad malitiam objecti," I refer to Scavini, Tract. i. c. iii. De actibus humanis. De moralitate. De Fontibus moralitatis, and de Fine Tourneley Continuatio, &c. De actibus humanis, c. vi. Art. 11.

2. For the meaning of quantitas as one of the seven circumstances which contribute to the gravity of the matter of moral acts, I refer to Scavini in the same place. De circumstantiis "Septem numerantur circumstantiæ," "Quis quibus," , &c. "Quid designat quantitatem," &c. Tourneley in the same place, and Sporer, who treats the subject fully.—Tract i. c. iii. s. 4.

It is not necessary, however, to dwell on these points.

In my last letter, among other proofs of S. Alphonsus' meaning, I quoted the answer he gives to the question, "An actus externus addat aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam moralem actui interno?

He says:—

"Dixi quod actus externus non addit bonitatem vel malitiam moralem intrinsecam et per se supra interiorem."

Therefore, in the teaching of S. Alphonsus, the act of theft is so wholly complete in the "advertentia" and "consensus," as they terminate in the mind of the agent upon the matter of the action, that the external act of perpetrating the theft adds no further essential malice.

Again. S. Alphonsus adds, "nam per accidens addit regulariter loquendo aliquam bonitatem vel malitiam accidentalem."

And he goes on to show in what this accidental malitia consists as follows:—

"Actus externus sæpe causa est et occasio ut actus *internus* fiat *pejor*."

(1.) Vel quia *multiplicantur actus interiores* donec exequantur actus extrincesè.

(2.) Vel quia actus *interior* habet majorem *durationem* quousque perficiat opus quod statim perfici non potest.

(3.) Vel quia fit *intensior* (i. e. actus interior) per extrincitatem actûs.

From first to last, the accidental malitia consists in the *aggravation of the internal act*, that is, the frame of mind of the agent.

It is plain, therefore, that S. Alphonsus teaches as follows:—

1. That the whole formal malice of sin consists in the frame of mind of the agent.

2. That the mortality or veniality of sins consists in the greater or less degree of malice in the agent.

3. That the difference of quantity in theft affects the mortality or veniality of the sin only in so far as that difference of quantity is the subject matter of the internal act, that is, of the advertentia and consent of the agent.

Finally, he places at the head of his chapter on "Quæ sit quantitas notabilis," the text of Busenbaum, in which it is distinctly laid down, "Ea non mathematicè sed moraliter metienda est."

Which proves at once that the quantity of theft, and the gradations of quantity, are not to be estimated arithmetically, but morally; and are to be regarded, not only as external to the mind of the agent, but as the object of the will, and of the internal act in which the whole essential malice of sin consists.

It appears to me, therefore, that the doctrine of S. Alphonsus is the direct contrary of the original statement which caused this correspondence.

I will now, as I promised, refer to the other points of your first letter.

The teaching of S. Alphonsus in respect to theft is as follows:

1. That to steal is, under all circumstances and conditions, a sin against the law of God.

2. That the only difference to be found among thefts is, (1.) that some deprive the soul of grace, which is the life of the soul, and incur the penalty of eternal death, for which cause they are called mortal; (2.) that others do not deprive the soul of grace, though they diminish it—offend God, and incur any extent and duration, it may be, of temporal punishment; but as they do not extinguish the spiritual life of the soul, they are, therefore, not mortal, and are called venial.

He does not admit the possibility of any theft which shall not be sin, either mortal or venial; for to steal is immutably a sin against God.

Whether, therefore, a rich man's son, in stealing three scudi, or the son of a principe, in stealing anything less than 50, or a monk, in stealing four scudi from his monastery, commit a venial or a mortal sin, every one is at liberty to judge, according to his conscience and his lights. Sin, either mortal or venial, according to S. Alphonsus, it must be. Whether mortal or venial, he leaves us, if we will, to judge.

Having treated of theft, S. Alphonsus goes on to say that there are cases in which to take that which belongs to another is not to steal, and, therefore, not to sin.

He founds this on the principle laid down, as he says, by all,

with S. Thomas, (quod docent omnes cum S. Thoma,) namely, that in case of extreme necessity, "bona sunt communia." He, therefore, affirms that the law of property introduced by political society ceases, in such cases, to exist. And more, that by the Law of God written in nature, the "jus in re" is transferred to the person who is in the necessity of which he speaks.

Six times in the Chapter, De Furto, H. A. c. ii. p. 1, he repeats this statement.

"In tali casu bona sunt communia."—s. 15.

"In extrema necessitate pauper habet *jus* in bona alterius."—s. 18.

"In casu extremæ necessitatis, in quâ bona fiunt communia."—Ibid.

"Fur habet idem *jus* in eam rem quam habet quilibet pauper."—s. 19.

"Pauper tunc jam habebat *jus*."—s. 20.

"Licet pauper habuisset *jus*, &c."—Ib.

He, and those he refers to, maintain that, in case of extreme necessity, a man has a right, "ex justitiâ accipere rem alienam."—(De Lugo de Jure et Justitiâ. Disp. xvi. 7. 143.)

The comment on the place of S. Thomas, referred to by S. Alphonsus, is, "Abusiva locutio est quod *liceat furari* in extremâ necessitate et aliæ hujusmodi; sicut non recte diceretur quod judici *licet* committere *homicidium*." Because, as the law, "Thou shalt do no murder," does not exist where the necessity of self-defence, or of capital punishment, arises, so with the law, "Thou shalt not steal."

S. Alphonsus uses, nevertheless the word, "furari" abusivè, because no one, with the principles of the treatise before him, can misunderstand it.

To say, therefore, that S. Alphonsus teaches that it is lawful to steal in any case whatsoever, is contrary to his express words, "fur habet *jus* in rem."

To say that he is large in admitting instances of necessity, or to deny his first principles of justice, would be a fair warfare; but it would be a new question.

He is of opinion that the case of the nobleman is one of extreme necessity. Others are not. You and I are equally at liberty to admit it, or not.

But we are not at liberty to say that S. Alphonsus holds it to be *stealing*, and yet permits it. He permits it because he *denies* it to be a theft.

As to the case of the wife, S. Alphonsus does not teach that she may expend a twentieth of her husband's income without his will. He says, "hæc summa merito judicatur excedens . . . saltem universaliter loquendo."

The rights of a wife, presupposed by S. Alphonsus, are thus given by De Lugo, to whom he refers.

She has a right to take from the property of her husband sufficient for the expenses, alms, and presents, which are proportionate to her state in life. "Nam hæc videntur includi in sustentatione debitâ uxoris ad quam vir ob matrimonium sese obligavit."—Disp. xvi. s. iv. 64.

The duty of giving alms is from the divine law, which, if the husband will not fulfil, the wife may. "Quo (jure) maritus eam privare non potest."—S. Alph. Theol. Mor. L. iii. Tr. v. 4.

She is "non *mancipium* sed *socia:*" and "licet sit sub viri potestate, est tamen socia et *particeps dignitatis* viri:" she is "*particeps bonorum:*" the husband is "Dominus," the wife, "Domina." "Unde licet, quoad administrationem, uxor sit subordinata viro, æquum tamen est ut ipse permittat suæ conjugi cum debitâ moderatione usum bonorum ad necessitates graves suorum sublevandas." "Ratio est quia maritus possit etiam ex communibus bonis subvenire propriis parentibus aut filiis prioris matrimonii indigentibus, cur ergo uxor non poterit idem facere cum onera singulorum debeant esse communia?"

The husband has a right to take of their common property to support the children of his former marriage. The wife has the same in equity.

The text of Busenbaum, given by S. Alphonsus, says that she is *bound*, by the *law of nature*, to support them; and that her husband is also *bound* to consent to her doing so.

S. Alphonsus adds that she is bound to compensate the children of this second marriage.—H. A. x. 11. 33.

Thus far she acts with a liberty founded in right. If she exceed that right, she would then fall under the law, and commit a theft, mortal or venial, as the case may be.

Lastly, as to servants:—

S. Alphonsus affirms that if a servant, forced by necessity, is hired at a price unjustly small, he commits neither mortal nor venial sin, if being otherwise unable to obtain justice, he takes of his master's goods the minimum of what is due to him for his service. His master is his debtor, and the price of his labour is his own.

The civil law might punish the act as a theft, but in the sight of God it might be free from the malitia peccati; and that on the double ground of necessity and justice.

But whatsoever judgment any one may form of these examples, one thing is beyond controversy, namely, that S. Alphonsus teaches that all thefts are sins, and that the cases in question are lawful solely on the principle *that they are not thefts*, because the law, in such cases, does not exist.

The teaching of S. Alphonsus on the subject of falsehood and equivocation, is as follows:—

1. That falsehood is always and essentially a sin, and therefore unlawful.

2. That when interrogated by those who have a right to interrogate, and in a lawful way, men are bound to communicate all their knowledge on the matter of the interrogation.

3. That when interrogated by those who have no right to interrogate, or in an unlawful way, men are not bound to communicate all their knowledge on the matter of the interrogation. No man is bound to make known to every one who may ask it, the matter of his confessions, or to reveal the sins or dishonour of his parents, friends, &c.

4. That, in case of such interrogations, he has a right to set aside the interrogation by any lawful means.

5. That to do so by falsehood, is absolutely unlawful.

6. That to do so by an answer with *mental* restriction, is equivalent to falsehood, because the matter spoken is false; this he calls "restrictio pure mentalis," which is condemned by the Church, under Innocent XI.—(Viva Propos. Damnatæ. Prop. xxvii. Inn. XI.)

7. That to do so by an answer, of which the matter is true, but the sense ambiguous, is not falsehood, and is, therefore, lawful.

This he calls "amphibology," or "equivocation," or "restrictio non pure mentalis."

The instances he gives are, in his judgment, lawful, because they are not falsehood.

We are at liberty to judge otherwise; but we are not at liberty to say that S. Alphonsus allows the use of falsehood.

It is because he denies this example to be falsehood, that he admits the use of them to be lawful. We may reject all his examples, but we may not say that he teaches the lawfulness of speaking falsely. If he thought them false, the first principle in his Treatise would condemn them as unlawful.

I find the same teaching in such Protestants and Jurists as treat the subject with sincerity, and more than I know how to defend.

Having no access to English books, I can only speak from memory, and from MS. notes.

But I believe that Baxter and Paley would bear out the above propositions. Grotius, Barbeyrac, and other writers on morals and law, are equally explicit.

Jeremy Taylor's testimony is of more weight, because of his captious and petulant tone against the Catholic Church. In his

Ductor Dubitantium, he says: Heber's edition, vol. xiii. p. 350, &c. &c.:—

"It is *lawful* to *tell a lie* to children, or to madmen, because they, having no power of judging, have no right to truth;" provided "the lie be *charitable* and *useful*." The same of physicians, but not to every patient; for if the man be wise, and can choose what he hath a mind to, "*therefore* to cozen him, is to injure him; and no man must commit *a sin* to do a good turn to a man *against his will*."—pp. 353–4.

"It is *lawful to tell a lie* to our neighbour by consent, provided *the end be innocent or pious*."—p. 355.

"*To tell a lie for charity*, to save a man's life, the life of a friend, of a husband, of a prince, of a useful and public person, hath not only been done in all times, but commanded by great, and wise, and good men."—p. 355.

"Not that every false proposition, spoken knowingly, is a sin; but if it be spoken to deceive, and not to profit, it is spoken to the injury of him that hears, and is *a sin because it is unjust*, and, therefore, not to be done for any good.—p. 359.

"But the case is not so clear in the matter of difference when it happens between a great charity and an unconcerning truth. For who would not save his father's life, or the life of his king, or of a good bishop, and a guide of souls, at the charge of a harmless lie, from the rage of persecutors and tyrants?"—p. 360.

It may be well to state, in passing, that the Catholic Church does not allow the lawfulness of such an act, even to save our life. Innocent III. says, "Ne pro vitâ quidem defendendâ nobis licitum est mentiri."

"When the things are true," Taylor adds, "in several senses, the not explicating in what sense I mean the words, is not criminal reservation."—p. 378.

"It is lawful, upon a just cause of great charity or necessity, to use in our answers and intercourses, words of divers significations, though it does deceive him that asks."—p. 379.

"Now, in these cases, where there is *no obligation to tell the truth*, any man may use the covers of truth, especially when, in this case, it is not a lie; for an equivocation is like a dark lantern; if I have just reason to hold the dark side to you, you are to look to it, not I. . . ."

"Now that part of the ambiguity which *I intend* in it is *true*."

"If it be fit that he be deceived, though I have no right to do it, *let him deceive himself*. It must be by his own act, to which *I may indeed minister occasionally*, by any fair and innocent means."—pp. 379–80.

"An equivocal speech hath a light side as well as a dark; it is true as well as false, and, therefore, it is, in its own nature,

innocent; and it is only changed into a fault when it is against justice and charity, under which simplicity is to be placed."—p. 380.

I have the good fortune to find a private hand to convey this to England, so that I need not inflict it on you by post.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours very faithfully,
H. E. MANNING.

LETTER XIII.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Trinity College, Oxford, May 12, 1854.

My dear Sir,

As I have heard that you are now returned to England, I send you a reply to the letter which you were kind enough to write to me from Rome, or rather, to a part of it, as the whole letter embraces too many things to answer in one letter. I do not at all wonder, with the number of occupations which you must have, and the length of time which has necessarily passed since the commencement of our correspondence, that you have come to think that the proposition which I supported was, that quantity was made by S. Alfonso, in all cases, to constitute the sole difference between mortal and venial sin. Perhaps you will allow me to recal to your memory some of the passages in my letters which show how entirely foreign to my whole purpose it has been to maintain anything so palpably incorrect.

In my letter of Aug. 24, 1853, I wrote, "I find, distinctly stated in Liguori, that there are *three* things necessary for mortal sin, sc., *advertentia*, *consensus*, *gravitas* .... Quorum si *unum* desit, the thing does not exist .... Ob *aliquem* horum defectum mortale fieri potest veniale." In the same letter I have corrected (as I supposed finally,) this misapprehension thus: "You say that he has not 'given his sliding scale of ducats and scudi to make the quantity of the theft the *sole* criterion of the sinfulness of the agent." No; but that does not seem to me to meet the point. He does teach that a certain frame of mind, *advertentia* and *consensus*, the one *plena*, the other *perfectus*, are necessary for mortal sin. *That I perfectly allow.* But he adds that these are not enough, that the sin is not yet mortal without a certain *quantitas*. Consequently, the

mortality or veniality of the sin does depend upon the 6*d.* more or less,—*plena advertentia, perfectus consensus,* and 2*s.* 6*d.* being a mortal sin; *plena advertentia, perfectus consensus,* and 2*s.* being venial. You give two reasons, whereby, you say, that it is disproved that S. Alfonso makes the quantity the measure of the sin, or, as I would correct it, *in part* the measure of the sin."

On Sept. 8 you quote almost all this passage.

My letter of Sept. 15, ended thus:

"Quantity is made the criterion between greater and less sins, even to the extent of making it *(advertence and consent presupposed,)* the distinction between a mortal and a venial sin."

This is the same phrase as you use in your letter of Sept. 9. "In proportion as the injury inflicted is greater, (advertentia and consensus always presupposed,)" &c.

On Sept. 24, I wrote, "What you undertook to disprove, viz. that *(advertence and consent presupposed,)* the quantity of what is stolen, is made the criterion of a sin of theft being mortal or venial, *so* that, *in a given case,* it would depend on the 6*d.* more or less."

These passages will be enough to show that I have never ignored *advertentia plena,* and *consensus perfectus,* and have never declared Liguori's theory to be, that quantity alone makes the difference between mortal and venial sin. I am surprised that you should think the passages which you have extracted from my letter to be in any way confirmatory of such a view. They appear to me to point exactly the other way. The first passage which you quote is this: "If this be so, *might* it not be the case that a theft of the same amount would be a mortal sin if the owner were a commoner, and a venial sin if the owner were a nobleman? and is not the guilt *of the act* made to depend upon something external, not upon the frame of mind of the agent?"

There is "no mention of advertentia and consensus," not on account of an "omission," but because I have never quarrelled with those two conditions, but only with the third, *gravitas materiæ.* The sentence might have been written more cautiously, but the use of the word "*might*" in the place of *would,* necessarily implies the existence of other conditions, which yet I affirm to be not sufficient without that to which I am objecting, viz. the relative quantity stolen. *Might* it not? (I asked.) Yes, it might, viz. when a man has *plena advertentia* and *perfectus consensus,* and with these two qualifications steals the specified quantity from the commoner, or from the nobleman, and thus "the guilt of the act," i. e. of the particular act under discussion, "is made to depend upon something external, not upon the frame of mind of the agent."

An illustration will show my meaning clearly. If a scholarship were to be given to a boy, provided he was possessed of three qualifications, intellectual attainments, moral character, and poverty—it *might* be the case that a boy with the two first qualifications would have to be rejected for want of the third, and then his want of success would be caused by his not being poor enough; so I affirmed that a case might occur, according to Liguori's teaching, in which an act would be performed having two of the conditions of mortal sin, but deficient in the third, and therefore not mortal sin, because the agent had not stolen enough.

So in the other two passages which you have quoted, "two men in identically the same state of mind, with the same *advertentia* and the same *consensus*, (i. e. both of them with *advertentia plena* and *consensus perfectus*,) "would, according to S. Alphonsus, be guilty, the one of a venial, the other of a mortal sin, according as the quantity of the thing they had stolen was more or less," because, though two conditions were fulfilled, yet the third would, in the latter of the two cases, be wanting.

The other passage you quote is this: "Yet you say that the quantity of the theft is not made the criterion of the sin; then what is? For this is the sole difference *in the two cases*." What two cases? The case of a man stealing *5s. with full advertence and perfect consent*, from a nobleman, and a man stealing *5s. 6d. with full advertence and perfect consent*, from a nobleman.

And these passages are taken from the letter which contains the passage, which on Sept. 8, you transcribed, saying that I perfectly allowed that he taught that a certain frame of mind, viz. full advertence and perfect consent, were necessary for mortal sin, but that, according to him, they were not enough, the sin being yet not mortal without a certain *quantitas*. Indeed, had I held the view which you attribute to me, the correspondence must have ended in one letter.

I now return to the question whether it is right that *gravitas materiæ* should be one of the three conditions without which a sin is not mortal, and whether it is right that a certain *quantitas furti* should be a condition without which a sin of theft is not mortal.

I see that the greater part of your letter which refers to theft still goes on the assumption that *gravitas materiæ* is identical with *malitia materialis* or *objectiva*. This I attempted to dispute in my last letter, and I see that you do not disprove my arguments. The words "accipiendi gravem materiam," alone seem to me sufficient to show that *gravitas materiæ* does not mean a "moral quality" or badness regarded objectively.

Your three instances of stealing a farthing from a rich man

and from the poor widow, of stealing a handful of meal from one who has abundance and from the woman of Sarepta, and of stealing a half-handful, and a half-handful together with one of the two sticks—all go on the same principle as the instance which you before brought forward of Nathan's Parable, and I would answer them in the same way. It is true that in each instance the one man would be in a worse frame of mind than the other. The act of the one would imply cruelty, violation of charity, hard-heartedness, and a host of other sins, which the act of the other would not,—at least in the same degree. If, therefore, it is a question which of the two men is the worst man, there is no doubt of the answer; but because B is a worse man than A, it does not follow that A has not committed a perfect act *of theft* or plunder,—and this I maintain that he has done, if he has taken possession of anything, however small, knowing that God's law forbade him, and yet wilfully choosing to do so. The sinfulness of the act of theft is perfect without consideration of the damage done; the consideration of the damage done adds to the sin of theft the sin of cruelty.

As by going on to the other questions, you seem to intend that this point should now, as soon as possible, be brought to a close, perhaps the best plan of coming to an agreement, or seeing where the point of difference lies, will be to begin at the other end of the argument synthetically, as we have been hitherto following the analytical method.

1. The first proposition, on which I believe we should agree, would be, that for an act to be sin at all, it must be voluntary, free, and that its wickedness must be recognized, (Theol. Mor. Q. 1, 2.) and that if any one of these three conditions are wanting, the act is not sin to the agent.

2. That sins may be either mortal or venial. Here we might agree in word, but differ in meaning, as shown in letters of July 20th, and July 22nd.

3. That for a sin to be a mortal sin, the recognition of the intellect must be full and deliberate, the consent of the will perfect, and that the "materia" must be of a certain "gravitas." That this is S. Alfonso's teaching I believe we should agree; that it is right, so far as the two first conditions go, we are also agreed: the difficulty is about the last condition, "gravitas materiæ."

4. To know whether the condition of *gravitas materiæ* is right, we must know what it means.

5. I have throughout maintained that *gravitas materiæ* is solely constituted by quantity or amount—amount *of what*, whether of time, or of money, or of anything else, depending upon the matter (in the philosophical sense) with which the act had to do.

6. You argued, in your letters of Sept. 8 and 9, that *gravitas materiæ* was the same as *gravitas peccati*. This you practically withdrew in your letter of Oct. 13th.

7. You then argued that *gravitas materiæ* was the same as *malitia materialis*, or *objectiva*, and on this assumption your last letter still goes.

8. On the *general* question, then, we seem to be brought to a standstill by being unable to agree on the meaning of the term *gravitas materiæ*. I have attempted to disprove in my last letter that *gravitas materiæ* does mean *malitia materialis*, having endeavoured to prove throughout, and especially in my letter of Sept. 15, by an appeal to S. Alphonso's use of the words, that gravity of matter was always constituted by amount.

9. With regard to the *particular* question of a mortal sin of theft, there is, in like manner, no difficulty as to the two first conditions, *advertentia plena*, and *perfectus consensus;* there remains the third, which I hold to be *gravitas materiæ*, constituted by a certain *quantitas furti*. As you deny that the gravity of matter does depend upon the quantity stolen, I suppose you consider that there are four conditions of a mortal sin of theft—*advertentia plena*, *consensus perfectus*, *gravitas materiæ*, and *quantitas furti*.

10. But whether *quantitas furti* does or does not constitute *gravitas materiæ*, there is no doubt that S. Alphonsus says that it is necessary that a certain quantity should be stolen for a sin of theft to be mortal, and the question—the question with which we began—is, whether this is right or wrong.

11. You have argued that it is right, if I mistake not, (α) because the quantity was a sign of the existence of the advertence (β) because the greater the damage done, the greater the sin committed. To which I have replied (α) that S. Alfonso nowhere represents quantity as being a sign of advertence or consent, but as an independent condition, (β) that though a sin of theft is aggravated by the damage done to the sufferer, yet that the sin is perfect *as a sin of theft*, if anything, however small, has been wilfully appropriated by a man, knowing that such appropriation was contrary to God's command.

12. On the general question, then, I must think that you have not proved that *gravitas materiæ* means either *gravitas peccati*, or *malitia materialis*, or disproved, by explaining S. Alfonso's use of the words in particular instances, that it is solely constituted by *quantitas*. [And I may add, that had you done so, you would at the same moment have proved that it need not have entered into the discussion at all, the object of the discussion being to justify *quantitas*.] On the particular question, I must think that you have not proved the propriety

of *quantitas*, your first argument for it being not in accordance with the teaching of S. Alfonso, and your second being based upon a false view of the Essence of the sin of Theft.

13. Had the propriety of quantity been proved, there would have remained three further points, (1.) whether this quantity should be absolute or relative, on which, I believe, we should not differ; (2.) whether scales of such relative quantity should be laid down; (3.) whether S. Alfonso's is a fair scale.

I have been unable to refer to the passages which you mention in Scavini, as I have not the book. (I called in Queen St. for it, but I had delayed so long, that it had been removed.) I have, however, examined Vasquez, Soto, Filiucci, Lugo, Layman, Bonacina, Lessius, and others, and I must say that my view is thereby confirmed. I began to take extracts, but I found the same quantitative principle running through them all, and, therefore, ceased.

I was struck by finding a consensus to the effect that "acum sartori," on which you have dwelt a good deal, is *not* a mortal sin "ratione furti," or, "in specie furti," but "injustæ damnificationis vel alterius malitiæ et scandali." Bonacina de Rest. 2. 8. 1. 7.

Lessius supplies the answer to your argument, founded on "ea non mathematicè sed moraliter censenda est." He thus explains its meaning:—"Resp. Non posse hanc quantitatem mathematicè statui sed moraliter. *Itaque* censebitur etiam peccare mortiferè qui saltem uno vel altero asse non abest ab hâc quantitate. Quæ enim parum distant nihil distare videntur." —Less. de Just. 2. 12. 31. So that all that the text means is, that a slight margin of a penny or two must be allowed in the case of each sum fixed; and that different sums must be fixed relatively to the wealth of the sufferers, not one absolute sum, like 5*d.* which Navarrus fixed, or £20. as others fixed. Lessius, too, gives the principle of *materiæ gravitas*, showing that it is quite distinct from *advertentia*, &c. "A sin may be venial, either from want of deliberation, or *ex materiæ gravitate*. This is certain, and so far as the *materia* goes, it is clear, because in such a theft there is no notable damage done. With regard to want of deliberation," &c.—Ib.

And again, "For a theft to be mortal it is requisite ut *materiæ quantitas* nobilis sit. Patet, quia non cujusvis rei ablatio POTEST esse culpa mortifera, v.g. pomi vel oboli."—Ib.

Lugo's account of the whole matter is very clear. "It is certain that in this matter a sin may be allowed to be light, not only on account of defect of advertence, but also on account of levity of matter. The whole difficulty is in determining how much matter is enough for a mortal sin of theft .... on which

point, first, it is certain, that the theft of a small thing (rei levis) is a sin at least venial. Yet a thing may be so small, that taking it is not a venial sin, nor a theft." Then he brings "acum sartori" under the head of damnificatio. He continues: "Though we can with certainty determine some *materia* to be small, v.g. an obol or a penny, and another matter to be certainly grave, v.g. £20. yet, between these two extremes, we cannot define what approaches to each of these two matters, ita ut circa talem summam sit levis et ultra illam sit gravis."—Lugo de Just. d. 16. n. 27, 28.

This difficult task S. Alfonso and others have undertaken in their scales of quantity.

Can you tell me when the condition of *quantitas* and *gravitas materiæ* was first introduced? So far as I have been able to see, they do not appear in the writings of S. Thomas Aquinas; but in such of his commentators as I have read, and their descendants, down to Liguori, the quantitative principle is clearly laid down and justified. I do not quite understand whether you deny its existence, or acknowledge and justify it.

To the other part of your letter I hope to reply at another time. I regret to hear that you have returned from Rome in not quite strong health.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours very faithfully,
F. Meyrick.

LETTER XIV.

Rev. H. E. Manning to Rev. F. Meyrick.

11, Half-Moon Street, May 29, 1854.

My dear Sir,

I was out of London, last week, when your letter came; and since I received it, I have been so continually occupied, that I have been obliged to delay thanking you for it until to-day.

If I have anywhere misunderstood your meaning, it has been unintentionally. My sole desire has been to find matter of agreement.

In these things, however, there is only One Source of perfect mutual understanding; and to Him I have not failed, as well as I can, to commend the correspondence which has passed between us.

Although all I had hoped has not been attained, yet I shall be always glad that these letters have passed between us.

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours, very faithfully,
HENRY E. MANNING.

LETTER XV.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Kinson, Wimborne, July 14, 1854.

My dear Sir,

The assertions which you have next to maintain, are the following:—"That a wife may support her previous children, (and other relatives, such as poor brothers and sisters,) out of her husband's goods, against his will, and spend something under the twentieth of his income on alms and gifts.—Hom. Ap. Tract x. 2. 33. That a nobleman in extreme distress may steal, if he is ashamed to beg.—x. 2. 15. That a servant may compensate himself for a salary remarkably too small.—vii. 3. 10. That a rich man's son may steal from his father three scudi, without grave sin. That a *principe's* son commits only a venial sin if he steal from his father anything under fifty scudi. That a monk is guilty only of a venial sin if he steal any sum less than four scudi from the monastery."

You appear to me to excuse this teaching on the following grounds:—

1. That in the three last cases—the rich man's son, the *principe's* son—the monk—the act *is* said to be sin, namely, venial sin.

2. That in the three first cases—the wife—the distressed nobleman—the servant—the act is not sin, because it is not theft.

3. That the reason why the wife's act is not theft, is, that she has a right, on grounds of justice, to what she takes.

4. That the reason why the distressed nobleman's act is not theft, is, that it is an act dictated by extreme necessity; and that where there is extreme necessity, all goods are common, and there is no place for stealing.

5. That the reason why the servant's act is not theft, is, that he has a right to what he takes, on grounds both of need and justice.

I believe that this a fair and concise representation of your views. I would answer as follows:—

1. It is true that S. Alfonso counts the act in the three cases of the rich man's son, the *principe's* son, and the monk, to be sin; but he goes out of his way to pick out these acts of theft, and declares them to be only venial sins. Now the difference in value between venial and mortal sins, is, of course, enormous; and if we wish to know what he thinks these acts worth, we must look to see what he counts to be mortal. Of course these acts are immeasurably less sinful than any laid down as mortal. To abstain from hearing Mass on Sundays, and certain Saints' Days, without good reason, is mortal. Consequently, it is a far less sin for a rich man's son to steal 12*s.* from his father, for a *principe's* son to steal £10 from his father, for a monk to steal 16*s.* from his monastery, than to abstain from hearing Mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation, without good reason—so much less, that in the three first cases, the sin need not be confessed—does not diminish God's love towards the agent—is punished only temporally,—while, in the last case, it extinguishes the life of the soul, and is punishable by eternal hell-fires. This appears to me to be exalting positive precept at the expense of morality.

2. Whether S. Alfonso *calls* the act of the wife, of the distressed nobleman, and of the servant, thefts or not, is, to me, of no moment. It is easy to frame definitions which shall exclude what ought to be included; and an argument from such definition is purely verbal, and, therefore, valueless. The question is, whether those acts *are* thefts, or not. If they are, S. Alfonso does sanction theft, however much he may deny them to be thefts. I may, however, observe that the words *furta* filiorum, *furta* domesticorum, &c. are used, without any notice of their being used *abusivè;* and "surripere" is the common verb employed, which, if it is not translated "pilfer," must, at least, be expressed, not by "take," but "take clandestinely." Moreover, Liguori heads one of his divisions of chapters, 4, 5, 4, with a distinct assertion in so many words, that they are theft "verè furtum."

3. Has the wife the right to support her poor brothers, &c. out of her husband's goods, against his will, and to spend under the twentieth of his income in alms and gifts? You say Yes, for two reasons. One because, according to Lugo, the wife is not a slave, but a companion, &c. from which he draws a very just conclusion, but as different from Liguori's doctrine as heaven from earth—that the husband ought to allow his wife the moderate use of their goods. That is very true; but it does not follow that she is to take them, if he does not do so. The other reason is, "that the duty of giving alms is from the Divine Law." True; but out of one's own goods, I presume. Liguori

lays down what are the goods of a wife, namely, her "dotalia," and her "paraphernalia," but says that she may give alms and gifts out of the other goods as well; and justifies it, not by the command of the Divine Law, but by "consuetudo."

4. The distressed nobleman's case is exactly the same as that of the Unjust Steward, supposing that the latter was a man of high birth. Si aliquem virum honoratum valde puderet mendicare vel laborare, an potest ex alienis sibi providere? Negant Salm..... Affirmant vero Viva, &c. &c. Hocque mihi videtur probabilius. In other words, "I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed," therefore I will clandestinely take what does not belong to me.

And this, according to Liguori, is justifiable. He would lose his character if he begged, therefore he is *unable* so to relieve his wants, and is labouring under quasi-extreme need; but as soon as a man is labouring under quasi-extreme need, he is no longer subject to the laws respecting meum and tuum. This runs us up to the principle on which Socialism rests. I am not a Socialist, and although I might allow that a case might occur in which extreme need justified appropriation, yet to lay it down, as you say, "six times," as a principle to guide action, that to appropriate goods not your own is allowable as soon as you are reduced to extreme necessity, or quasi-extreme, or very grave necessity, such as incurring danger of death, or risk of losing a limb, or of becoming a prisoner, or of being sent to the galleys, or of incurring a bad disease, or of losing your character, appears to me to strike at the root of social security, and of morality alike.

5. The case of the servants taking their masters' property to make up their wages to a sum higher than that which they bargained with their master to receive, is one which you pass over lightly. You say that they *might* be free from malitia peccati. This does not meet the case. According to Liguori they *are;* they are doing an act which cannot be blamed, on grounds of justice, right, and integrity. "The civil law," in "punishing such an act as theft," appears to me to show itself far superior to the Moral Theologians' law, which justifies it.

There is one other thing which I would note. You say, "He (Liguori) is of opinion that the case of the nobleman is one of extreme necessity. Others are not. You and I are equally at liberty to admit it, or not." Is this perfectly correct? You and I are equally at liberty to admit it; but are we at liberty equally *not* to admit it, to condemn it as conflicting with plain principles of morality? If so, what mean the high-sounding sentences in the Preface to the Theologia Moralis? Nullam inesse opinionem contra fidem aut bonos mores, &c. &c. I

would fain *not* think so, for I have persuaded myself that the reason why Archdeacon Manning has maintained these, and other principles of morality, with their applications, has been, that he has been compelled to do so by his system—that he is not at liberty to do otherwise without giving up his present position; and as long as he does defend them, I would fain be allowed to think so still.

I remain, my dear Sir,
Sincerely yours,
FREDERICK MEYRICK.

LETTER XVI.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

Kinson, Wimborne, July 18, 1854.

My dear Sir,

What you have next undertaken is to defend the principle and practice of Equivocation, as laid down by Liguori. Accordingly, you have to maintain that, when asked a question which cannot but be answered in the affirmative, it is truthful to reply, "I say, No," intending the questioner to understand that you deny his question, but meaning, in your own mind, simply to affirm that you are making use of the word "No" in your conversation.—4. 2. 151. You have to justify the once well-known principle, Ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, which is identical with that Liguori lays down, 4. 2. 171. where he says, that if a man has only sworn externally, he has not sworn, he has joked. You must hold that a man may insert a "not" into an affirmative sentence, in a whisper not heard so as to be understood by the other party, and that his oath is then truthful, while he means to swear *No*, and the other conceives that he is swearing *Yes*. You must hold that oaths, promises, vows, pledges, secrets, do not lose all security, through his teaching with regard to their sanctity and the means of releasing oneself from them. You must, I suppose, regard Ex capite meo hoc erui, &c. Hom. Ap. xi. 18. as truthful, and "mentitus sum quia omne peccatum est mendacium," as truthful.

The only arguments which you have brought forward are two. (1.) S. Alfonso denies that he allows the use of falsehood, and does allow the use equivocation, therefore equivocation is not falsehood. (2.) Jeremy Taylor has teaching of a similar nature.

The first of these arguments is the same as that which you used with regard to stealing. S. Alfonso excludes equivocation

by his definition of falsehood; and therefore, it is true that in his own estimation, and according to his own definition, in teaching the lawfulness of his equivocation, he does not teach that falsehood is lawful; but the question is, whether equivocation (and what equivocation is, we must gather from his own examples, such as those given above) is not, morally speaking, falsehood; and if it is, in teaching the lawfulness of equivocation, he does teach the lawfulness of falsehood. That equivocation is moral falsehood, is to me clear, because, on analyzing it, we find it to consist of a moral untruth, conveyed by means of a material truth, and that it is only a confusion existing in men's minds with respect to moral truthfulness and material truth, which could ever have led them to regard equivocation as morally truthful. Indeed, I cannot doubt that equivocation, as interpreted by Liguori's examples, is merely a double lie; first, a lie to another, and then a deception passed on himself by the speaker, to the effect that he has not lied.

2. With regard to Jeremy Taylor, one great difference between him and Liguori on this point seems to be, that while the latter confines the name of lie to that one species of moral untruth which is conveyed by means of a material untruth, leaving men at liberty with respect to the other species, Taylor, on the other hand, applies the name of lie to every deception passed upon our neighbour; but in the case of children, madmen, persons incompetent to judge for their own good, persons willing, persons justly presumed to be willing, he holds that they may be deceived to their good. To them, therefore, if spoken for their good, he allows what *he* calls a lie. And, in some other exceptional cases, he thinks that charity may override the duty of veracity. Verbally, therefore, and technically, Taylor allows a lie in some cases, and Liguori does not; but, nevertheless, Taylor is far the stricter of the two, because his word "lie," and Liguori's word "lie," mean quite different things, Liguori's "lie" being a narrow species contained under the broad genus of Taylor's "lie."

The following passage, with which he concludes the subject, seems to express Bishop Taylor's mind. "He that does speak, and is bound to speak, must speak according to the mind of him with whom he does converse, that by our fault he be not deceived against his right, against justice, against charity."

But I am not careful to enter at length into a defence of Bishop Taylor. I prefer Bishop Sanderson's teaching on this point, as I think that Taylor has given somewhat too great a liberty to men to conceive that other virtues, such as justice and charity, may interfere (as they sometimes do) with the duty of veracity; and I think it is a pity that he has used the word

"lie" in any sense except a bad sense. But I am not bound to maintain his views. Taylor does not stand to me as S. Alfonso stands to you. The latter's system has, as you are doubtless aware, been discussed twenty times by the Sacred Congregation of Rites, and approved, "voce concordi, unanimi consensu, unâ voce, unâ mente." It has been declared that it contains nothing to be censured, which is explained to mean "that his whole teaching is altogether free from all error, which the Church now sees to be error; that we are quite certain, from the infallible teaching of the Catholic Church, that in S. Alfonso's works, in the whole of his Moral Theology, not one principle is disapproved of; that there is not in it any opinion contrary to faith or good morals, new, opposed to the sense of the Church, heretical, erroneous, approaching to error, savouring of heresy or error, suspected of error, rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, ill-sounding, such as to lead the simple astray, schismatical, harmful, impious, blasphemous." So that, in the words of the Preface to his Life, edited by the Fathers of the Oratory, and approved and recommended by Cardinal Wiseman, "the morals of this saintly Bishop cannot be censured, without setting up as a censor of authority itself; without, in fine, censuring the decision of the Holy See." It cannot be denied that Liguori's book is the authoritative exponent of Rome's moral teaching.

There are two of the original points of discussion which I see you have not touched. I should be glad to know whether or no you do approve of the four answers put into the mouth of the adulterous wife: (1.) that she had not broken marriage; (2.) that she was innocent of the crime; (meaning that she had confessed it;) (3.) that she had not committed adultery; (meaning that she had not committed idolatry;) (4.) that she had not committed adultery; (meaning so as to have to tell her husband)?

I should like also to know whether or no you do think that a man who has seduced a maiden on promise of marrying her, is *not* bound to keep his promise, (whether the victim did, or did not know of any disparity between them,) because he is of considerably higher birth, or because he is considerably richer. And whether, on this point, you would yourself, in the confessional, hold, with the Cardinal Archbishop of Besançon, "that the judgment of Rome should be fully adhered to, and that the opinion of the blessed Alfonso de' Liguori should be followed, and reduced to practice, all doubt whatever being thrown aside."

I am, dear Sir,
Yours faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

LETTER XVII.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

My dear Sir,

In my two last letters I believe that I did not acknowledge and thank you for your note of May 29. Allow me to thank you for the kindly tone pervading it and the rest of your letters, and at the same time to inquire whether you intend to make any further answer to my remarks of May 12, July 14, and July 18, or whether you propose that our correspondence on these points should now close.

I am, my dear Sir,
Yours very faithfully,
F. MEYRICK.

Kinson, Wimborne, Aug. 16, 1854.

LETTER XVIII.

Rev. H. E. MANNING to Rev. F. MEYRICK.

78, South Audley Street, Aug. 18, 1854.

My dear Sir,

I did not write again to acknowledge your two last letters, because I understood them to be the conclusion of one which preceded them, in which you said that you would send some further remarks. My note was intended as an expression of my thanks for all your letters. You will believe me that I should regret to seem wanting towards you in this.

It seemed to me that our correspondence had reached its natural end, for we could do no more than re-affirm our opposite views, and out of this no good could come. Indeed, most correspondences end in a wider difference, which, at least, I hope has not been the case with ours.

If we cannot approach more nearly in this, we can at least remember each other at other times, and in a better way: and I may assure you that, so far as I am able, I do not fail of my part in this. Once more, with my thanks,

Believe me, my dear Sir,
Yours very faithfully,
HENRY E. MANNING.

LETTER XIX.

Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING.

London, Sept. 14, 1854.

My dear Sir,

I return your copy of the Homo Apostolicus, with many thanks to you for allowing me to keep it so long. I hope that it has not received any damage since I have had it. Our correspondence has now terminated, and, I am afraid, has not wrought conviction on either side. With regard to gravity of matter, on which we have written most, I am still quite unable to reconcile either of the views which you have put forward. 1. That it is gravity of sin. 2. That it is objective and material *malitia* of the act, with the frequent expressions, "sumere materiam gravem," &c. and with the whole scope of the chapter in S. Alfonso. I am, therefore, left with the same opinion as that with which I began, owing to a belief that your hypotheses do not account for the facts of the case. Nor am I shaken by S. Alfonso having declared, as you have said, that the external act adds no essential *malitia* to the internal act, or words to that effect. (He does not speak very clearly in the Homo Apostolicus.) For it is of the nature of error to be discordant with itself. And that statement appears to be adopted from earlier writers, to whom gravity of matter was unknown.

I should have liked to have learnt whether you should individually feel yourself justified in condemning as immoral, some of the opinions of S. Alfonso, which I quoted in my last letters, and also to have inquired whence you draw your explanation of venial sin, which, on again referring to the Homo Apostolicus, and the Theologia Moralis, I see is considerably more stern than that of Liguori, who says that a man does not sin gravely though he determine to commit every possible venial sin; but I have already detained you a long time in the discussion of these matters, and I shall only now return you my sincere thanks for the kindness and courtesy which you have shown.

I am, dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

F. MEYRICK.

APPENDIX.

PAPER CIRCULATED IN A LONDON PARISH.

THE teaching of St. Alphonsus on the subject of falsehood is as follows:—

I. That to speak falsely, is immutably a sin against God. It may be permitted under no circumstances, not even to save life. Pope Innocent III. says, "Not even to defend our life, is it lawful to speak falsely."

II. That when interrogated by those who have a right to interrogate, and in a lawful way, men are bound to communicate all their knowledge on the matter of the interrogation, e. g. in a Court of Justice—in the Sacrament of Penance, &c.

III. That when interrogated by those who have no right to interrogate, or in an unlawful way, men are not bound to communicate all their knowledge on the matter of the interrogation. A Judge cannot administer an oath out of his own court to compel evidence, nor a Confessor interrogate out of the sacrament, much less may others interrogate men as to the matter of their confessions, and as to the sins or dishonours of their parents, friends, &c.

IV. That in case of such interrogations, every man has a right to set them aside by lawful means.

V. That to do so by falsehood, is absolutely unlawful.

VI. That to do so by an answer with mental restriction, i. e. made silently, or in the mind only, is equivalent to falsehood, because the words spoken, as they are heard, are false. This is condemned by the Church, under Innocent XI. in full and absolute terms.

VII. That to do so by an answer, of which the matter is *true*, but the sense ambiguous, is not *falsehood*, and is, *therefore*, lawful. This is called amphibologia, equivocation, or restriction not purely mental, because the words spoken are absolutely true in the sense they hear.

Every instance given by St. Alphonsus is of this kind. He

allows the instances *because they are* not *falsehood.* If they were false, his first principle would condemn them.

They who accuse him, do it in one of these two ways.

I. Either they say, "*I* call this falsehood, and St. Alphonsus allows it, therefore St. Alphonsus allows falsehood," which is nonsense; or, II. "St. Alphonsus admits this to be falsehood, and yet allows it, therefore he allows falsehood," which is simply to break the ninth (Anglican) commandment. He allows it, because he maintains it to be *Truth.* Anybody may reject his instances if they will; they may think him *large* and lax, but they may not falsify his words. Let us now see what Anglicans have said. Jeremy Taylor, in his Ductor Dubitantium, which is full of irritability and unfairness against the Catholic Church, says:—

I. "It is lawful to tell a lie to children and madmen, . . . provided the lie be charitable."

II. "It is lawful to tell a lie to our neighbour by consent, provided the end be pious."

III. "To tell a lie for charity, to save a man's life, &c. hath been done and commended by great, and wise, and good men." (See above, Innocent III.)

IV. "When things are true in several senses, the not explicating in what sense I mean the words, is not criminal reservation."

V. "It is lawful, upon a just cause, . . . to use words of diverse significations, though it does deceive him that asks."

VI. "An equivocation is like a dark lantern—if I have just reason to hold the dark side to you, you are to look to it, not I. Now that part of the ambiguity which I intend it in is true," &c.

VII. "If it be fit that he be deceived, though I have no right to do it, let him deceive himself. It must be by his own act, to which I may indeed minister by any fair and innocent means."

VIII. "An equivocal speech hath a light side as well as a dark: it is true as well as false, and, therefore, it is in its own nature innocent; and it is only changed into a fault when it is against justice and charity, under which simplicity is to be placed."

There are abundant more expressions of the same kind from Protestant writers, who only differ from St. Alphonsus in going beyond him, and in allowing what the Catholic Church condemns.

Sincere writers on both sides teach the same *principles,* though they may differ as to particular examples.

REPLY, WRITTEN BY REQUEST OF THE CLERGYMAN OF THE PARISH.

The *whole* of the argument in this paper goes upon the assumption that Equivocation and Mental Restriction are only allowed by St. Alphonsus to be used on the defensive, to put aside an unlawful question. This is a false assumption. "When there is good reason of necessity or expediency, a man may use Amphibologies in swearing, even though he offers to swear without being asked."—L. iv. 169. It is an aggressive weapon. However, it may be as well to examine and consider it as though the assumption in question were true.

I. There is ambiguity in the expression, "speak falsely." Does the writer mean, "speak a thing in itself false?" e.g. "the sun moves?" or, "speak so as to deceive your neighbour?" Does he mean, "speak a material falsehood," or "a moral falsehood?" It is the former (which may be harmless) that Liguori condemns: he allows the latter, (i.e. moral untruthfulness,) as is shown by many examples, some of which will be quoted below.

II. How far this is true may be gathered from the following passages of St. Alphonsus: (1.) "In a Court of Justice," &c. "A witness or defendant, when not legitimately questioned by the judge, may swear that he does not know a crime which he really does know, understanding to himself that he does not know a crime about which he can be legitimately questioned, or that he does not know it so as to give evidence about it .... When, however, the witness or defendant is legitimately questioned by the judge, he must not use any equivocation, because he is bound to obey the rightful precept of his superior .... Except in the case of a trial the crime be altogether concealed, for then a witness may, nay, he *is bound to say that the defendant has not committed it.*"—L. iv. 154. See *Theory of Truthfulness*, pp. 22, 23.

(2.) "In the Sacrament of Penance," &c.

"A penitent, questioned by his confessor, about a sin which he has confessed, may swear that he has not committed it, understanding aside, that he has not committed anything which has not been confessed."—L. iv. 157. *Theory of Truthfulness*, p. 19.

III. IV. These propositions are denied by no one.

V. Here, again, is an ambiguity in the word "falsehood." It is only a material falsehood which Liguori teaches to be unlawful.

VI. It is true that purely mental Restriction was condemned by Innocent XI. (who lived twenty years after Pascal's Provincial Letters had been published, and had tendencies himself towards Jansenism,) but Restriction not purely mental, is only formally, not morally, distinguishable from it, and that is still allowable. Pure Mental Restriction is that which takes place wholly in the mind, and is undiscernible by any outward sign; non-pure Mental Restriction is that which is discernible, although (it may be,) it is not discerned, e.g. "it is allowable to swear something false, adding in a low tone, a true circumstance, if the whisper can, by any means, be possibly perceived by the other, although its meaning is not caught, but not if it should, in every respect, remain concealed from him."—L. iv. 168. See *Theory of Truthfulness*, p. 19.

VII. It is not correct, therefore, to say that non-pure Mental Restriction is the same as Amphibology, or Equivocation. Liguori says, "We must distinguish between Amphibology or Equivocation, and Mental Restriction. Amphibology can be in three fashions .... Mental Restriction is of two kinds; one purely mental, which cannot be discerned in any manner by others, the other not purely mental, which can become known from circumstances connected with it."—L. iv. 151, 152.

When the writer says, that an answer, of which the matter is true, but the sense ambiguous, is not falsehood, he is clearly speaking of material falsity, not moral falsehood. The answer contains a material truth, but is a moral falsehood. When he says that Equivocation is not falsehood, "because the words spoken are absolutely true in the sense they hear," he is using words which appear to me to have no meaning. I do not know the meaning of "hearing the sense of words." If he means, "in the sense they *understand*," his statement is untrue; for the essence of an Equivocation, used for a serious purpose, is, that it should not be true in the sense the hearer understands, but only in the sense the speaker understands; e.g. "Is A. B. in London?" It is allowable if you have a good reason, says Liguori, to answer, 'No, I say,' although he is; because, though your hearer understands you to deny his presence in London, you understand the words differently, and mean to affirm that you are speaking the monosyllable *No*.—L. iv. 151. And what is the use of a thing being "absolutely true" if it is not true, and you know that it is not true, relatively to the person whom you address? "For sometimes," says Bishop Taylor, "a man may speak that which is truth, and yet be a liar at the same time in the same thing."

Those who accuse St. Alphonsus, do it in neither of the ways specified. They do not say, "*I* call this falsehood," or, "St.

Alphonsus calls this falsehood," but "*This is* falsehood;" and they *prove* that it is falsehood, by pointing out the true nature of moral untruthfulness, and showing that it includes under it what he calls Equivocation, Amphibology, and Mental Restriction. If, then, Liguori allows this Equivocation, he does allow moral falsehood, however much he may say that he does not. If a man were to deny that infanticide were murder, and then teach that infanticide were allowable, he would not the less teach that murder was allowable, because he chose to deny that infanticide was murder.

For the true character of Equivocation, as taught by St. Alphonsus, see *Theory of Truthfulness*, pp. 12 and 39.

"Anybody may reject his instances if they will." Every Romanist is bound to regard every principle and every opinion in Liguori's Moral Theology as entirely free from error, as not savouring of error, suspected of error, rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, ill-sounding, or misleading to the simple.—Præf. Mor. Theol. p. 12.

"They may not falsify his words." This is either intended to insinuate that some one has falsified his words, in which case the assertion ought to have been proved not insinuated, or is a truism gratuitously asserted.

It ought not to be asserted that "Jeremy Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium is full of irritability and unfairness against the Catholic Church," without proof being adduced.

Jeremy Taylor's principle is, that the use of Equivocation, or Mental Restriction, is only, then, permissible when downright lying is allowable. "In the same cases in which it is lawful to tell a lie, in the same cases it is lawful to use a Mental Reservation."—D. D. iii. 25. "Where it is lawful to lie, it is lawful to equivocate, which may be something less than a plain lie; but where it is not permitted to tell a lie, then the Equivocation must be innocent, that is, not deceiving, nor intended that it should."—D. D. iii. 34.

He does not, like Liguori, say that all Equivocation is permissible with good reason, and one of the two kinds of Mental Restriction. Where you may lie, there, and there only, with a few exceptions, (of which more hereafter,) you may equivocate, or use mental restriction. But may you ever lie? Taylor holds that occasions may arise in which other virtues, such as charity, may outweigh the duty of veracity. All men have a right to truth, but "this right may be taken away by a superior right intervening; or it may be lost, or it may be hindered, or it may cease upon a greater reason."—D. D. iii. 6.

This is the reason that he says, I. "It is lawful to tell a lie to children or to madmen, *because they, having no power of judg-*

ing, have no right to truth; but then the lie must be charitable and useful." In the case, therefore, of speaking to children and madmen, we find his first exception to the rule of truth-telling, because, he holds, they may be rightfully deceived. The others who may be treated in like manner, are, according to him, (1.) persons incompetent to judge for their own good; (2.) persons willing; or, (3.) persons justly presumed willing. He makes no other exceptions. To them, therefore, alone, he allows for certain, a falsehood to be spoken, while in the case of others, when "a great charity and unconcerning truth" clash, he speaks dubiously.

II. What Taylor means by this is shown, as in the case of Liguori, by his example. His example is, "Thus, in besieged places, they write letters of confidence and great ostentation of the strength which they have not, when their parties have covenanted that they should do so for their just advantages."

III. This is an assertion of an indisputable historical fact. The writer would have done better had he added that it is *not* Taylor's opinion. He says that "it may be better admitted" in case the charitable lie be told to the man whose life is saved; but if it be for the preservation of a third person, then, "though it be allowed by very many of the ancient Doctors of the Church, and by the wisest among the heathen, and hath in it a very great charity, *yet I cannot see sufficient cause to allow it.*" To which he afterwards adds: "But the case is not so clear in the matter of difference, when it happens between a great charity and an unconcerning truth." Then he leaves it to the individual conscience.

IV. It would have been better had the writer given the conditions and limitations which Taylor affixes to this statement; they are, 3. "(*a*) This liberty is not to be used by inferiors, but by superiors only; (*β*) *not by those that are interrogated,* but by them which speak voluntarily; (γ) not by them which speak of duty, but which speak of grace and kindness. Because superiors, and the voluntary speakers, and they which out of kindness speak, are tied to no laws in this particular, but the measures of their own good-will; and the degrees of their kindness, of their instruction, of their communication, are wholly arbitrary; but the inferiors, the examined, the speakers out of duty and obligation, are tied to answer by other men's measures, by their exigencies, demands, understandings, and purposes, and, therefore, must not do anything whereby that truth, which they have right and interest to inquire after, may be hindered. The conclusion is this in the words of S. Gregory: "The wisdom of just men is to make no pretence for deception, but by words to open the secrets of the heart."—D. D. iii. 32. This makes *his*

Mental Reservation *toto cælo* different from Liguori's. *It is not an instrument of deception.*

V. Taylor explains what he means by "just cause." His words are, "It is lawful upon a just cause of great charity or necessity," &c. When the principle of great charity or necessity supervene, then he holds that veracity may give way, so that, perhaps, we may say what is false; certainly, we may equivocate. In drawing this distinction between lying and equivocating, slight as it is, he falls, I think, into error.

VI. Here Taylor hazards an assertion somewhat inconsistent with his general principle, that in some respects Equivocation is better than a lie. As I have said, I think this an error, nor am I in any way bound to think with him. No English Churchman is bound to any opinion of Bishop Taylor. Every Romanist is bound to every opinion of Liguori.

VII. Again the limitations are omitted. They are, "that the Equivocation be not insolent, (i. e. unusual,) or strange, but such as is usual in form of witty speech. For then he who uses them does no more deceive his hearer" (*this is the test*) "than he that speaks obscurely or profoundly is the cause of error in the ignorant people," and also that it be "upon just cause."

VIII. This is a passage in which Taylor again appears led somewhat too far by his zeal for defending an eminent Confessor, who used an Equivocation, speaking mystically.

But the *principle* of Taylor is clear, the true and sound principle that we are guilty of untruthfulness when we deceive our neighbour—that we must not speak what is untrue, except in such cases where we have a right to deceive our neighbour, of which cases he enumerates five—that in these cases, whether we speak what is untrue by means of a Lie, of a Mental Restriction, or of an Equivocation, makes no difference. This is his *principle*, though, as I have shown, he is led, once or twice, to give rather too much liberty to Equivocation, of which he says, "There is between Lying and Equivocation this only difference, that this may, upon less necessity, and upon more causes, be permitted than Lying."

How can it be said, then, that "sincere writers on both sides teach the same *principles?*" Taylor is by no means a strict Anglican Moralist on this point. Sanderson is far stricter; but yet we see that Taylor's *principle* is, that the guilt of Lying, Equivocating, and employing Mental Restriction, is all one, viz. that we are wrongfully deceiving our neighbour. Whereas, Liguori's *principle* is, that we have a full right to deceive our neighbour, i. e. be guilty of moral untruthfulness, provided that we do not do it by the one means of a *material* untruth.

I do not altogether defend Taylor's teaching. It is a pity that

he has not confined the word lie to unjustifiable untruth. He has *not quite* held by his own principle of Mental Restriction and Equivocation being as bad as Lying, and he has used some expressions which may easily bear an ill interpretation. But he made a mighty stride to Truth, being one of the first writers on Morals who handled the subject differently from the Roman casuists, and cast away with scorn the puerile confusion between Moral Truthfulness and Material Truth, on which their system rests. "He that tells a lie, and by his Mental Restriction says he tells a truth, tells two lies, one practical, and the other in theory; one to the magistrate, and the other to himself."—D. D. iii. 28.

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MORAL THEOLOGY

OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.

No. III.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S THEORY OF THEFT.

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S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S

THEORY OF THEFT.[1]

THAT S. Alfonso Maria de' Liguori's *Theologia Moralis* is the latest exponent of Rome's moral system we have already made clear. We have shown that S. Alfonso was beatified and canonized so late as the year 1839, that the Sacred Congregation of Rites examined his System of Morality twenty times, and agreed, 'with concordant voice, with unanimous consent, with one voice, and with one mind,' that it contained nothing to be censured. We have shown that an authoritative document, issuing from the Sacred Penitentiary in 1831, decreed that the opinions professed in the Blessed Alfonso's Moral Theology might with safety be followed and professed, on the ground that the Holy Apostolic See had declared that it found nothing in his works worthy of censure; and that the Cardinal Archbishop of Besançon required his clergy to adhere to the judgment of Rome by following and reducing to practice the opinions of the Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori, all doubt whatever being thrown aside. But it appears that the beatification, canonization, commendation, approbation, ratification, and sanction, have not been sufficient to persuade some of our readers that all members of the Roman Church are really tied to accepting his morality. Indeed, with respect to Englishmen who are members of the Roman Communion, we cannot wonder at a little kicking, and plunging, and tossing the yoke, when they find what they have to bear. We must, therefore, add more

[1] 1. *Theologia Moralis S. Alphonsi de Ligorio, &c.* Parisiis, 1845.

2. *Homo Apostolicus, sive Praxis et Instructio Confessariorum. Auctore illustrissimo et reverendissimo D. Alphonso de Ligorio.* Moguntiæ, 1842.

3. *Compendium Theologiæ Moralis S. Alphonsi Mariæ de Ligorio, Auctore* D. NEYRAGUET. Liburni, 1851.

4. *Cases of Conscience, or Lessons in Morals.* London, 1853.

testimony, showing, on unimpeachable authority, that Rome is committed to S. Alfonso, and that his morality is her morality.

The preface to his Moral Theology opens as follows:—'The 'new edition of S. Alfonso de' Liguori's Moral Theology, which 'has been long looked for from the Mechlin press, is at last pub- 'lished. The work which is thus issued afresh, after innumerable 'editions, and no small labour, is not only the teaching of a very 'learned, experienced, and wise author, but of a Saint; and it is 'approved by the judgment of the Catholic Church itself. We 'hold, therefore, that it is a superfluous task to commend or 'defend it against those who find fault with it, since it has 'been commended and defended by the oracle of the Church 'itself.'

Again: 'We have issued a work in which, by the judgment 'of the Roman Church itself, there is found nothing, no opinion 'and no principle, which is deserving of censure; of this we are 'most perfectly assured, by the decree concerning the revision 'of S. Alfonso's works. The teaching of Benedict XIV. about 'the canonization of Saints, shows us what force the Apostolic 'approbation has, and what is the mind of the Church in 'approving of the writings of the servants of God, with a 'view to their canonization. In our times all the writings of 'a servant of God who is to be placed among the Blessed, must 'be subjected to an extremely rigid examination according 'to the decrees of Urban VIII., and the approved teaching of 'Benedict XIV. And the purpose of a judicial revision of this 'nature is, that it may be seen whether the teaching of the 'servant of God be free from all theological censure. Now 'every proposition which is heretical, erroneous, approaching to 'error, savouring of heresy or error, suspected of error, rash, 'scandalous, offensive to pious ears, ill-sounding, misleading to 'the simple, schismatical, injurious, impious, or blasphemous, is 'subject to theological censure, several sorts of which Benedict 'himself recounts. The revisers are bound to note if there is 'in the works any error against faith or good morals, or any new 'doctrine unaccordant with the sense of the Church; meaning by 'new doctrine, not anything brought forward in a new way, but 'something put forth which is really new, vain, and useless, op- 'posed to Scripture and to the Fathers. It is the duty, there- 'fore, of the revisers to subject every single proposition to its 'own special censure, and to pass judgment on the quality of 'the propositions as they are in themselves, independently of the 'author's intention, so that it is impossible to proceed further 'when once they find that the servant of God has written any- 'thing against the faith, or good morals, or the sense of the 'Church, although he wrote it with a good intention. An ex- 'amination of this nature having been instituted with a view to

'the canonization of S. Alfonso de' Liguori, and the Church 'having declared that in his works there was found nothing 'worthy of censure, it follows that it is safe for anyone to 'follow and profess the opinions which S. Alfonso professes in 'his Moral Theology, and that no man is to be troubled for 'doing so, although he may not have weighed the reasons on 'which the several opinions rest.'

The meaning of *nihil censurâ dignum* is then further explained to be a true approbation, 'by which it is certain that the whole 'teaching of our saintly author is altogether free from every 'error which the Church now sees to be error. The works of 'S. Alfonso, therefore, rejoice in this highest and singular privi- 'lege, which those of no uncanonized moral writers can possess, 'for in the case of the latter it is not made certain by so solemn 'a judgment of the Church, that there is no error, no erroneous 'principle, no erroneous opinion in their writings. But we are 'now made quite sure, by the infallible judgment of the Catholic 'Church, that in S. Alfonso's works, in the whole of his Moral 'Theology, there is not one principle disapproved, not one opinion 'against the faith or good morals, new, unaccordant with the 'sense of the Church, heretical, erroneous, approaching to error, 'savouring of heresy or error, suspected of error, rash, scan- 'dalous, offensive to pious ears, ill-sounding, misleading to the 'simple, schismatical, injurious, impious, or blasphemous. And 'this being so, who will not confess that, in the matter of morals, 'grave and difficult as it is, and so involved with doubts and 'questions, minds are wonderfully set at rest by an approbation 'of this nature, which, if not called formally positive, is practi- 'cally the same?'

Neyraguet is no less happy and confident. Having quoted the approbation of Pope Pius VII., Pope Leo XII., Pope Pius VIII., and Pope Gregory XVI., he continues: 'Thus by 'acting and by teaching, to heaven flew off the Blessed One. 'What can you prize higher? what happier lot can you wish for 'yourself? There is then no danger of erring, no possibility 'of fearing hell in following the steps of so great a man. It is 'no wonder, therefore, that in these times this Theology is 'everywhere desired and sought after; that it is extolled with 'the highest praises by prelates of Churches, and the chiefest 'doctors, not only in Italy, but also in Germany, Belgium, 'France, &c.; that it is circulated throughout the whole world, 'and is in the hands of almost all the clergy. What then can 'be more absurd than to find fault with a work of such singular 'excellence, which innumerable doctors and so many oracles of 'the Holy See have so highly commended!'

In the same way the Redemptorist Father, who has translated S. Alfonso's *Glories of Mary*, stands over some reluctant friends

whom he mentally anticipates as recalcitrating at some of the tales which are recounted, like Queen Eleanor before Fair Rosamond, with his *nihil censurâ dignum* in one hand, and his book in the other, and tells them to take their choice between condemning the Holy See, and swallowing the miracles, having himself, with delightful inconsistency, omitted two of the stories as being totally impossible of digestion to an English stomach. 'Remember,' he says, 'that it has been strictly ex-'amined by the authority which is charged by God Himself to 'instruct you, and that that authority has declared that it con-'tains NOTHING worthy of censure.'[1]

The Bull of Canonization was issued by the present Pope's predecessor, Gregory XVI., and in it we find the late Pontiff announcing as *imprimis notatu dignum, quod licet copiosissime 'scripserit, ejusdem tamen opera inoffenso prorsus pede percurri a 'fidelibus posse, post diligens institutum examen perspectum fuerit.'* If any ask, even yet, for evidence, the following passage from the Life of S. Alfonso de' Liguori, edited by the Fathers of the Oratory, and approved and recommended by Cardinal Wiseman, may satisfy them. 'The works of S. Alphonso not only do not 'contain any proposition whatever which can be called schisma-'tical or scandalous, but also none which are either pernicious, 'erroneous, or rash; the morals, therefore, of this saintly Bishop 'cannot be censured without setting up as a censor of authority 'itself; without, in fine, censuring the decision of the Holy 'See.'

The character of Rome's moral teaching is then irrevocably tied to the character of Liguori's teaching. And it must not be thought that he is the representative of a lax school among Romish Casuists. On the contrary, he makes it his greatest boast that he is not an extreme man, that he is not over-strict or over-lax, but holds the middle course. 'In completing 'this work,' he says in his Preface to his *Homo Apostolicus*,

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[1] P. xviii. The *Glorie di Maria* is a book which S. Alfonso tells us that he has printed for the sake of providing Priests with materials for sermons on Saturdays, and for *Novenas* in honour of S. Mary. From the headings to the chapters, we learn that S. Mary is Queen of Mercy, and our loving Mother; that she obtains us the pardon of our sins and perseverance, and renders death sweet; that she is the Hope of all; that her intercession is necessary for our salvation; that she is a tender Advocate, able to save all; that she is the Peace-maker between sinners and God; that she delivers her clients from hell, succours her clients in purgatory, and leads her servants to heaven; that she is the Treasury of all divine graces; that she offered to God the life of her Son; that she is the Queen of Martyrs;—together with many more 'new inventions of honours,' as Father F. W. Faber approvingly terms them. Cardinal Wiseman cordially recommends the English translation to the Faithful. So do we. We think few books on the subject more instructive. A Review of it will be found in the *Christian Remembrancer* for October, 1855.

speaking of the *Theologia Moralis*, 'I have toiled for fifteen 'years, going over and weighing the teaching of very many 'writers whom I have examined. Some I found too indulgent, 'for led by a false zeal for expediting the salvation of souls, 'they have granted too much liberty, not without prejudice to 'the laws divine and ecclesiastical; and others I found who, 'detesting so great compliance, have fallen into the other extreme 'of excessive rigour. This has been my greatest labour, to 'select from such a congeries of opinions those sentiments 'which on one side have due regard to the precepts of God 'and of the Church, and which on the other do not add burdens 'which have not been imposed by God, nor tie every one to a 'perfection which human weakness renders morally impossible 'to the common run of the faithful.' And again in the preface to the *Theologia Moralis* itself: 'So I have determined to 'publish this new work to hold a middle place between too lax 'and too severe opinions.' And in his tract upon Conscience: 'I protest that as I do not approve of confessors who adhere to 'over-great austerity, and condemn using a number of opinions 'which rest on a grave foundation; so on the other hand, I 'cannot approve of those who easily admit opinions as probable, 'which are without sure foundation.'[1] In fact Liguori is a safe *via media* man, as Rome counts safeness.[2]

At first sight there seems a certain degree of security in an Authorized Book of Morals, but second thoughts will show that such an impression is altogether unfounded. It can only be a help on the side of liberty, not on that of strictness. No sort of lax opinions are thus put down. They stand upon their own ground, just as though there were no such book at all. They

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[1] Theol. Mor. l. i. 83.

[2] The strict school consists of Merbesius, Contensonius, Natalis Alexander, Jueninus, Cabassutius, Collet, Genettus, Petrocorensis, and Concina, almost all of whom, it will be seen, are Gallicans. It was really for its strict moral teaching, and not for its speculative dogmas, that Jansenism, the child of Gallicanism, was proscribed. 'The Jansenists,' says their enemy Francolinius, 'have their Theology, both speculative, and practical or moral: their speculative Theology is Jansenism, their practical or moral Theology is Rigorism. This has three principles. To make very much of the Fathers, little of the Pontiffs, nothing of modern Theologians. To pay true regard to the Fathers, as quoted by themselves, a pretended regard to the Pontiffs, to the other Doctors neither one nor the other. Never to leave S. Augustin, real or spurious, and not interpret the Doctor by Councils, but Councils by him: sometimes to go near Pontiffs when teaching *ex cathedrâ* and to profess to do so—if, that is, they are not against them. Always to avoid Schoolmen, especially those of the two last ages, in controversies with respect to morals, both in subject and in manner of speech, and not even to read them, far less make honourable mention of them in their writings and books.' Well would it have been for France and for the Christian Church, had not maligned Jansenism fallen beneath the calumnies and the violence of its semi-Pelagian assailants! And well would it be for France now if she could recall the spirit of her Arnauds and her Pascals, instead of cherishing in her bosom the extremes of Ultramontanism!

are neither approved nor condemned, and are left to the individual conscience. But all the opinions which are given and commended in such a book, whether strict or lax, are thenceforward sacred. The only result, therefore, is, that if there are any lax opinions in it, those opinions receive a sanction, without which a conscientious mind would not have allowed itself to adopt them.

The evils of this are shown in the case of Equivocation. As we have already shown, a person committed to the defence of Liguori's Theory of Truthfulness must maintain, that when asked a question which cannot but be answered in the affirmative, it is truthful to reply, '*I say, no;*' intending the questioner to understand that you deny his question, but meaning in your own mind simply to affirm that you are making use of the word *no* in the course of your conversation.[1] He must justify the once well-known principle, 'Η γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ', ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος; for that is identical with the principle adopted by Liguori, that when a man has sworn only externally, he has not sworn, he has joked.[2] He must hold that a man may insert a *not* into an affirmative sentence in a whisper, not heard so as to be understood by the other party, and that his oath is then truthful, though he means to swear *no*, and the other conceives that he is swearing *yes*.[3] He must maintain that a witness in a court of justice has not only the liberty of lying, but that it is his duty to lie, if the crime about which his evidence is required is otherwise unknown.[4] He must not dare to express indigna-

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[1] Theol. Mor. l. iv. 151. [2] L. iv. 171. [3] L. iv. 168.

[4] L. iv. 154.—In the trial of Boyle *v.* Wiseman, which took place in the course of the month of August of the year 1854, the object of the plaintiff's counsel being to prove that the defendant had written a letter which had been published with his name, the following is reported as having occurred: 'Dr. T. Grant was then examined. He said, "I am the Roman Catholic Bishop of S. George's, Southwark. I know the defendant, and am upon intimate terms with him. I remember going to Paris on the subject of this libel, but *I don't remember* having had any conversation with the defendant relating to it. I had a conversation with a gentleman belonging to the *Univers* journal, but he did not give me any MS. I am quite sure the defendant never told me that he wrote the letter signed 'Nicholas, Cardinal Wiseman,' which is the subject of the present action." The Rev. George Spencer, known as Father Ignatius, was the next witness. He said, "I am intimately acquainted with Cardinal Wiseman, but I don't see much of him. I remember reading the article in the *Catholic Standard*, and I had a few words with the Cardinal on the subject. *All I can remember* that he said was that he had reason to know that Boyle had communicated the article that appeared in the *Ami de la Religion*. He did not say a word of the authorship of the letter." "Did you say to him, 'I have read your letter, Cardinal Wiseman?'" "*I don't remember.*" (The witness gave his evidence in such a low tone, and so confusedly, that the jury several times requested him to speak louder and more plainly, as they could not hear what he said.) "I cannot say how the conversation began. The Cardinal did not send me to the plaintiff to try to arrange this matter, but I did go to Mr. Ivors on the subject.—*I don't remember* the words that passed afterwards between me and the Cardinal. I am certain he did

tion at the four answers allowed to the adulterous wife: 1. That she had not broken the marriage (meaning to herself that the marriage was still existing); 2. That she was innocent of the crime (meaning to herself that she had been absolved of the guilt of the crime after confession); 3. That she had not committed adultery (meaning to herself that she had not committed idolatry); 4. That she had not committed adultery (meaning to herself so as to have to tell her husband).[1] He must not denounce as wicked the doctrine that a man who has seduced a maiden, on promise of marrying her, is *not* bound to keep his promise, if he is of considerably higher birth, or if he is considerably richer, whether the victim did or did not know of any disparity between him and herself.[2] If he is a 'good Catholic,' he will hold with the Cardinal Archbishop of Besançon, that on these points 'the 'judgment of Rome should be fully adhered to, and that the 'opinions of the Blessed Alfonso de' Liguori should be followed 'and reduced to practice, all doubt whatever being thrown aside.' If not so enthusiastic as the Cardinal Archbishop, yet he is absolutely bound to hold that the above teaching is not erroneous, rash, scandalous, offensive to pious ears, ill-sounding or misleading to the simple.

We will now examine the Theory of Theft; and we shall see there the same evil as in the case of Equivocation—laxity en-

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not tell me the letter was his, and I did not tell him that it was his. I went to the plaintiff (Mr. Boyle) of my own accord, and I afterwards communicated with the Cardinal. My object was to endeavour to settle this action." "Surely you can tell us what passed between you?" "*No, I do not remember.*" "Why how long ago is it since this occurred?" "About a month." "And you mean to swear you have no recollection of what occurred?" "I do; *I only recollect* what I have told you." "What else did the Cardinal say? What did he say relative to the matter?" "*I don't recollect.*"'

We have no cause for thinking that Bishop Grant and Father Ignatius are gifted with good memories; therefore we conclude that they have short memories. But it is an interesting inquiry, as a purely speculative question. What must they have done on the received principles of Roman Moral Theology if they *had* recollected that Cardinal Wiseman had told them that he was the author of the letter signed by his name? They must have done exactly what they did. Otherwise they would have 'sinned by discovering the truth which they ought to have concealed.' (L. v. 270.) '*If in a trial the crime is altogether concealed, the witness may, nay he is bound, to say that the defendant has not committed it.*' (L. iv. 154.) This would be exactly our hypothetical case: for in matter of fact, the trial was quashed because 'the crime' of having written the libel was 'concealed;' therefore 'the witnesses were bound,' even if they had known the contrary to be true, 'to say the defendant had not committed it.' This is, to say the least, remarkable. We should scarcely have thought it possible—indeed without S. Alfonso's assistance we never should have thought it possible—that when English gentlemen were giving evidence upon their oath in an English court of justice, and were questioned as to whether or no they recollected something taking place, they should be religiously and morally bound not to allow the fact of their recollection or non-recollection to make any difference in their answer.

[1] L. iv. 162. [2] L. iv. 644.

couraged by the sanction of authority: and we shall, in another instance, learn what is the nature of that morality which Rome inculcates through her Confessors and her Directors.

'What is theft? It is the secret and unjust taking-away of a thing belonging to another, when the owner is reasonably unwilling.'—L. iv. 518.

This is an awkward beginning. Who is to be the judge, whether the owner is reasonable or unreasonable in wishing to keep his goods himself? If he is likely to have a prejudice on the side of possession, the thief is at least as likely to have a prejudice on the side of abstraction. We suppose that it will be necessary to call in the Director to settle the point between them.[1]

Having got our definition of theft, we may see what acts of taking other people's goods are not thieving, which unenlightened consciences might conceive to be such. Five kinds of such acts are at once enumerated. The first is that of a man who takes what is another's by way of joke. We may let that pass. 'I only did it in fun,' has always been accounted a sufficient excuse to save a schoolboy from anything beyond a reprimand.

The next is that of one who takes what is another's for the latter's good or advantage, 'As if a wife take away money from 'her husband, that he may not waste it on games or feasting, or 'take away wine from him that he may not get drunk, or *an 'heretical book that he may not read it;* or, if a servant gives a 'very poor man alms of no very great amount, which his master 'would not be reasonably unwilling that he should give, although 'for shame, or some other reason, he does not dare to ask him.' This is a principle which might be extensively applied, especially if it should happen that a lady were married to an heretical husband. But we shall have occasion again to consider the case of wives, children, and servants, separately.

The third case of taking, not thieving, carries us up at once to first principles.

'It is certain that a man who is in extreme necessity may purloin other people's goods, enough to free himself from such a necessity. So the doctors hold, "in common,"[2] with S. Thomas. The holy Doctor's reason is, that in such a case all things are common, for the law of nations by which a division of goods was made, cannot derogate from natural law by which every man is allowed to provide for himself, so long as he labours under extreme necessity. The same is said when the necessity is next to

[1] In the *Homo Apostolicus*, the cases in which the owner is regarded as unreasonable in his unwillingness to part with his goods to the thief are when the latter is in extreme necessity, or when he is justly compensating himself, but no such limit to his unreasonableness is laid down in the *Theologia Moralis*.

[2] For the technical meaning of 'common opinion,' and of 'probable and more probable opinion,' we must refer our readers to the *Theory of Truthfulness*, p. 7.

extreme, or equivalent to it, for in such a necessity, which is called very grave or quasi-extreme, a man may also *provide for himself*, by ordinary means, but not by strange and extraordinary. So, "in common," Lugo, Lessius, Sporer, the Salamanca Doctors, Navarrus, Soto, Cajetan, Prado, &c., Viva, Sylvius, Azorius, Croix, Cardenas, Haunoldus, and Tamburini, the last of whom calls the opinion certain. But a very grave necessity of this kind is supposed to exist when a man is in probable risk of incurring death, or indeed in danger of losing some principal member, or some sense, such as an eye; also when a man is in danger of falling into perpetual captivity, or being sent to the galleys, or catching a very grave or lasting disease, or incurring loss of character. For it is not necessary that evils of this kind should be actually upon the man, but it is enough that they are very near him, and morally certain, or indeed—Holzmann says—if there is certainly probable danger of them. But it is doubted whether a father is supposed to labour under the same necessity if he is in danger of prostituting his daughter through want. Bonacina says Yes, and Mazzotta, Cajetan, Suarez, &c., agree. But "with greater probability" the Salamanca Doctors say No, because no necessity can compel a man to sin when there is any other way of relieving his necessity, such as at least he has in begging. But what, if a nobleman is very much ashamed to beg or to work, can he provide for himself out of other people's goods? The Salamanca Doctors say No, with Soto and Prado, on the ground that this must be rather counted grave than extreme necessity, temporal goods being ordained only for preserving life, not for keeping honour. But Viva says Yes, and Roncaglia and Mazzotta, as well as Lessius, Palao, and Diocastillo in Croix: so do Bannez and Serra. And this seems to me the "more probable," if he is so ashamed of begging that he would rather die than beg.'—L. iv. 520.

Six times in the course of three pages in his *Homo Apostolicus*, sixteen times in the course of one section of a chapter in his *Theologia Moralis*, Liguori lays down the principle that, as soon as a man is reduced to extreme necessity, all goods become common, and, more than this, that the thief has a right to what belongs to others. We need not say that we here find ourselves referred to the fundamental principle of Communism, just as Mariana appeals to the fundamental principle of Red Republicanism, when he asserts that every private man has a right to stab the king who has been declared a public enemy.[1]

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[1] 'Any private man, whoever he may be, has a right equal to the best, to kill the king declared a public enemy: let him only have the will to fling away hopes of impunity, despise the risk, and dare attempt to serve his country. I never will believe that he who makes essay to slay him has done anything whatever which he has not a right to do.... It is indeed more virtuous and more magnanimous openly to satisfy the grudge and fall upon the country's enemy before the eyes of all the world. But there is more prudence in trying to catch him, as in a trap, by artifice. For then the happy issue comes without tumult, and with the certainty of less danger, public as well as private.... Whether open force is resorted to, and he is struck down in the midst of insurrection and arms publicly taken up ... or with greater caution he dies by stratagem or device, a single man devoting himself, or a few sworn together secretly against his life, and struggling, each at his own peril, to redeem his country safe! Suppose that they escape! Like great demi-deities they are revered their whole life long. And if they fall, they fall a sacrifice grateful to the gods and grateful unto men, in a noble undertaking, and are illustrious to all posterity!'—Mariana, pp. 60, 65, as quoted in *Cases of Conscience*, p. 51.

Now that a case might arise in which circumstances would justify appropriation is a proposition which we do not deny, and it is this modicum of truth which blinds Liguori and his followers in the instance before us. If it be true that it might happen, under very peculiar circumstances, that a man might be justified in appropriating what was not his, it does not follow that it should be laid down as a general rule to guide practice that as soon as a man is reduced to extreme necessity he is relieved from paying any regard to the laws of property: and then that the term 'extreme necessity' should be so liberally interpreted as to include under it every distressed nobleman. Take this last case and analyze it. It is precisely the case of the Unjust Steward, provided that the latter was a man of high birth, or indeed even that would not be necessary, for *vir honoratus* would scarcely mean more than a man holding a respectable position. This parable has caused much difficulty to such commentators as did not mark that 'the lord' there spoken of is like the Steward himself, a man of the earth, earthy, and, in addition, that the commendation does not belong to the morality of the act done, but to the cleverness displayed in doing it. No such difficulties need be felt by them if they will take Liguori for their guide. 'I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed.' Then, says S. Alfonso, you are justified in clandestinely taking. 'If a 'man in an honourable position is very much ashamed to beg 'or to work, may he provide for himself out of other persons' 'goods? The Salamanca Doctors, &c. say No—but Viva, &c. say 'Yes, and this seems to me the "more probable."' The ingenuity which has contrived to bring the distressed nobleman into the category of those labouring under extreme necessity, is as commendable as the Unjust Steward's own cleverness. The method in which it is done is as follows:—It was necessary to make some kind of explanation of what extreme necessity is. In doing this it appeared hard to be too strict and rigid, and so *extreme* necessity was softened down into *grave* necessity. So Lessius, Malderus, &c. Here, however, Innocent XI. stepped in—that same Innocent, who, as we have seen, attempted to put a stop to the practice of Mental Restriction. But he and his Jansenist morality has fared no better in the matter of Theft than in that of Untruthfulness. Then, as we may recollect, on his condemning mental restriction, mental restriction was divided into two classes, morally undistinguishable, pure mental restriction, and non-pure mental restriction, and his condemnation was confined by the Casuists to the former. Here he condemns the proposition 'that it is allowable to steal not only in extreme but also in grave necessity.' The Casuists hear and obey the Papal voice. But the Pontiff spoke only of *grave*, he said nothing of *very grave* necessity: so *gravi* is changed into *gravissimâ*, and the

Jansenist Pope's decree goes for nothing. To permit a man to steal in grave necessity is immoral, says Innocent. True; but to permit a man to steal in very grave necessity is moral, reply the Casuists, and we have the privilege of explaining what 'very grave' means. This they accordingly proceed to do. And first a man is to be considered labouring under very grave necessity, if he is in probable danger of incurring death—next, if he is in danger of losing a principal limb—then, if he is in very near risk of being imprisoned for life—or of being sent to the galleys —or of catching a very bad disease—or of incurring disgrace. This last heading covers the case of the distressed nobleman. He would feel disgraced if he were to dig or to beg; therefore he is *unable* to have recourse to this method of relieving his wants, and is labouring under very grave or quasi-extreme need. That is all that is necessary. At once the laws of *meum* and *tuum*, so far as he is concerned, have perished. He may take what he wants. In providing for his needs out of other people's goods he cannot steal if he would. But if a man's want is so pressing that he is in risk of prostituting his daughter, the same authority tells us that that does not justify him in 'providing for himself.' To save his own character in the eyes of men he may take clandestinely. To save his daughter's ruin of body and soul he may not.

In connexion with this subject of extreme necessity, there are, says Liguori, many difficult questions. They are, 1., whether men in captivity to the Turks may purloin what is not theirs, and whether rich men are bound to redeem them. To the latter part of this question Rome's oracle replies: 'In this doubt, 'which has heaped upon me a mighty confusion, and on which 'the Doctors speak so obscurely, I dare not decide anything. It 'is enough to have put forward the arguments of both sides. 'Let the wiser judge.' Question 2. is, whether a poor man in extreme necessity may secretly purloin (*occulte alienum surripere*) without going through the previous ceremony of begging. To this Coninchius answers in the negative; Lessius, Layman, and Concina, in a qualified affirmative; Cardinal Lugo and Liguori have recourse to a *distinguendum*. In reply to Question 3. we learn that 'no one is bound to spend so much as 600*l.* or '800*l.* to save another man's life, although the donor should 'not lose his station by giving more.' Question 4. asks if the thief who consumes what he has taken away in extreme necessity has to restore it. Palao, Coninchius, Navarrus, Diana, Sporer, Lessius, and Tamburini, are on the negative side, 'on 'the grounds that, as in extreme necessity all things become 'common, the thief has not only the right of taking others' 'goods, but also of consuming them, just as he has the right 'of purloining again.' Lessius, Sylvius, Armilla, Azorius, and

Concina, are on the other side. Liguori thinks both 'probable.'[1] The 5th question is whether the purloiner is bound to restore when his extreme necessity has ceased. Here there are three opinions. The first, affirmative, supported by seven Doctors; the second, negative, supported by eight Doctors; the third, a *distinguendum*, supported by twelve Doctors. Question 6. asks, If a rich man, who does not help a poor man in extreme necessity, is afterward bound to restore? Here there are eight Doctors on the affirmative side, nine on the negative, which Liguori says is the 'more probable;' 'for, though the poor man 'has a right to take the rich man's goods, yet the same justice 'does not require the rich man to give.'[2]

The next case of purloining, not thieving, is 'when a man 'takes by way of just compensation, if he cannot otherwise get 'what is due to him; *e. g.* if a servant cannot get just wages 'otherwise, or if he has been unfairly induced to undertake the 'place at an unfair price.' This being a liberty given especially to domestics (though not confined to them), we shall defer its consideration till we are able to take a panoramic view of the indulgences granted by Rome to wives, children, and servants, to take clandestinely at the expense of the master of the house. At present we will content ourselves with Pascal's illustration of the principle in the story of John d'Alba.

'"Father Bauny," said the monk, "has established a prime maxim in favour of those who are not content with their wages: 'May servants who are dissatisfied with their wages use means to raise them, by laying hands on as much of the property of their masters as they may consider necessary to make the said wages equivalent to their trouble? They may, in certain circumstances; as when they are so poor that, in looking for a situation, they have been obliged to accept the offer made to them; and when other servants of the same class are gaining more than they elsewhere.'" "Ha, Father!" cried I, "that is John d'Alba's passage, I declare." "What John d'Alba?" inquired the Father; "what do you mean?" "Strange, Father," returned I, "do you not remember what happened in this city in the year 1647? Where in the world were you living at that time?" "I was teaching Cases of Conscience in one of our colleges at a distance from Paris," he replied.

'"I see you don't know the story, Father: I must tell it you. I heard it related the other day by a man of honour whom I met in company. He told us that this John d'Alba, who was in the service of your fathers, in the College of Clermont, in the Rue St. Jacques, being dissatisfied with his wages, had purloined something to make himself amends; and that your fathers, on discovering the theft, had thrown him into prison on the charge

[1] Elsewhere we find:—'If a man gets something by borrowing, hiring, or asking, and then consumes it in extreme necessity, he is not bound to make restitution. Nay, "probably" he is not bound to restore what he has previously stolen and afterwards consumed in this necessity, because his stealing does not take away from him the right which in such a case he had to the thing, no more than if he had taken it when actually in the necessity and consumed it.'—L. iv. 623.

[2] L. iv. 520.

of larceny. His case was reported to the court, if I recollect right, on the 16th of April, 1647; for he was very minute in his statements, and, indeed, they would hardly have been credible otherwise. The poor fellow, on being questioned, confessed to *having taken* some pewter plates, but maintained, nevertheless, that he *had not stolen* them; pleading in his defence this very doctrine of Father Bauny, which he produced before the judges, along with a pamphlet by one of your fathers, under whom he had studied Cases of Conscience, and who had taught him the same thing. Whereupon M. De Montrouge, one of the most respected members of the court, said, in giving his opinion, 'That he did not see how they could discharge the accused on the ground of these fathers' writings, containing as they did a doctrine so illegal, pernicious, and contrary to all laws, natural, divine, and human, and calculated to ruin all families, and sanction all sorts of household robbery. But his opinion was, that this too faithful disciple should be whipped before the college-gate by the hand of the common hangman, who should at the same time burn the writings of those fathers which treated of larceny, with certification that they were prohibited from teaching such doctrines in future, upon pain of death."

'"The result of this judgment, which was heartily approved of, was waited for with much curiosity, when some incident occurred which made them delay proceedings. But in the meantime the prisoner disappeared nobody knew how, and nothing more was heard about the affair; so that John d'Alba got off, pewter plates and all. Such was the account he gave us; to which he added, that the judgment of M. De Montrouge was entered on the records of the court, where any one may consult it. We were highly amused with the anecdote." "What are you trifling about now?" cried the monk; "what does all that signify? I was explaining the maxims of our Casuists, and was just going to speak of those relating to gentlemen, when you interrupt me with impertinent stories." "It was something suggested by the way, Father," I observed.'—*Letter* vi.

We will only add here that John d'Alba would, as we shall presently show, be equally justified by S. Alfonso's system of morals, as by that of Father Bauny, in spite of another fruitless attempt of Innocent XI., which we shall notice in its place. The last case of purloining, not thieving, is interesting to our Eastern *protegés* at the present moment, and may be of some advantage to our French allies in preparing their commissariat in Turkey. All, and more than all, that the Emperor of Russia requires for his justification is freely allowed him. The Czar's claim is not a tenth part as bold as that of Molina, Cajetan, Victorelli, Naldus, Duvallius, Revellus, Velasquez, Covarruvias and Diana, any one of which theologians is of sufficient authority to make the opinion which he espouses 'probable,' and, therefore enough for a sovereign to act upon.

'A bye-question here arises whether Christians may lawfully purloin the property of the Turks? If Christians are captives in Turkish territories, it is certain that they may purloin from their masters enough for their redemption and for their return home, by way of compensation for their unjust slavery, and the losses which they consequently suffer. This is according to a decree of the Sacred Congregation, Aug. 23, 1630, in which it is declared—"Captives, unjustly detained by unbelievers, may take from their own masters, without doing wrong, enough for a proper compensation,

to the amount of their redemption, from them, or from others who belong to the state, whether it be Jewish or Turkish." The only real question is, if *every* Christian, without distinction, may purloin the goods of the Turks. Azorius and Filliuccius say No, but, "with probability," Molina and Cajetan say Yes. So do Victorelli, Naldus, Duvallius, Rebellus, Velasquez, Covarruvias, and others in Diana, who also holds it "probable." The reason is, that it may be rightly presumed that every Christian has this permission given him by Christian sovereigns, who have a right'—[hear it, O Alexander!]—'to despoil the Turks of all their goods and of the territories usurped by them. Felix Potesta agrees in this, provided that (as he rightly limits it) there be not among the Turks a time of truce, or of safe-conduct, and provided that it do not apply to any single Turk living in Christian countries, whether free or a slave, especially if he is there as a public official under royal protection.'—L. iv. 525.

So much for purloining, which is not thieving. We now proceed to venial thieving. 'Mortal sin,' the *Homo Apostolicus* says, 'is that which deprives man of divine grace, which is 'the life of the soul, and is therefore called mortal. Venial sin 'is that which does not deprive of grace, *and does not diminish* '*God's love towards us*, but does diminish our love towards 'God.'[1] The distinction between mortal and venial sin being so enormous—venial sins being so trifling, that we are told a man does not sin gravely who deliberately determines to commit every venial sin under the sun[2]—it is very important to see what are the conditions which bring acts under one class or the other. That there are some sins less offensive to God, which, if we please, we may call venial, and some sins more offensive to God, which, if we please, we may call mortal, we do not deny; but it is clear, that according to any system which is not wholly unspiritual, it must depend altogether upon the disposition of mind in which the sin is committed, whether it is light or grave; and that to lay down an abstract chart in which certain sins are dotted down as venial, and certain others as mortal, is intellectually ludicrous and morally unprincipled. Rome's theologians think otherwise. One of the chief purposes of such books as that which we are reviewing is to classify all acts as respectively venial and mortal. The rules by which these writers have to direct themselves in deciding between the two classes, are three:—All sins requiring advertence on the part of the intellect, and consent on the part of the will; a sin is not mortal, unless the advertence be full and

[1] Hom. Apost. Tract. iii. 66. Vide *Theory of Truthfulness*, p. 7, for a further explanation of 'mortal and venial sin.'

[2] 'Does any Christian man sin gravely who determines to commit every venial sin? Sanchez and Bonacina say Yes, because, as S. Thomas teaches, venial sins naturally dispose towards mortal sin: but, "with greater probability," Palao and Antony of the Holy Ghost say No; (provided however that he does not act in contempt, and is not in proximate risk of falling into mortal sin, which he would learn from his past experience.) The reason is, that really a purpose of this kind only conduces in a remote manner to mortal sin.'—Theol. Mor. l. v. 12.

the consent be perfect. So far good: those two rules, if assailable on any other ground, are not liable to the charge of unspirituality. But there is a third: for a sin to be mortal there is also required 'gravity of matter;' and strange are the shifts to which those who try to divest Rome's morals of a hard, dry, calculating, mechanical character, are driven, in order to explain what this 'gravity of matter' is. Sometimes they will say that it means 'the gravity of the sin;' but 'matter' and 'sin' are not the same thing; and Liguori, in so many words, distinguishes them. Sometimes they will say that it means 'the objective and material badness of the act.'[1] This is less tenable than the former; and so at last they are compelled to acquiesce in the simple account given of it by all the commentators on S. Thomas Aquinas, and adopted from them by S. Alfonso. We will take Cardinal de Lugo's account, as representing the earlier writers. He says:—

'It is certain that in this (*i. e.* in stealing) a sin may be allowed to be light, not only on account of defect of advertence, but also on account of levity of matter. The whole difficulty is in determining how much matter is enough for a mortal sin of theft. . . . Though we can with certainty determine some matter to be small, viz. an obol, or penny, and other matter to be certainly grave, viz. 20*l.*; yet between these two extremes we cannot define what approaches to each of these two matters, so as to be light if up to that sum, and grave if beyond it.'—*Lugo de Just.* d. 16. n. 27, 28.

The meaning, then, of gravity of matter in the case of theft is the amount stolen. If the amount stolen is equal to a certain quantity, which is called notable, then the theft is *in grave matter*, and (supposing that it is committed with full advertence and perfect consent) the act is a mortal sin. If it is below that quantity, then the theft is *in light matter*, and (in spite of full advertence and perfect consent) the act is a venial sin. S. Alfonso accordingly asks, on the subject of theft,—

'What is notable quantity for mortal sin?' . . . 'Various are the opinions on this subject. Navarrus, with too great scrupulousness, says that 2½*d.* is enough; others, with too great laxity, say 2*l.* 10*s.*; with greater moderation, Toletus, Medina, Lessius, &c. say 10*d.*, though less than that is enough, if it does notable damage.'—L. iv. 526.

These authors are but rough artists. As yet, we may observe, the attempt is to fix an *absolute* sum, settling at once (as one of three conditions) the spiritual price of each theft; viz. below 10*d.* purgatory, above 10*d.* eternal death. But what this absolute sum should be, it was difficult to decide. There is

[1] Vide *Moral Theology of the Church of Rome, No. II.*

some difference between 2*l.* 10*s.* and 2½*d.*; nor does 10*d.* seem a fair medium between them. But by degrees the science grows more exact, and it is determined that the sum fixed must be *relative*, not absolute; and that it must be higher or lower, according to the circumstances of the person from whom the thief steals.

'What is grave quantity with respect to different sorts of persons, or to different circumstances? . . . The Doctors say "in common," that in theft that is grave matter which would be enough for a man to support himself and his family with for a day, according to their condition in life, counting, as Croix, Sporer, Gomez and others well note, not only his board, but also the price of his clothing and lodging. But as this rule is very obscure and confused, and cannot be applied to all without exception, we will bring forward the Doctors who fix what is grave matter for different kinds of persons.

'1. With respect to poor mendicants, Habert, Elbel, Sporer, and Holzmann, fix on a few coins as grave matter. But others "more commonly" fix 5*d.*, or sometimes even 2½*d.* (but rarely, as the Salamanca Doctors say). So Busembaum, Lessius, Bonacina, Viva, Anacletus, Escobar, Renzi, Mazzotta, Wigandt, with Bannez and Serra; so too Navarrus, Reginald, and Diana in Lugo.

'2. With respect to poor labourers, speaking generally, Layman and Lugo say that anything equal in value to a day's maintenance, or to the ordinary wages which are given to a labourer for a day, is grave matter. Others, however, speak more distinctly. Roncaglia and Habert fix 5*d.* for grave matter; but others "more commonly" say 10*d.*, both for labourers and artizans or mechanics. So Layman, Lessius, Medina, Bonacina, Viva, Wigandt, Concina, Renzi, Escobar, Mazzotta, Tamburini, Busembaum, Holzmann, Serra in the Salamanca Doctors, and Navarrus, Reginald, and Diana in Lugo. Nevertheless, Soto, and Peter Navarrus in Lessius, require for artizans more than 10*d.* to make grave matter, and so Elbel and Potesta say; Filliuccius requires 1*s.* 3*d.*, Lugo 1*s.* 8*d.* Hence I say with "probability," that 10*d.* is enough for labourers, but that for artizans at least 1*s.* 0½*d.* is required for grave matter, if they earn as much or more a day. Habert, however, rightly notes that if a workman supported himself with difficulty, earning 7*d.* or 8*d.* a day, such an amount would be grave with regard to him.

'3. With respect to men rich in a common or ordinary way, men who live on their own income, Concina and Roncaglia fix 1*s.* 3*d.* for grave matter, Layman about 2*s.* 6*d.*; but "more commonly," Busembaum, Lessius, Bonacina, Gordon, Habert, Viva, Anacletus, with Peter Navarrus, Elbel, Tamburini, Holzmann, Potesta, Wigandt, Bannez, Serra, Reginald, Diana, with the Salamanca Doctors, say that for these 1*s.* 8*d.* is grave matter. Nay, Filliuccius, Escobar, Mazzotta, Renzi, and Tamburini extend it to 2*s.* 1*d.* Viva, however, rightly notices that this does not apply to men who live very closely, although they do live on their own income: in their case I certainly think 1*s.* 3*d.* is grave matter; nay even less in the case of those who keep themselves and their household in exceedingly wretched plight. On the other hand, for a person absolutely wealthy, Sporer requires 2*s.* 1*d.*, Lugo 2*s.* 6*d.* or 2*s.* 11*d.* But with regard to tradesmen of small fortune, I think that 1*s.* 0½*d.* is grave matter. For others of moderate fortune, I think, with Elbel, Viva, Anacletus, and Croix, 1*s.* 8*d.* For a very rich tradesman Croix requires 3*s.* 4*d.* Tamburini, Renzi, and Potesta require 5*s.* But Layman, Elbel, Holzmann, Angelus, Sylvester, Rodriguez, Peter of Aragon, Antony of Cordova in the Salamanca Doctors, require 2*s.* 1*d.*

'4. With respect to very rich noblemen, Sylvester, Angelus, Peter of Aragon, Antony of Cordova, and Rodriguez in the Salamanca Doctors, require more than 10*s.* for grave matter; Viva, Elvel, Sporer and Croix, at least 10*s.*; but "more commonly" it is said that 5*s.* is enough for grave matter, by Bonacina, Gordon, Mazzotta, Filliuccius, Anacletus, Tamburini, Lugo, Navarrus, Reginald, Diana, Lessius, Soto, Peter Navarrus, Roncaglia, Holzmann. And Filliuccius, Roncaglia, Holzmann, and Lugo, say that this applies to kings too, because though, absolutely regarded, 5*s.* may seem light matter to them, yet really, they say, considering the burdens and functions of kings, it is grave. The Salamanca Doctors say that 7*s.* 6*d.* at least, is enough for kings. Others however "probably" say that at least 10*s.* is required, as Croix, Bonacina, Busembaum, Sporer, Mazzotta, Elbel, Tamburini, Viva, and Serra in the Salamanca Doctors. Nay, Potesta requires more than 10*s.* for kings, and very many others extend it to 15*s.*; as Wigandt, Bannez, Serra, Layman, Peter Navarrus, Angelus, Sylvester, Soto, Peter of Aragon, Rodriguez, Antony of Cordova, and the "common opinion," as Layman says.

'5. With respect to a community, Sanchez and Cardenas in Croix, think that 5*s.* is always grave matter; but Croix says "probably," that if the community were very rich, grave matter might be extended further, so that it did not exceed 10*s.*

'Conclusion, and "more probable opinion." From all this I draw, in conclusion, what seems to me "more probable." 1. With respect to mendicants, I think that 5*d.* is grave matter, or still less, if any poor persons gain less per day by alms. 2. With respect to labourers and similar workmen, commonly speaking, 10*d.*; for artizans, 1*s.* 0½*d.* 3. With respect to ordinarily or moderately rich men, 1*s.* 8*d.*; and less for those who live in wretched plight or on their own goods; but for the absolutely rich, 2*s.* 1*d.* or 2*s.* 6*d.*; and I think the same for very opulent tradesmen. 4. With respect to very rich noblemen, 5*s.*; and I think the same for a very opulent community—at least for this, I think that 7*s.* 6*d.* is enough for grave matter. With respect to kings, 10*s.*'—L. iv. 527, 528.

Is this morality or arithmetic? And what does it all mean? It means this. First, the principle is admitted that unless a certain quantity is stolen a sin of theft is not mortal. Then, as Cardinal Lugo says, comes the difficult task of fixing what this sum must be. At first an absolute sum was fixed for all cases, whether 2½*d.*, or 10*d.*, or 2*l.* 10*s.* It was soon seen that that would not do, and so the absolute sum was changed into a sum relative to the income of the sufferer. Still, however, more exactness was demanded, and men were accordingly divided into so many classes, and a certain sum affixed to each one of these classes. He who stole anything under the sum fixed for each class from any member of that class sinned venially; he who stole as much as the sum fixed sinned mortally. On the question, What should be the recognised scale of prices? we have seen that doctors have considerably disagreed. The last tariff, the one with which we have to do, is as follows:—

	s.	*d.*
With respect to mendicants	0	5
With respect to labourers	0	10

	s.	*d.*
With respect to artizans	1	0½
With respect to moderately rich men	1	8
With respect to absolutely rich men	2	6
With respect to very rich noblemen	5	0
With respect to a very rich community . . .	7	6
With respect to kings	10	0

Now mark the inexpressibly absurd consequences resulting from laying down scales of this nature. Let there be 2*s.* 6*d.* lying on the table—let a man with full knowledge that God's law forbids him to appropriate it, yet wilfully and deliberately steal it for present gratification, nay, let there be added in his mind a malicious feeling of hatred against the owner. Is it not clear that he has been guilty of as perfect an act of theft as could be committed? that in God's sight he is a malicious thief, and must bear his burden accordingly? *Distinguendum* answers Rome. We must first ask to whom that 2*s.* 6*d.* belonged. If it belonged to a mendicant, if it belonged to a labourer, if it belonged to an artizan, if it belonged to a moderately rich man, or to an absolutely rich man, then it is true the sin of theft was mortal. But in case that it belonged to a very rich nobleman, a very rich community, or to a king, the character of the act is changed; two of the conditions of a mortal act of theft are fulfilled, but the third is wanting. True, the man's mind, soul, and spirit, remain in exactly the same disposition, but he has not stolen enough. He is excused from mortal sin on the ground of levity of matter. He has but committed a venial act of theft, and for that God's love is not diminished towards him, though his own love towards God is dulled. He need not confess what he has done.

Again, suppose a man standing between a country squire and a rich peer. Let him be affected exactly in the same manner and degree towards each. Let him know and bear in mind that God has forbidden him to take what does not belong to him, but let him wilfully determine to do so. He puts out his right-hand and steals 3*s.* from the peer. God's love is not thereby diminished towards him—it is a venial act of theft. He puts out his left-hand and steals the same sum of 3*s.* from the squire. He has earned to himself eternal hell fires, and his soul is dead—it is a mortal act of theft.

Once more,—a man is sitting in a railway carriage,—the temptation comes upon him, and though he is aware of the wickedness of the act, he filches 2*s.* from his neighbour's pocket. Has he sinned mortally or venially? He does not know. If his neighbour was an absolutely rich man, he sinned venially; if

a moderately rich man, he sinned mortally. Purgatory and everlasting death are in the balance.

Such are some of the absurdities which the introduction of the Quantitative Principle into morals produces. The date of such introduction we need scarcely say is that period at which the vicious system of modern casuistry was in its strength. That there is a hint of it or approach to it in S. Augustine, and the moralists of the early Church, it would be an insult to them and to Christianity to suppose. Nay, it is not found in S. Thomas Aquinas. The names referred to in the passage quoted from Liguori will show its origin. The cause of its introduction is mainly twofold; first it may be traced to that spirit of defining, materializing, and making tangible, which has so unhappily pervaded Roman theology, doctrinal and moral; and next to a false idea that theft was only so far and to such degree sinful as it harmed our neighbour more or less. The fallacy which makes this latter notion plausible is easily exposed. It is true that the wilful harm done to our neighbour adds another sin to the sin of theft; but the sinfulness of the latter is already complete in its own kind as soon as a man has consciously and wilfully appropriated any sum, however small, knowing at the time that such appropriation was contrary to God's law. For example, God has written in our hearts the moral law of justice, 'Thou shalt not take that which is not thine to take;' and upon it has founded the positive law in His Word, 'Thou shalt not steal.' A man is conscious of these laws, and aware that he is bound by them. In the midst of this consciousness his eye lights upon something which he covets. The temptation is too strong for him, and he stretches out his hand and takes it. The sinfulness of the act is perfect, and yet not a thought has come into his mind of the harm, greater or less, done or not done, to his neighbour. So far as the sin of theft goes, it is wholly unimportant whether the thing which he coveted and appropriated was worth 2*d.* or 200*l.* It is true that if it were worth 200*l.*, and if that 200*l.* had been gathered together by a poor man in the sweat of his brow, and was his all, and the thief was conscious of this, another offence would be added to that of theft. Had the rich man in Nathan's parable taken the ewe lamb from another rich man, still he would have been guilty of a perfect sin of plunder, though he would not have added to it the further aggravation of cruelty and hard-heartedness. As it was, he was guilty first of seizing that which was not his, so transgressing the law of justice, and then, concomitantly with that sin, and by the same act, he was guilty of a host of other iniquities, by which he transgressed the laws of charity and humanity. We need not say that, without any additions or aggravations, theft and plunder are in themselves deadly sins.

So in murder. The formal sinfulness of murder consists in transgressing the law of God written in our hearts and in His Word, 'Thou shalt not take another's life.' 'Thou shalt do no murder.' The sin would be a perfect sin of murder, although good rather than harm should come to the sufferer. The harm done to the sufferer adds another sinfulness to the already mortal sin of murder.

We shall be met by the question, What, then, is a boy a thief who eats a turnip as he is passing through a field? Certainly not, in virtue of that act taken abstractedly. What we have maintained all along is, that the guilt of the act depends upon the frame of mind of the agent. A merry boy who lightly takes an apple from an orchard is not blameless, but he is not guilty of a serious act of theft. But *if* he took that apple or that turnip not thoughtlessly, or because it was an allowed thing, but with a firm conviction all the time that it was forbidden by God, and that he was transgressing His law in doing so, then it would be a grave sin. But, says Lessius, 'for a theft to be mortal, it is 'necessary that the quantity of matter be considerable: and this 'is clear, for *it is not possible* that taking any little thing such as 'an apple or a penny, can be deadly guilt.'[1] We, on the other hand, lay down no abstract rule. In every case we say it depends upon the disposition of mind of the agent.

We now return to some more of the consequences of making *notabilis quantitas furti*, a condition of a mortal sin of theft.

'Lessius, Trulenchius, and Villalobos, say, that in separate small thefts twice as much is needed for grave matter, *i.e.* if 1*s.* 8*d.* is grave matter of itself, 3*s.* 4*d.* is required for grave matter by small thefts. Holzmann requires the same quantity, if these petty larcenies are committed on different persons, and if they take place at considerable intervals, he requires three times as much. To us, however, it seems more fair, as others quoted by Elbel say, to hold that if the petty larcenies are committed on the same person at intervals, or on different persons at the same time, then as much, and half as much again, *i.e.* 2*s.* 6*d.*, is requisite and enough for grave matter. But if both these things concur, namely, if they are committed on different persons, and at different times, I think twice as much is needed, *i.e.* 3*s.* 4*d.* This, however, is to be understood with Lessius and Lugo, provided thefts are not purposely made in portions, and provided that there is not a long interval between the thefts. Layman, Bonacina, Lugo, &c. add, that petty larcenies do not coalesce if they are committed on different owners, and after a long interval, such as a year. Nay, Sanchez, Decian, Roncaglia, Viva, and Trulenchius, excuse from making restitution *sub gravi*, though the petty larcenies were committed on one owner, if there is an interval of a year. But Viva and Roncaglia reject the opinion of Filliuccius, Diana, Salaz, Vidal, Toletus, &c., who excuse from making restitution if fifteen days or a month have elapsed, as Navarrus in Sanchez admits: unless, excepts Viva,

[1] Lessius de Just. 2, 12, 13.

the matter is very small. Hence, I rather approve of Roncaglia's opinion, namely, that there must be at least an interval of two months, when the matter is, though not grave, yet very nearly grave.'—L. iv. 350.

Thus we see that the category of Time, as well as the category of Quantity, is important in Rome's Theory of Theft. A disregard of a few days with respect to the period at which he commits his venial theft may perchance precipitate a man beyond the range of Purgatory. The next extract will show that the category of Place is equally worthy of the regard of an Italian disciple.

'It is asked, Is it mortal to steal a little piece of a sacred relic? No one doubts that it is mortal in the Roman district, as Clement VIII. and Paul V. have excommunicated those who steal the very smallest relics against the will of the Rectors of the Churches. But it is not, (as Croix says "probably" with Sanchez, Bonacina, Castropalao, Diana, and Bardellus,) if, *outside the district*, a man steals some very little thing, the loss of which does not disfigure the relic or diminish its value—unless it be some remarkable or rare relic, as part of the Holy Cross, or of the Hairs of the Blessed Virgin Mary, &c.'—L. iv. 532.

'If a man, on an occasion arising, only steals a little, whether from one or from more, not intending to acquire much himself, nor to do great harm to his neighbour by his several thefts, he does not sin gravely, nor do all these taken together constitute one mortal sin; but after a notable quantity has been reached, he may sin mortally by keeping it.'—L. iv. 533.

'It is enough for avoiding mortal sin, that only that little matter be restored which makes up the grave matter, as is more probably held by Sanchez, Lessius, Vasquez, Rebellus, Bonacina, &c., with Croix; against Medina, Lopez, Esparsa, &c.—L. iv. 533.

'But if a man has the intention of gradually enriching himself by a number of little thefts, committed on one or many, or of doing great harm, he sins gravely in that intention; and though each act is only venial in itself, yet, as it subserves to such an intention, it is, on the whole, the commission of a mortal sin, because men do grave damage to the community, and that practice is very pernicious to human society, *e. g.* if a tailor purloin a little piece of cloth from different persons, or if tradesmen use too short measures, &c. (Mark here the proposition condemned by Innocent XI. "No one is bound, under penalty of mortal sin, to restore what has been taken away by small thefts, however great the total may be.") Meantime they [*i. e.* the tailors, tradesmen, &c.] are sometimes excused from grave sin. 1. From what has been said above. 2. If they act as they do for the sake of indemnifying themselves, or because they would otherwise make no profits, or because they ought to raise their price, and then would not find customers. 3. If otherwise they have not means of supporting themselves and those belonging to them.'—L. iv. 533.

In the above extract we have an instance of the method so frequently, not to say constantly adopted, by our author, of laying down a good principle, and then eating out the heart of it by exceptions broad enough to cover every case. It will be

seen that almost any tailor might justify himself in purloining little pieces of cloth, and almost any tradesman in using too short measures.

'If a man, after having taken enough to make grave matter, steals some other little thing again, Lugo, Croix, Sporer, Decian, &c., think it is a mortal sin every time the pilfering takes place. But Lessius and the Salamanca Doctors, with Tapia and Diana, say that a light theft of this sort does not make a mortal sin, unless it amount afresh to another grave quantity. And this Bonacina rightly thinks "very probable."'—L. iv. 538.

Before bidding farewell to 'grave and small matter,' we must trace it in a few words into other branches of morals, and see how widely the Quantitative Principle extends, and what strange confusions it produces.

In oath-breaking:—

'It is certain that if you only fail in keeping a little of what you have sworn, it is not a grave sin; *e.g.* if you have sworn that you will not drink wine, you do not sin mortally by drinking a little, for then the smallness of matter is an excuse.'—L. iv. 173.

In working on Sundays:—

'What is gravity of matter in this? Some canonists quoted by Suarez fix one-third of the day for grave matter; but this opinion is commonly rejected. Others again, with too great rigour, fix one hour. Others fix for grave matter two hours, as Roncaglia, Sanchez, Trulenchius, the Salamanca Doctors, Palao, Elbel, and Holzmann: and Sporer, Mazzotta, and Marchantius, call this the common opinion. Henno thinks so too, if the work is very servile, such as breaking stones or digging, but in other cases he requires three hours. But others, speaking generally, require for grave matter (and not without "probability") at least two, and rather more than two hours, as Viva, &c., with Tamburini, who says that this is now the received opinion in our age. Others, as Marchantius and Gobat, require three hours. Busembaum, likewise with Filliuccius, says that it is hard to condemn working for two or three hours as mortal sin. Croix agrees, and concludes that it is now the "more common, and more probable opinion," that it is not mortal, unless the work continues at least a good deal more than two hours, say two hours and a half.'—L. iv. 305.

In failing to hear Mass:—

'What omission is a grave sin? There are different opinions. The first says it is grave to omit from the beginning to the Epistle exclusively . . . . The second to the Epistle inclusively . . . The third to the Gospel inclusively . . . Although the Creed be omitted . . . It is the "common" opinion that a man does not sin gravely who omits everything after the reception, nor even one who omits at the same time everything before the Epistle, and everything after the reception.'—L. iv. 310.

In being at a distance from the Altar:—

'May Mass be heard by a man who looks at the altar out of his own house on the other side of the street? Sporer, Lugo, Decian, Gobat, &c., in

Croix, say Yes; and this, not without "probability," is admitted by Mazzotta, Elbel, Escobar, and very many more, if the distance is small, because then he is, morally, sufficiently present. Lugo and Escobar say that a distance of sixty feet is not an obstacle, but Tamburini and Gobat do not allow that.'—L. iv. 312.

In fast-breaking, Pasqualigo holds half an ounce to be small matter. The Salamanca Doctors, on the contrary, confine it to the eighth part of an ounce.[1] In omitting to say office, three Doctors think that half, or the third part, of a small 'hour' is notable matter, but this is denied by thirteen other Doctors; fourteen Doctors hold that anything less than the whole of a small hour is light matter; five Doctors maintain that the whole of the vespers on Easter-eve may on this ground be omitted without grave sin.[2] In failing to say Mass at the right hour, Azorius thinks twenty minutes to be grave matter; Layman half-an-hour; the more general opinion is anything under an hour.[3]

'In talking to nuns is smallness of matter allowed? De Alessandro thinks not; but the common opinion is on the other side. But authors differ in fixing what is small matter in such talking. Ciera thinks a few words; Merolla thinks ten words; Diana and Mazzotta the length of a *Miserere*, and a little more; Quarti and Vericelli say a quarter of an hour . . Nor is Quarti's opinion condemned by Clement the IXth's Decree . . for the only opinion there condemned was that a quarter of an hour and half a quarter of an hour was small matter.'—L. vii. 236.

Such as these are the rules to which men are reduced when they ignore the true character of man's conscience, and forget that machines must be regulated in one way, and God's creatures, with God-given instincts of right and wrong, in another. We now pass on to the limited liberty granted to wives, children, and servants, to steal from their husbands, fathers, and masters. And let no one think that we are selecting an invidious term in employing the expression 'steal.' *Furari*, *surripere*, and *furta*, are the words freely and innocently used by S. Alfonso. *Furari* we translate by *steal*, *surripere* by *purloin*, and *accipere* by *take*.

We have already seen that a wife may, without any fault, take money from her husband, to prevent him from spending it on bad objects; may carry his wine away, that he may not drink too much; and make away with his heretical books, that he may not read them. Further:

'A wife may give alms and gifts, according to the custom of other women of her position and station, although her husband forbid her to give any alms, because custom allows her this right, and her husband cannot deprive

[1] L. iv. 1029. [2] L. v. 147. [3] L. vi. 346.

her of it. So says Lugo, in "common" with Molina, Lessius, Concina, Bonacina, Reginald, &c., in Diana, the last of whom, with Molina and ten others, teaches that, without letting her husband know anything about it, she may give the twentieth part of the income which he has, or of the profits which he makes, because it belongs to the respectability of her position to do so, and it would be unreasonable for her husband to be unwilling. (But Lugo, Sporer, Tamburini, and Croix, do not allow this when expressed so universally.) It follows also, that a wife may, with Abigail, give moderate alms to gain the conversion of her husband, or that God may not punish him. Vasquez, Bonacina, Reginald, and ten others, against Concina.'—L. iv. 540.

'A wife commits no sin in secretly subtracting *(subducendo)* some things; whether by way of compensation, if her husband is an expensive man, (because then he wrongs the wife by wasting her share,) or for food, dress, and the other necessaries for herself and the household, which husbands often don't understand, and it would be of no use to ask them.'—L. iv. 541.

'If a wife's father, mother, or children by another marriage, are poor, so as to be living wretchedly according to their station, and her husband will not help them, she may supply them out of her own goods, or, as well, out of the common goods, (provided that after her husband's death she reckons the sum spent to her own share,) because she is bound by the law of nature to keep them, and her husband to allow her to do so. Navarrus, Palao, Lessius, Diana. The latter extends this right to the support of brothers and sisters, which Lessius and Trulenchius also think "probable," with Lugo, Molina, Sanchez, &c.'—L. iv. 542.

We will exemplify this case. A gentleman has, we will say, 20,000*l.* a year. He marries a wife who is, or becomes, a faithful adherent of Rome, and consequently, thenceforth, has her conduct governed, through her Director, by S. Alfonso de' Liguori's Theory of Morals. Now, if the gentleman were given to racing and to drinking, we do not think that the best method of reclaiming him would be for his wife to lay hands on his money, in order to prevent him from spending it to his own harm or disadvantage. This, however, she might do if she liked (L. iv. 519). But we will not suppose him addicted to such pursuits. We will picture him to ourselves as a high-bred English gentleman. First, then, he must look after his library, for any books which are placed upon the Index are in danger (L. iv. 519). And next he must make up his mind to various other losses, small and great, and all of them taking place in a mysterious and underhand manner, for his lady does not exercise her privileges openly.

Her great right, with which we will begin, is 1000*l.* per annum, to be taken from her husband's goods, without his knowledge, and bestowed in what is generally called charity, *i.e.* pious works pointed out by her Director. This 1000*l* a-year must not be supposed to be her allowance from her husband, or property belonging to herself (which Liguori sets apart under the head of *dotalia* and *paraphernalia*): it is five per cent. on 'her husband's annual income,' and she is to get it, and give it away—this

is the point to which we call especial attention—without her husband knowing anything about it—*inscio marito*. If she should be asked any troublesome questions, or if her conscience should become uneasy, the questions are answered, and her conscience is quieted by the argument, that it would not be respectable and befitting her station if she did not give away 1000*l.* a-year in charity; and so, if her husband were unwilling that she should do so, it would be unreasonable in him; and according to the very definition of theft, if the owner is unreasonable in his dislike at having his goods taken away, there can be no stealing—*Hoc pertinet ad decentiam statûs, et maritus* irrationabiliter *est invitus . . . Furtum est occulta et injusta rei alienæ ablatio, invitio* rationabiliter *domino*. And how is this 1000*l.* a-year to be spent?—In alms and gifts. One special method of almsgiving is suggested 'to gain her husband's conversion, or that God will not punish him,' *i. e.* Masses for his conversion and for his spiritual benefit. We doubt if the kind purpose here displayed would soften the loss of the 1000*l.* to the husband. We are not sure, indeed, whether the sum spent on Masses, with this object, is not an additional 'gift' exclusive of the 1000*l.*; at all events, but a part of the latter could well be spent in it. The price of Masses differs in different countries, and for different classes. The usual price advertised in the *Esperanza*, and other Spanish newspapers, is 2*s.* In Florence we found the general charge to be two pauls; and in the South of Italy the lowest price is a carlino, or 5*d.* In each place a tariff of prices is to be laid down, says Liguori, by the Ordinary. However high it should be fixed, yet it could not swallow up any considerable part of the 1000*l.* per annum; though we doubt not that a priest might thus find sufficient support to maintain him while occupied in converting his patroness's husband's tenants—and then there is the Chapel to be built. In one way or another the whole of this 1000*l.* is to be given away every year.

The next thing which the wife has to do is to make up her mind whether her husband is more expensive and wasteful than he ought to be; if she determines that he is, she may 'secretly subtract some things,' in order to make compensation to herself for the injury which she is told is thus done to her.

Thirdly, she may 'secretly subtract some things' for food, dress, and household necessaries, which her husband would not allow her if she asked him; for husbands don't understand those things.

Fourthly, we must suppose that her father and mother are alive, that she has four or five brothers and sisters, and some children of her own by a previous marriage. Some reverses have fallen upon them, and they are no longer able to live in the style of gentlemen and ladies, as they have been used to do.

She goes to her husband and asks him to help them. The husband, feeling perhaps the loss of the 1000*l.* and the other 'subtractions,' refuses, *non vult succurrere.* Then, says Liguori, in his *Homo Apostolicus*, 'She may take something from the goods 'which belong to them both in common, or indeed from those 'which belong especially to her husband—enough for them to 'live according to their station—although her husband is repug-'nant to it, for his repugnance is irrational.' This will be another very serious item in the husband's expenses: seven or eight persons cannot be supported in the station of gentlemen and ladies for nothing. We think it must be put down at another 1000*l.* per annum.

On the other hand, she must cook the dinner and sweep the house, if her husband tells her, according to the opinion of some Doctors. 'Is a noble wife bound to fulfil menial offices at her 'husband's command, such as cooking the dinner and sweeping 'the house? Angelus, Tiraquellus, &c. say she must.' Others, however, are of a different opinion, and make the consolatory remark, that if the wife did such works she might compensate herself, *i. e.* take as much more of her husband's goods as would serve for a cook's or housemaid's wages. 'Sanchez, the Sala-'manca Doctors, with Sylvius, Garcias, Fagundez, &c., "with 'greater probability," say she need not, because the wife is 'a companion, and therefore is not bound to perform the works 'of a servant, which would be a disgrace to her; and if she 'did perform them herself, she might make compensation to 'herself, as they say.'[1]

Moreover, the husband 'may sometimes chastise moderately 'with words, and on grave cause with moderate blows, if he has 'regard for her condition and station,' but must not 'beat her 'heavily.'[2] It appears too, that, on the authority of Sanchez, Surdus, &c., he may starve her if her dowry has not been paid: the more general opinion, however, would only justify him in maintaining her in the same style in which he keeps his servants.

'Is the husband bound to keep or support *(alere)* his wife if her dowry has not been paid? The Doctors in common say No, if it is the fault of the promiser that it has not been paid. So Sanchez, Bonacina, Bossius, the Salamanca Doctors, Fagundez, Trulenchius and others, saying that the object of the dowry is that the husband may keep his wife with it. Except, however, 1, if the husband married without a dowry being promised, and, 2, if the wife pays obedience to her husband, for then he is at least bound to keep her like a servant. So say the Salamanca Doctors, with Abbas, Lupo, &c., quoted by Sanchez. Sanchez, however, with Surdus and others, does not allow the second exception, because (as he says) the wife is bound

[1] L. iv. 352. [2] L. iv. 356.

to pay her husband both a dowry and obedience, and therefore it is not necessary for him to maintain her if she only pays obedience. But I rather adhere to the opposite opinion, because the law of nature itself teaches you to keep one who occupies himself in being your servant.'—L. vi. 939.

Still, he must take care how he behaves, for, since the conversion of his wife, the continuance of his marriage is entirely at the mercy of the neighbouring Roman Catholic Bishop—it may be, the very Director who arranges how the 1,000*l.* shall be bestowed in works of piety. It is no longer lawful for his wife to live with him except by the dispensation of the Bishop. The second of the four causes which justify divorce, *quoad vinculum* in Roman Theology, is the fact of one of the two being converted to the faith. On this head a question is asked, 'If the 'unbeliever will not be converted, but still wishes to live peace-'ably without wrong towards the Creator, may the faithful one 'separate from him not only *quoad torum* but also *quoad vincu-'lum?*'[1] To this three answers are given. The first absolutely in the negative, which is held by S. Paul; the second absolutely in the affirmative, which is held by Bellarmine:

'The third is the "more common and more probable" opinion, held by Sanchez, Concina, Pontius, Tournely, and others, which says that *in old days* the believing wife[2] might not go away from her husband and proceed to another marriage, unless there were danger of her perversion, because there was no cause for her leaving her unbelieving husband, for very many unbelievers were converted to the faith by miracles, which were then much more commonly worked by the faithful; *but now-a-days*, when so great a frequency of miracles has ceased, it is made unlawful to live with an unbelieving husband by the received custom of the Church, which has been introduced from experience having taught that there is no little risk of perversion from living with an unbeliever—except the Bishop gives a dispensation for living with him from probable hope of his conversion. We must however mark with S. Thomas, Concina, and Petrocorensis, that the marriage is not broken till the one who believes has left the other and proceeded to another marriage. And also that before the believing one contracts another marriage, she ought to warn the unbelieving one, to see if he will be converted to the faith, as Gregory XIII. and S. Pius V. commanded. Sanchez, however,

[1] It may suggest itself to our readers that the word *infidelis*, 'unbeliever,' here used, can mean only the heathen, and not be applicable to those whom Rome calls heretics as well. This, however, is not so. For not to mention that the contradictory to *infidelis* here employed is not *Christianus*, but *Catholicus*, and to put out of sight the fact that the Rev. F. W. Faber, in his Essay on Missions, has declared for himself and his co-religionists that it is a point of sound theology to hold all Englishmen not in communion with Rome, and all Protestants, to be 'infidels,' we have S. Alfonso's own definition of what he means by *infidelis*. '*Infidelitas*, or unbelief,' he says, 'is of three kinds. The first *negative*, of men who have never heard anything about the faith.... The second *contrary*, of those who despise or obstinately contradict the faith when it has been sufficiently brought before them, *as the heretics*. The third *privative*.... Unbelief termed *contrary* is also threefold, viz. Paganism.... Judaism.... Heresy.'—L. iii. 17.

[2] Or 'husband,' throughout.

says that this need not be done if it is certain that the unbeliever is obstinate, or if he is very far off. Croix notices that in case the unbelieving one cannot be warned, the Pontiff's dispensation is required, as, he says, the aforesaid Gregory XIII. has commanded.'—L. vi. 957.

Besides the four methods of divorce *quoad vinculum*—by death—by the conversion of one of the two—by entering a monastery within two months after marriage, and before consummation—by Papal dispensation under certain circumstances;—there are also six methods of divorce, *quoad torum*. The first is that which proceeds on our Lord's precept, 'unless it be for fornication.' The second is ill-treatment, which Liguori says has been introduced by the authority of the Church.[1] The third is 'if one entices the other to sin, for example, solicits her 'to become a heretic, to deal in witchcraft, &c.: for then the 'innocent one is allowed, nay, is bound to separate if the danger 'is serious.'[2] The fourth is a contagious disease, like leprosy.[3] The fifth, heresy or apostasy, arising after marriage, for 'a wife 'may go away from an heretical husband, though his heresy is 'secret, nay, she is bound to do so, if she is in danger of being 'perverted.'[4] The sixth is mutual consent.[5]

Liguori, in qualifying a liberty of dispensation with regard to marriage, allowed to the Pope by Busembaum, Sanchez, Bellarmine, Navarrus, the Salamanca Doctors, Cajetan, Vasquez, Bonacina, Rebellus, Becanus, &c., expresses a fear that if it were allowed, few marriages could stand firm.[6] We think that, with-

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[1] L. vi. 970. [2] L. vi. 973. [3] L. vi. 973.

[4] L. vi. 974. A marriage, however, originally contracted with a 'heretic,' is valid, though illicit. 'To contract a marriage with a heretic, though it is a thing unlawful in itself, and is held to be a mortal sin in Spain and Italy, is yet probably allowable, owing to the authority of grave doctors, in Germany, if there is a grave cause for it, with a *salvo*, however, for natural law, and provided that there is no danger either to the contracting party or to the children; settlements ought to be made at the beginning with regard to the children, that they should be brought up as Catholics.'—L. iii. 19. And again, 'Marriage with heretics is, generally speaking, forbidden by the Church, but it is very probable that where heretics and Catholics live mixed together, as in Germany, Poland, &c., it is allowable, from received and tolerated custom, to marry heretics, provided that, 1, the Catholic may freely remain in the faith; 2, there is no danger of perversion; 3, the children are allowed to be brought up as Catholics; 4, it is not easy to find a partner among Catholics. But if any one of these conditions is wanting, it is not allowable; as Croix rightly says.'—L. vi. 56. We find, too, that 'His Holiness Pope Benedict XIV. grieves over Catholics who do not from their soul abhor those detestable marriages which holy mother Church has always condemned.'—L. vi. 1044.

[5] L. vi. 975.

[6] 'But the second opinion says Yes, [*i. e.* that the Pope can free a *vinculo*, in the case of a marriage celebrated but not consummated,] and is held by Busembaum, Sanchez, Bellarmine, Navarras, the Salamanca Doctors, Cajetan, Vasquez, Concina, Bonacina, Rebellus, Becanus, &c., on the grounds that Pontiffs have made it customary by very often dispensing after a marriage has been celebrated, as Navarrus and Cajetan declare of their own knowledge, and also because the Chief Pontiff, as Christ's Vicar entrusted with the government of the Church, may very well dispense, when he has a good reason, even in things which are *de jure divino*, and

out this liberty, there are few which might not be overthrown by the ten methods of divorce enumerated above; the more as we find that there are twenty-one impediments of marriage, six only of which make it unlawful, but still valid; while the other fifteen make it absolutely null, *although it has been celebrated.*[1]

We now proceed to the rights of sons in stealing from their fathers:—

'Salaz says, in Croix, that a son's theft of *5l.* or *7l.* 10*s.* is not grave, if his father has 375*l.* a year; and Lugo does not find fault with this statement, if the father is not close, and if the son is grown up, and takes it for honest purposes. Lessius, Navarrus, and Filliuccius in Sporer, say that a son does not sin gravely in stealing 10*s.* or 15*s.* from a rich father. Bannez says, that for a grave theft by the son of a very rich father, at least 12*l.* 10*s.* is required; but Lugo and La Croix reject this, unless it were the son of a *principe*. Holzmann agrees in this; he says, too, that it is not grave to take 2*l.* 10*s.* from a very rich father. Navarrus, Soto, Layman, &c., allow that if a son is engaged in study, and his father sends him 25*l.*, the son may spend 1*l.* 5*s.* in honest recreations, on the presumed consent of his father.'—L. iv. 543.

'If the son, say, of a tradesman or an innkeeper, manages his father's goods, he may require his father to give him a salary as large as he would give to a man who was no relation; and if he cannot get it, or does not venture to ask for it, he may take it clandestinely. So, "with probability," Layman, Diana.'—*Ibid.*

Some of the other duties of parents and sons towards each other are given in the few next extracts:—

'Parents sin gravely if, without good reason, they expose their offspring in a hospital or in public places: but the child's being illegitimate is a good reason, as Layman, Diana, Henriquez, and the Salamanca Doctors say.... Hospitals of this kind are instituted for the assistance not only of the poor, but also of the rich in danger of disgrace; for then they are used to procure abortion, or kill their child, to avoid loss of character. Now, this is the evil which hospitals are intended to meet; nay, I say, they are erected rather for spurious children than for the poor, for the purpose of freeing the former

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concern human actions. And, as the afore-named authors say, a good reason would be *impotentia superveniens*, or scandal impending, or barrenness lately discovered, when the public good requires that children should be born. They add also disparity of condition, a contagious disease, dissensions being foreseen, and mutual consent; but Concina does not allow these last four reasons, and he is right, at least unless the necessity of the public good require their being acted on: for, otherwise, if they were admitted, few marriages could stand firm.'—L. vi. 959. This, it will be observed, is *quoad vinculum*, not only *quoad torum*.

[1] I. Ecclesiæ vetitum, II. necnon tempus feriarum,
III. Atque Catechismus, IV. Crimen, V. Sponsalia, VI. Votum,
Impediunt fieri, permittunt facta teneri.
I. Error, II. Conditio, III. Votum, IV. Cognatio, V. Crimen,
VI. Cultûs disparitas, VII. Vis, VIII. Ordo, IX. Ligamen, X. Honestas,
XI. Ætas, XII. Affinis, XIII. Si clandestinus, XIV. et Impos,
XV. Raptave sit mulier nec parti reddita tutæ,
Hæc socianda vetant connubia, *facta retractant.*—L. vi. 982, 1008.

from the danger of death, eternal and temporal, which they would be likely to undergo, through fear of disgrace, if the parents had to keep them of their own cost.'—L. iv. 336, 656.

'A father must support both his legitimate and illegitimate children. . . . And ecclesiastics may keep their spurious children out of their clerical revenue.'—L. iv. 336.

'A son sins gravely against reverence, if he despises his parents for being poor, and will not acknowledge them. But still, if he only outwardly dissembles his knowledge of them, and will not have them with him, for a good reason, Bonacina excuses him from grave sin so that he provides them with necessaries, because it is not reasonable for them to be unwilling that he should so act. Hence, "with probability," Azorius, Navarrus, Toletus, and Trulenchius, excuse the son who does this, from mortal sin, in the following cases:—1. If he would suffer grave harm. 2. If his parents bear the stigma of a disgraceful crime. 3. If he only outwardly dissembles, and has not inward contempt, because then the parents themselves are not supposed to be gravely or reasonably unwilling.'—L. iv. 334.

'Sporer says, absolutely, that if a son curses his parents, or mocks at them, he is not excused from mortal sin, whether he does it in their presence or their absence. I do not know how this author, who is moderate enough in his other opinions, and perhaps sometimes over-indulgent, could make this assertion so absolutely; for, as he confesses himself, and every one teaches, no harm is done to reverence or respect but by insult offered in a man's presence, or if it be in his absence, with the purpose of its coming to his knowledge. And besides, there is the argument which is used by very many grave Doctors, who say that sacrilege is not committed, and a Church is not polluted, by fornication in it, provided it be committed secretly, on the grounds which Coninchius gives, that due respect to a Church, like character, consists in the opinion of men; consequently, as men do not lose their character unless their crimes are made public, so the reverence of a holy place is not violated unless the crime is publicly known. However it may be about this opinion, (which is "quite probable," as the Salamanca Doctors say, though the opposite appears to me "more probable," because of the irreverence to God, who is specially present in a Church, and sees everything which is secret,) what I am concerned with is the reason which they bring forward; viz. that no harm is done to reverence but by an open manifestation of insult. How, then, can a son sin gravely when he curses his father without his knowing it, or mocks at him behind his back, inasmuch as, in that case, there is neither insult nor irreverence? And I think that the same is to be said, even though he does this before others. Still I do not deny that there is in it a sort of slight which is opposed to due filial reverence, and a special *malitia contra pietatem continentem*, but it does not reach to mortal sin, except in case the son cursed them with malevolent meaning or with great contempt; for example, if he should curse them in the presence of others, with the purpose of their carrying it to his parents, or supposing they would carry it.

'Now Viva, Elbel, Tamburini, Mazzotta, Bonacina, and others, say that a son sins gravely in cursing his parents, whether they are alive or dead. But the afore-named authors, with somewhat too great inconsiderateness, do not explain whether they speak of curses uttered with malevolent meaning or not. And yet it must be altogether understood that he does not sin gravely if he curses them without such design. And indeed Navarrus and Filliuccius, whom Bonacina cites for his doctrine, do understand it so; for Navarrus says that a son sins who curses his parent, *and means it*, whether his parent is dead or alive; but if he only curses them with his tongue, it

is no more than a venial offence. And this Filliuccius confirms in almost the same words.'—L. iv. 334.

We will now return to the case of the gentleman whose wife we have represented as acting upon the approved principles of Roman moral theology, and see how he would fare with his children.

The tariff by which sons are to steal from their fathers is as follows :—

	£.	*s.*	*d.*
The son of a rich nobleman may venially steal .	12	10	0
The son of a man worth 375*l.* a year, from 5*l.* to	7	10	0
The son of a very rich man	2	10	0
The son of a rich man from 10*s.* to	0	15	0

This does not seem a very fair scale of prices, but we must take it as it stands.

An English gentleman with 20,000*l.* per annum, whether noble or not, is, we need scarcely say, more than equal in position to an Italian *principe*. The sum, therefore, which each of his sons may steal from him without grave sin is 12*l.* 10*s.*, and the interval which we have seen must elapse between two acts of venial theft is two months. The whole sum, therefore, which each son may venially steal, in the course of the year, is 75*l.* If he has six or seven sons this will take away another 500*l.* per annum from his income, besides what is more precious than gold or silver, what cannot be counted by money, but which a father's feelings could appreciate, and a Christian's heart weep over.

But the father is now growing old, and he hands over the management of his estates to his eldest son. The right of claiming a salary, in such a case, is not confined to the sons of tradesmen and innkeepers, as might appear from the passage which we have extracted above. Any son may do so according to Navarrus, Lessius, Angelus, Lopez, Layman, and Busembaum, though Molina, Sanchez, and Croix think otherwise. Cardinal de Lugo and Liguori make a distinction, and say that the profits which the son makes belong to his father,[1] but that if the trouble to which he is put is very great, he may quite well ask for a salary. And according to the same Doctors, 'The son is not 'to be presumed to have given up his claim to his salary, if from 'reverence to his father he refuses to *ask* for it: in that case, 'however, he must subtract what he costs his father for his 'keep.'[2] The euphemistic method of expression here used is

[1] This, however, is only if he acts in his father's name; 'but,' say Lugo and Molina, 'the profits belong to *him* if he engages in business in his own name, *suppose that he has stolen the money from his father*, or the money was resting idle in his father's hands.'—Theol. Mor. l. iv. 488. 3.

[2] L. iv. 488. 3.

highly praiseworthy, but, as we have seen, it is in the analogous case of the tradesman's son expressed more plainly—*potest clam accipere*—'he may take it clandestinely.' Here, therefore, is the mysterious loss of several more hundreds to the gentleman whose unhappy fortunes we have been tracing.

The son's right of pretending not to know his father, and refusing openly to acknowledge him, would not be called into exercise in the present case: but the privilege of cursing him might. We have seen that S. Alfonso becomes almost eloquent in maintaining that it is only venial in him, provided he curses him behind his back. He may do it before other people, so that he does not do it with the purpose of its getting round to his father's ears. And, besides, it is not grave sin, unless he intends the imprecation which he utters really to take effect; otherwise, *si oretenus tantum maledixerit*, it is also venial. In like manner, in another passage, we are told that to curse the devil is seldom a mortal, and not often even a venial, sin.[1] That to use the words *Blood of God! Body of God!* in anger towards man, but without direct indignation against God, is not blasphemous[2]—that *God's Death! God's Wounds!* similarly used, and without scandal or circumstances which imply contempt, are serious instances of venial sins[3]—that it is only venial to utter an imprecation on a man, '*The devil seize you!*' so that it was not meant.[4] A long dissertation is introduced to prove that cursing the dead is not mortal, and Liguori utters a most earnest ejaculation 'that all Confessors and Preachers would anxiously take care to 'instruct rude people on that point!'[5] How soon this privilege of venially cursing their parents is allowed to children does not appear. In the *Praxis Confessarii*, the Confessor is desired to use the utmost affection and the sweetest manners possible to boys—*modos suaviores quantum fieri potest*—and then, after their confession, to inquire—1. Whether they have omitted telling anything from shame. 2. Whether they have blasphemed against the Saints or Saints' Days, or taken a lying oath.[6] 3. Whether they have omitted to hear Mass on festivals. 4. Whether they have been disobedient to their parents, or shown irreverence towards them, by mocking at them, or making long noses at them, or uttering abusive words and imprecations in their presence.[7] And it seems that for sons to call their parents to their faces drunkards, beasts, fools, robbers, wizards, scoundrels, is mortal; but that calling them old fellows, ignorants, stupids, &c., may be venial.[8]

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[1] L. iv. 129. [2] L. iv. 124. [3] L. iv. 128. [4] L. iv. 131. [5] L. iv. 130.

[6] Not, it will be observed, whether they have told a lie, but *an juraverint cum mendacio.*

[7] Prax. Conf. cap. vii. 90.

[8] Prax. Conf. cap. ii. 34. Another piece of advice in thus sweetly dealing with

The son, on the other hand, must recollect that he sins gravely 'if, without good reason, such as inequality of birth, ill-health, 'ugliness, stupidity, immorality, he will not marry the wife that 'his parent wishes, especially if quarrels would be so lulled, or 'the parents' necessities lightened.'[1] In case, however, that he wishes to enter Holy Orders, or to go into a Monastery, he is not to be so careful of their wishes, for, 'if he sees that his 'parents will unjustly hinder him, he will act most wisely by 'concealing the matter from them, and performing the divine 'will.'[2] 'Relatives must be altogether removed from a discus-'sion on a religious vocation, says S. Thomas, for on that matter 'relations are not friends, but enemies.'[3]

Our view of a Liguorian household must now conduct us to the kitchen department.

'Servants commit no sin if their master refuses them their just keep or wages, and they make secret compensation to themselves, provided that there is no other way of getting it, and they do not take more than is owed, and there is no fear of scandal, or other grave discomfort.'—L. iv. 349.

'In the same way Navarrus and Lessius teach that they may make themselves compensation out of their master's goods, if it cannot be otherwise obtained, for services which they have performed without being bound to do so, if they did them, not *gratis* and liberally, but intending to be paid.'—*Ibid.*

'May a servant who works without any settled wages ask for or secretly purloin *(occulte surripere)* his just pay, at least the lowest which is customary? *Distingue.* If it is the master's custom to pay servants like him, he may: not otherwise, when, for example, noblemen or bishops are asked to take boys into their household; for in that case it is enough for the master to give them board, clothing, and lodging, such being the custom.' —L. iv. 348.

'May a servant, more than three years after he has left his master, ask for his salary, and secretly make compensation to himself? Yes, say Sanchez, the Salamanca Doctors, Molina, Fagundez, Villalobos, and others.'—L. iv. 347.

'A man does not steal if he takes by way of just compensation, and cannot otherwise get what is due to him; *e.g.* if a servant cannot otherwise obtain just wages, or as been unfairly induced to undertake the place for an unfair price.'—L. iv. 521.

'But may a servant, being himself quite sure of the justice of his payment, make himself this compensation of his own private judgment? Croix, Cardenas, and Viva say No, professing that no servant, nor any one else

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boys is observable: 'Let the Confessor, too, take the greatest care to insinuate into boys' minds devotion towards the Mother of God, *(curet magnoperè pueris insinuare devotionem erga Deiparam)* and get them to recite the Rosary every day, and the *Ave* three times morning and evening, always adding this prayer, "My mother, free me from mortal sin!"'—Cap. vii. 91. Rome knows how to make use of the waxen youth of boys, and does make use of it unscrupulously.

[1] L. iv. 335. [2] L. iv. 335. [3] Hom. Apost. xiii. 24.

employed for money, ought to make himself compensation, except upon the "most common judgment" of men who are skilled, or of a man very learned or engaged on Morality; and so they say that the judgment of a Confessor of but ordinary learning is not enough. But the Salamanca Doctors say, that a servant may, of his own private judgment, make himself compensation for his work, if his judgment is clear that he deserves higher pay. And this appears "quite probable" to me and other learned moderns, if a servant or person employed is a prudent man, cautious *(timoratus)*, and really fit to judge right, and is quite sure of the justice of the compensation without any danger of hallucination. But this is very seldom the case. And the 37th proposition condemned by Innocent XI. is no obstacle, for that proposition was rightly condemned because it spoke in too general terms.'—L. iv. 524.

Once again we find Innocent XI. attempting to put a stop to all this, and once more we find him foiled in his Jansenism.

'Mark here,' says Liguori, 'the proposition condemned by Innocent XI., which said "Domestic men-servants and maid-servants may secretly pilfer from their masters, to make compensation to themselves for their work, which they think is more than they need do for the wages which they receive.'"—L. iv. 522.

Observe, now, the way in which the Jansenistical Pope's condemnation is treated by the Casuists:

'The Salamanca Doctors, and others, speaking of this condemned proposition, say, 1. That a servant can *not* afterwards make himself compensation if he makes his bargain freely with his master for a lower sum, without necessity; *but* that he is not forbidden to do so, if he agrees on wages considerably less than are just, from necessity; namely, to lighten his own distress. The reason is that Pontifical decrees do not mean to bind a servant contrary to justice.'—L. iv. 522.

Do these writers really believe in the authority which, when it suits them, they are pleased to make so much of, and which it is an almost ruled point of faith to call infallible?[1] It cannot be. See the way in which they argue here. If the Papal

[1] About the infallibility of the Pope there are more opinions than one. The first is that of Luther and Calvin, who heretically teach that the Pope *is fallible*, though he speaks as universal doctor, and even with a council. The second, which Albert Pighius maintains, is the direct contrary to this, that the Pope *cannot err*, though speaking in his private capacity. The third is that of some who teach that the Pope *is fallible without a council*. This opinion was embraced by the Gallican clergy in 1682....The fourth, which is the "common opinion," and the one to which we subscribe, is that though the Roman Pontiff, as an individual, or a private doctor, can err (just as he is also fallible in questions of mere fact, which chiefly depend on human testimony); yet when the Pope speaks as the universal doctor defining *ex cathedrâ*, that is, from the supreme power given to Peter of teaching the Church, then we say that he is altogether *infallible* in deciding controversies of faith and morals.... The Doctors infer that this opinion of ours is at least next to being a matter of faith, and the contrary, as Bellarmine says, seems altogether erroneous, and next to being heresy.... Our doctrine that the dogmatic decrees of the Pontiff are infallible.... Our opinion of the infallibility of the Pontifical definitions.'—Dissertatio de Rom. Pont. Auctor. Theol. Mor. l. i. 110.

decree meant what it clearly does mean, it would be unjust: therefore it *cannot* mean what it clearly does mean: therefore it *does not* mean what it clearly does mean: therefore it means something different from what it clearly does mean. What is it that it does mean? *We* will interpret it by introducing proper limitations and qualifications, and we are the Salamanca Doctors, and Viva, Lessius, Suarez, Molina, &c. with Liguori. Thus they appeal from infallibility to themselves.[2] La Croix, however, will not go with his brethren:

'Croix says that a servant may not purloin anything at all after he has made a bargain, because then he has given up his right; but it is answered, that when a servant is forced by his poverty to make such terms, he does not give up his right voluntarily, but upon compulsion; and so *his* poverty cannot excuse the master from not paying at least the lowest wages. But when a servant is compelled by necessity to agree for a small sum, he may make himself compensation up to the lowest sum usual. So says Viva, with Lessius, Suarez, Molina, Decian, and others, with (as he says) the "most common opinion." This, however, does not hold if the master has already *justly* found other servants for the same small sum, or if the servant offered himself, and the master was only employing him through kindness, on account of his indigence.'—L. iv. 522.

Croix is thus silenced: but the whole of its force has not yet been extracted from Innocent's decree; so there is a second dictum of the *Salmanticences* respecting it:

'The Salamanca Doctors say, 2. That if a servant of his own free choice, does more that his work, he may *not* purloin anything, because he is then supposed to give his labour for the sake of ingratiating himself with his master; *but* he may purloin if he does more than his work by his master's wish, whether expressed or tacit, for then the rule is to be observed, that the labourer is worthy of his hire. So the Salamanca Doctors, Molina, Soto, Villalobos, Navarrus, Diana, Fagundez, Bassæus, Corrella, Filguera, Torrecilla, Lastra, and Hozes; and Croix agrees.'—L. iv. 523.

The country gentleman of 20,000*l.* a-year has, as we have seen, suffered serious losses in the character of husband and father. Now he must make up his mind to undergo many

[2] There are fifteen canons, or rules how to make use of Pontifical decrees, appended to the *Theologia*. The example given to illustrate the thirteenth is as follows:—Sixtus V. issued a bull named *Detestabilis*, and condemned the method of contract called *trinus contractus*. But 'Cardinal Toletus, and Cardinal S. Severina, who were entrusted by Sixtus V. with the drawing up of the law or bull *Detestabilis*, told Father Stephen Tuccius, a Theologian of the Society of Jesus, that Sixtus did not wish any contracts to be forbidden by his law except what were unjust. Consequently all the contracts which were just before his law was passed, (and many say that the *trinus contractus* was so) were just after it, as the learned Comitolus writes in his Moral Replies, lib. iii. qu. 12. n. 3.'—Dissertatio de Rom. Pont. Decretis, vol. vi. p. 210. There is a mighty war waged in the fourth book of the *Theologia* about this *trine contract*. On one side there are three Popes, Sixtus V., Benedict XIV., and Pius V., supported by twelve Doctors; on the other side twenty-two Doctors, supported by the opinions of the Universities and theological faculties of Cologne, Trèves, Alcalá, Salamanca, Ingoldstadt, Freiburg, and Mentz. The twenty-two Doctors and the seven Universities carry the day against the three Popes and the twelve Doctors; and Pope Sixtus gets treated with the utmost contumely, each Doctor having a better reason than the last for throwing overboard his *Bulla Detestabilis*.—L. iv. 908.

more in his character of master. It is true they will not be individually so large in amount, but there will be many more of them, for he doubtless has a large establishment. Nor is the privilege of compensation confined to household servants; it is allowed to every one employed by him on his estates, or in his business—*quicunque alius mercenarius*. Here, too, there is not even the check of purloining being venial sin, which in the case of the sons, at least, there was. We cannot venture to calculate the amount of loss which he will have to suffer, because we cannot tell the nature of his occupations, and consequently how many men and women he has in his employment. We will take the case of one from which a guess may be made with regard to the others. A footman has been hired for 25*l.* He considers this notably less than what is just, and that he ought to have 35*l.*, which, in such a household as his master's, is the very lowest sum which a footman of his qualifications ought to receive. However, if he had not taken the place he would have been very likely to have found a difficulty in getting another, and he was too poor to live without one; so he could not help it; he was forced to take what his master offered him, he accepted the terms, and held his tongue. But by having made this bargain with his master for 25*l.* he had not given up his claim to 35*l.* He determines that he will make up the other 10*l.* by secret compensation. But who is to be judge if he really deserves 35*l.* a year? It must be either a Moral Theologian or himself; and to know whether he may decide for himself, he is to ask himself two questions. Is he sure of the justice of the compensation without any risk of hallucination? Is he a prudent man, cautious, and really fit to judge right? He has no difficulty in answering these two questions in the affirmative, and now he is perfectly justified in secretly appropriating 10*l.*, so that he takes care to avoid scandal and annoyance in doing so. The case of John d'Alba is perfectly borne out.

We have also here found a key to an occurrence which took place to ourselves and a companion at Florence in the year 1849. After having stayed for some days at the hotel, we determined on taking lodgings for a fortnight. We accordingly examined some houses which were to be let, and after a time found one which would suit us in all respects. Being at that time in blissful ignorance of the theory of Compensation—(we had not then begun our studies of S. Alfonso)—we were agreeably surprised to find that the price was lower than that of the other apartments which we had been looking at. We took up our quarters in the lodgings, and were made sufficiently comfortable. At the end of the fortnight we looked over our clothes and other goods, which had not been kept under lock and key, preparatory to our departure. To our dismay we found very serious and consider-

able losses in the clothes department. We were led to make a vigorous investigation of the house, and from different odd corners, holes, shelves, and drawers, we drew forth several missing waistcoats, shirts, and other articles of dress: especially we recollect raising ourselves by the help of a chair to a lofty shelf, from the far recesses of which we extracted several pairs of socks which we threw down from our elevation to our companion. Having recovered as much of our property as we were able, we summoned the *Padrone*, demanded the rest of our goods, and told him in pretty plain language that he was a dishonest man. The *Padrone* was horror-struck; he vowed he had never *stolen* anything in his life, and burst into sobs at the imputation. Seeing that we were not melted, he hastily left the room, and sent in his wife. The lady's nerves were more overcome than her husband's. She burst into floods of tears—so many years she had let lodgings, and never, never before was such a charge brought against her house: she protested by all that was saintly that she had *stolen* nothing. 'Perjury added to 'theft,' said we grimly to each other in English: nor was the severity of our faces relaxed, except after she had declaimed for half-an-hour or so by an occasional yawn, till she left the room, still vowing that nothing had been *stolen*. Now in our simplicity we thought that she and her husband were guilty of petty larceny, and of lying to boot. But had we been acquainted with S. Alfonso de' Liguori's Moral Theology, we should have judged them less hardly. From the little facts which came under our notice, we drew the conclusion that they had stolen our goods; whereas we now see that the conclusion which we ought to have drawn was that they had good heads for arguing by analogy—a thing in itself admirable and praiseworthy. They knew, from their attendance at the confessional, that household servants might compensate themselves, in the way explained above, if they had wages lower than their services deserved, and they knew that tailors, tradesmen, &c. were justified in purloining little pieces of cloth, using short measures, &c. 'if they would otherwise make no profits, or if they ought to raise their price, and 'then would not find customers.' (L. iv. 533.) Being gifted with reasoning powers, they inferred that as they had let their apartments at a lower rate than their neighbours, and as they 'ought' to have raised their price, but very likely would not, they thought, have then found lodgers, they were fairly entitled to make up their profits by secret compensation. This they accordingly did; and it was difficult for them perhaps to settle the amount of compensation due to them. It would depend upon the abstract value which they put upon their lodgings totally apart from their bargain with us. We believe that they must have placed a high price upon them in their own minds,

for after all the recoveries which we succeeded in making, our Journal-book still relates the loss of many articles of dress which might have continued with us throughout our travels in Italy, had we known the Theory of Secret Compensation, and been accordingly upon our guard.

But further—to return to the country gentleman's household—as there is a large number of servants in the house, the footman's place is not very heavy. This being so, he does more than his regular work, more than he is bound to do by his place, and this he does, not *gratis*, or liberally, but intending to be paid for it. Then, say Navarrus and Lessius, he may secretly take so much more as he thinks will recompense him for this extra labour. And if his master has appeared to him to exhibit a tacit desire that he should perform these supererogatory tasks, it is the universal opinion of the Doctors that he may proportionably purloin, on the principle that the labourer is worthy of his hire. How much hire his labour is worth he again decides for himself, or his Director settles for him. Perhaps we may fix this at another 5*l.*, though we doubt if the footman would be so moderate.

He has still a further right of purloining:—

'Though servants sin gravely in carrying eatables and drinkables out of the house and selling them, they are more easily excused (in the same way that monks are) for what they consume themselves at home; for then the master or the prelate is often only unwilling with regard to the secret manner of taking, not with regard to the appropriation itself. Yet it might be feared that he would be unwilling if things extraordinary were taken.—Layman, Escobar, and Lessius. The latter teaches that very little thefts of servants out of eatables which are not generally locked up, do not unite so as to become grave matter, if what is stolen is not taken to sell, but only to eat. So, too, Cajetan, Navarrus, Bannez, Moya, and Sanchez in Croix. But Sporer rightly does not admit this last point, if the quantity is large.—L. iv. 545.

So, if they are not kept locked up, the footman may drink his master's champagne and claret—or, supposing him very conscientious, he may perhaps confine himself to the port and sherry; and all the eatables, from the store-room to the larder, are at the mercy of the respective servants who have to do with them. This again will be a serious expense to the master of the house, particularly, as in spite of Sporer,[1] however much is thus consumed in the end, the small quantities stolen at several times cannot coalesce into one notable quantity, and so there can be no grave sin.

Alas for the dignity, the uprightness, the purity, the confidence of homes, when such principles as these come into

[1] 'We have said in the First Book, and we shall say more at length in the Sixth Book, that if a Penitent has a probable opinion on his side, he cannot be refused absolution; and this is "commonly" taught.' So if the confessor recom-

vogue! We have been calculating the money losses of the master of the house; but we trust that our readers have seen that it has been in a sort of εἰρωνεία that we have confined ourselves to this point. What are money losses as compared to all the other far more precious losses which he would have to suffer? Where could be the husband's reposing trust in the assured affection of the wife of his bosom? Where could be the respectful and tender confidence between father and son? Where the guileless frankness between brother and sister? Where the unhesitating trust in the old servant's, or retainer's, honesty and faithfulness? They could not but wither and utterly perish. Englishmen do not sufficiently realize the blessings of an English home. Whether it be the Elizabethan mansion surrounded by its ancestral trees, or the humbler parsonage, or the old farm-house, or the cottage—*home and home relations* are essentially English. Nowhere else is found that union of liberty and restraint among the younger members, of combined respect and love towards the head of the house, of confidence and frankness among all. The English Church is essentially domestic. She strengthens the ties of home, sanctifies them, and works through them. Rome cuts away home influences in her love of centralization, and substitutes that of the Director. The husband, father, and master, is no longer the head of the house, around which the thoughts and feelings of the family are grouped. An extraneous mind is the ruling power. He who ought to be the rightful authority feels that he is so no longer; there is a shadow between him and his: confidence is not given, and, therefore, he does not give it. He feels himself no longer the centre of the household. He knows not why, or, if he does know, his religious principles forbid him to apply a remedy,—he acquiesces and betakes himself to the Café. Such books as Michelet's 'Priests, Women, and Families'—embittered, maddened, frenzied, as they are—would not have been written without some cause.

Look at what a home ought to be, its confidence, its love, its reverence, and its dignity; and then look at the picture as drawn by Liguori, of a household free from all but venial sin,[1] —the wife pilfering from her husband, appropriating a large percentage of his income, and taking care that he should not

mends Sporer's doctrine, the penitent has only to quote Lessius or Cajetan, and then he may *demand* absolution. 'After having confessed his sins, the penitent has a definite right to absolution, and it may not be denied him, unless he is otherwise indisposed, and he cannot be called indisposed for not following the confessor's opinion, for it does not belong to the latter to reject opinions which other wise men approve of.'—L. iv. 669.

[1] We must again remind our readers that venial sins do not diminish God's love towards the agent, (Hom. Apost. iii. 66,) not though he determines to commit every venial sin that has been, is, or will be. (Theol. Mor. l. v. 12.)

find it out, maintaining her relations out of his goods, in spite of his prohibition, secretly subtracting one thing and another thing, and being justified in all by her Director: children stealing periodically, cursing and mocking at their parents behind their backs; refusing to acknowledge or to recognise them, if they are ashamed of them; taught to conceal their purpose of entering into Holy Orders, or the Monastic life, from them as from enemies, but, with a curious inconsistency, required, though not absolutely bound, if they marry, to marry whom their parents bid them: daughters, as we find from the same authority, not allowed to be taught to read by a man, and scarcely by quite a little brother;[1] warned against having their hair done by a male hair-dresser;[2] not trusted to go to church by themselves, or to stay long in church without their parents' supervision;[3] not allowed to receive more than one, or at most two visits from their betrothed, and that for the most degrading of all reasons;[4] and lastly, servants pilfering to recompense themselves for having too low wages; pilfering to recompense themselves for extra work which they do; pilfering all the eatables and drinkables which are not kept locked up. Who would not take refuge in Cafés and places of public resort, in which gentlemen in foreign countries spend so much of their time, out of such a place as this, to which the name of *home* can be scarcely applied except in mockery? We will transcribe a few lines of Mr. Martin Tupper's 'Proverbial Philosophy' by way of contrast:—

'My soul was sickened within me, so I sought the dwelling-place of Joy;
And I met it not in laughter; I found it not in wealth or power;
But I saw it in the pleasant home where religion smiled upon content,
And the satisfied ambition of the heart rejoiced in the favour of its God.
* * * *
His love is pure and single, sincere, and knoweth not change;
For his manhood has been blessed with the pleasant choice of his youth:
Behold his one beloved; she leaneth on his arm,
And he looketh on the years that are past to review the dawn of her affection.
Behold his little ones around him; they bask in the warmth of his smile;
And infant innocence and joy lighten their happy faces;
He is holy, and they honour him; he is loving, and they love him;
He is consistent, and they esteem him; he is firm, and they fear him.
His friends are the excellent among men; and the bands of their friendship are strong;
His house is the palace of peace: for the Prince of Peace is there.
As the wearied man to his couch, as the thoughtful man to his musings,
Even so from the bustle of life he goeth to his well-ordered home.
* * * *
Man, the noble and intelligent, gladdeneth earth in beauty,
And woman's beauty sunneth him, as with a smile from heaven.'[5]

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[1] Prax. Conf. Cap. viii. 101. [2] Ibid. iii. 62. [3] Ibid. vii. 101. [4] Ibid. iv. 64.
[5] Proverbial Philosophy. On Joy and on Beauty.

It may be thought that in picturing a Liguorian *home*, free from all but venial sin in thieving and other respects, we have made a somewhat unfair selection: our readers may think that the Church of Rome is notoriously unfavourable to the domestic relations, but that, at any rate, there would not be this permission to purloin, and this general laxity, in a state which she specially approves, and stamps with the title of the Religious life. We will make a few extracts on this point from the *Homo Apostolicus*:—

'It is doubted what quantity is grave for a monk to spend without leave? Some say that the same decision should be come to about the thefts of monks relatively to their monastery, as about the thefts of sons relatively to their parents. But Sanchez and Lugo are right in not admitting this, because sons are capable of possessing, and monks are not; and also Prelates are more unwilling in the case of their monks thieving than parents in that of their sons. The Doctors, however, say in common, that a greater quantity is required for a monk's thefts out of the monastery's goods to be grave, than in the case of other thefts. Opinions differ as to what it should be. Azorius, Navarrus, Castropalao, Sanchez, &c. fix on 1*l.* for grave matter, and rather more when the convent is rich; but this seems too indulgent. Soto and Rodriguez fix on 10*s.* as grave matter, and Croix counts this certain. Lugo thinks that 2*s.* 6*d.* is grave matter, and 3*s.* 4*d.* if the monastery is rich, even though the monk takes it from the portion assigned to his own use; but supposing he gave it to other monks belonging to the monastery, he extends the sum to 1*l.* 5*s.*, provided that it is not in actual money. Sanchez, Bonacina, the Salamanca Doctors, &c. allow that it is no grave fault to take eatables at many different times, and in light matter, though afterwards they reach to grave matter, as Prelates are presumed not to be gravely unwilling, provided (as they limit it) that the damage done to the convent is not great, and the things are not precious.'—*Hom. Apost.* xiii. 10.

The principle is the same in the *Theologia Moralis*, but there is a difference in some particulars. The sums there fixed for grave matter are (1) 1*s.* 8*d.*; (2) more than 1*s.* 8*d.* provided that the convent be rich; (3) still more than that if it is not money, but clothes, books, &c.; (4) 2*s.* 11*d.* if taken from what is destined for himself; (5) or 3*s.* 4*d.*; (6) more than that if purloined for his own use; (7) 2*s.* 6*d.* if purloined from the common goods of the monastery, and given to strangers; (8) 3*s.* 4*d.* if taken *ex rebus quæ usu non consumuntur*, provided it is only done once or twice a-year; (9) or 3*s.* 9*d.*; (10) 10*s.*; (11) the same sum which sons are allowed to steal, 'for monks stealing what 'would in ordinary cases be grave matter, commit no sin against 'justice, but only against their vow of poverty, unless the theft 'causes grave damage to the monastery;' (12) 5*s.* if taken from what is allowed for his use, and given to a brother-monk; (13) or even 8*s.* 4*d.*; (14) more than 1*l.* 5*s.* if not actually money; (15) still more than that if coming from extraneous persons to give to others. Thefts of small amount do not coalesce so as to become grave if there is a long interval between them: and a

'long interval' is interpreted by Sanchez to mean a year, by the Salamanca Doctors, Filliuccius, Diana, Garcias, and Antony of the Holy Ghost, to mean a month.[1]

We are anxious that we should not make things appear worse than they really are; we desire, therefore, to call the attention of our readers to the fact that in this passage the word theft implies something a little different from that which we generally understand by it. The notion which we generally have of theft is secret appropriation for personal gratification. Here it does not always mean that the thing appropriated is consumed in personal gratification: it may be given away to others, or spent upon self: and it may be taken from the common goods of the monastery, or from the goods assigned to the monk's own use. In the last case the chief feature of the act is that of disobedience, because it is a thing forbidden by the laws of the community, to the control of which the individual has submitted himself; it does, however, likewise involve secret appropriation, because he has no right to more than that which is sufficient for his personal support, according to the rules of the Society: and if that which he purloins is anything of the nature of clothes, or of a fixture with which the monastery had supplied him, it will become necessary for the monastery to replace it. Still we should not brand it with the title of theft in the harshest sense of that word. But whenever the sum taken is purloined from the general goods of the monastery, the pilferer is then directly guilty of theft:—theft more excusable, if what is taken is given away to others; theft less excusable if retained for himself. The tariff by which monks are to steal, varies according to these differences. The sums fixed are the following:

According to some Doctors	£0	1	8[2]
According to other Doctors	0	2	6
According to other Doctors	0	2	11
According to other Doctors	0	3	4
According to other Doctors	0	3	9
According to other Doctors	0	5	0
According to other Doctors	0	8	4
According to other Doctors	0	10	0
According to other Doctors	1	0	0
According to other Doctors	1	5	0

[1] Theol. Mor. v. 24, 25.

[2] We have considerable doubts whether there is not a misprint of *argentei* for *aurei* in the *Theologia Moralis*, and that instead of 1*s.* 8*d.* it ought to be 1*l.*; for the same authors (Navarrus, Azorius, &c.) are quoted in the *Homo Apostolicus* for the latter sum who are set down in the former as authorizing only the less liberal amount. It is a thing which should be looked to; for it would be a serious hardship on a monk to confine him to stealing 1*s.* 7¾*d.* a-month, when he might have stolen 19*s.* 11¾*d.* a-month, if it had not been for a misprint.

The vow of poverty, which was referred to above in the passage taken from the *Theologia Moralis*, and which, if honestly observed, would make it impossible for monks to give away anything not supplied to them for the purpose, except by first stealing it, is one of the three vows essential to the monastic life; the others being those of chastity and obedience. 'By the vow of poverty,' says the *Theologia Moralis*, 'the monk is bound to have nothing of 'his own; that is, no temporal goods which can be valued at a 'price; the ownership of these things, or, at least, the free and 'independent disposition of them, he has given up for ever.' 'By the vow of poverty,' says the *Homo Apostolicus*, 'monks 'are forbidden to possess or to dispose of anything whatsoever 'which can be valued by money.' This appears strict and self-denying. Now mark the exceptions:—

'It is not contrary to the vow of poverty, 1, *to possess goods in common*, as S. Thomas teaches, and as it is expressly allowed by the Council of Trent. It is not contrary to the vow of poverty, 2, *to possess private property*, or a maintenance, which monks in many Orders keep with the Prelate's licence; because, though according to the Council of Trent it does not seem possible to doubt that this is forbidden, since it is there said, "Let none be allowed to possess goods, moveables, or fixtures, even in the name of the convent:" nevertheless, the custom which has now become almost universal, and is tolerated by the Holy See, *does* make it allowable to have private property, for necessary and honest uses, with the permission of the Superiors, provided that the monk is ready to give it up at the Prelate's nod; for the vow of poverty, though it cannot be abrogated in substance, yet (as the Doctors agree) can be changed as to its manner, according to custom, which is presumed to be right when practised by scrupulous monks, and tolerated by Superiors, who know what goes on, and do not forbid it, when they easily might.'—*Hom. Apost.* xiii. 6.

Thus we learn that custom is superior in authority to Church law and to the Decrees of Councils, and that a monk is still considered to keep his oath of possessing nothing, though he possesses things (1) in common with others, (2) in private by himself. We learn from the same chapter that Clement VIII. and Urban VIII. issued Bulls forbidding monks to make any gifts: but 'many doctors quoted by those of Salamanca, say 'that Clement's Bull has not been received, or at least has 'become obsolete, and, therefore, does not bind; and others 'have said the same of Urban's. Liguori, however, thinks that this cannot be maintained, and goes off to the question of grave and light matter,—for, of course, if they give a small quantity, they make no grave transgressions of the Bulls: how much that quantity may be, depends, he says, on 'the approved 'custom, according as the aforesaid Bulls have been received 'in any of the Orders.'[1] Again, we learn that 'Monks commit 'no sin in not observing their primitive rule after a contrary use

[1] Hom. Apost. xiii. 24.

'has been introduced.'[1] Elsewhere we find, on the same authority, that monks may go out hunting two or three times a-year, provided they can do so without giving scandal, or making a great deal of noise;[2] and it is laid down as a rule, that supposing each monk has 25*l.* a-year, he may stake 1*l.* 5*s.* every year on games of cards, &c.[3] There may be some room left for observance of the vow of poverty and strict self-denial, and we doubt not that a man who was in earnest would find it, like, for example, S. John of the Cross;[4] but we cannot be surprised to learn, still on S. Alfonso's authority, that one motive which frequently induces men to enter monasteries, and against which Confessors are desired to be on their guard, is 'the desire of spending a more comfortable life'—*vitam agendi commodiorem.*[5] Nor can one be greatly astonished at finding that it is his deliberate opinion that 'the majority of nuns *(major harum pars)* 'enter their nunneries not by the calling of God, but by the 'urgency of their parents, and hence it is that they afterwards 'lead there a life of restlessness, and introduce laxities into the

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[1] Hom. Apost. xiii. 17. [2] Ibid. x. 72.

[3] 'How great a sum may a monk stake on a game? Sporer thinks that if the game is not specially forbidden by his Rule, he may stake three florins a-year. But others, as Lugo, Elbel, Sanchez, Navarrus, Gregory of Valentia, Jacobus de Graffiis, Salonius, Molina, &c. think, "with probability," that if a monk has 25*l.* a-year, he may stake 1*l.* 5*s.*, provided that he has not spent as much during the same year on other unnecessary uses. Others, again, as the Salamanca Doctors, Lugo, Molina, Azorius, &c. say that he may stake as much as he can save by spare living out of the things assigned to his use.'—Theol. Mor. l. iv. 901. This is not a very high motive for a monk's living sparely.

[4] S. Juan de la Cruz was, under S. Teresa's auspices, the great reformer of the Carmelite Order. The Breviary's account of him is short: *Severioris disciplinæ et arctioris vitæ cupidissimus, primitivam Ordinis Regulam* ex Superioris licentiâ *professus est.* It tells us, too, that *strictioris disciplinæ promovendæ ardore accensus*, he was divinely given to S. Teresa, as her assistant in restoring the observance of the original Rules; and that finally, after great trials, and worn out by sickness, he fell asleep in the 49th year of his age. His Spanish biographer enters into further details, and shows us what the 'Superior's licence' means, and what was the cause of his toils and sickness. The convent into which he entered was one where the rules were, as usual, not observed, and the young monk resolved upon keeping them. At first he was scorned for his Puritanism; then he was persecuted. He was shut up in the *carcel*, or prison of the monastery, a small dark room, admitting light only by an opening in the door: from hence he was brought out, and scourged before all the brethren, at first every day, afterwards every Friday. At last he determined to escape; he broke out of his prison, and let himself down from the convent wall by a rope, assisted, as his biographer says, by *la Virgen Santisima.* For a time he was in danger of being retaken, but, after a while, he settled himself at a distance, and lived alone and unmolested. Others came and joined him, and S. Teresa suggested to him to found a new monastery on the old rule. She furnished him with money obtained from the nunneries under her control, procured him licences from Rome, and, under her direction, he carried out the desired reform. But it was to the sufferings which he had to undergo in his original monastery, that his biographer (in his Life prefixed to the folio edition of his Works, and published by authority) attributes the ruin of his health, to which the Breviary refers.

[5] Prax. Conf. cap. vii. 92.

'community to the common detriment.'[1] And supposing this laxity to have crept in, we do not see how it is easily to be weeded out again, for it seems that liberty of lying—we beg pardon, of covering the truth by means of words—is granted to nuns, even when subject to their Bishop's visitation:—

'It is to be noted that nuns being interrogated by the Bishop or the Prelate of the Order in the act of Visitation, are bound to discover the truth about the observance of the rule, as De Alessandro and Texeda say, even though the transgressions be light, because the relaxation of the whole rule generally begins from them.'

Bravely spoken! But now for the exceptions. Could there be one nun who would not be excused?

'Lezana and Alessandro, however, excuse nuns from telling the truth, 1. If the crime is amended: hence they infer that no one is bound to lay open another's crime committed some years since, say three years, as Mascardus thinks: and for the same reason reproof is generally to be used before denunciation. 2. Nuns are excused from telling the truth if the crime is concealed, and there is no scandal or clear proof. 3. If they are sure that the Prelate will apply no remedy; or if they know that other nuns, from whom they heard of the crime themselves, have denounced it, for no one is bound to do a useless work. 4. If telling it has a tendency to do harm to themselves. 5. If the crime is known under the obligation of a natural secret, except, however, it is productive of common damage.'—*Theol. Mor.* l. v. 57.

We have lingered so long over Liguori's Theory of Theft, and of Domestic and Monastic Economy, that we have no space left for the Theory of Restitution of what is stolen. We will extract one passage from the *Praxis Confessarii*:—

'If the theft is uncertain,—*i.e.* if it is not known who the person is to whom the damage is done—the penitent is to be bound to make restitution for the purpose of having Masses celebrated, or giving alms to the poor, or making gifts to holy places, and, *if he is poor himself, he may apply it to himself, or to his family.*'—Cap. ii. 44.

For example, Pius V. decreed that, if incumbents did not say divine office, they should make restitution of a certain part of the fruits or income of the benefice: but he did not say to whom the restitution was to be made. The Casuists apply the omission:—

'It is to be given to the poor, or the Church, or to be spent on the parsonage house, or in improving the parsonage lands. And under the name of the poor come all poor people, wherever they live, and the dead, too, are meant by it. And the incumbent himself, also, may apply the said fruits to his own relief, if he is really poor, as Palao, Navarrus, Suarez, Bonacina, Toletus, Viva, and Lessius say, in accordance with the "common opinion." Except, however, he purposely omits office, knowing that

[1] Hom. Apost. vii. 61.

he may keep the fruits because he is a poor man, as Palao and Viva rightly notice.'—L. iv. 672.

And again:—

'You are excused from making restitution of things, the owner of which is uncertain, if you have made composition with the Bishop or the Pope; and also in case you are bound to restore something to the poor, and being yourself really in want, you give it to yourself—*tibi ipsi eam des*; and in this latter case, though you afterwards become richer, still you are not bound to make restitution.'—L. iv. 696.

Deridet, says Cicero, speaking of one of Verres' iniquitous tricks, *quum sibi ipsum jubet satisdare Rabonium.* What would he have said to a man stealing first, and then conscientiously making restitution—*to himself?* But Cicero was a heathen, and had not the approbation of infallibility.

We have now shown at length the authorized teaching of Rome on two most important branches of Morals—on Truthfulness and Falsehood, and on Honesty and Stealing. We appeal to the unprejudiced conscience, if on these points she is indeed the high-principled, strict, unbending, religious moralist, which her advocates have represented her to be, when they have been dealing with earnest and enthusiastic minds, and it has therefore suited their purpose so to represent her. The theory of the English Church and of the Primitive Church, on the subject of Equivocation, we have shown to be the direct contradictory of that which she holds, inasmuch as England and Antiquity alike inculcate Truthfulness, and Rome justifies Deceit. With regard to theft we have no *theory*—we have a *precept*, 'Thou shalt not steal;' and the expansion of that precept by our Theologians has been for the purpose of showing how we may keep it in the spirit and in the letter, not how we may break it in the spirit while we may keep it in the letter. Anglican moralists do not frame definitions excluding what ought to be included, and then argue from their definitions. They do not employ their ingenuity in teaching how to lie without lying, how to steal without stealing, how to sin without sinning. On the subject of thieving, the Church herself explains in her Catechism what she understands by the Divine command, 'Thou shalt not steal.' The lessons which she draws from it are two, one positive and the other negative; and these she puts into the mouth of each one of her children. They are, 1. To be true and just in all my dealings. 2. To keep my hands from picking and stealing. And these two lessons are still further enforced by her Divines. Take Bishop Nicholson, for example. He writes:—

'Man may have a just title to somewhat which he may call his own, whether his title ariseth by just acquisition, inheritance, by gift or donation,

or by contract. And it is the purpose of God here to secure *suum cuique*, every man in his own estate, setting a hedge and a fence about his goods, by an eternal law of commutative justice, that no man dare to break over, or rush upon, what is his, without an apparent injury and an affront done to God. This being the end, (1.) *Here is commanded*, 1. That every man be content with his estate, and to have moderate desires. 2. To preserve our neighbour's goods, and to suffer every man to enjoy his own quietly and fairly. 3. To give and pay every man his due, and injure no man. 4. To use justice in all our dealings, contracts, bargains. 5. To be frugal, and not to spend above our estates. 6. To use honest means to get a livelihood, viz. prayer and labour. 7. To use our goods to benefit others justly, liberally, cheerfully. 8. That we restore what is unjustly gotten or detained. (2.) *Here is forbidden*, 1. Injustice, violence, oppression. 2. Covetousness, and hoarding up all that comes in. 3. Tenacity, or the niggard's hand. 4. Contentiousness, and vexatious lawsuits. 5. Immoderate care and solicitude. 6. Deceit, fraud, circumvention in bargaining, contracts, buying, selling. 7. Picking and stealing, or secret purloinings. 8. Open robbery, violence, plundering, and rapacity. 9. False weights and measures. 10. Sacrilege: to detain tithes, tribute, custom. 11. To borrow and not to pay again when they are able. 12. To detain hirelings' wages, cheat orphans and widows. 13. To embezzle other men's estates and fail a trust. 14. To receive bribes, and to set justice to sale. 15. To break their promise, and refuse to stand to their bargains. 16. To embase and adulterate coin, and pass it for good and perfect. 17. Prodigality, to waste their own estate. 18. They who make not restitution offend. 19. To live an idle life, and not to use honest labour to live.'—*Bishop Nicholson on the Catechism*, p. 114.

We can conceive the lofty contempt with which a disciple of S. Alfonso would look down upon the simplicity which could have dictated this teaching. 'What? not one word about pur-'loining not being thieving? Nothing about extreme and quasi-'extreme necessity? Nothing about distressed noblemen pro-'viding for themselves out of other people's goods? Nothing 'about robbing Turks? No reference to grave and light 'matter? Nothing about mortal and venial thieving? No 'tariff laid down to steal by? No thieving-licence given to 'wives and children? No permission of pilfering to servants 'and monks? No theory of secret compensation? Secret pur-'loining and the use of short weights and measures absolutely 'forbidden? Bribes not to be received by judges? Promises 'not to be broken? Such is the result of Anglican negations! 'Thanks to Heaven that we are living where Morals have been 'studied and systematized under the humane and indulgent 'supervision of the Holy Roman Church!'

John and Charles Mozley, Printers, Derby.

DEVOTIONAL THEOLOGY

OF THE CHURCH OF ROME.

S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S

'GLORIES OF MARY.'

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S. ALFONSO DE' LIGUORI'S

GLORIES OF MARY.*

To men seriously desirous of learning the exact position which other bodies of men hold in relation to that body to which they themselves belong, nothing is more satisfactory than to receive from the hands of those bodies themselves an authorized exposition of their teaching or constitution. When this has been done, the mind is at once relieved from the fear of doing unintentional wrong to the whole body, by attributing to it what may be the eccentricities of individuals, and it enjoys a sense of security from knowing that it has now the means of judging on grounds the fairness of which can be gainsaid by no one. This is the reason why we have thought the works of S. Alfonso de' Liguori so especially valuable. His works, together with every opinion in them, have been so fully approved by the Church of Rome, in the most formal manner possible, that there can be no risk and no unfairness in looking upon him as the special exponent of her morality and her doctrines in the present century. We will not repeat the proofs which show the complete identification of his teaching with her teaching. They will be found at length in the *Christian Remembrancer* for October, 1854. We will only add here, that these proofs might be multiplied indefinitely; for writers who have reproduced S. Alfonso's words or sentiments, such as Scavini and Gaume, naturally enough parade the amount of authority which they have at their disposal, and defy their opponents to disprove it. In vain does the Abbé Laborde writhe under the infliction. In vain does

* 1. *The Glories of Mary. Translated from the Italian of S. Alphonsus de' Liguori, Founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer. By* A FATHER OF THE SAME CONGREGATION. London: Wallwork. 1852.

2. *The Glories of Mary. Translated from the Italian of S. Alphonsus M. Liguori By* A CATHOLIC CLERGYMAN. Dublin: Duffy. 1851.

3. *The Glories of Mary. Translated from the Italian of S. Alphonsus Liguori.* First American Edition. New York: Dunigan. 1854.

4. *El Mes de Maria, ó el mes de Mayo, consagrado á Maria Santisima.* Sevilla. 1850

he cry out against 'the strange corruption which this Casuist spreads over all the duties of morality.'[1] In vain does he argue that his canonization is void, 'because the theologians who exa-'mined his works were themselves full of the maxims of the 'corrupted and corrupting morality contained in his books.'[2] In vain he declares that 'it is a matter of perfect demonstration, 'that had they followed the necessary rules, Alfonso de' Liguori '*never could* have been canonized: that it is only because they 'were not followed that he has been; and consequently that 'his canonization has taken place contrary to the rules of the 'Holy See, which, in this case, are those of religion and reason' —that 'if his doctrine is holy and safe, then the strait way of the 'Gospel has been enlarged, or rather turned aside, and the 'broad and wide way which leads to perdition has been inaugu-'rated *dans la pratique*, and henceforth it is almost idle to look 'for the morals of Christians in Christendom.'[3] The voice of the Gallican may here and there be heard wailing over the loss of purity, holiness, and righteousness, but the Gallican is no representative of the modern Roman Catholic. His voice is silenced by a command from Rome; his publications are placed on the Index; he is commanded to retract his words; he is threatened with deprivation, disgrace, and want;[4] while his triumphant Ultramontane rival floats on with the stream, and dreams of the hat of a cardinal. The following passage, which we take from the preface of the Spanish translation of the Abbé Gaume's work, *El Libro de los Confesores*, represents the almost universal regard in which S. Alfonso is held by his co-religionists:—

'The works of Alfonso de' Liguori were examined according to the utmost rigour of these rules, before they proceeded to his beatification; and the examination was the more careful, because his doctrine was on many points a subject of dispute. And what was the result of the examination? The decree of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, confirmed by Pope Pius VII., will reply. It says that it has discovered *nothing* to be censured in all the different works of the servant of God. They contain no single proposition which is, I will not say, impious, heretical, schismatical, or scandalous, but even erroneous, harmful, or rash. The morals of this holy Bishop cannot be censured without setting up a censor of authority itself, without censuring the decision of the Holy See, which has declared their orthodoxy, and shown that there is in them nothing, absolutely nothing, which is reprehensible. Here we have seven Popes who have approved, eulogized, and recommended the Theology of the blessed Liguori; here is the Church, which places this holy Bishop upon her altars, and recognises his doctrine as having worked prodigies of salvation in souls,' &c.[5]

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[1] 'La Croyance à l'Immaculée Conception de la Sainte Vierge ne peut devenir dogme de foi,' p. 18.

[2] Ibid. p. 19. [3] Ibid. p. 21.

[4] This is what is occurring at the moment in which we are writing to the Abbé Prompsault, who has ventured publicly to maintain the principles of Bossuet.

[5] Prólogo, p. xxiv.

'What wonder,' cries the Abbé Laborde, 'that those who 'have destroyed the practice of the ancient Morality are occu- 'pying themselves, by way of compensation, with the enterprise 'of introducing a new Faith!'[1] What this new faith is, as it left the hands of S. Alfonso de' Liguori, we now proceed to investigate. The historical argument against the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception has been already discussed in our pages,[2] and we do not intend to re-open it. We repeat, our present purpose is to show what is the real doctrine of the Church of Rome with reference to devotion towards S. Mary, according to the testimony of her own authorized exponent, or rather, what it was previous to the immense impulse given to it by the dogmatic declaration that she is exempt from the otherwise universal taint of original sin.

The book to which we are able to refer for this purpose, without fear of being either misled ourselves or misleading others, is the *Glorie di Maria*. The following passage from S. Alfonso's *Praxis Confessarii* will show the object with which it was written, and the cause of its immense popularity, and will likewise lead us to conjecture how enormous its influence must be throughout the Roman Catholic world:—

'The parish priest is to be specially watchful to render his sheep earnest in their devotion towards the Virgin Mary, by declaring how powerful and how pitiful this divine Mother is in helping those who are devout towards her. He is, therefore, to induce them to recite *(insinuet ut recitent)* five decades of the Rosary in common with their family every day; and he is to suggest to them to fast on Saturdays, and to celebrate Novenas on the festivals of our Lady; and these he must give out himself from the altar whenever they occur. It will be highly praiseworthy if he makes a little address every Saturday about the Blessed Virgin, in which he should always narrate some *Example*. And once a year he should celebrate a solemn Novena of our Lady, with a sermon and an exposition of the Holy Sacrament. And for this purpose he can use, among others, the little book called *Glories of Mary*, which I have published on this very account, and in which he will find plenty of materials and of Examples. Happy is that priest who makes his parishioners fervid in their devotion towards the most Blessed Virgin, for they will then lead a good life by her help, and he at his departure hence will have her for his faithful and powerful advocate! He is, moreover, to recommend them above all things to get into the habit of frequently commending themselves to God, by asking holy perseverance of Him, through the merits of Jesus and Mary.'—Cap. x. 216.

In the *Glorie di Maria*, therefore, we have the popular and approved pulpit teaching of Rome on the subject of S. Mary. We have ourselves heard it reproduced in foreign sermons, and it serves as the groundwork of numberless little devotional works, which are issued at the beginning of May each year. Nor is it repudiated in England and Ireland—witness the two following testimonies:—

[1] La Croyance, &c. p. 22.

[2] Vide *Christian Remembrancer*, April, 1852.

'We entirely accept S. Alphonsus as a fair type of the prevalent and living spirit of Catholic devotion towards the Blessed Virgin. We adopt his language; we venerate his example; we circulate his writings; we deny that they are disliked by the rich or the educated, or the laity as such.'[1]

And, again, a Roman Catholic authority, a few months ago, gives us the following 'Outline of the Rev. H. Marshall's Sermon at Clapham, on the Feast of S. Alphonsus,' after the morning sermon had been preached by 'the Bishop of Southwark:'—

'Mr. Marshall's discourse was divided into three parts. In the first, he dwelt on the mercies of God, showing for what purposes saints were sent into the world, and that each had his own peculiar work allotted him. After panegyrising other great saints, he came to S. Alphonsus, who, he said, was emphatically *the Saint of modern times*. He spoke of him as the founder of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, and replied to the arguments of those who preferred the active to the contemplative orders. They know not, (said the rev. preacher,) from whence many of the graces we continually receive come to us; they think not of the pains in purgatory which are shortened by the prayers of these holy contemplatives, and by the indulgences which they obtain from the mercy of God. He showed how closely S. Alphonsus followed his Divine Master, by seeking out the sinner, and restoring him, by his preaching and his other charitable labours, to the grace which he had forfeited. Our Blessed Lord (said the preacher,) shed one drop of His sacred blood upon His holy Mother when standing at the foot of His cross, and another upon the beloved disciple; but upon the sinner, the penitent Magdalene, He poured forth a deluge as she embraced His feet. In the second part of his discourse, he spoke of the writings of S. Alphonsus—the sweet effusions in which he seemed to have poured forth his whole soul, and which embraced every subject of Christian meditation and practice. Thus we were instructed on the necessity of prayer and the Sacraments; on devotion to the Sacred Passion, the Holy Eucharist, and the Blessed Virgin, whose praises he preached and published during a long and laborious life, and who rewarded him with many wonderful favours. Your readers are probably aware that a new and much improved English edition of the works of S. Alphonsus is in course of publication by one of the Redemptorist Fathers—a work for which the Bishop of Southwark has obtained the especial blessing of the Holy See. A new translation of the "Glories of Mary" was lately published by Mgr. Weld. A beautiful Litany and Hymn (indulgenced by the Bishop of Southwark) in honour of S. Alphonsus were used on this feast, and the greatest devotion was manifested on the occasion. The Cardinal Archbishop has frequently preached at Clapham on this feast, and he observed on one occasion, *that there was not a confessional in England which was not, more or less, under the influence of the Saint's mild Theology*. The new translation of the "Glories of Mary" (which may be had of Mr. Wallwork, Great Marlborough-street, Regent-street,) is put forth with the Archbishop's approbation, who strongly recommends it to Catholics.'[2]

It is this highly approved edition which we take as the groundwork of our present article. The book is divided into three parts. The first part consists of a commentary on the *Salve Regina*, ending with 'some devout prayers addressed by various saints to the Divine Mother.' The second consists of nine Discourses on her Immaculate Conception, her Birth, her

[1] Rambler, Nov. 1854. [2] Tablet, Aug. 11, 1855.

Presentation, Annunciation, Visitation, Purification, Assumption, and Dolours, together with Reflections on her Dolours and her Virtues, and an enumeration of various practices of devotion in her honour. The third part is composed of miscellaneous examples, meditations, sermons, novenas, rosaries, and prayers. Prefixed is the Translator's Preface, of which the following extract is a sufficient specimen :—

'The name of S. Alphonsus de' Liguori is dear to all Catholics; and the sweet odour of his virtues has been everywhere disseminated by his works, in which the blessed saint has planted them, as in a garden of delights. But in the midst of this garden, beloved reader, one bed of choicest flowers is seen, whose fragrance attracts the traveller from afar; and which, as he approaches, ravishes his soul. It is "love for Mary" which composes the flower-bed of which we speak; for though in this garden flowers of every kind abound, yet "love for Mary" is the rose whose scent has been wafted by the breeze on every side; it is "love for Mary" which more especially adorns the saint's eternal crown, and which has become, in a manner, identified with himself, so that the very mention of Alphonsus' name recals the love of Mary to each Christian heart. The cold North wind, and the warm and balmy breezes of the South, have alike blown through this garden of delights—the cold North wind, I say, which chills devotion in the Church of God, which would induce men to refuse to Mary that love and honour which God Himself has given her, and which, under specious pretexts of reverence, would at length drive from amongst us her sweet name. Yes, indeed, this wind has blown through the beautiful bed of roses which is now presented to you. . . . . But the sweet zephyrs of the South have also blown through this garden, and friendly souls, the true children of Mary, have inhaled these delicious perfumes, and thereby have become as pillars of smoke of aromatical spices, and ascended to the throne of God. Oh, how many have been delivered from hell by this sweet devotion! How many have thus become illustrious in the Christian warfare, and at length have been placed on the altars of the Church! But enough! this sweet flower is now in the reach of all, so that each may, while perusing this little work, enjoy its delicious scent. I will, therefore, only premise a few remarks, which may help to increase the confidence of its readers in all that they will find advanced, as to the greatness and the power of this Mother of God, as also as to her love and tender mercy for us. In a Protestant country, and breathing a Protestant atmosphere, it is difficult to have those tender feelings of love and confidence which all true Catholics should entertain towards Mary; but as the difficulty is great, so also should our efforts be great to obtain and nourish in our souls that tender devotion towards her which is looked upon by the saints and spiritual writers as a pledge of eternal salvation.'—P. iv.

At the end of the Preface we find the usual sentence, which sounds as much like a threat as an assurance: 'Remember, that 'it has been strictly examined by the authority which is 'charged by God Himself to instruct you, and that that 'authority has delared that it contains NOTHING *(sic)* worthy 'of censure.' (P. xviii.) In spite, however, of its entirely unobjectionable nature, the Editor, or Censor, (Cardinal Wiseman,) has thought it necessary to omit two of the Examples; though why others should have been allowed to pass, and these alone struck out, it passes our comprehension to conceive. Cer-

tainly, they are immoral and incredible, but they only share these characteristics with nine-tenths of the other examples. We quote them as they are given in Duffy's edition of the work—an edition which, although it does not omit these two cases, is, in other respects, far more cleverly cooked for the English market, as we shall presently have occasion to point out.

'Our advocate has shown her great mercy towards sinners, in favour of a religious called Beatrix, in the monastery of Fonte Eraldo.—Cæsarius, 1, 7, c. 35, P. Rho. in Ex. This unhappy religious devised a plan of flying off from the convent. She went one day before an image of Mary, and at its feet deposited the keys of the monastery, for she was portress, and left the convent. Having reached a certain town, *she there lived in the miserable state of sin for a considerable time.*[1] She happened one day to meet the agent of the monastery, and believing that in consequence of her change of dress he would not recognise her, she asked him if he knew sister Beatrix? "I know her well," replied the agent; "she is a holy nun, and is at present mistress of novices." At this answer she was confounded and stunned, not knowing how she could be mistress of novices. To ascertain the truth, she put on another dress and went to the monastery. She sent for sister Beatrix, and behold the most holy Virgin appears in the form of the image before which sister Beatrix left the keys and her habit at her departure from the monastery. The Divine Mother then said, "Know that, to prevent your disgrace, I have taken your form, and have performed for you the duties of your office *since your flight from the monastery.*[2] My child, return, do penance, my Son still waits for you; and endeavour, by a holy life, to preserve the good name which I have here acquired for you." After these words the Virgin disappeared. Beatrix entered again into the monastery, resumed the religious habit, and, grateful for Mary's great mercy, she lived a saint, and at death disclosed all, to the glory of this great queen.'—P. 284.

'Cæsarius relates (lib. 7, Dial. cap. 3) that a Cistercian monk, who was greatly devoted to the Blessed Virgin, desired a visit from his beloved lady, and prayed for it continually. He went one night into the garden, and while he was looking up towards heaven, sending forth ardent sighs to his queen, through a desire of seeing her, behold! he sees a beautiful and luminous virgin descending from on high. She said to him, "Thomas, would you wish to hear me sing?" "Certainly," replied the monk. The virgin sang so sweetly, that the devout religious thought he was in Paradise. She disappeared, leaving to him a strong desire to know who she was. Another most beautiful virgin appears and begins to sing. He could not refrain from asking her name. The virgin answered: "The person you saw first was Catherine—I am Agnes; we are both martyrs of Jesus Christ, and have been sent by our Lady to console you. Thank Mary, and prepare to receive a greater favour." She then disappeared. The religious began to entertain greater hopes of seeing his queen. Nor was he disappointed; for soon after he beholds a great light, feels his heart filled with a new joy, and in the midst of that light he sees the Mother of God, surrounded by angels, and far surpassing in beauty the two virgins who had first appeared. She said to him, "My dear servant and child, I have accepted the service

[1] This is softened by Mr. Duffy. The American translation, approved by Archbishop Hughes, is, 'She led the miserable life of a prostitute *for fifteen years.*'—P. 224.

[2] Substituted in place of 'for the fifteen years that thou hast lived far from the monastery and from God.'—American Edition, p. 225.

you have rendered to me, and have heard your prayers. You have desired to see me; I wish also to allow you to hear me sing." The most holy Virgin began to sing; and such was the melody and sweetness of her voice, that he lost his senses, and fell prostrate on the ground. The bell rang for matins, the monks assembled; but not seeing Thomas, they went to look for him in his cell, and in other parts of the convent; at length they found him in the garden—he appeared to be dead. The superior commanded him to tell what had happened to him; he instantly recovered his faculties, and through obedience related all the favours of the divine Mother.'—P. 345.

We will now extract some of the theological statements contained in the work before us, and point out the manner in which they are enforced. The first title given to S. Mary is that of

'Queen, Mother, and Spouse of the King: to her belongs dominion and power over all creatures.'—P. 12.

'She is Queen of Mercy, as Jesus Christ is King of Justice.'—P. 13.

'If Jesus is the Father of souls, Mary is also their Mother. On two occasions, *according to the holy Fathers*, Mary became our spiritual Mother. The first, according to blessed Albert the Great, was when she *merited* to conceive in her virginal womb the Son of God. This was revealed by our Lord to S. Gertrude, who was one day reading the above text, and was perplexed, and could not understand how Mary, being only the Mother of Jesus, could be said to have brought forth her first-born. God explained it to her, saying that Jesus was Mary's first-born according to the flesh, but that all mankind were her second-born according to the Spirit. . . . The second occasion on which Mary became our spiritual mother, and brought us forth to the life of grace, was when *she offered* to the Eternal Father the life of her beloved Son on Mount Calvary with such bitter sorrow and suffering.'—P. 23.

'Thus it is that in every engagement with the infernal powers we shall always certainly conquer by having recourse to the Mother of God, who is also our Mother, saying and repeating again and again: "We fly to thy patronage, O holy Mother of God: we fly to thy patronage, O holy Mother of God!" Oh, how many victories have not the faithful gained over hell by having recourse to Mary with this short, but most powerful prayer! Thus it was that that great servant of God, sister Mary, the crucified, of the Order of S. Benedict, always overcame the devils.'—P. 26.

'"Since the very tigers," says our most loving Mother Mary, "cannot forget their young, how can I forget to love you, my children?"'—P. 30.

'Our Blessed Lady herself revealed to sister Mary the crucified, that the fire of love with which she was inflamed towards God was such, that if the heavens and earth were placed in it, they would be instantly consumed; so that the ardours of the Seraphim, in comparison with it, were but as fresh breezes.'—P. 31.

'Let us love her like a S. Francis Solano, who, maddened as it were (but with holy madness) with love for Mary, would sing before her picture, and accompany himself on a musical instrument, saying that, like worldly lovers, he serenaded his most sweet Queen.'—P. 38.

'Let us love her as so many of her servants have loved her, and who never could do enough to show their love. Father Jerome of Texo, of the Society of Jesus, rejoiced in the name of slave of Mary; and, as a mark of servitude, went often to visit her in some church dedicated in her honour. On reaching the church, he poured out abundant tears of tenderness and love for Mary; then prostrating, he licked and rubbed the pavement with his tongue and face, kissing it a thousand times, because it was the house of his beloved Lady.'—P. 38.

'Mary is the Mother of repentant sinners.'—P. 42.

'When Mary sees a sinner at her feet imploring her mercy, she does not consider the crimes with which he is loaded, but the intention with which he comes; and if this is good, even should he have committed all possible sins, the most loving Mother embraces him, and does not disdain to heal the wounds of his soul.'—P. 45.

'"My God," she says, "I had two sons—Jesus and man; man took the life of my Jesus on the cross, and now thy justice would condemn the guilty one. O Lord! my Jesus is already dead, have pity on me; and if I have lost the one, do not make me lose the other also!" And most certainly God will not condemn those sinners who have recourse to Mary, and for whom she prays, since He Himself commended them to her as her children.'—P. 47.

These passages we have taken almost at random from the first chapter, which is a paraphrase of the words, *Hail, holy Queen, Mother of Mercy!* They are very moderate as compared with what follow, but we have not passed them over, in order that our readers may see the general tone of the book, as well as certain specific statements contained in it. The manner adopted by S. Alfonso for especially enforcing the truth of his doctrines, is that of giving Examples, which profess (like the two given above) to be real historical facts, illustrative of the principles which he has been laying down. The scene of this Example, which is to prove that Mary is the mother of repentant sinners, is laid in England.[1] There was, we are told, a young nobleman, named Ernest, who had a tender devotion to the Blessed Virgin. Twice she spoke to him: once from an altar, the second time from an image in a corridor; but as 'he cooled in his devotions towards Mary,' and 'neglected to recommend himself to her,' he fell into sin, fled from his monastery, and ended with being a highwayman and assassin. Just before he was taken by the officers of justice, a young nobleman, whom he was going to murder, was suddenly changed into a bleeding crucifix. Filled with confusion, he set off to his monastery to do penance; but being arrested on the way, he was condemned to be hung, without having even time given him for confession. The rest of the story we will give in S. Alfonso's own words:—

'He recommended himself to Mary, and was thrown from the ladder; but the Blessed Virgin preserved his life, and she herself loosened the rope, and then addressed him, saying, "Go, return to thy monastery, do penance, and when thou seest a paper in my hands announcing the pardon of thy sins, prepare for death." Ernest returned, related all to his abbot, and did great penance. After many years he saw the paper in the hands of Mary,

[1] 'In an English city,' say the Redemptorist and Cardinal Wiseman. 'In a certain city in England,' says Mr. Duffy. 'In the city of Ridolf,' says a French edition, published by Gauthier, in Paris, in 1835. 'In Ridolio, a city of England,' say Mr. Dunigan and Archbishop Hughes. The reason why the Redemptorist, the Cardinal, and Mr. Duffy, omitted the name, is clear. Ridolio is not an English sounding name. But is this honest? In a French edition, published at Lyons in 1835, and approved by the Archbishop of Paris, the whole story is left out.

which announced his pardon; he immediately prepared for death, and in a most holy manner breathed forth his soul.'—P. 50.

The next chapter is a comment on the words *Our Life—our Sweetness*, as applied to S. Mary. It opens thus:—

'To understand why the holy Church makes us call Mary our life, we must know that as the soul gives life to the body, so does Divine grace give life to the soul. . . To have recourse to Mary, is the same thing as to find the grace of God.'—P. 52.

'S. Bridget heard an angel say that the holy prophets rejoiced in knowing that God, *by the humility and purity of Mary*, was to be reconciled with sinners, and to raise those who had offended Him to favour.'—P. 56.

'Mary is our Life because she obtains us the pardon of our sins, (p. 52.) and also because she obtains us perseverance.'—P. 59.

'We shall obtain the greatest of all graces, perseverance, most certainly, if we always seek it through Mary.'—*Ibid.*

'Blessed Allan was one day assaulted by a violent temptation, and was on the point of yielding, *for he had not recommended himself to Mary;* when this most Blessed Virgin appeared to him, and in order that another time he might remember to invoke her aid, she gave him a blow, saying, "If thou hadst recommended thyself to me, thou wouldst not have run into such danger."'—P. 62.

'Bernardine de Busto relates that a bird was taught to say, *Hail, Mary!* A hawk was on the point of seizing it, when the bird cried out *Hail, Mary!* In an instant the hawk fell dead.'—P. 64.

'We, says S. Thomas of Villanova, need only, when tempted by the devil, imitate little chickens which, as soon as they perceive the approach of a bird of prey, run under the wings of their mother for protection. This is exactly what we should do whenever we are assaulted by temptation: we should not stay to reason with it, but immediately fly and place ourselves under the mantle of Mary.'—P. 65.

We may notice here how this metaphor, applied by our Lord to Himself, is transferred from Him to S. Mary.

'Mary renders death sweet to her clients.'—P. 68.

'If at the hour of our death we have only the protection of Mary, what need we fear the whole of our infernal enemies? David, fearing the horrors of death, encouraged himself by placing his reliance in the death of the coming Redeemer, *and in the intercession of the Virgin Mother*. "For though," he says, "I should walk in the midst of the shadow of death, thy rod and thy staff, they have comforted me." Cardinal Hugo, explaining these words of the royal prophet, says that the staff signifies the cross, and the rod is the intercession of Mary; for she is the rod foretold by the prophet Isaias, "And there shall come forth a rod out of the root of Jesse, and a flower shall rise up out of his root." "This Divine Mother," says S. Peter Damian, "is that powerful rod with which this violence of the infernal enemies is conjured;" and therefore does S. Antoninus encourage us, saying, "*If Mary is for us, who shall be against us?*"'—P. 71.

The third chapter enlarges on the words *our Hope*:—

'Mary is the Hope of all.'—P. 79.

'S. Thomas of Villanova repeats the same thing, calling her *our only refuge, help, and asylum.*'—P. 81.

'In the book of Exodus, we read that God commanded Moses to make a mercy-seat of the purest gold, because it was thence that He would speak to him: "Thou shalt make also a propitiatory of the purest gold. Thence will I give orders and will speak to thee." S. Andrew of Crete says that

"the whole world embraces Mary as being this propitiatory." And commenting upon his words, a pious author exclaims, "Thou, O Mary, art the propitiatory of the whole world!"'—P. 81.

'Mary is the Hope of sinners.'—P. 88.

'In Judæa, in ancient times, there were cities of refuge in which criminals, who fled there for protection, were exempt from the punishments which they had deserved. Now-a-days, these cities are not so numerous; there is *but one, and that is Mary*, of whom the Psalmist says, "Glorious things are said of thee, O city of God."'—P. 89.

'Blessed Albert the Great says, that "God, before the birth of Mary, complained by the mouth of the Prophet Ezekiel, that there was no one to rise up and withhold him from chastising sinners; but that He could find no one, *for this office was reserved for our Blessed Lady, who withholds his arm until he is pacified.*"'—P. 93.

The following is the example which is specially illustrative of Mary being the hope of sinners:—

'Blessed John Herold, who out of humility called himself the Disciple, relates that there was a married man, who lived at enmity with God. His wife, who was a virtuous woman, being unable to engage him to give up sin, begged him, in the wretched state in which he was, to practise at least the devotion of saluting our Blessed Lady with a "Hail, Mary!" each time that he might pass before her picture. He began to do so. One night this wretched man *was on his way to commit a crime*, when he perceived a light at a distance; he drew near to see what it was, and found that it was a lamp burning before a devout picture of Mary, holding the child Jesus in her arms. He at once, *according to custom*, said the "Hail, Mary!" In the same moment, he beheld the Divine infant covered with wounds, from which fresh blood was streaming. Terrified, and at the same time moved to compassion, at this sight, he reflected that it was he who, by his sins, had thus wounded his Redeemer. He burst into tears, *but the Divine infant turned His back to him.* Filled with shame, he appealed to the most Blessed Virgin, saying:—"Mother of mercy, thy Son rejects me. I can find no advocate more compassionate and more powerful than thee, for thou art his Mother; my Queen, do thou help me, and intercede for me." The Divine Mother, speaking from the picture, replied, "You sinners call me Mother of Mercy; but, at the same time, you cease not to make me a Mother of Sorrows, by crucifying my Son afresh, and renewing my sorrows." But, as Mary can never let any one leave her feet disconsolate, she began to implore her Son to pardon this miserable wretch. *Jesus continued to show himself unwilling to do so.* The most Blessed Virgin, seeing this, placed him in the niche, and, prostrating herself before him, said: "My Son, I will not leave thy feet until thou hast pardoned this sinner." "My Mother," then said Jesus, "I can deny thee nothing; thou willest that he should be forgiven; for love of thee, I pardon him; make him come and kiss my wounds." The sinner, sobbing and weeping, did so; and, as he kissed them, the wounds were healed. Jesus then embraced him as a mark of forgiveness, and he changed his life, which, from that time, was one of holiness; and he always preserved the most tender love and gratitude towards this Blessed Virgin, who had obtained him so great a grace.'—P. 98.

We would beg our readers to observe, that the person here described merely practised an external devotion without being devout, and simply said his *Hail, Mary!* from custom, while determined on sin. Yet all these miracles—miracles far more

startling than any mentioned in the New Testament—were vouchsafed him.

Next we come to a paraphrase on the words, 'To thee do we cry, poor banished children of Eve:'—

'Blessed is he who in the midst of these sorrows often turns to the *Comfortress of the world;* to the refuge of the unfortunate; to the great Mother of God, and devoutly calls upon her and invokes her.'—P. 100.

'S. Anselm, to increase our confidence, adds, that "when we have recourse to the Divine Mother, not only we may be sure of her protection, but that *often we shall be heard more quickly, and be thus preserved if we have recourse to Mary, and call on her holy name, than we should be if we called on the name of Jesus our Saviour;*" and the reason he gives for it is, "that to Jesus as *a Judge*, it belongs also to punish, but mercy alone belongs to the Blessed Virgin as a *Patroness.*" '—P. 106.

It is scarcely necessary to say, that S. Anselm never said this. The words are taken from a spurious treatise, which every theologian knows that S. Anselm did not write.

'"Many things," says Nicephorus, "are asked from God, and are not granted; they are asked from Mary, and are obtained." '—P. 106.

Thus we see that prayer to God the Father, and God the Son, are alike superseded.

'Not only is the most Blessed Virgin Queen of Heaven and of all Saints, but she is also Queen of Hell and of all evil spirits; for she overcame them valiantly *by her virtues.* From the very beginning, God foretold the victory and empire that our Queen would one day obtain over the serpent, when he announced that a woman should one day come into the world to conquer him. "I will put enmities between thee and the woman—*she* shall crush thy head." And who could this woman, his enemy, be but Mary, who, *by her fair humility and holy life*, always conquered him and beat down his strength.'—P. 110.

'It is said in the Old Testament that God guided his people from Egypt to the land of promise; "by day in a pillar of a cloud, and by night in a pillar of fire." This stupendous pillar, at times as a cloud, at others as fire, says Richard of S. Lawrence, was a figure of S. Mary fulfilling the double office she constantly exercises for our good. As a cloud, she protects us from the ardour of Divine Justice; and as fire, she protects us from the devil.'—P. 115.

Our readers need not be reminded, that in the cloud the Doctors of the Church have seen the presence, not of Mary, but of the Holy Spirit.

'S. Bernard declares, that "in the name of Mary every knee bows; and that the devils not only fear, but tremble at the very sound of her name." '—P. 116.

S. Bernard was not guilty of thus travestying the words applied by S. Paul to our Lord. We may conclude that the words are spurious, as the Editor of S. Alfonso acknowledges that he cannot find them.

'Blessed Allan remarks, "At the very sound of these words, *Hail, Mary!* Satan flies and Hell trembles." '—P. 117.

In the fifth chapter we come to some more startling asser-

tions. It is headed thus, 'Of the Necessity of the Intercession of Mary for our Salvation.'

'S. Lawrence Justinian asks, "How can she be otherwise than full of grace who has been made the *Ladder to Paradise, the Gate of Heaven, the most true Mediatrix between God and Man?*" '—P. 121.

'That which we intend to prove here is that the intercession of Mary is now *necessary* to salvation; we say necessary—not absolutely, but morally. This necessity proceeds from the will itself of God, that all graces that He dispenses should pass by the hands of Mary, according to the opinion of S. Bernard, and which we may now with safety call the general opinion of theologians and learned men. The author of *The Reign of Mary* positively asserts that such is the case. It is maintained by Vega, Mendoza, Pacciuchelli, Segnori, Poiré, Crasset, and by innumerable other learned authors.' —P. 122.

This doctrine, then, is nearly ripe for a dogmatic decree.

'We most readily admit that Jesus Christ is the only Mediator of Justice according to the distinction just made, and that by His merits He obtains us all grace and salvation; but we say that Mary is the Mediatrix of Grace; and that receiving all she obtains through Jesus Christ; and because she prays and asks for it in the name of Jesus Christ, yet all the same, whatever graces we receive, they come to us through her intercession.'—P. 124.

Our readers will recollect what marvels were wrought with the rod of *Distinguendum*, in S. Alfonso's *Theologia Moralis;* and they will remember who first invented 'those clever but wholly arbitrary distinctions,' which have been the main argumentative support of the Papal doctrine and discipline.

'In the office appointed to be said on the Feasts of Mary, the Holy Church applying the words of Ecclesiasticus to this Blessed Virgin, gives us to understand that in her we find *all hope:* "In me is all hope of life and virtue." In Mary is every grace: "In me is all grace of the Way and of the Truth." In Mary, finally, we shall find life and eternal salvation: "Who finds me, finds life, and draws salvation from the Lord." And elsewhere, "They that work by me, shall not sin: they that explain me, shall have everlasting life." '—P. 125.

'S. Bonaventure says, that Mary is called the Gate of Heaven, because *no one can enter that blessed kingdom without passing by her.*'—P. 127.

'S. Bernardine of Sienna says, "that all graces of the spiritual life that descend from Christ, their head, to the faithful who are His mystical body, are transmitted by the means of Mary." '—*Ibid.*

'S. Bernardine says, that for this reason, "*all gifts, all virtues, all graces, are dispensed by the hands of Mary, to whomsoever, when, and as she pleases.*" ' —P. 128.

' "Address yourselves to the Blessed Virgin," says the venerable Abbot of Celles, "for by her, and in her, and with her, and from her, the world receives, and is to receive, every good." '—P. 128.

'It must be now evident to all, that when these Saints and authors tell us in such terms that all graces come to us through Mary, *they do not simply mean to say that "we received Jesus Christ, the source of every good, through Mary,"* as the before-named writer pretends; but that they assure us that God, who gave us Jesus Christ, wills that all graces that have been, that are, and will be dispensed to men, to the end of the world, through the merits of Christ, should be dispensed by the hands, and through the intercession of Mary.'—P. 129.

This portion of the 'new faith' is enforced by the following Example:—

'Belluacencis and Cæsarius relate, that there was a certain noble youth who had reduced himself by his vices from a state of opulence, in which he had been left by his father, to one of such poverty, that he was obliged to beg his bread. He left his country, that he might be able to live with less shame in a place where he was unknown. On his road, he one day met a man who had formerly been his father's servant. This man, seeing him in such affliction, on account of the distress into which he had fallen, told him to be of good heart, for he would take him to a prince who was so liberal, that he would be provided with all he could desire. This abandoned wretch was a sorcerer; and one day he led the poor youth to a wood, near a lake, and began to address an invisible person. The youth asked him to whom he was speaking. He replied, "To the devil;" but, seeing that the young man was alarmed, he encouraged him, and told him to fear nothing; and then continued to address the evil spirit, and said, "Master, this young man is reduced to the greatest poverty; he would wish to be reinstated in his possessions." "If he will obey me," replied the fiend, "I will make him richer than ever; but, *in the first place, he must renounce God.*" *This horrified the young man; but, being incited to it by that cursed magician, he complied and renounced his God.* "*But that is not enough,*" *added the devil;* "he must *also* renounce Mary, for to her we are indebted for our greatest losses. Oh, how many does she not snatch from our hands, and lead them back to God, *and save!*" . "Oh no," answered the youth, "that I will never do; deny my Mother, indeed! She is all my hope; rather would I go begging all my life long;" and, so saying, he left the spot. On his return, he passed by a church dedicated to Mary. The afflicted youth entered, and cast himself on his knees before her image, and began to weep and implore her to obtain him the pardon of his sins. He had scarcely done so, when Mary began to intercede with her Son for the poor wretch. Jesus at first replied: "But, Mother, this ungrateful soul has denied me." But on seeing that his Mother did not cease to pray, he said, finally, "O Mother, I never denied thee anything; he is forgiven, since thou askest it." The person who had purchased all the property of the young spendthrift was concealed in the chapel, and heard all that passed, and witnessed the compassion of Mary towards the sinner. He had an only daughter, and determined to give her to the young man in marriage, and make him heir of all he possessed. And thus did this youth recover both the grace of God and his temporal possessions, by the means of Mary.'—P. 130.

We stated above, that Mr. Duffy's edition of the *Glories of Mary* was more cleverly cooked for the English taste than that of the Redemptorist Father, notwithstanding the omission by the latter of two of S. Alfonso's tales, as well as some other alterations. The word may have seemed harsh —we will now take occasion to justify it, remarking, by the way, that the Redemptorist's edition is as superior in its cooking to the American edition, as Mr. Duffy's is to the Redemptorist's. In the story given above, it will be seen that S. Alfonso represents the young man as denying God, but starting back with horror at the thought of denying Mary. Mr. Duffy's is a controversial edition, full of notes, explaining and justifying the assertions made by the Author. How, then, does he deal with this awkward statement? His course is to

omit it. There was no other English translation of the book at that time in being; and as few were likely to look into the original, it was not probable that it would be found out. All the words which we have placed in italics are omitted: nor is he content with omissions. In place of the words '"Oh no," 'answered the youth, "that I will never do; deny my Mother 'indeed! She is all my hope,"' Mr. Duffy has substituted, 'The 'young man refused to comply, saying, "I cannot deny my 'Mother; she is my only hope *after God.*"' And in order that the tampering might not be betrayed, he has been compelled to change, 'But, Mother, this ungrateful soul *has denied me,*' into 'My Mother, this ungrateful sinner *has renounced my service.*' Mr. Duffy has played these tricks all through his edition. Thus in the very next page succeeding to the above Example, there is, as usual, one of S. Alfonso's ordinary prayers to S. Mary. The words inserted by Mr. Duffy we will place in brackets.

'I know that it is thy sole goodness which has impelled thee [to *procure* for me so many benefits.—*Duffy.*] Ah! too little would it be in comparison with what I owe thee, did I shed my blood and give my life for thee; for thou hast delivered me from eternal death; thou hast enabled me, as I hope, to recover Divine grace; to thee, in fine, I owe all I have. [I acknowledge to have received all the good which has come to me *from God.*— *Duffy.*] My most amiable lady, I, a poor wretch that I am, can make thee no return but that of always loving and praising thee. Ah! do not disdain to accept the tender affection of a poor sinner who is inflamed with love for thy goodness! If my heart is unworthy to love thee because it is impure and filled with earthly affections, it is thou who must change it. Ah! change it then! [by thy prayers.—*Duffy.*']—P. 132.

We shall point out a few more of Mr. Duffy's insertions and omissions as we go along, but shall not go out of our way for the purpose. The above will show what trust can be placed in the fidelity of his edition, and the conscientiousness of the editor.[1]

S. Alfonso returns with renewed vigour to his thesis, that the intercession of Mary is necessary for our salvation.

'Blessed Albert the Great calls Mary the "Helper of the Redemption," and the Blessed Virgin herself revealed to S. Bridget, that "as Adam and Eve sold the world for an apple, *so did she with her Son redeem it,* as it were, with one heart."'—P. 133.

'Mary is called the co-operator in our justification, for to her God has entrusted all graces intended for us.'—*Ibid.*

'Richard of S. Lawrence says, as often as we see ourselves in danger of perishing in the midst of temptations and contending passions of this life, let us have recourse to Mary, and cry out quickly, O Lady! help us, save us, if thou wilt not see us perish.'—P. 135.

Again, as usual, words which S. Peter addressed to our Lord are applied to S. Mary.

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[1] We use the phrase, 'Mr. Duffy's edition,' to indicate the edition published by him. The Editor has not given his name, but calls himself 'a Catholic Clergyman.'

'Shall we scruple to ask her to save us when "the way of salvation is open to none otherwise than through Mary," as a certain author remarks.' —P. 135.

'As Pharaoh said to Joseph, "The land of Egypt is in thy hands," and addressed all who came to him for food to Joseph, "Go to Joseph," so does God send us to Mary when we seek for grace: "*Go to Mary.*"'—P. 136.

'Cassian says, absolutely, "that the salvation of all depends on their being favoured and protected by Mary." He who is protected by Mary will be saved; he who is not will be lost.'—*Ibid.*

Towards the end of this chapter, S. Alfonso enters into a short dissertation, to show that it is probable that all the other saints do not intercede directly with God, but with Mary. 'What difficulty can there be in saying, that God, in order to 'honour His mother, and having made her Queen of Saints, 'and willing that all grace shall be dispensed by her hands, 'should also will that the saints should address themselves to 'her to obtain favours for their clients?' Here we see the germ of a development which may end in transferring prayers from S. Mary to some other saint, such as S. Joseph, just as at present they are transferred from her Son to her.

The sixth chapter consists of three sections, which are respectively headed 'Mary is an Advocate who is able to save all,' (where Mr. Duffy substitutes, 'to obtain salvation for all through the merits of her Son,') 'Mary is so tender an Advo-'cate that she does not refuse to defend the cause even of the 'most miserable,' and 'Mary is the Peace-maker between 'sinners and God.'

'S. Peter Damian addresses her in these words: "All power is given to thee in heaven and on earth, and nothing is impossible to thee, who canst raise those who are in despair to the hope of salvation."'—P. 145.

'"At the command of Mary all obey, even God." S. Bernardine fears not to utter this sentence, meaning, indeed, to say, that God grants the prayers of Mary as if they were commands.[1] And hence, S. Anselm, [the treatise referred to is forged,] addressing Mary, says, "Our Lord, O most holy Virgin, has exalted thee to such a degree, that by His favour, all things that are possible to him should be possible to thee." "For thy protection is omnipotent, O Mary," says Cosmas of Jerusalem. "Yes, Mary is omnipotent," repeats Richard of S. Lawrence: "for the Queen, by every law, enjoys the same privileges as the King." "And as," he adds, "the power of the Son and that of the mother is the same, a mother is made omnipotent by an omnipotent Son." "And thus," says S. Antoninus, "God has placed the whole Church, not only under the patronage, but even under the dominion of Mary."'—P. 146.

'Blessed Albert the Great makes Mary say: "I have to be asked that I may will; for if I will a thing, it is necessarily done."'—P. 147.

'Mary has only to speak, and her Son executes all.'—P. 149.

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[1] Translated in the American edition: 'S. Bernardine of Sienna does not hesitate to say, that all obey the commands of Mary, even God himself, signifying by these words, that God listens to her prayers as though they were commands.' The Latin is *Imperio Virginis omnia famulantur, etiam Deus.*

'S. Antoninus says, that the prayers of the Blessed Virgin being the prayers of a mother, have in them something of *a command*, so that it is impossible that she should not obtain what she asks.'—P. 151.

'S. George, Abp. of Nicomedia, says that Jesus Christ, even as it were to satisfy an obligation under which He placed Himself towards His mother, when she consented to give Him his human nature, grants all she asks. "The son, as if paying a debt, grants all thy petitions."'—P. 152.

The ensuing example seems to be the last over again, with a few alterations made in it. We shall again mark Mr. Duffy's insertions and omissions.

'Father Razzi, of the Camaldolese Order, relates that a young man of the name of John, on the death of his father, was sent by his mother to the court of a prince. His mother, who had a tender devotion towards Mary, before bidding him farewell, made him promise that he would every day say the "Hail, Mary!" adding at the end of it these words: "O most Blessed Virgin, help me at the hour of my death." After having been at court for a short time, he became so dissolute, that his master was obliged to dismiss him. No longer knowing how to obtain a living, in despair he became a highway robber and murderer; but during this time even, he never neglected to recommend himself to our Blessed Lady, according to his promise. At length he was taken and condemned to death. When in prison, and the day before his death, reflecting on his own shame, on the grief of his mother, and on the death he was about to endure, he wept bitterly; and thus the devil seeing him disconsolate and filled with melancholy thoughts, appeared to him under the form of a handsome youth, and told him that he would deliver him from prison and death if only he would obey him. The culprit said, he was ready to do all he might ask. The youth then told him that he was the devil come to aid him. *In the first place, he required that he should deny Jesus Christ and the most holy sacraments. To this he consented.*[1] He then demanded that he should renounce the Blessed Virgin Mary and her protection. "Ah, that I will never do!" answered the young man; and, raising his heart to her, he repeated his accustomed prayer, "O Blessed Virgin, help me at the hour of my death." At these words the devil disappeared. The young man was immediately filled with the most bitter grief *for the crime he had committed in denying Jesus Christ*;[2] but having recourse to the most Blessed Virgin, she obtained him true sorrow for all his sins, and he confessed them with great sighs and contrition. On leaving the jail to go to the scaffold, he passed on the road a statue of Mary, and saluted it with his ordinary prayer, "O most Blessed Virgin, help me at the hour of my death;" and the statue returned his salutation in the presence of all by bowing its head. Moved with tenderness, he begged leave to kiss the feet of the statue. The guard refused, but at length consented, on account of the acclamations of the people. The youth stooped to kiss the feet, when Mary extended her arm, took him by the hand, and held him so tight, that it was impossible to remove him. At the sight of such a prodigy all began to cry out, "Mercy, pardon, forgiveness;" and it was granted. The young man returned to his own country, and led a most exemplary life, and always filled with the most tender affection for Mary, *who had delivered him*[3] from both temporal and eternal death.'—P. 153.

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[1] Omitted by Mr. Duffy.

[2] 'On account of his sins' is substituted by Mr. Duffy.

[3] 'By whose prayers, presented in the name of her Son, he was delivered,' substitutes Mr. Duffy.

Thus the direct cause of the salvation of this youth and of the young nobleman before mentioned is, that they had a love for the creature which was greater than that which they had for God and for Jesus Christ.

'With good reason, then, does Denis the Carthusian call the Blessed Virgin the singular refuge of the lost, the hope of the most abandoned, and the advocate of all sinners who have recourse to her.'—P. 156.

'"Be comforted, then, O you who fear," will I say with S. Thomas of Villanova; "breathe freely and take courage, O wretched sinners. This great Virgin, who is the mother of your God and Judge, is also the advocate of the whole human race; fit for this office, for she can do what she wills with God; most wise, for she knows all the means of appeasing Him; universal, for she welcomes all, and refuses to defend no one."'—P. 161.

'O my own beloved Mother, if by thee I save my soul, as I hope to do, I shall no longer be ungrateful. I shall make up for my past ingratitude, and for the love thou hast shown me, by my everlasting praises, and all the affections of my soul. Happy in heaven where thou reignest, and wilt reign for ever, I shall always sing thy mercies, and kiss for eternity those loving hands which have delivered me from hell as often as I have deserved it by my sins. O Mary, my liberator, my hope, my queen, my advocate, my own sweet mother, I love thee, I desire thy glory, and I will love thee for ever. Amen, amen! Thus do I hope.'—P. 163.

Ten pages are devoted to showing that Mary is the Peace-maker between sinners and God. She is the Dove of Noah's Ark, the rainbow round the Throne of God, the Moon. Her 'chief office, on being placed in this world,' was 'to raise up souls that had fallen from Divine grace, and to reconcile them with God' (p. 167.) Among a number of spurious passages from S. Chrysostom, S. Anselm, and others, occurs the following quotation from Cardinal Hugo, which is an average specimen of these ten pages:—

'"Mary is the great Peace-maker, who finds and obtains the reconciliation of enemies with God, salvation for those who are lost, pardon for sinners, and mercy for those who are in despair."'—P. 165.

Next we come to a paraphrase of the words, 'Turn thou thine eyes of mercy towards us.' We will give three passages, as specimens of the rest.

'It was revealed to S. Gertrude that when these words are addressed with devotion to the most Blessed Virgin, "Turn thou, O most gracious Advocate, thine eyes of mercy towards us," Mary cannot do otherwise than yield to the demands of whoever thus invokes her.'—P. 178.

'The prophet Isaias foretold that, together with the great work of the redemption of the human race, a throne of Divine mercy was to be prepared for us poor creatures: "And a throne shall be prepared in mercy." What is this throne? S. Bonaventure answers, "*Mary is this throne*, at which all, just and sinners, find consolations of mercy." He then adds, "For as we have a most merciful Lord, so we have a most merciful Lady. Our Lord is plenteous in mercy to all who call upon Him, and our Lady is plenteous in mercy to all who call upon her."'—*Ibid.*

'The Abbot Guarric thus addresses the Mother in the name of Jesus

Christ: "My Mother, in thee will I establish the seat of my government; through thee will I pronounce judgments, hear prayers, and grant the graces asked of me. Thou hast given me my human nature, and *I will give thee my Divine nature*, that is, Omnipotence, by which thou mayest be able to help to save all whomsoever thou pleasest." '—P. 179.

We add the Example:—

'In the chronicles of the Capuchin fathers it is related, that in Venice there was a famous lawyer, who, by fraudulent dealings and bad practices, became rich, so that he lived in a state of sin. The daily recitation of a particular prayer to the Blessed Virgin was probably the only good thing that he ever did. *And yet this slight devotion obtained him, through the mercy of Mary, deliverance from eternal death.* It was thus. He, happily for himself, took an affection for Father Mathew de Basso, and entreated him so often to come and dine at his house, that at length this good father complied with his request. When he got to the house, the lawyer said, "Now, father, I will show you a thing you never saw before. I have a most extraordinary monkey, who serves me as a valet, washes the glasses, lays the table, and opens the door for me." "Ah," replied the father, "take care; perhaps it is not a monkey, but something more; bring it here." They called again and again for the monkey, but no monkey appears; they seek for it everywhere, but it is not to be found. At length they discovered it concealed under a bed, in a lower part of the house; but no, the monkey would not come out. "Well, then," said the religious, "let us go to it;" and when the lawyer and he reached the place where it was, the father cried out, "Infernal beast, come forth, and on the part of God I command thee to say what thou art." The monkey replied, "that he was the devil, and *that he was only waiting for that sinner to omit, for a single day, his ordinary prayer to the Mother of God*; for, the first time he omitted it, he had permission from God to strangle him, and carry him to hell." On hearing this, the poor lawyer cast himself on his knees to ask for help from the servant of God, who encouraged him, and commanded the devil to leave the house without doing mischief. "Only," said he, "I permit thee to make a hole in the wall of the house, as a sign of thy departure." He had scarcely said the words than, with a tremendous noise, a hole was made in the wall, and which, though often closed with mortar and stone, God permitted should remain open for a long time, until at length the servant of God advised that it should be covered with a marble slab, with the figure of an angel on it. The lawyer was converted, and, as we hope, persevered until death in his change of life.'—P. 181.

As he advances, our author grows more bold and enthusiastic. The next chapter is divided into three sections, which are thus headed: 'Mary delivers her Clients from Hell—Mary succours her Clients in Purgatory—Mary leads her Servants to Heaven.' It begins with the following sentence: 'It is impossible for a client of Mary who is faithful in honouring and recommending himself to her, to be lost.' Having made this statement, S. Alfonso begs his readers to know that 'it is to be understood of those clients who, with a sincere desire to amend, are faithful in honouring and recommending themselves to the Mother of God.' On which we might ask—first, why this necessary condition of repentance is not stated at once? and next, why he has confirmed his original proposition with further

statements and tales, in which there is no mention whatever of repentance, and which must lead simple, childlike minds to the belief that repentance is not necessary? To make out his point, S. Alfonso first declares that 'he will examine what other saints and learned men have said on the subject.' Accordingly he appeals—1st, to S. Anselm; the passage which he quotes is forged. 2d, to S. Antoninus, from whose words he concludes, 'consequently the clients of Mary will necessarily be saved.' 3d, to Blessed Albert, who says that 'all those who are not thy servants, O Mary, will perish.' 4th, to S. Bonaventure, who says, 'that not only those from whom Mary turns her face will not be saved, but that there will be no hope of their salvation.' He then claims S. Ignatius the Martyr and S. Chrysostom, in the following words:—

'Before him, S. Ignatius the Martyr said, "that it was impossible for any sinner to be saved without the help and favour of the most Blessed Virgin; because those who are not saved by the justice of God are, with infinite mercy, saved by the intercession of Mary." Some doubt as to whether this passage is truly of S. Ignatius; but, at all events, as Father Crasset remarks, it was adopted by S. John Chrysostom. It is also repeated by the venerable Raymond Jordano.'—P. 185.

Again, three pages lower:—

'"No," says S. Ignatius the Martyr, "he who is devout to the Virgin Mother will certainly never be lost."'—P. 188.

There is something very perplexing in this: not in finding such an authority for such doctrine, because none of our readers will require to be informed that the passages are forgeries, and are not found in any works of S. Ignatius or of S. Chrysostom, nor, to the best of our knowledge, in any writings attributed at any time by any person to S. Ignatius or S. Chrysostom, previous to the time of the Jesuit De Celada, in the appendix to whose commentary on Judith, writing in the year 1537, after the waste of much labour, we at length found it. But it is perplexing to find that a man of devout mind, writing in behalf of religion, can so entirely divest his mind of the obligation of speaking the truth with regard to historical facts. Whether the venerable Raymond Jordano has repeated it or not we do not know: this venerable abbot, who lived at the end of the fourteenth century, 'out of humility,' we are told, 'surnamed himself *The Idiot*' (p. 235).

The following is one of the methods by which Mary delivers her clients from Hell:—

'It is the opinion of many theologians, and of S. Thomas in particular, that for many who have died in mortal sin the Divine Mother has obtained from God a suspension of their sentence, and a return to life to do penance. Trustworthy authors give us many instances in which this has occurred. Amongst others, Flodoardus, who lived about the ninth century,

relates in his Chronicles, that a certain deacon named Adelman, who was apparently dead and was being buried, returned to life and said, "that he had seen hell to which he was condemned, but that at the prayers of the Blessed Virgin he had been sent back to this world to do penance."'—P. 188.

'Pelbertus says that in his time, when the Emperor Sigismund was crossing the Alps with his army, a voice was heard coming from a skeleton, asking for a confession, and declaring that the Mother of God, for whom he had a tender devotion when a soldier, had obtained that he should thus live until he had been able to make his confession; and, having done so, the soul departed.'—P. 189.

'Blessed Henry Suso used to say, "that he had placed his soul in the hands of Mary, and that if he was condemned, the sentence must pass through her hands;" being confident that if he was in such hands, this tender Virgin would certainly prevent its execution. The same do I hope for myself, O my own most holy Queen; and, therefore, I will always repeat the words of S. Bonaventure; "In thee, O Lady, [after Jesus *ins. Duffy.*] have I placed all my hopes; and thus I confidently trust that I shall never be lost, but praise and love thee for ever in heaven."'—P. 190.

Some, perhaps, among our readers, who remember their ministrations to dying penitents, will recollect that the language, or, if not the words, the feelings, of those who after an ungodly life have been turned by the blessing of God to better ways and penitential lives, are 'I am a great sinner; but if I perish, 'I perish at the foot of Christ's cross, where never sinner perished 'yet.' For this godly sorrow and self-distrusting hope, are we to substitute such thoughts as the teaching of Blessed H. Suso and S. Alfonso would suggest—'I have committed myself to 'Mary, I have placed my soul in her hands, and, with so 'merciful a mediatrix and protectress, I cannot but be saved?'

In the following Example we beg our readers to observe that there is not the smallest hint of the necessity of amendment or penitence. The two persons spoken of are equally criminal and sinful, but one is hurried to everlasting hell-fire because he did not, and the other is saved alive on earth because he did, recite some *Hail, Marys* 'without devotion and half asleep.'

'In the year 1604, in a city of Flanders, there were two young men, students, but who, instead of attending to their studies, gave themselves up to a life of debauchery. One night they were both in a house with an evil companion, when one of them, named Richard, returned home, leaving his companion there. After he got home, and had begun to undress, he remembered he had not that day said some "Hail, Marys" that he was in the habit of reciting. Feeling very sleepy, he was loath to say them; he did himself violence, and repeated them, *though without devotion and half asleep*. He then laid down, and had fallen into a sound slumber, when he was suddenly roused by a violent knocking at the door, and without its opening, he saw his companion, deformed and hideous, standing before him. "Who art thou?" he cried out. "What! dost thou not know me?" "Ah! yes, but how thou art changed! Thou seemest to me a devil." "Truly," he exclaimed, "poor unfortunate creature that I am! I am damned; and how? When I was leaving that wicked house, a devil came and strangled me; my

body is in the street, and my soul in hell;[1] and thou must know," added he, "that the same fate awaited thee, *had not the blessed Virgin preserved thee in consideration of that little act of homage of the 'Hail, Mary.'* Fortunate art thou if only thou knowest how to take advantage of this warning sent thee by the Mother of God!" With these words he opened his mantle, and, showing the flames and serpents by which he was tormented, he disappeared. Richard immediately burst into sobs and tears, and, casting himself prostrate on the ground, he returned thanks to Mary, his protectress; and whilst thinking how to change his life, he heard the bell of the Franciscan Monastery ringing for matins. "Ah! it is there," said he, "that God calls me to do penance." He went straight off to the convent, and implored the fathers to admit him. But they were hardly willing to do so, knowing his wicked life; but he, sobbing bitterly, told all that had taken place; and two fathers being sent to the street, and having found the strangled body, which was as black as a coal, they admitted him. From that time forward Richard led a most exemplary life, and at length went to preach the Gospel in the Indies, and thence to Japan, where he had the happiness of giving his life for Jesus Christ, being burnt alive for the faith.'—P. 191.

On the succour given by Mary to the souls in Purgatory, S. Alfonso does not give us so many particulars as Mr. F. Faber, who is adding several pious opinions on the subject to the stock of the general belief, such as that S. Mary is 'Empress' and S. Michael 'Prince of Purgatory and our Lady's Regent;'[2] but our author tells us a great deal.

'Mary not only consoles and relieves her clients in Purgatory, but she delivers them by her prayers. Gerson says, "that on the day of her assumption into heaven, Purgatory was entirely emptied." Novarinus confirms this, saying, that "it is maintained by many grave authors, that when Mary was going to heaven, she asked, as a favour from her Son, to take all the souls then in Purgatory with her." "And from that time forward," says Gerson, "Mary had the privilege of delivering her servants." S. Bernardine of Sienna also positively asserts, "that the Blessed Virgin has the power of delivering souls from Purgatory, but particularly those of her clients, by her prayers, and *by applying her merits for them.* Novarinus says, that *by the merits of Mary*, not only are the pains of those souls lessened, but the time of their suffering is shortened through her intercession. She has only to ask, and all is done.'—P. 195.

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[1] 'Look at the saint's story about those two young reprobates who went to the bad house; one of them goes home to bed, then the other comes to him, and what does he say? Why, he says, "My body is lying dead in the street," says he, "and my soul is away in hell," says he, "and here I am myself," says he. Now, your honour, who was he, or what was he at all! He wasn't his body, for that was in the street; he wasn't his soul, for that was in hell: and is there anything else in a man to make himself? so who was he at all?'—Letter of Pat Murray to the Catholic Layman, April, 1855. The learning and temper of this periodical are most commendable.

[2] 'All for Jesus,' pp. 8 and 376. The following passage, too, is remarkable: 'Some of our writers have said that our Lord will not help them (the souls in Purgatory) without our co-operation; and that our Blessed Lady cannot help them, except in indirect ways, because she is no longer able to make satisfaction, though I never like to hear of anything our dearest Mother cannot do,' p. 368. A little above (p. 350) Mr. Faber had spoken of Jesus' 'helplessness with regard to his dear spouses in Purgatory' as 'beautiful;' but he is shocked at the supposition of S. Mary being helpless.

The last words are a gloss upon *ope Virginis*. It is her merits, not her intercession, that the author is regarding. Intercession is, unfortunately, an ambiguous word, sometimes meaning prayer, sometimes intervention.

'The promise made by our Blessed Lady to Pope John XXII. is well known. She appeared to him and ordered him to make known to all, that *on the Saturday after their death she would deliver from Purgatory all who wore the Carmelite Scapular*. This, as Father Crasset relates, was proclaimed by the same Pontiff in a Bull, which was afterwards confirmed by Alexander V., Clement VII., Pius V., Gregory XIII., and Paul V.; and this latter, in a Bull of the year 1612, says "that Christian people may piously believe that the Blessed Virgin will help them after death by her continual intercession, her merits, and special protection; and that on Saturdays, the day consecrated by the Church to her, she will in a more particular manner help the souls of the brethren of the confraternity of our Blessed Lady of Mount Carmel, who have departed this life in a state of grace, provided they have worn the habit, observed the chastity of their state, and recited her office; or if they could not recite it, if they have observed the fasts of the Church, and abstained from meat on all Wednesdays, except Christmas Day."'—P. 196.

There is a great deal more about the advantages of this Scapular at a later part of the book. We extract one passage:—

'Modern heretics, as usual, ridicule this devotion; but the holy Church has approved it by many bulls and indulgences. Father Crasset and Lezana, speaking of the Scapular of Mount Carmel, relate that towards the year 1251, the Blessed Virgin appeared to S. Simon Stock, an Englishman, and, giving him the Scapular, said that all who should wear it would be saved from eternal damnation. She said, "Receive, my beloved son, this Scapular of thy order, the badge of my confraternity, a privilege granted to thee and to all Carmelites; *whoever dies clothed with it will not suffer eternal flames*."'—P. 485.

By way of example to others, S. Alfonso says that he wears himself the Scapular of Mount Carmel, the Scapular of Mary in sorrow, the Scapular of Mary of Mercy, and particularly the Scapular of the Conception. In this place Mr. Duffy has been more honest in his translation than the Redemptorist Father and Cardinal Wiseman; for the former tells us that 'the Indul-'gences granted to any religious order, pious place, or to any 'person, are annexed to the Scapular of the Immaculate Con-'ception, which is blessed by the Theatines; and, by reciting a '*Pater*, *Ave*, and *Gloria* six times in honour of the most holy 'Trinity and Immaculate Mary, we can gain *(toties quoties)* 'each time all the Indulgences of Rome, of Portiuncula, of Jeru-'salem, and Galitia' (p. 335), which the Redemptorist Father and Cardinal Wiseman pare down into 'very great Indulgences.' Mr. Duffy is, in turn, convicted by Mr. Dunigan of having omitted the number of these Indulgences; they are 'four hundred 'and thirty-three Plenary Indulgences, beside the temporal, 'which are innumerable' (p. 661.)

The example given to exhibit the power of Mary over Purgatory would, perhaps, equally as well show her influence in saving her clients from hell. It tells how one Alexandra was killed while in mortal sin, and her head thrown into a well; how, some days afterwards, S. Dominic was passing by, and the head came to the edge of the well and begged him to hear its confession, which he accordingly did, and gave it the communion; after which it stayed for two days to be looked at, and declared that this was the Blessed Virgin's doing, because it had always said the rosary in her honour. Then it went to Purgatory, and a fortnight afterwards S. Dominic saw the happy soul go to heaven.

The manner in which we are taught that Mary leads her servants to heaven is more shocking to our minds than the power attributed to her over Hell and Purgatory. We do not refer to the false quotation from S. Ambrose, 'Open to us, O Mary, the gate of Paradise, since thou hast its keys;' or the equally false quotation from S. Anselm, 'It suffices, O Lady, that thou willest it, and our salvation is certain;' or the equally false quotation from S. Athanasius, 'And thou, O Lady, wast filled 'with grace that thou mightest be the way of our salvation, and 'the means of ascent to the heavenly kingdom;' or the daring parody of S. Bonaventure, 'Give ear, O ye nations; and all 'you who desire heaven, serve, honour Mary, and certainly you 'will find eternal life.' These are in no respect different from the rest of the book, but we call attention to the following story:—

'In the Franciscan Chronicles it is related, that brother Leo once saw a red ladder, on the summit of which was Jesus Christ; and a white one, on the top of which was his most holy Mother; and he saw some who tried to ascend the red ladder, and they mounted a few steps and fell; they tried again, and again fell. They were then advised to go and try the white ladder, and by that one they easily ascended, for our Blessed Lady stretched out her hands and helped them, and so they got safely to heaven.'—P. 201.

We shall add no comments to this vision. It embodies the teaching of the whole book, and we leave it to our readers to ponder over. We give the same story in its Spanish dress, taken from the Spanish Month of Mary placed at the head of our article, a book in tenor and form very similar to that of S. Alfonso.

'One of the most intimate and familiar companions of S. Francis, brother Leo by name, beheld the following vision. (*Auriem.* t. ii. p. 289.) He saw in an extensive plain a representation of the last Judgment; there was an innumerable assemblage of persons, and others were continually coming at the blast of a terrible trumpet, which called them to judgment. Two ladders were placed, one red, and the other white, which reached from earth to heaven. At the top of the first stood Jesus Christ, and near him the seraphic Father, who, with a loving countenance, exhorted his children to

ascend by it; they began to do so, but before reaching the top they fell—some from the third step, some from the fourth, some from the tenth. Then the Holy Father, in great affliction, began to cry out to them that they should ascend by the other ladder, where the Most Holy Virgin was: the monks ran to it—that most pitying Mother gave them her hand, and they entered heaven. Wretched are we, if we have not recourse to that Supreme Lady, by whose means they that choose to climb the ladder, and to walk in the straight way of righteousness, will obtain salvation.'—*El Mes de Maria*, p. 47.

We shall not linger over the two last chapters of the Paraphrases of the *Salve Regina*, which continue in the same fashion to illustrate the words, 'O clement, O pious, O sweet Virgin Mary.' Two or three passages will suffice.

'"How is it," asks a writer, "that the Lord, who, under the old dispensation, was so rigorous in his punishment, now shows such mercy to persons guilty of far greater crimes?" And he answers, "That it is all *for the love of Mary, and on account of her merits.*" "Oh, how long since," exclaims S. Fulgentius, "would the world have been destroyed, had not Mary sustained it by her powerful intercession!"'—P. 214.

This quotation from Fulgentius is one which S. Alfonso's editor has been unable to discover.

'"Mary," says S. Antoninus, "is that throne of grace to which the Apostle S. Paul, in his Epistle to the Hebrews, exhorts us to fly with confidence that we may obtain the Divine mercy, and all the help we need for our salvation."' (Heb. iv. 16.)—P. 215.

'Father Charles Bovius relates, that in the principality of Dombes, in France, there was a married man, whose wife was jealous of another woman, and did nothing but call down both on her husband and the woman the judgments of God; and this she did especially one day that she came before an altar of the Blessed Virgin to pray for justice against this woman. The woman, however, was in the habit of going every day to recite "Hail, Mary!" before the same image. One night the Divine Mother appeared in a dream to the wife, who, on seeing her, began, as usual, to exclaim, "Justice, O Mother of God, justice!" But our Blessed Lady replied, "*Justice! Chastisements! dost thou seek them of me? No, go to others, for I will not grant what thou askest; for know*," she added, "*that that sinner recites every day a salutation in my honour, and by whomsoever it is recited, it deprives me of the power of allowing her to suffer, or to be chastised for her sins.*" In the morning the wife went to hear mass in the above-named church of our Blessed Lady, and on returning home met this woman, and immediately began to abuse her, and then declared that she was a witch, and that she had succeeded even in enchanting the Blessed Virgin herself. The people who were present told her to hold her tongue. "Be silent! indeed I will not, for what I say is true; for last night our Blessed Lady appeared to me, and when I demanded justice, she told me that she could not grant it, on account of a salutation offered her every day by this wretch." The woman was then asked what salutation it was that she offered every day to the Mother of God, and she replied that it was the "Hail, Mary!" On hearing that for that trifling devotion the Blessed Virgin had shown her such mercy, she went and cast herself before the holy image, and there, in the presence of all, she asked pardon for the scandal she had given, and made a vow of perpetual chastity. She then clothed herself with the habit of a nun, built herself a little room near the church, and there remained

until her death, leading a life of continual mortification and penance.'—P. 216.

We shall refer to the moral tendency of this story by-and-by. The sweetness of Mary's name is thus exhibited:—

'It is narrated in the life of the Rev. Father Juvenal Ancina, Bishop of Saluzzo, that in pronouncing the name of Mary, he tasted so great and sensible a sweetness, that, after doing so, he licked his lips. We read, also, that a lady at Cologne told the Bishop Marsilius, that, as often as she uttered the name of Mary, she experienced a taste far sweeter than honey. The Bishop imitated her, and experienced the same thing.'—P. 220.

'One day, in the hearing of S. Bridget, Jesus Christ promised his most holy Mother, that he would grant three special graces to those who invoke that holy name (Mary) with confidence: first, that he would grant them perfect sorrow for their sins; second, that their crimes should be atoned for; and, thirdly, strength to attain perfection; and at length the glory of Paradise.'—P. 226.

In two of the previous Examples we have seen how sinners were willing to deny God and Jesus Christ, but were saved by refusing to deny their beloved mother, Mary. In the following case we see how much more dear is the name of Mary than the sign of the Cross. There was a young woman, we are told, who was sent to market, and desired to sleep at her aunt's house in the town; but her aunt not giving her a bed, she was not able to get home while daylight continued:—

'Night came on whilst she was on the road, and, in a great passion, she called on the Devil with a loud voice to assist her. She had scarcely done so, when he appeared to her under the form of a man, and promised to help her, provided she would do one thing. "I will do anything," replied the unfortunate creature. "All that I require," said the enemy, "is, that you should no longer make the sign of the Cross, and that you should change your name." "As to the sign of the Cross," said the girl, "I will no more make it, but my name of Mary is too dear to me; I will never change it." "Then I will not help you," said the Devil. At length, after much disputing, it was agreed that she should be called by the first letter of the name of Mary; that is, M. On this arrangement, they started for Antwerp: and there the poor wretch remained with this wicked companion for seven years, leading a most shameful life, and a scandal to all.'—P. 229.

The conclusion of course is, that she is converted by 'having still preserved a spark of devotion towards the mother of God,' and so became 'transformed into a happy slave of her benefactress.' Mr. Duffy, as usual, omits the readiness to give up the sign of the Cross, and he also makes the time spent with the Devil at Antwerp, *six* instead of *seven* years. The American edition explains the bearing of the story thus, 'A girl rescued from the Devil by one letter of the name of Mary' (p. 792.)

There is a tenderness about the following prayer which might be very beautiful:—

'O great Mother of God, and my Mother Mary, it is true that I am unworthy to name thee: but thou who lovest me, and desirest my salvation, must, notwithstanding the impurity of my tongue, grant that I may always

invoke thy most holy and powerful name in my aid; for thy name is the succour of the living, and the salvation of the dying. Ah! most pure Mary, most sweet Mary, grant that from henceforth thy name may be the breath of my life. O Lady, delay not to aid me when I invoke thee, for in all the temptations which assail me, and in all my wants, I will never cease calling upon thee, and repeating again and again, Mary! Mary! Thus it is that I hope to act during my life, and more particularly at death, that, after the last struggle, I may eternally praise thy beloved name in heaven, O clement, O pious, O sweet Virgin Mary! Ah, Mary! most amiable Mary! with what consolation, what sweetness, what confidence, what tenderness, is my soul penetrated in only naming, in only thinking of thee!' &c. &c.—P. 231.

We have thus patiently led our readers through the First Part of the Glories of Mary—the Church of Rome's authorized manual, as it may be called, on the subject of the worship[1] of S. Mary—and now we will pause for a few moments and look back on what we have learnt. There are several ways in which we might consider it. We might examine it theologically: Is it true? Or we might deal with it as a moral and religious question: Is it good? The first course would lead us to inquire, Is this really and indeed the Christian religion? The second, Is this teaching such as would produce holy lives and godly affections in those who are subject to it?

We will first make a short investigation into the truth of these statements. Are they part of the Christian faith, or are they that *nouvelle foi* which the Abbé Laborde exclaims against in the bitterness of his soul? This may be examined into simply as a matter of fact.

Our simple and natural course would be to compare Liguori's teaching with that of Scripture; but we are met on the threshold by the insurmountable difficulty that there is nothing in Scripture which we can take for the purpose of constituting our comparison—nothing positive, we mean, for we find numberless passages which directly and indirectly negative his doctrines. We learn from Liguori that S. Mary is Queen of Mercy (p. 13); that she is the Mother of all mankind (p. 23); that she offered her Son to the Father on Mount Calvary (p. 23); that she is especially the Mother of repentant sinners (p. 42); that she is our Life (p. 52); that God was reconciled with sinners by the humility and purity of Mary (p. 56); that she

[1] We are far from using this word in an offensive sense. No Roman Catholic can feel hurt at the use of a word adopted by the Pope. In the decree of Dec. 8th, 1854, Pius IX. urges all Catholics *colere, invocare, exorare beatissimam Dei genitri cem*, translated as follows by the *Tablet* (Jan. 27th): 'Let all the children of the 'Catholic Church most dear to us, hear these our words; and, with a most ardent 'zeal of piety and love, *proceed to worship, invoke, and pray to* the most Blessed 'Virgin Mary, Mother of God, conceived without original sin.' The head of the Roman Catholic Church, therefore, now urges on his subjects a *greater* zeal and ardour in the worship of S. Mary than that which S. Alfonso has displayed in the above passages. In the same decree he states that 'the true object of this devotion' is S. Mary's 'Conception.' How that act can be an object of devotion, it passes our comprehension to imagine.

obtains us perseverance (p. 59); that she renders death sweet to her clients (p. 68); that she is our Protectress at the hour of death (p. 71); that she is the Hope of all (p. 79); that she is our only Refuge, Help, and Asylum (p. 81); that she is the Propitiatory of the whole world (p. 81); that she is the one City of Refuge (p. 89); that it is her office to withhold God's arm from chastising sinners until He is pacified (p. 93); that she is the Comfortress of the world, the Refuge of the unfortunate (p. 100); that we shall be heard more quickly if we call on the Name of Mary than if we call on the Name of Jesus (p. 106); that she is our Patroness (p. 106); that she is Queen of Heaven and Hell, of all saints, and all evil spirits, because she conquered the latter by her virtues, and the devil by her fair humility and holy life (p. 110); that she protects us from the Divine Justice and from the devil (p. 115); that at the name of Mary every knee bows and hell trembles (p. 116); that she is the Ladder of Paradise, the Gate of Heaven, the most true Mediatrix between God and man (p. 121); that her intercession is necessary for salvation (p. 122); that she is the Mediatrix of Grace (p. 124); that in her is all hope of life and virtue, all grace of the Way and Truth (p. 125); that in her we find eternal salvation (p. 125); that no one can enter heaven except by her (p. 127); that all graces of the spiritual life are transmitted by Mary (p. 127); that all gifts, virtues, graces, are dispensed by her, to whomsoever, when, and as she pleases (p. 128); that from her the world receives every good (p. 128); that she is the Helper of the Redemption (p. 133); that she and her Son redeemed the world (p. 133); that she is the Co-operator in our Justification (p. 133); that the way of salvation is open to none otherwise than through Mary (p. 135); that God says, 'Go to Mary,' when we seek for grace from Him (p. 136); that the salvation of all depends on the favour and protection of Mary (p. 136); that the other saints intercede with her (p. 138); that she is a tender Advocate; that all power is given unto her in heaven and earth (p. 145); that God obeys the command of Mary (p. 146); that Mary is omnipotent (p. 146); that the whole Church is under the dominion of Mary (p. 146); that what she wills is necessarily done (p. 147); that her prayers have something of a command in them (p. 151); that Jesus Christ is under an obligation to her to grant all she asks (p. 152); that she is the singular Refuge of the lost (p. 156); that she is the Advocate of the whole human race (p. 161); that her chief office in the world is to reconcile fallen souls with God (p. 167); that she is the great Peace-maker who obtains reconciliation, salvation, pardon, and mercy (p. 165); that she is the Throne prepared in mercy (p. 165); that in her is established the seat of God's government (p. 179); that she delivers her

clients from hell (p. 183); that her clients will necessarily be saved (p. 184); that she has sent back many from hell to earth who have died in mortal sins (p. 188); that she consoles, relieves, and succours her clients in Purgatory (p. 195); that she delivers her clients from Purgatory by applying her merits (p. 195); that she carries away from Purgatory all who wear the Carmelite Scapular on the Saturday after they die, provided they have been chaste and have said her office (p. 196); that she does not suffer those who die clothed in the Scapular to go to hell (p. 485); that Mary leads her servants to heaven (p. 198); that she has the key of the Gate of Paradise (p. 199); that she is the Way of our salvation (p. 200); that it is for love of Mary and on account of her merits that God is more merciful under the New than under the Old Dispensation (p. 214); that her powerful intercession sustains the world (p. 214); that she is the Throne of grace to which S. Paul bids us fly (p. 215); that Christ has promised that all who invoke the holy Name of Mary with confidence shall have perfect sorrow for their sins, atonement for their crimes, strength to attain perfection, and shall reach the glory of Paradise (p. 226).

These statements, it will be seen, are taken just as they come, and no attempt has been made to increase their force by anything like artistic arrangement. They are scarcely, if at all, more than average specimens of all the rest of the book. But now what have we in Holy Scripture to compare with them? Comparison, as distinct from contrast, requires the existence of some similitude; but take any passage in which S. Mary is mentioned, from the salutation down to the period after the Ascension, and there is nothing in any way similar. It only remains, therefore, to contrast instead of comparing. But our readers are as well acquainted with Holy Writ as ourselves, and we remit that task to them, only begging them to remember these four things:—1. That S. Mary is represented as she is, and not otherwise, in the Gospels. 2. That she is not mentioned at all in the Acts after the first chapter, or in the Epistles, although S. Paul has entered so minutely into the economy of the Christian scheme of salvation. 3. That Liguori transfers all that prophet and apostle has said of our Lord to S. Mary. 4. That all those passages which speak of the one Mediator between God and man not only ignore, but exclude the modern doctrine.

After Holy Scripture, we look to the testimony of the early Church. Do we find similar statements and a similar tone in the writings of the Fathers of the Church? Are we able to compare, or only to contrast? We will see. The expressions of the Catholic creeds, we need only remind our readers, are similar to those in Holy Scripture. We proceed to the Fathers

of the first century. They are S. Clement, S. Ignatius, and S. Polycarp, and, we may add, Barnabas and Hermas, though the writings attributed to the latter are not their own. S. Clement makes no mention of S. Mary at all, but he does speak of prayers addressed to Jesus Christ, and to God through Jesus Christ.[1] S. Ignatius says nothing of S. Mary, except that there is 'one Physician born from Mary and from God,'[2] that 'the virginity of Mary' and the birth of her Son were mysteries concealed from Satan,[3] that Christ was 'born of Mary.'[4] He speaks of her in no more exalted terms than these, and his whole doctrine is, that there is but one God, one Mediator, and one Comforter. S. Polycarp makes no mention of S. Mary. Barnabas makes no mention of S. Mary. Hermas makes no mention of S. Mary. During the first century and a half, then, there is not a trace of any prayer or invocation to S. Mary, or of any belief that she is our mediatrix and intercessor.

The second century supplies us with the testimony of Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athenagoras, Theophilus, S. Irenæus, S. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian. Justin mentions S. Mary three times: 'Mary drew her origin from Abraham;'[5] 'Mary the Virgin having received faith and joy, answered, "Be it unto me according to thy word;"'[6] 'Joseph taking Him, together with Mary, went into Egypt.'[7] By his pupil Tatian, by Athenagoras the philosopher, and by Theophilus, her name is not mentioned. In the Latin translation of S. Irenæus, we find the first passage (forgeries apart) which is attempted to be wrested to the support of the modern system. We give it in a note below.[8] He never speaks of her in higher terms than 'Mary,' or the 'Virgin Mary.' Clement of Alexandria speaks not a word in her honour. Tertullian represents her as guilty of unbelief.[9]

The third century gives us the names of Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, S. Cyprian, S. Firmilian, Methodius, and Lactantius. Origen never speaks of S. Mary in any higher terms

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[1] Cap. xxi. and xxxvi. Pp. 88 and 124. Ed. Jacobson.
[2] Ep. ad Eph. c. vii. p. 274. [3] Ibid. c. xix. p. 290. [4] Ep. ad Trall. c. ix. p. 336.
[5] Trypho, sect. 100, p. 195. [6] Ibid. [7] Sect. 102, p. 196.
[8] 'Etsi ea inobedierat Deo, sed hæc suas a est obedire Deo, uti Virginis Evæ virgo Maria fieret advocata, et quemadmodum astrictum est morti genus humanum per virginem, *solvatur* per virginem æquâ lance disposita; virginalis inobedientia per virginalem obedientiam.' S. Iren. adv. Her. lib. v. c. 19, p. 429. London, 1702. In order to make this applicable, the *Dublin Review* (June, 1844) writes '*salvatur* per Virginem, æquâ,' &c. It is only the change of one letter and a comma. It should be said that this change was first suggested by Grabe in 1702. Bellarmin leaves out the words *Virginis Evæ*, and declares that S. Irenæus represents S. Mary as an Advocate. In this untruth he is followed by the Rev. J. B. Pagani, in a book called 'The End of the World,' which he has just published.
[9] Adv. Marc. iv. 19, p. 433. Paris, 1695.

than those which are applied to her by the English Church; but he does say that we must pray to God alone, and that the sword which pierced Mary's heart was that of her own unbelief; for 'if all have sinned and want the glory of God, being justified 'by His grace and redeemed, surely Mary, too, was offended at 'that time.'[1] Gregory Thaumaturgus says nothing in her honour. S. Cyprian, much as he has written on prayer, says not a word in her reverence. S. Firmilian as little. Methodius (spurious works apart) says nothing. Lactantius uses no term of reverence beyond that of a 'holy Virgin.'[2]

In the fourth century we meet with Eusebius, S. Athanasius, S. Cyril of Jerusalem, S. Hilary, Macarius, S. Epiphanius, S. Basil, S. Gregory of Nazianzum, S. Ephraim Syrus, S. Gregory of Nyssa, S. Ambrose. Eusebius uses no terms of reverence towards S. Mary; neither do the Apostolical Canons, which are probably of about this date. S. Athanasius (forgeries apart) speaks of her no otherwise than as 'the holy Virgin who bare God;' but he writes, in arguing for the Godhead of Christ from the fact of prayer being addressed to Him, 'No one would 'pray to receive anything from God *and* the holy angels, *or any* '*other created being.*'[3] And thus we have reached and passed the date of the great Council of Nicæa. S. Cyril of Jerusalem must have given an account of her worship, had it existed, in his Catechetical Lectures. There is not a word. He calls her 'the pure and holy Virgin Mary,' 'who gave birth to God:' he says, 'By a virgin Eve came death; it was fitting that by a virgin, or rather of a virgin, life should appear:' he says that 'the Holy 'Spirit made Mary holy that she might have power to receive 'Him by whom all things were made.'[4] Nothing else. S. Hilary has not a word in favour of religious reverence being paid to her; but he writes, 'Since that Virgin who conceived 'God is to come into the severity of the final judgment, who 'will dare to be judged of God?'[5] Macarius speaks of her in no other terms than the Creed. S. Epiphanius considers it a heresy to say that S. Mary had children by S. Joseph. Many divines of the Church of England also regard her as ever-Virgin. But besides this, S. Epiphanius denies her Immaculate Conception, for he says that she was 'not born in any way differently from the nature of men;' he denies the story of her Assumption, for he says that 'her end is not known;' and writing on the Collyridian heresy, he expresses the orthodox

[1] Cont. Cels. sect. 8, c. xxvi. vol. i. p. 761; and Hom. in Luc. xvii. vol. iii. p. 952. Ed. Delarue.
[2] Vol. i. p. 299. Ed. Dufresnoy. 1748.
[3] Vol. i. p. 561. Ed. Bened. Paris. 1698.
[4] Cat. xii. c. 15; and Cat. xvii. c. 6.
[5] In Ps. 119, p. 262. Ed. Ben. Paris, 1693.

doctrine as follows. Short extracts are probably known to our readers, and we therefore give the passages at some length.[1]

'"Nay," (some will reply,) "but the body of Mary is holy!" Yes, but not a deity. "Nay, but the Virgin is a virgin, and honoured!" *Yes, yet not given for us to worship*,[2] but herself worshipping Him who was born of her in the flesh. For this reason the Gospel confirms us, saying (in the words of our Lord,) "Woman, what have I to do with thee?" Lest any should think that the Holy Virgin was a being of superior excellence, He calls her "woman," as if He prophesied, on account of those divisions and heresies which were to take place on the earth, in order that no one, by admiring the Holy Virgin in excess, might fall into this folly of heresy. The whole story' (he continues) 'is full of absurdity. For what Scripture speaks of it? Which of the prophets ever suffered a man to be worshipped, not to say a woman? She is a chosen vessel, but she is a woman, and not at all changed in nature, though as to her mind and sense she is held in honour, as the bodies of the saints, or whatever else in point of honour I might mention more excellent; as Elijah, a virgin from his birth, and continuing so throughout, and being taken up, did not see death; as John, who lay upon the bosom of our Lord, whom Jesus loved; as the holy Thecla; and as Mary, honoured above her, because of the dispensation of which she was deemed worthy. But neither is Elijah, though among the living, an object of worship; nor is John an object of worship, though by his own prayer, or, rather, by receiving grace from God, he made his death wonderful; nor is Thecla, nor any one of the saints, an object of worship. For the old error shall not lord it over us, that we should leave the Living One, and worship things made by Him. "For they served and worshipped the creature more than the Creator." For if He willeth not that the angels be worshipped, how much more is He unwilling that worship should be paid to her who was born of Anna, and was given to Anna from Joachim, given to the father and mother by promise, but nevertheless not born differently from the nature of man.'—P. 1061. Paris, 1622; *Tyler*, p. 217.

Again:—

'God the Word, as a Creator, and of authority over the thing, formed Himself from the Virgin, as from the earth, having clothed Himself with flesh from the holy Virgin; but, nevertheless, not a virgin to be worshipped, nor that He might make her a deity, not that we might offer in her name, not that so many generations of women should become priestesses. God willed not this to take place in Salome, nor in Mary herself. He suffered her not to administer baptism, nor to bless the disciples; He did not commission her to rule upon earth; but only appointed this, that she should be a holy thing, and be deemed worthy of His kingdom. Whence, then, is the coiling serpent? Whence are his crooked counsels renewed? *Let Mary be in honour; but let the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost be worshipped. Let no one worship Mary.* The mystery (that sacred thing, religious worship) is assigned, I do not say to no woman, but not even to any man; it is assigned to God. Neither do angels receive that ascription of glory (that doxology). Let these errors, written in the hearts of the deceived, be wiped away. Let the evil generated at the tree be obliterated from our sight. Let no one eat of the error which has arisen by means of holy Mary; for though the tree be beautiful, yet it is not given for food; and though

[1] We have adopted the translation given by the late Rev. J. Endell Tyler, in his valuable and calmly-written book on the 'Worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary.'

[2] Compare the *colere, invocare, exorare* of Dec. 8, 1854.

Mary be most beautiful, and holy, and honoured, yet she is not intended to be worshipped. . . . And how many more things might be said? for these silly women offer to her the cake, as either worshipping Mary herself, or they take upon themselves to offer this rotten fruit in her behalf! *The whole thing is foolish and strange, and is a device and deceit of the devil. But, not to extend my discourse further, what I have already said will suffice. Let Mary be in honour. Let the Lord be worshipped.*'—P. 1066; *Tyler*, p. 210.

In the writings of S. Basil the Great there is not one word of religious veneration of S. Mary, but he regards the sword which pierced her soul to have been the doubt and unbelief into which she fell at the time of the Passion.[1] The genuine writings of Gregory of Nazianzum are equally free from any expression of religious respect. There is a tragedy called 'Christ Suffering,' containing such expressions in abundance, from which Cardinal Wiseman quotes freely, as though it were genuine;[2] but it is acknowledged as spurious by Tillemont, Dupin, Baillet, Baronius, Rivet, Vossius, Bellarmin, Labbé, Ceillier, Caillau, as well as Cave. There is also an oration attributed to Gregory, (Calderon has made use of it, and Shelley has translated the drama,) which represents S. Cyprian, when a young man, alluring a young lady, with whom he was enamoured, into his power by magical arts, in which the following words occur: 'Justina, discarding all others, flies for refuge 'to God, who had protected Susanna and Thecla, and takes her 'own bridegroom for her champion against hateful lust... Medi-'tating on these, and more instances than these, *(and beseeching 'the Virgin Mary to assist a virgin in peril,)* she throws before 'her the charm of fasting and mortification,' &c. The Benedictine Editors retain this Oration amongst Gregory's works, and declare that 'nowhere else is the protection and assistance 'of the Blessed Virgin Mary so clearly and explicitly com-'mended in the fourth century.' This, we think, must be considered to be the strongest testimony against the similarity of the teaching of the fourth century and of the nineteenth, as exhibited in the works of S. Alfonso. That this Oration is likewise spurious, is satisfactorily proved by Mr. Endell Tyler.[3]

The works attributed to S. Ephraim Syrus, like those of the last writer, may be classed under three heads. Some are acknowledged to be spurious, some are doubtful, and some genuine. The first of these classes we will refer to presently; in the last there is not a shadow of religious respect paid to S. Mary; in the doubtful class there occurs this passage, descriptive of the cries of the damned: 'Farewell, ye holy and 'just, from whom we are separated:—friends and relations,

[1] Vol. iii. Ep. 260, p. 400. Paris, 1721.
[2] Remarks on a Letter from the Rev. W. Palmer, by N. Wiseman, D.D. Bishop of Melipotamus. London, 1841.
[3] Worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary, Appendix C, p. 402.

'fathers and mothers, sons and daughters, apostles, prophets, 'and martyrs of the Lord. Farewell, Lady, who didst give 'birth to God! Thou indeed didst labour much, exhorting us 'to save ourselves, but we would not repent and be saved. 'Farewell thou, too, honoured and life-giving Cross! farewell, 'thou paradise of delight which the Lord planted! farewell, 'Jerusalem, who art above, the mother of the first-born! fare-'well, kingdom of heaven that hast no end! fare ye all well! 'We shall never see you again. We are going to judgment, 'which hath no end or rest.'[1]

We repeat, it is more than doubtful whether this passage is genuine; but suppose it is: the writer speaks elsewhere of 'our 'Mother Jerusalem which is above, calling upon us with love 'and desire to come to her,' just as here he represents S. Mary as anxious for our salvation. Eastern poetry *is* poetry.

In the writings of Gregory of Nyssa, there is not a trace of invocation or of religious regard. S. Ambrose writes as Bishop Pearson has written, except that the latter has expressed himself more strongly in honour of S. Mary than the former. He distinctly anticipates and rejects the doctrine, that S. Mary assisted in the Redemption at the time of the Passion.[2] With S. Ambrose we reach the end of four hundred years of the Church's life.

We will examine the teaching of one more century. During the fifth century we meet with the great names of S. Chrysostom, S. Augustine, and S. Jerome, of Basil of Seleucia, Orosius, Sedulius, Vincentius Lirinensis, S. Cyril of Alexandria, Isidore of Pelusium, Theodoret, Prosper, S. Leo, Hilarius, Simplicius, Felix, Gelasius, Anastasius, Symmachus. In S. Chrysostom's works, there is not anything approaching to an invocation of S. Mary, nor any expression of confidence in her intercession and merits. On the contrary, he considers her character to have been imperfect, and declares that it was 'excessive ambition,' 'foolish arrogance,' and 'vain glory,' that made her 'stand without and desire to speak with Him.'[3] S. Augustine writes of her throughout in the same terms as members of the English Church employ, and in no others. Far the strongest passage which is found in his works is the following, in which he declines, 'for the honour of the Lord,' to say whether or no she was personally sinful:—

'Except, therefore, the Holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honour of the Lord, I wish not any question at all to be discussed when the subject is on sins—for how can we tell whether a greater portion of grace was not given to her to enable her to conquer sin altogether, who was thought worthy to conceive and bring forth Him, who, it is certain, had no sin?—

[1] Vol. ii. p. 220; Tyler, p. 260.
[2] Vol. ii. p. 260. Ed. Bened. 1636.
[3] Vol. vii. p. 467. Paris, 1718.

except this Virgin only, if we could collect all the holy men and holy women who ever lived here, would they not confess, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves?"'[1]—Vol. x. p. 144.

In S. Jerome's works, there is not a word which can be brought forward in support of the modern system. He regards her as ever-virgin, and as an example to virgins;[2] he speaks of death having come by Eve, and life by Mary;[3] he considers the branch in Isaiah xi. 1. to be 'the mother of our Lord, 'simple, pure, sincere, with no external germ, and, after the 'likeness of God, fruitful in herself alone,' and 'the flower of 'the branch' to be 'Christ;'[4] he says that 'the clear light of 'Mary hides the little fires of other holy women, such as Anna 'and Elizabeth.'[5] But he says no more, and he adds, 'We 'worship not nor adore, I do not say, the relics of martyrs, but 'neither the sun, nor the moon, nor angels, nor archangels, nor 'cherubim, nor seraphim, nor any name that is named in the 'present world, or in the world to come, lest we serve the 'creature rather than the Creator, who is blessed for ever;'[6] and he translates and so adopts the homily of Origen, in which the latter speaks of S. Mary as having been scandalized at the time of the Passion.[7]

All the passages which have been quoted from the works of Basil of Seleucia are spurious. Orosius says nothing of S. Mary. Sedulius, in one of his poems, speaks of her as the woman through whom alone the way of life was effected.[8] The well-known Vincentius Lirinensis bids no one 'attempt to 'defraud the Holy Mary of the privileges and special glory of 'divine grace; for by the singular gift of our Lord and God, 'her Son, she must be most truly and blessedly confessed to 'be Theotocos.'[9] He knew no other privilege which she has, except that of bearing Him who was God. S. Cyril of Alexandria (in his genuine writings) speaks in the same strain, and no other. She is 'Theotocos' and 'the Holy Virgin.'[10] Like Tertullian, Origen, S. Basil, S. Chrysostom, S. Gregory

[1] That this means actual, not original sin, is shown by his expressly stating that she was conceived and born in sin.—Vol. iv. p. 241; vol. x. p. 654; vol. iii. part i. p. 268. Paris, 1700.

[2] Ep. 107, p. 679. Ed. Bened. Veronæ, 1734. [3] Ep. 22, vol. i. p. 120.

[4] Vol. i. p. 101. [5] Vol. vi. p. 671. [6] Ep. 109, vol. i. p. 720.

[7] Hom. xvii. in Luc. vol. vii. p. 300. [8] Bib. Vet. Pat. Venetiis. 1773, tom. ix.

[9] Vinc. Lirin. Common.

[10] There is a homily attributed to S. Cyril, known under the name of *When the Seven*, which is to be found in Mansi, vol. iv. p. 1254; and another version of the same homily given in Aubert's edition of Cyril's works, called 'An Encomium upon Holy Mary the Theotocos,' in which stronger expressions are to be found; but we cannot regard them as even doubtful. Unhappily, we have not the authority of the Benedictines to appeal to, as they have not edited S. Cyril. It is quoted by Cardinal Wiseman as genuine, (Remarks, p. 25,) and it should be said that Basnage (Hist. Egl. tom. ii. p. 1214) admits it. Tyler proves it to be spurious. Appendix, p. 408.

of Nazianzum, S. Ambrose, S. Jerome, and other Fathers, he tells us that she had imperfections, and that her faith failed at the time of the Crucifixion, and he gives that as the reason why our Lord entrusted her to S. John, because he, being versed in divine mysteries, could enlighten her ignorance;[1] and he tells us 'not 'to wonder at all if the Virgin was ignorant on a point on 'which even the Holy Apostles themselves were of little faith.'[2] Isidore of Pelusium speaks of her in no other way than as the Mother of our Lord. Theodoret argues that the titles of Theotocos and Anthropotocos ought to belong to S. Mary, because Christ was God and man—nothing more. Prosper simply speaks of her as an unspotted virgin, from whom Christ was born. In the genuine writings of Pope Leo, the great assertor of the true doctrine of the Incarnation, not a word of religious respect to S. Mary is found. Popes Hilarius, Simplicius, and Felix, are alike free from any such expressions. Pope Gelasius calls her the most Holy Virgin Mary, and elsewhere he says 'that it *belongs alone* to the Immaculate Lamb to 'have no sin at all; otherwise that might seem not to be impu-'ted to Him alone if *any holy one besides* should be thought free 'from sin.'[3] In the remains of Popes Anastasius and Symmachus there is nothing to the purpose; and this brings us beyond the boundary of the first five centuries of the Church's history.

In this review of the writers of the first five hundred years, we have not knowingly omitted a single passage expressive of religious respect for S. Mary, which is found either in *their genuine* or in *their doubtful* works. By comparing them, therefore, on the one hand, with the statements of S. Alfonso de' Liguori, and on the other with those of Bishop Pearson, whose words we have unhappily not space to quote,[4] our readers will be able to judge for themselves which of the two Churches, whose sentiments are expounded by these two writers, holds the ancient Catholic faith, and which that *nouvelle foi* of which the Abbé Laborde complains. We cannot do better than sum up this portion of our subject in the words of the Rev. E. Tyler, to whose conscientious labours we have been so much indebted:—

'We have examined to the utmost of our ability and means the remains of Christian antiquity. Especially have we searched into the writings of those whose works (A.D. 492) received the approbation of the Pope and his council at Rome; we have also diligently sought for evidence in the records of the early Councils; and we find all the genuine and unsuspected works of Christian writers—not for a few years, or in a portion of Christendom, but to the end of the first five hundred years and more, and in every country in the Eastern and Western Empire, in Europe, in Africa, and in Asia—testifying as with one voice that the writers and their contemporaries knew of no

[1] Vol. iv. p. 1064. Paris, 1638.
[2] Vol. vi. p. 391.
[3] Sacr. Conc. p. 1240. Paris, 1621.
[4] Vide Pearson's 'Exposition of the Creed.'

belief in the present power of the Virgin, and her influence with God; no practice, in public or private, of prayer to God through her mediation, or of invoking her for her good offices of intercession, and advocacy, and patronage; no offering of thanks and praise made to her; no ascription of divine honour and glory to her name. On the contrary, all the writers through those ages testify that to the early Christians God was the only object of prayer; and Christ, the only heavenly Mediator and Intercessor in whom they put their trust.'—P. 390.

But besides the genuine works of the early Fathers, and besides those which it is doubtful whether they wrote or not, there is a third class of writings which we must unfortunately likewise refer to. These are such as are acknowledged to be spurious or forged. S. Alfonso, in quoting 'devout prayers addressed by various Saints to the Divine Mother,' tells his reader that 'the following prayers are put here, not only that 'they may be used, but also that they may show the high idea 'that the Saints had of the power and mercy of Mary, and the 'great confidence they had in her patronage' (p. 232.) Thus he declares that he is bringing forward historical evidence in proof of the doctrine which he is enforcing. With this profession in his mouth, how jealous ought he not to be to be sure that the quotations which he makes are genuine, and to quote them correctly! We cannot conceive a more certain test of a truthful mind or a perverted conscience than is supplied by the manner in which such a task as this is performed. How, then, does our author bear this trial? Does he cite what he does cite with accuracy? Does he cite the true writings of the Saint to whose authority he is appealing? The first of these questions is answered by a witness whose testimony is unimpeachable. The *Rambler*, in recommending its friends not to use the book which we are reviewing in controversy, says, 'To name but one, 'and that not the chief cause of this unfitness, it is only neces-'sary to mention that *S. Alphonsus did not scruple to make most 'important additions to the passages which he quoted from the 'Fathers;* and this, though perfectly allowable in a book of me-'ditations,' [we do not here pause to examine the morality of this doctrine,] 'of course destroys its value as a work of autho-'rity in matters of controversy.' We need, therefore, say no more as to the accuracy of the passages cited. We must linger for a moment to show that he, and not only he, has scrupled as little to cite acknowledged forgeries as genuine.

The first false citations which we meet with (reckoning chronologically) are those which we have transcribed from pp. 185 and 188. The Apostolic Father S. Ignatius is there quoted; and the translation being given in the text, his supposed words are added in the note. They are as follows:—*Impossibile est aliquem salvari peccatorem nisi per tuum, O Virgo, auxilium et favorem. Quia quos non salvat Dei justitia salvat sua interces-*

sione Maria, misericordia infinita. Ap. Celada in Jud. Fig. § 10. And again, *Numquid peribit, qui genitrici Virgini devotus sedulusque extiterit.* S. Alfonso admits that some doubt whether S. Ignatius did write the first of these passages, but he declares that it has been adopted by S. Chrysostom, or as it is given in the Lyons translation of 1835 (p. 261,) '*S. Jean Chrysostôme le lui attribue.*' We have already shown that it is untrue that S. Ignatius wrote one passage or the other, and equally untrue that S. Chrysostom adopted or attributed either of them to him.

The next author falsely cited as a witness to the worship of S. Mary is Origen. This, however, is not done by S. Alfonso, but by Cardinal Wiseman. There is a work called the 'Lament of Origen,' which was declared spurious by Pope Gelasius and his council. It is quoted as genuine by Cardinal Wiseman: Lectures, vol. ii. p. 107; 1836. 'It is wonderful,' says Huet, Bishop of Avranches, 'that these works should be sometimes 'cited in evidence by some theologians, *without any note of their* '*being forgeries.*'

The next spurious documents made use of to support the modern system on the point which we are examining, are three sermons attributed to Gregory Thaumaturgus by Vossius, who first published them as Gregory's; they really belong to the seventh or eighth century. Bellarmin quotes one of them as a homily of S. Athanasius. Methodius comes next. S. Alfonso quotes him frequently, and, in a long prayer to S. Mary attributed to him, makes him say, 'We are all God's debtors, but He is debtor to thee!' (p. 236.) Cardinal Wiseman[1] also quotes a homily attributed to him, to the same effect. The spuriousness of this work is declared by the Benedictine Editors of S. Jerome,[2] and by Baronius.[3]

From a supposed homily of S. Athanasius, S. Alfonso, (p. 238,) Bellarmin,[4] and Cardinal Wiseman,[5] quote a lengthy prayer of Invocation. The Benedictine Editors declare 'that 'there is no learned man who does not now adjudge this dis-'course to be spurious;'[6] and Baronius says that it cannot have been written previous to the Monothelite controversy.[7] With S. Epiphanius' works, a spurious panegyric on the Mother of God is published.[8] Next we come to Gregory of Nazianzum. We have already shown that the drama called 'Christ Suffering' has been quoted as genuine by Cardinal Wiseman, and has been declared spurious by Tillemont,[9] Dupin,[10] Baillet,[11] Baronius,[12]

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[1] Remarks, &c.
[2] In Feb. 2, p. 57. Paris, 1607.
[3] Lectures, vol. ii. p. 108. 1836.
[4] Letter to Stapleton. 1592.
[5] Tom. ix. p. 559.
[6] Tom. iv. part ii. p. 457.
[7] Vol. ii. p. 910.
[8] Vol. ii. p. 515. 1721.
[9] Vol. ii. p. 332. Padua, 1777.
[10] See Fabricius, vol. viii. p. 275.
[11] Tom. ii. p. 372.
[12] Tom. i. ad. anno. 34, p. 157.

Rivet,[1] Vossius,[2] Bellarmin,[3] Labbé,[4] Ceillier,[5] Caillau,[6] Tyler.[7] The homily which represents S. Cyprian as attempting to bring about his lustful purposes by magical arts we have called doubtful, in compliment to the Benedictine Editors; but it is proved by Mr. Tyler to be spurious, if external proof were wanted.[8]

From S. Ephraim Syrus we have a long prayer in S. Alfonso, in which S. Mary is addressed as 'the only Advocate of sinners,' and 'the Mediatress between God and man' (p. 232.) The prayer is spurious. Cardinal Wiseman likewise twice refers to S. Ephraim, and quotes him at length.[9] The passages cited by Cardinal Wiseman as S. Ephraim's were not written by him, and have never been attributed to him by any one; they were first bound up in the same volume with S. Ephraim's works, in an edition published at Rome in 1732, and were printed from a Vatican MS., which does not pretend to contain the works of S. Ephraim. Another passage is quoted by Cardinal Wiseman as S. Ephraim's from a sermon called the 'Eulogy of the Holy Virgin.' This is likewise spurious. Tillemont says that it has nothing of S. Ephraim about it, and is probably the production of a Jerusalem monk.

S. Augustine is twice appealed to by the Breviary as giving the title of 'Only Hope of sinners' to S. Mary.[10] The passage quoted is spurious, and is rejected by the Benedictine Editors.[11] The 'Book of Meditations,' in which prayer is addressed to S. Mary, was once attributed to S. Augustine. This is quoted as genuine by Kirk and Berrington (p. 445); and Mr. Ambrose Lisle Phillipps[12] cites the 'glorious S. Augustine, Bishop of Hippo,' 'in his third discourse to the Catechumens on the Creed, 'as referring the vision of S. John in the Apocalypse to our 'Blessed Lady.' Both of these publications are excluded from S. Augustine's works by the Benedictine Editors. Spurious passages are cited as S. Augustine's by Liguori in pp. 326, 343, &c. Basil of Seleucia is quoted by S. Alfonso as calling S. Mary the Peace-maker and Umpire between God and man (p. 245.) The supposed works of his, in which such expressions occur, were first published by Dausqueius, a Jesuit, in 1661; they were sent to him, he says, by his brother-Jesuit Schottus, having been just drawn out of their hiding-place. Fortunately, Photius has left us an account of the writings of

[1] Crit. Sacr. p. 343.
[2] Inst. Poet. lib. ii. c. 14, p. 72.
[3] De Script. Eccles.
[4] De Script. Eccles.
[5] Hist. des Aut. Sacr. Tom. vii. p. 176.
[6] Op. Greg. Theol. vol. ii. p. 1205. Paris, 1840. Edited by M. Caillau, Priest of the Society of Mercy, called 'The Blessed Mary Immaculate in her Conception.'
[7] Worship of the Blessed Virgin Mary, p. 399.
[8] Ibid. p. 402.
[9] Lectures, vol. ii. p. 109. Remarks, p. 20.
[10] In fest. Nat. B. M. V.
[11] Pseudo. S. Aug. Serm. cxcv. Op. tom. v. Ap. p. 323.
[12] Manual of Devotion, p. 98. 1843.

Basil, and they are not those which the two Jesuits extracted from their hiding-place.

Two sermons supposed to have been delivered by S. Leo, on the Feast of the Annunciation, are suppositious. The idle tale of S. Mary of Egypt, which Cardinal Wiseman calls 'a remarkable monument of most confident supplication to the Blessed Virgin,'[1] and which he supposes to have been written about A.D. 500, was probably composed about the close of the seventh century. S. Alfonso gives us the story (p. 66), but in so softened a form, that had it not been for 'the lion who came and made her grave with his claws,' we should scarcely have recognised it.

We have thus, as we believe, gone through all the genuine and doubtful passages, and all the more important spurious passages, found amongst the works of the writers of the first five centuries, which have a bearing on the devotion to S. Mary. By a reference to them, and to the quotations made from the 'Glories of Mary,' it will appear that there are mainly two foundations on which S. Alfonso and Cardinal Wiseman rest their system. One is that of forged documents, the other that of special revelations to individual saints. With regard to the first, our readers will form their own judgment; with regard to the last, we will say one word, to remind them that it entirely alters the standard or rule of the Christian faith. That Rule of Faith is no longer, according to the Anglican theory, Holy Scripture, as interpreted, where intepretation is needed, by the witness of the Church, exhibited in the annals of her history—it is no longer Holy Scripture and tradition, according to the Tridentine theory. It is Holy Scripture, tradition, and modern revelations—not a single, nor a double, but a triple standard, which may vary from day to day.

The *amount* to which false quotations are made use of by S. Alfonso may be learnt from the following passage:—

'Hence the Divine Mother, on account of the great merit she acquired by this great sacrifice which she made to God for the salvation of the world, was justly called by S. Augustine, "The Repairer of the human race;" by S. Epiphanius, "The Redeemer of captives;" by S. Anselm, "The Repairer of a lost world;" by S. Germanus, "Our Liberator from our calamities;" by S. Ambrose, "The Mother of all the faithful;" by S. Augustine, "The Mother of the living;" and by S. Andrew of Crete, "The Mother of life." For Arnold of Chartres says, "The wills of Christ and of Mary were then united, so that both offered the same holocaust, she thereby producing with Him the one effect—the salvation of the world." At the death of Jesus, Mary united her will to that of her Son, so much so, that both offered one and the same sacrifice; and therefore the holy Abbot says, that both the Son and the Mother effected the human redemption, and obtained salvation for men—Jesus by satisfying for our sins, Mary by obtaining the application of this satisfaction to us. Hence, Denis the Carthusian also asserts, "that

[1] Remarks, p. 26.

the Divine Mother can be called the Saviour of the world, since by the pain she endured in commiserating her Son, (willingly sacrificed by her to Divine justice,) she merited that through her prayers the merits of the Passion of the Redeemer should be communicated to men." '—P. 343.

Whether S. Germanus, S. Andrew of Crete, Arnold of Chartres, and Denis the Carthusian, wrote the words here attributed to them, we neither know, nor are we careful to know; but the first quotation from S. Augustine is spurious, the quotation from S. Epiphanius is spurious, the quotation from S. Anselm is spurious, the quotation from S. Ambrose is spurious, and the second quotation from S. Augustine is spurious. In the same manner, in p. 417, there are three quotations from S. Jerome, from S. Chrysostom, and S. Augustine—all of them are spurious.

We have still to consider the moral and religious tendency of this teaching. We have seen that it is not the ancient doctrine of the Christian Church; but although it is not true, is it nevertheless such as to produce godly life and chastened affections? Before examining this question, we will make a few extracts from the two latter portions of the book, though we have not space to do so with the same copiousness as we did from the first part.

'I will say, in the words of S. Philip Neri, "Immaculate Virgin, thou hast to save me. Grant that I may always remember thee; and then, do thou never forget me! The happy day, when I shall go to behold thy beauty in Paradise, seems a thousand years off. So much do I long to praise and love thee more than I can now do, my Mother! my Queen! my beloved, most beautiful, most sweet, most pure, Immaculate Mary! Amen!" '—P. 269.

'It is well known with what unanimity theologians and holy Fathers (*the* holy Fathers *Duffy*—the very holy Fathers *Dunigan*) give Mary this title of Mediatress, on account of her having obtained salvation for all, by her powerful intercession and merit so called of congruity, thereby procuring the great benefit of redemption for the lost world. *By her merit of congruity*, I say, for Jesus Christ alone is our Mediator by way of justice, and *by merit de condigno*, to use the school term, He having offered His merits to the Eternal Father, who accepted them for our salvation. Mary, on the other hand, is a Mediatress of grace by way of simple intercession and merit of congruity, she having offered to God, as theologians say with S. Bonaventure, her merits for the salvation of all men, and God, as a favour, accepted them with the merits of Jesus Christ.'—P. 275.

The difference, then, between the Redemption as wrought by Jesus, and as wrought by Mary, would be this. Both redeemed mankind by their merits: but God was bound, as a matter of justice, to accept the merits of Christ, and he accepted the merits of Mary as a matter of grace or favour.

'Mary, then, was the Mediatress of men; it may be asked, but how can she be called also the Mediatress of angels? Many theologians maintain that Jesus Christ merited the grace of Perseverance for the angels also; so that as Jesus was their Mediator *de condigno*, so also Mary is said to be the

Mediatress even of angels *de congruo*, she having hastened the coming of the Redeemer by her prayers. At least meriting *de congruo* to become the Mother of the Messiah, she merited for the angels that the thrones lost by the devils should be filled up. Now, she at least merited this accidental glory for them; and therefore Richard of S. Victor says: "By her every creature is repaired; by her the ruin of the angels is remedied; and by her human nature is reconciled." And before him S. Anselm said: "All things are recalled and reinstated in their primitive state by this Blessed Virgin."' —P. 278.

The quotation from S. Anselm is spurious.

'From the first moment that this heavenly child was sanctified in her mother's womb, which was the instant of her Immaculate Conception, she received the perfect use of reason *that she might begin to merit.* This is in accordance with the general opinion of theologians, and with that of Father Suarez in particular, who says that as the most perfect way in which God sanctifies a soul is by its own merit, as S. Thomas also teaches, it is thus we must believe that the Blessed Virgin was sanctified. "*To be sanctified by one's own act, is the more perfect way. Therefore it is to be believed that the Blessed Virgin was thus sanctified.*"'—P. 288.

Does it not follow from hence, that if the Immaculate Conception be true, S. Mary must have merited to have been immaculately conceived before she was conceived, and, therefore, that she must have enjoyed a previous state of existence? This would be a thing to be decreed by another dogma.

'Supposing she had 1,000 degrees of grace in the first instant, (of her conception,) in the second she had 2,000, in the third 4,000, in the fourth 8,000, in the fifth 16,000, in the sixth 32,000. And we are as yet only at the sixth instant: but multiplied thus for an entire day, multiplied for nine months, consider what treasures of grace, merit, and sanctity, Mary had already acquired at the moment of her birth.'—P. 281.

Mr. F. W. Faber adopts this 'arithmetic of Suarez' in a book published a month or two ago, called 'The Blessed Sacrament.' He writes:—

'We remember the various splendours of the angelic kingdom; and we remember how, in the one first moment of her Immaculate Conception, the imperial Mother of God was adorned with greater graces, and shone with greater merits, than all the angels put together, were they to add their merits into one for a million of years. *If we do the sum of her grace and merits by the arithmetic of Suarez, for which that saintly theologian was thanked by Mary herself*, how far beyond the expression of our figures has the sum advanced, when fifteen years of moments, each moment with the full use of reason, each moment even of slumber, meriting on a gigantic scale, are fully accomplished! To our eyes she is almost lost in the light of grace. We can hardly make a picture of what she was like as a Jewish woman of royal birth.'—P. 440.

Most true: the reality is eclipsed by the imaginary ideal. A few pages lower he says: 'She is so like Him, that when we describe her it sounds as if we were describing Him.' (P. 465.) That is true likewise.

'The Father crowned her by imparting His power to her; the Son His wisdom; the Holy Ghost His love. And the three Divine Persons, placing

her throne at the right of that of Jesus, declared her Sovereign of heaven and earth, and commanded the angels and all creatures to acknowledge her as their Queen, and as such to serve and obey her.'—P. 370.

Accordingly, the following doxology is occasionly in use in Spain at the end of sermons:—

'Gloria al Padre.
'Gloria al Hijo.
'Gloria al Esp'ritu Santo.
'Gloria à la Sacratisima Virgen.'

'Let us dedicate ourselves to the service of this Queen, to honour and love her as much as we can.'—P. 375.

'O great, exalted, and most glorious Lady, prostrate at the foot of thy throne, we adore thee from this valley of tears. . . . On this day, on which thou wast made Queen of the universe, we also consecrate ourselves to thy service. O Lady, change us from sinners into saints: work this miracle, which will redound more to thy honour than if thou didst restore sight to a thousand blind persons, or didst raise a thousand from the dead.'—P. 377.

We have seen that a very common Patristic explanation of the sword which was to pierce S. Mary's bosom, is the pang which she felt on the failure of her faith at the time of the crucifixion. As to the soundness of such an exposition, we express no opinion one way or another, but we notice the contrast of S. Alfonso's interpretation. Having spoken of Simeon's prophecy, he continues:—

'Whence the holy Abbot Arnold of Chartres says, "that whosoever had been present on Mount Calvary to witness the great sacrifice of the Immaculate Lamb, would there have beheld two great altars, the one in the body of Jesus, the other in the heart of Mary; for, on that mount, at the same time that the Son sacrificed His body by death, Mary sacrificed her soul by compassion."'—P. 383.

'Richard on the words of St. Paul, "For the unbelieving husband is sanctified by the believing wife," also says, "that Mary is the believing woman, by whose faith the unbelieving Adam and all his posterity are saved."'—P. 451.

'Tenth devotion in honour of Mary, To say or to hear Mass, or to have Mass said in honour of the Blessed Virgin.'—P. 492.

Mr. Faber goes far beyond this: he teaches that it is 'in accordance with sound theology, and the principles of the faith,' to maintain that in every consecrated host there is the Blessed Virgin's flesh and blood, viz.: that part which our Lord took on His Conception.[1]

We will conclude our extracts from the second part of 'the Glories,' by three Examples which are given to teach respectively 'devotion to the dolours of Mary,' and the advantages of wearing the Scapular of her dolours. The first of these, on the testimony of S. Bridget's Revelations, gives an account of a prince who 'had given himself, by an express compact, as a

[1] The Blessed Sacrament, p. 515.

'slave to the devil, and for sixty successive years had served him, 'leading such a life as may be imagined.' S. Bridget, by revelation, sent her confessor to him as he was on his death-bed, and after some time he died contrite and resigned. 'After his death 'Jesus Christ again spoke to S. Bridget, and told him that the 'sinner was saved; that he was then in purgatory; and that he 'owed his salvation to the intercession of the Blessed Virgin 'His Mother; for the deceased, although he had led so wicked a 'life, had, nevertheless, always preserved devotion to her dolours, 'and whenever he thought of them pitied her' (p. 392.) This revelation of S. Bridget is introduced in proof of a revelation of S. Elizabeth, by which the latter made known, that after her Assumption, S. Mary appeared with her Son to S. John the Evangelist while he was still on earth.

'The saint (S. John) then heard Mary ask her Son to grant some special grace to all those who are devoted to her dolours. Jesus promised her four principal ones:—1st. That those who before death invoke the Divine Mother in the name of her Saviour, *should obtain true repentance of all their sins.* 2d. That He would protect all who have this devotion in their tribulations, and that He would protect them especially at the hour of death. 3d. That He would impress upon their minds the remembrance of His passion, and that they should have their reward for it in heaven. 4th. That He would commit such devout clients to the hands of Mary, with the power to dispose of them in whatever manner she might please, and to obtain for them all the graces she might desire.'—P. 391.

S. John has failed to recount this interview in the Book of the Revelation, nor was any one aware of it, until it was narrated by Pelbertus as a revelation made to S. Elizabeth. The two Examples, illustrating the efficacy of the Scapular, are as follows:—

'A young man in Perugia promised the devil that if he would enable him to attain a sinful object he had in view, he would give him his soul; *and he gave him a written contract to this effect, signed in his own blood.* When the crime had been committed, the devil demanded the performance of the promise; and for this purpose led him to the brink of a well, at the same time threatening that if he did not throw himself in, he would drag him, body and soul, to hell. The wretched youth, thinking that it would be impossible to escape from his hands, got on the little parapet to cast himself in; but terrified at the idea of death, he told the devil that he had not courage to take the leap, but that, if he was determined on his death, he must push him in. The young man wore a Scapular of the dolours of Mary; the devil, therefore, said, "Take off that Scapular, and then I will push thee in." But the youth, discovering in the Scapular the protection still vouchsafed to him by the Divine Mother, refused to do so; and at length, after much altercation, the devil, filled with confusion, departed; and the sinner, grateful to his sorrowful Mother, went to thank her, and, penitent for his sins, presented as a votive offering to her altar, in the church of Santa Maria la Nuova, in Perugia, a picture of what had taken place.'—P. 421.

The other Example happened to a friend of S. Alfonso. He was engaged in hearing confession, when a young foreigner of noble birth came and confessed as follows:—

'Besides the other innumerable shameful crimes and murders he had committed, he said, that having entirely despaired of salvation, he committed sins no longer from inclination, but expressly to outrage God, out of the hatred he bore Him. He said, amongst other things, that he wore a crucifix, and that he beat it out of disrespect, and that that very morning, only a short time before, he had communicated sacrilegiously, and for what purpose? It was, that he might trample the sacred particle under his feet. And he had, indeed, already received it, and had only been prevented from executing his horrible design by the people who would have seen him. He then consigned the sacred particle, in a piece of paper, to the confessor. Having done this, he said, that passing before the church, he had felt himself strongly impelled to enter it; that, unable to resist, he had done so. After entering, he was seized with great remorse of conscience, and at the same time a sort of confused and irresolute desire to confess his sins: and hence the reason for which he stood before the confessional; but while standing there his confusion and diffidence was so great, that he endeavoured to go away, but it seemed to him as if some one held him there by force. "In the meantime," he said, "father, you called me, and now I am here making my confession, and I know not how." The father then asked him if he ever practised any devotion during the time; *meaning, towards the Blessed Virgin; for such conversions only come through the powerful hands of Mary.* "None, father—devotions indeed! I looked on myself as damned." "But reflect again," said the father. "Father, I did nothing," he repeated. "But, putting his hand to his breast to uncover it, he remembered that he wore the Scapular of Mary's dolours. "Ah, my son," said the confessor, "dost thou not see it is our Blessed Lady who has obtained thee so extraordinary a grace? And know," he added, "that to her this church is dedicated."'—P. 346.

The Third Part is altogether omitted in Mr. Duffy's edition. Why, we do not know. It is just like the other parts in its tone. Two or three specimens shall suffice:—

'When S. Dominic was preaching at Carcassone, in France, an Albigensian heretic, who, for having publicly ridiculed the devotion of the rosary, was possessed by devils, was brought to him. The saint then obliged the evil spirits to declare whether the things which he said about the most holy rosary were true. Howling, they replied: "Listen, Christians; all that this enemy of ours has said of Mary and of the most holy rosary is true." They, moreover, added that they had no power against the servants of Mary, and that many by invoking in death the name of Mary were saved, *contrary to their deserts.* They concluded, saying: "We are forced to declare that no one is lost who perseveres in devotion to Mary, and in that of the most holy rosary; for Mary obtains for those who are sinners true repentance before they die." S. Dominic then made the people recite the rosary; and, oh, prodigy! at every *Hail Mary*, evil spirits left the body of the possessed man, *under the form of red-hot coals*, so that when the rosary was finished, he was entirely freed. On this occasion many heretics were converted.'—P. 502.

'Blessed Father Patrizi, who had the greatest devotion to the *Hail Mary*, used to recite 500 a-day. Mary announced the hour of his death to him, and he died as a saint. After forty years a beautiful lily grew out of his mouth, and on each of the leaves was written the *Hail Mary*, in letters of gold. This lily was afterwards taken to France.'—P. 508.

So, too, there was a Cistercian lay-brother, who knew no other prayer except the *Hail Mary*, which he repeated continually; and after his death a tree grew from his grave, with *Hail Mary*,

full of grace, on its leaves. References are gravely given for these two stories to 'Bolland, xv. Maii,' and 'Ap. Crass. tom. ii. tr. 6, p. 1;' but the editor has been obliged to confess that he could not find them. We should have referred to Ovid, who tells the tale more prettily, perhaps, than any one else.

'A devout servant of Mary went one day, without telling her husband, to visit a church of our Blessed Lady, and was prevented by a storm from returning home at night. She was greatly alarmed lest her husband should be angry at it; she, however, recommended herself to Mary, and returned home, when she found her husband very kind to her, and quite in a good humour. By her inquiries she learnt that the night before the Divine Mother had taken her form, and attended to all the duties of the household as a servant. She then related all that had taken place to her husband, and they both ever afterwards had the greatest devotion to the Blessed Virgin.'—P. 515.

'A devout Virgin was in prayer, when she saw Jesus on a throne, in the act of sending a sinner to hell; but His most Holy Mother said that at one time he had honoured her, and obtained him thirty days in which to repent.' —P. 516.

'A great sinner was once in prayer at the feet of a crucifix, earnestly entreating that he might receive a sign of pardon; but not receiving it, he addressed himself to Mary in sorrow, who then appeared to him. He saw her present his tears to her Son, saying, "Son, shall these tears be lost?" He then understood that Christ had already pardoned him, and thenceforward led a holy life.'—P. 517.

'Mary is called the Gate of Heaven, because, as S. Bernardine declares, "No one can enter heaven unless by Mary, as through a door." Our Queen says, "My power is in Jerusalem." Richard of S. Lawrence adds, "*Commanding* what I will, and introducing whom I will." '—P. 588.

'Ah, my Mother, in thee do I repose my hope of eternal salvation. I love thee; do thou save me; never allow a servant of thine, who loves thee, to go to blaspheme thee in hell.'—*Ibid.*

'O Mary, thou hast to save me! Thou art my hope!'—P. 594.

'O my Queen, Mediatress of sinners, perform thy office; intercede for me. My sins shall not prevent me from trusting in thee, O great Mother of God! No, I trust in thee, and so great is my confidence, that were my salvation in my own hands, I would place it in thine. O Mary, receive me under thy protection, for that is all my desire.'—P. 599.

The book ends with forms of dedication of one's self and one's family to S. Mary, with ejaculatory prayers to her, and acclamations in her praise. The final ejaculatory prayer, 'with 'which she revealed to a devout that she was much pleased at 'being honoured by her servants,' is as follows:—

'I thank Thee, O Eternal Father, for the power given to Mary, Thy daughter. *Our Father, Hail Mary, Glory be to the Father*, &c.

'I thank Thee, O Eternal Son, for the wisdom given to Mary, Thy Mother. *Our Father, Hail Mary, Glory be to the Father*, &c.

'I thank Thee, O Eternal and Holy Spirit, for the love given to Mary, Thy Spouse. *Our Father, Hail Mary, Glory be to the Father*, &c.

'To thee do we cry, O Queen of Mercy, return, that we may behold thee dispensing favours, bestowing remedies, giving strength. Show us thy compassionate looks, and we shall be saved.

'O Sovereign Lady of all things, Saint of saints, [*splendour of the world,*[1]] glory of heaven, acknowledge those who love thee; hear us, for thy Son honours thee by denying thee nothing.

'Run, hasten, O Lady, and in thy mercy help thy sinful servant, who calls upon thee, and deliver him from the hands of the enemy.

'Who will not sigh to thee? We sigh with love and grief, for we are oppressed on every side. How can we do otherwise than sigh to thee, O solace of the miserable, refuge of outcasts, ransom of captives? We are certain that when thou seest our miseries, thy compassion will hasten to relieve us.

'O our Sovereign Lady and our Advocate, commend us to thy Son. Grant, O blessed one, by the grace which thou hast merited, that He who through thee was graciously pleased to become a partaker in our infirmity and misery, may also, through thy intercession, make us partakers in His happiness and glory.

'In thee, from my whole heart, I have placed my hope.

'It is not possible, O Lady, that thou shouldst abandon him who has placed his hopes in thee.

'Thou hast only to will our salvation, and then it is not possible that we should not obtain it.

'Hail, Daughter of God the Father! Hail, Mother of God the Son! Hail, Spouse of God the Holy Ghost!

'O Virgin! how lovely thou art!
Mother of my God, my poor heart
Is filled with affection for thee.

'Thanks be to God and to Mary.

'May all things be to the eternal glory of the most Holy Trinity, and of Immaculate Mary!

'Live always, Jesus our love, and Mary our hope, with Saint Joseph and Saint Teresa, our advocates!'—P. 619.

In contrast with this rhapsody, we transcribe the sober and reverential words of one among ourselves, leaving our readers to draw the comparison, and the conclusions which result from that comparison, for themselves:—

'We honour the Virgin Mary, we love her memory, we would, by God's grace, follow her example in faith and humility, meekness and obedience; we bless God for the wonderful work of salvation, in effecting which she was a chosen vessel; we call her a blessed saint and a holy Virgin; we cannot

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[1] These words, '*splendour of the world,*' are substituted by the Redemptorist and the Cardinal for the following, which is honestly given by the American translator: '*Our strength and refuge,* GOD, *as it were,* OF THE WORLD.' In making a translation of a book, two things are to be considered—1, honesty; 2, prudence. Those who are not under the influence of the former principle should at least have regard to the latter. It was, surely, very imprudent of Cardinal Wiseman, Archbishop Hughes, the Redemptorist Father, Mr. Duffy, and Mr. Dunigan, not to agree between themselves which passages they would alter. As it is, one is convicted by another. In the standard French edition of Liguori's works, published in Paris in the year 1842, by a Society of Ecclesiastics, and edited by the Abbés Vidal, Delaille, and Bousquet, the words are as follows: *Domina rerum, Sancta sanctorum virtus nostra et refugium, Deus mundi, gloria cœli.* In the Sermon *Super Salve,* wherein the words occur, which is found in the Appendix to S. Bernard's works, the reading is *decus mundi.* But the editors of Liguori have nothing to do with what the unknown author of that sermon wrote, but only with what Liguori wrote.

doubt of her eternal happiness through the merits of Him who was "God of the substance of His Father before the world, and man of the substance of His mother born in the world." But we cannot address religious praises to her; we cannot trust in her merits, or intercession, or advocacy, for our acceptance with God; we cannot invoke her for any blessing, temporal or spiritual; we cannot pray to God through her intercession, or for it. This in us would be sin. We pray to God alone; we offer religious praise, our spiritual sacrifices, to God alone; we trust in God alone; we need no other mediator, we apply to no other mediator, intercessor, or advocate, in the unseen world, but Jesus Christ alone, the Son of God and the Son of Man. In this faith, we implore God alone, for the sake only of His Son, to keep us steadfast unto death; and in the full assurance of the belief that this faith is founded on the Apostles and Prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being the chief corner-stone, we will endeavour, by the blessing of the Eternal Shepherd and Bishop of souls, to preserve the same faith, as our Church now professes it, whole and undefiled, and to deliver it down, without spot or stain of superstition, to our children's children, as their best inheritance for ever.'—*Tyler*, p. 391.

We have now to consider the morality of this teaching. That S. Alfonso was personally a devout man, we do not doubt; that his desire was to make others likewise devout, we as little question. Yet the tendency of his teaching is Antinomian in the extreme. We do not now refer to his Moral Theology,—'the saint's *mild theology*,' which, as Cardinal Wiseman congratulates us, now 'influences every confessional in England,'—but to the book with which we are at present dealing. The practical doctrine of the book is summed up in the Franciscan Brother's vision of the white and red ladders leading from earth to heaven: the latter being the ladder of Jesus Christ, by which men could not mount; the former that of the Blessed Virgin, by which they safely reached heaven. S. Alfonso has found an easier way of salvation than Christ the Way (p. 200); another door beside Christ the Door (p. 588); another mediator beside Christ the Mediator (p. 275); another intercessor beside Christ the Intercessor (p. 129); another advocate beside Christ the Advocate (p. 144); another redeemer beside Christ the Redeemer (p. 275); another saviour beside Christ the Saviour (p. 343). But what we have especially to note at present is, that salvation by Mary is *easier* than salvation by Christ. Salvation is to be had by Christ (so that it be dispensed by Mary), but it is a hard thing—the ladder is red; and though men try and try again, still, after having mounted a few steps, they fall off, for none stretches out a hand to help, though Christ stands looking down from the top. Then they have recourse to the white ladder, and our Blessed Lady—all tenderness, all mercy, all affection—at once extends to them her loving aid, and they are safe. Now, putting aside the wrong thus done to the yearning sympathies of Him who is our Brother, by whom we are brought nigh to the mercies of our Abba Father, let us ask ourselves what must be the practical moral tendencies of this teaching? Surely, that men in general will give up

attempting to reach God's presence by the hard, rough ways which Christ requires, by faith, and love, and obedience, and self-denial for Christ's sake, and trust to the easier path pointed out to them. Add to this, that S. Mary is represented as especially the advocate of sinners as such (p. 157). Those whom the justice of Christ rejects, are accepted and succoured by the mercy of Mary (p. 131). Those who are faithful clients of Mary cannot be lost (p. 183.) This is, then, the first step—there is an easier and a surer way than that by Christ; and being easier, it will most surely be followed by the majority.

But yet this way, easier though it is, may still be too hard; devotion to Mary may be too much to require. Can a man remain in sin, and yet be safe by means of a third way? Yes; he need not have true devotion of the heart even to Mary: all that he has to do is, to keep up a form of external addresses and compliments to her, and as long as he does that, he is safe from the devil. This is proved by the example of the lawyer and the monkey (p. 181), and many others. But it may be thought that, though safe for the time, still he may be finally lost. No, this is impossible. It is true that morality and Christianity alike teach that the effect of continuing in sin is, that the heart becomes hardened, and so repentance at length next to impossible. But, according to this system, no such dread need be entertained by the sinner. Witness the promise made by our Lord in the hearing of S. John the Evangelist, that all 'who before death 'invoked the Divine Mother in the name of her sorrows, should 'obtain true repentance of all their sins' (p. 391); and the Example of the man who had been serving the devil as his slave by express compact for sixty years, and yet was moved to contrition, and saved at the intercession of S. Mary, because, 'although he had led so wicked a life, he had nevertheless 'always preserved devotion to her dolours, and whenever he 'thought of them pitied her' (p. 392). Again, experience and Christianity alike teach that a man may be cut off in the midst of deadly sin, and no time given him for repentance. No such dread has to be entertained by the sinner who offers an external form of devotion to S. Mary. Such an one is either kept alive on earth, that he may have the means of repenting—witness the example of the two students in Flanders, both equally guilty, but one saved alive because he said some Hail Marys without devotion and half asleep; the other damned because he did not (p. 190)—or, supposing that he is hurried away by death, still he is saved from hell; S. Mary sends him back again to earth, like the deacon Adelman (p. 188), or a canon, who was drowned in the Seine, but sent back from hell because, though he was in mortal sin, he nevertheless was praising Mary when he fell into the river (p. 519). Or, if not sent back for years like the

canon, 'to propagate devotion to the Immaculate Conception,' still his soul is kept out of hell on earth, like the skeleton mentioned by Pelbertus (p. 189), or Alexandra's head (p. 197); or a robber's head in Normandy (p. 506). This, then, is the second step in making easy that which God has not made easy.

There is still a third step. Hitherto it has only been proved that those who are devout to S. Mary, or who keep up a form of devotion in her honour, are sure of final salvation, however sinful their lives may be; but suppose that people will not be devout even to S. Mary, and are too careless to keep up even a mechanical habit of saying *Hail Mary* each day, is there no other way still easier for them? There is: they must put on the Scapular of Mary's dolours: then they are quite safe from the devil in this life, though they have sold their souls to him, and signed the contract in their own blood, as proved by the Example of the young man in Perugia (p. 421); they will receive the gift of repentance—witness the young nobleman who carried about the crucifix in order to beat it (p. 346); they are quite safe from the devil in the next life, for S. Mary promised S. Simon Stock, that 'whoever died clothed with it should not suffer eternal flames' (p. 485); they are quite safe from a lengthened suffering in Purgatory, because S. Mary will come down and take them out on the very next Saturday after their deaths, as testified by Pope John XXII., Pope Alexander V., Pope Clement VII., Pope Pius V., and Pope Gregory XIII.[1]

We will not trace this subject further. We have shown that S. Alfonso de' Liguori's system is an exaggeration of the exaggerations of Bonaventure and the two Bernardines. We have shown that his system is fully sanctioned by the whole weight of the authority of the Church of Rome, and, indeed, that the latter has shot far ahead of him into still wilder exaggerations since the 8th of December last. We have shown that it is totally different from, and opposed to, the doctrine of the Christian Church for the first five hundred years. We have shown that it has grown up by help of spurious quotations and false revelations, and we cannot see where it is to stop. We have shown further, that if a man desired to remain in sin and yet to reach heaven at last, this system is just such as would encourage him in his evil course of life, by making easy that which God has not made easy, and discovering a less self-denying Way than that of Jesus whereby to arrive at final salvation.

Had we space, we might point out the wrong done to the

[1] Pope Paul V. has added two more conditions to that of wearing the Scapular to insure being taken out of purgatory the Saturday after death, viz., chastity, and saying the little office of the blessed Virgin, or, if the last is too much, keeping the fasts of the Church, and abstaining on Wednesdays; but S. Mary is not narrated to have added these conditions when she appeared to Pope John XXII. and made the promise.

character of her who was highly favoured and blessed among women, by representing her as actuated by such fantastic notions as those on which she is supposed to act, without regard to either right or justice—nay, in contradiction to them (pp. 216, 502). And, still more, we might grieve over the picture, not only of our Abba Father, but of Him who loved us, and gave Himself for us—our Brother—the tender sympathies of whose human heart, we read, were moved even to tears at his brethren's sufferings. But these are points rather for our readers to meditate over than for us to enlarge upon in these pages. We will but add the eloquent and touching words of one of the deepest thinkers of the day, embodying conclusions which he drew from his experience of Italy, and the system there practically prevalent.

'The beautiful conception of the Virgin,' writes Mr. Gladstone, 'as affording the tenderness and intensity of feminine sympathies to be our medium of communication with the transcendent glory of the Son, disguises a reality of infinite danger. It is the very reverse of the method taken with children, which hides bitter but wholesome drugs under some sweet confection :—

'Succhi amari ingannato ei beve
E dall' inganno suo vita riceve.'

For here poison is carried to the lips under an exterior the most attractive. The practical upshot, though I cannot believe it to be, even in the extremest case, the conscious intention, of the whole is a tendency infinitely various in degree, but sometimes direct and absolute, to extrude our Saviour, in the view of the believer, from many or even all of His redeeming functions, and to leave Him only in the stern unapproachable character of a Judge. To her will, by some strange process, the effectuation of His coming is referred, as if it had been not an instrument merely, but a cause. The habitual communion with Him into whose Body we have been incorporated by Baptism, and who, through the medium of that Body, becomes the sustenance of our daily life, is made to pass through the intervention of her person. The constant application of His Blood and merits, whereby alone we can for a moment stand in the place of sons, and realize the spirit of adoption, is exhibited as dependent on her prayers, to which we are to resort for habitual aid. In short, she is practically exhibited as the Way, and He as the Truth and the Life, mainly or even alone approachable by that way. Hence it is, that common devotion seems to revert naturally to her in a thousand secondary forms, where to us it would seem that the privileges of the covenant, as well as the necessities of our condition, carry us directly to our Redeemer . . . . As though all human sympathy were not absolute deadness in comparison with the exquisite sensibility of Him, whom in all things it behoved to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High-priest, touched with the feeling of our infirmities, in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. As though all human love were not shallowness itself in comparison with the unexplored profoundness of those yearnings of affection, which, with more power than superstition ever ascribed to magic charms, did draw down the sun of heaven from its throne, did clothe the Very and Eternal Word with the form of a servant, with the likeness of men, so that He humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the Cross. As if the Maker of woman did not possess in inexhaustible abundance those treasures of tenderness from and out of whose overflow it is that He has adorned the loveliest of His works.' —*Church Principles*, vii. 34, 35.

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AN EXAMINATION

OF THE

REV. R. I. WILBERFORCE'S CHARGES AGAINST

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,

CONTAINED IN HIS

'INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF CHURCH AUTHORITY.'

AN ARTICLE REPRINTED FROM

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE

REV. R. I. WILBERFORCE'S CHARGES AGAINST

THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND,[1]

&c.

THERE is nothing new in the present 'Inquiry' except its name. We doubt if there is a single fact or thought contained in its pages which has not previously appeared in one or the other of Mr. Allies' two works on the same subject. Indeed the whole book may be said to be an expansion of the Preface to Mr. Allies' 'See of St. Peter.' At the same time, though Mr. Wilberforce has brought forward no new facts, and has discovered no new principle to give an altered complexion to facts previously known, his present book is by no means deficient in merits of its own. It is excellently arranged. A theory is put forward, and facts are marshalled in such a way as to fit in with the theory as well as is possible. Whether this has been done fairly or unfairly, whether counterbalancing facts have been duly noticed or omitted, whether the facts which are selected have been stated with all their qualifying circumstances, or whether they have been so strung together as to lead a reader to draw a conclusion from them different from that which in themselves they would naturally suggest, are points which we propose presently to consider.

Besides the merit of arrangement, Mr. Wilberforce has also the advantage over Mr. Allies in good-temper. Mr. Allies was full of his feelings as a 'free man,' of the 'infamy,' 'degradation,'

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[1] 1. *An Inquiry into the Principles of Church-authority; or, Reasons for recalling my Subscription to the Royal Supremacy. By* R. I. WILBERFORCE, M.A. London: Longmans. 1854. Pp. 284.

2. *Papal Supremacy tested by Antiquity. By the late* Rev. JAMES MEYRICK, M.A. London: Longmans. 1855. Pp. 84.

'naked infidelity' of Anglicanism: the 'virus of the Reformation' was 'flagrant;' and the English Church was a 'hideous phantom.' Nothing of this sort is found in Mr. Wilberforce. There is one quiet hit at Dr. Wordsworth (p. 17) and another at the Queen (p. 279): otherwise personalities are avoided. Again, Mr. Allies began by showing his teeth in the first page, and by setting his reader as 'a Protestant' at the extremest point of opposition to himself the 'Catholic.' More wisely Mr. Wilberforce begins with what his reader is likely to hold with himself,—'You 'believe in the Church—you believe that the Church hath 'authority in controversies of faith—you believe the Episcopate 'to be the medium of Church authority—you think a Hierarchy 'useful—you don't object to acknowledging a certain kind of 'Primacy—won't you hold the Supremacy?' This is more telling than Mr. Allies' fashion; not that one way or the other way ought in reason to have influence with a man of clear thought; but we know that we are all more disposed to go along with one who takes us for a part of the journey in the direction in which we are desirous of travelling, and we are less likely to mark the slight divergence of his and our path at the outset, than when it is prominently brought before us, that the spots to which they lead are thousands of miles apart.

Setting out on this principle, Mr. Wilberforce avoids startling his reader in his first chapters. His weapon here is exaggeration. For example, it is true that the Church is not 'a mere congeries of individuals,' and that it does 'possess a collective character;' but to illustrate this Mr. Wilberforce uses a metaphor which will naturally lead the mind to accept the doctrine of development: 'By a wall is meant a certain arrangement of 'bricks, which, when united, are nothing more than bricks still, 'but a tree is not merely a congeries of ligneous particles, but 'implies the presence of a certain principle of life which com-'bines them into a collective whole' (p. 2). Mr. Wilberforce's first proposition should not be established on a metaphor which does not only suggest the idea which is needed, but adds to it another idea to which Mr. Wilberforce finds it necessary to have recourse in his after pages (p. 99, &c.). Again—as specimens of the same method—in the second, third, and fourth chapters we find propositions laid down and elaborately proved, with which we heartily agree, but before Mr. Wilberforce leaves them he pushes them on into being something quite different from what they were when he started with them. For example, because we hold with Mr. Wilberforce that 'the Church hath authority in controversies of faith' (p. 7), and 'that the Church is a witness to truth, and also that in matters of conscience its authorities have a claim to attention' (p. 8), we are not therefore bound to cast aside all those other means of arriv-

ing at truth which a greater than Mr. Wilberforce has enumerated, viz. Holy Scripture, Tradition, Catholicity, Learning, Antiquity, the National faith, Common sense, natural Perception of right and wrong, the Affections, the Imagination, Reason, and the like.[1] Yet this is involved in the assertion which we arrive at in p. 37, that the principle on which the belief in Church-authority depends is 'that the Divine Spirit, which has its dwelling in the collective body,' (he means, as the context shows, '*qua* dwelling in the collective body,') 'is our *sole* guide in the things of God.' We can contemplate the union in one person of the two characters of a reasonable and reasoning individual Christian and a deferential Churchman.

Again, we can believe that it is to the early Church that we owe the settlement of the canon of Holy Scripture, and we can feel assured, upon that evidence of probability which is by God's dispensation our only guide except in matters of science and revelation, that the canon there fixed, as distinct from that accepted at Trent or elsewhere, is the true canon, and yet we need not see in this act a proof of the inspiration of the Church, and then upon the inspiration thus proved, build up the theory of infallibility, 'that gift of spiritual discernment which had 'dwelt originally in the person of our Lord, and had been 'bestowed upon the Apostles' (p. 98). The account left us by Eusebius is entirely inconsistent with the theory that the Church settled the canon by a spiritual discernment and distinctly inspired judgment, rather than because it was 'nearer to the age of the Apostles than ourselves' (p. 28). Mr. Wilberforce builds a great deal on this act of the Church, but there are two objections to his view. The first is the historical evidence, which is to be found throughout the pages of Eusebius, that the early Christians used the ordinary rules of criticism and inquiry in making up their minds as to what were and what were not inspired books. And the second difficulty is that, supposing

[1] Prophetical Office of the Church, p. 158. 'Most men try to dispense with one or other of these divine informants; and for this reason,—because it is difficult to combine them. The lights they furnish, coming from various quarters, cast separate shadows, and partially intercept each other; and it is pleasanter to walk without doubt and without shade, than to have to choose what is best and safest. The Romanist would simplify matters by removing Reason, Scripture, and Antiquity, and depending mainly upon Church-authority; the Calvinist relies on Reason, Scripture, and Criticism, to the disparagement of the Moral sense, the Church, Tradition, and Antiquity; the Latitudinarian relies on Reason, with Scripture in subordination; the Mystic on the feelings and affections, or what is commonly called the heart; the Politician takes the national faith as sufficient, and cares for little else; the man of the world acts by common sense, which is the oracle of the careless; the Popular Religionist considers the authorized version of Scripture to be all in all. But the true Catholic Christian is he who takes what God has given him, be it greater or less; despises not the lesser because he has received the greater, yet puts it not before the greater, but uses all duly and to God's glory.'—P. 160.

Mr. Wilberforce's foundation true, still he could not build upon it the doctrine of infallible discrimination *in dogma*, but *in matters of fact*, which proves too much, for he rejects the opinion 'that the Holy Ghost has been given to the Church to enable 'her to judge about matters of fact' (p. 33).

Once more, we can believe that it was quite right that eating of blood should be allowed, and that the observance of the Jewish law should be prohibited, in the time of S. Augustine, without being driven to the conclusion, that the Church had power to abrogate Apostolic decrees handed down in Scripture, and that the principle on which she possessed this power was, that her authority was equal to that of the Apostles. We can believe that such decrees were intended to be temporary, and that when the necessity for them ceased they thereupon ceased, without equalizing the power of those who determined that the necesssity for them was now passed with that of the holy Apostles who instituted them. (p. 25).

This method of exaggeration is the peculiar vice of Mr. Wilberforce's mind. He lays down one principle, traces it out to its conclusion, and becomes enslaved to it. He cannot see the force of a counteracting principle: he does not make allowance for the limiting and controlling power of other truths equally certain with that which he is pursuing to its consequences.

This is shown in his doctrine concerning Councils. We believe that the Holy Spirit's guidance is present in the Councils of the Church. We also believe that these Councils are constituted by fallible men. Mr. Wilberforce can see no way of reconciling these two doctrines, except by regarding the Council as a mere mouth-piece of the Holy Ghost, in the same way that the prophets of old were His penmen—having 'that peculiar 'authority which belongs to them through the promises and 'indwelling of the Holy Ghost' (p. 79); 'possessed of a living 'power through the presence of the Holy Ghost, who was 'believed to dwell in them' (p. 76); like the Church itself, 'possessed of a being and action which was irrespective of the 'will of its individual members, and was impressed upon it by 'some higher authority' (p. 2); 'guided in interpretation, not 'by logical argumentation, but by the Spirit of God' (p. 36). This theory, and more than this, is, of course, necessary for a Church which presumes to coin a new doctrine in the nineteenth century of the Christian era. But nothing can be well more opposed to the teaching of Vincentius Lirinensis[1] (an

[1] 'The sacred Council held almost three years since at Ephesus ... in which disputation being had of authorizing rules of faith, lest there might, by chance, some profane novelty creep in, as happened at that perfidious meeting of Ariminum, this was thought the most Catholic, faithful, and best course to be taken, by all the Priests there present, which were about 200 in number, that the opinion of

author of whom Mr. Wilberforce carefully avoids mention, though dealing often with the same subject, which he discussed at the beginning of the fifth century), and of S. Augustine:[1] nor does it account for facts. A different view may perhaps be less striking, and less simple, but not therefore the less true. But we hasten over these points, and similar exaggerations of truths spread through the early chapters—not even tempted to linger for the purpose of throwing back the parallel of the Donatists (p. 81), which Bishop Andrewes has long since shown to be applicable not to ourselves, but to the *exclusive* Roman Church.[2] We are anxious, without further delay, to reach ground where we can meet Mr. Wilberforce front to front.

There are four propositions, which, when we have removed all that is extraneous and ornamental, stand out conspicuous as directed against the position of the English Church:—

1. That after the ascension of the Lord, S. Peter was, by Divine appointment, the head and centre of unity to the Apostles and Disciples, as specially representing Christ.

2. That after the death of S. Peter, the Bishops of Rome

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these holy Fathers should be brought forth, of whom it was certain that some of them had been martyrs, some confessors, and that all had lived and died Catholic Priests, that *by their consent and verdict*, the true religion of *ancient* doctrine might be duly and solemnly confirmed, and the blasphemy of profane novelty condemned: which, being so done, that impious Nestorius was worthily and justly judged to have taught contrary to the old Catholic Faith, and blessed Cyril to have agreed with holy and sacred antiquity.'—Common. c. 29.

[1] 'Even as respects plenary Councils themselves, earlier ones are often improved upon by later, when experience lays open that which was hidden, and makes known that which was concealed.'—De Baptism. c. Don. 4. Were a Council simply the mouth-piece of the Holy Spirit, no 'experience' of its members could have any effect on its decisions.

[2] 'We plainly acknowledge the Catholic Church, as spread everywhere through all lands, nor will we allow that it is bound down to any spot nor circumscribed by any boundaries. But your Pope dares not thus speak—he dares not even use the word *Catholic* without adding *Roman* to it; but by adding *Roman* he overthrows *Catholic*, as though belief were expressed in what is not confined to any spot, and yet was confined to a certain spot. *Roman-Catholic* is the same as saying *particular-universal* or *part-whole*,—it is shutting up the world in a city. A man who believes this is no Catholic,—he is a Donatist, for as they used to believe in an *African-Catholic* Church, so you, who are in every respect similar to them, believe in a *Roman-Catholic* Church. And, as theirs was not the Catholic Church, because it was African, but only Donatus's party, so yours is not the Catholic Church, because it is Roman, but only the Pope's party.'—Tortura Torti, p. 369.

'"The Roman Church," says the Cardinal, "has got the name of Catholic." What! a part got the name of the whole, an individual got the name of its species! Let him tell that to his own ἰδιῶται! for any one who has the least smattering of learning recognises this claim at once as having a sound of Donatus, who said that Christ had deserted the rest of the world, *et in meridie cubare et pascere*, and was not to be found anywhere else except in Donatus's party. Donatus's assertion, however, is the least objectionable of the two, for he did leave a whole quarter of the globe to Christ, and did not thrust Him into one ruined city. The Cardinal is the worst, in so far as Rome is smaller than Africa.'—Responsio ad Bellarminum, p. 164.

were, by like appointment, as inheriting S. Peter's privileges, the head and centre of unity to the Christian Church.

3. That the Bishops of Rome filled this position at first as Primates, afterwards as Monarchs; the Primacy and Supremacy being 'the same power under a different name, and in altered circumstances.'

4. That in the sixteenth century the English Church rejected this divinely-constituted head and centre of Christendom, and assumed the King or Queen of England as the head and centre of unity, thereby cutting herself off from the Church Catholic.

These are the fewest propositions to which Mr. Wilberforce's argument can be reduced, and it is clear that every one of them is necessary for its validity. If he fails in his proof of the first, the three others fall to the ground; and in like manner the second is necessary for the third and fourth—the third for the fourth; and if he fails in proving the fourth, he has failed in that for which all the rest were but steps. It would be enough, therefore, for us to choose out any one of these propositions, and disprove it. Our purpose, however, is to show, with respect to *each one of them*, these two things—1st, that Mr. Wilberforce has not proved his statement; and 2ndly, that the statement is untrue.

I. The first thing, then, that we have to do is, to show that Mr. Wilberforce has not proved that after our Lord's ascension S. Peter was, by Divine appointment, the head and centre of unity to the Apostles and Disciples, as specially representing Christ, but that the statement here adduced is a false statement.

The obvious course of proof on Mr. Wilberforce's part would be to appeal at once to Scripture, and show from the Gospels that S. Peter was to be the centre of unity to his brethren, and from the Acts and the Epistles that the Church did actually revolve round him. But before making this attempt, Mr. Wilberforce goes on for 250 years, and lays the foundations of his theory in a passage of S. Cyprian—then returns and endeavours to show that the theory so discovered can be made good from Scripture. This course does not exhibit much confidence in the testimony of Scripture, but yet, were it fairly done, we should not find fault with it; but we are constrained to say that it is not fairly done.

Having quoted some passages of S. Cyprian, all of which we shall presently give, Mr. Wilberforce comments as follows:—

'Such are the statements of the earliest writer on the unity of the Church. He supposed that the whole body of Christ was intended to be one; that its unity was to be of a practical kind, enabling it to speak with authority on all questions which should arise; that its utterance was to be through the consentient determination of all its Bishops; and, finally, (which is the point immediately before us) that their co-operation was secured by that peculiar commission which St. Peter had received, antece-

dently to the general commission to all the Apostles. And this Primacy he supposed to be inherited by the Bishop of Rome, as occupying the "seat of St. Peter," "the principal Church," "the root and mother" of all the rest. Here, then, is a principle, by which that arrangement under Metropolitans and Patriarchs, which constituted the original organization of the Church, as it was instituted by the Holy Apostles, might receive its completion. For if the mutual interdependence among these several authorities issued in a relation to a single head, it was possible to obviate those disputes, which must necessarily arise, so long as the various parts were wholly independent.'—P. 105.

There is a strange number of inaccuracies in this passage, and, we regret to say, not only in this passage. It is stated first, that according to S. Cyprian the co-operation of all the Bishops of the Church was secured by S. Peter's commission.—S. Cyprian makes no such statement. It is stated next, that according to S. Cyprian, S. Peter received a peculiar commission antecedently to the general commission to all the Apostles.—S. Cyprian makes no such statement, but denies it. It is stated next, that S. Cyprian supposed that 'this Primacy,' (*i. e.* that by which unity is secured,) is inherited by the Bishops of Rome.—S. Cyprian makes no statement from which such a 'supposition' of his could be gathered. It is stated next, that S. Cyprian calls the Church of Rome 'the root and mother of all the rest.'—S. Cyprian does not use the expression 'the root and mother of all the rest' of the Churches, at all; and the expression, 'the root and womb of the Catholic Church,' which he does use, he does not apply to the Church of Rome.

It is stated next, that the arrangement under Metropolitans and Patriarchs was the original organization of the Church instituted by the holy Apostles. Mr. Wilberforce has no grounds for stating that Metropolitans or Patriarchs were instituted by the Apostles beyond his private conjecture. The only necessary elements of Church government are Bishops, Priests, and Deacons. The hierarchy is an arrangement, and a most useful arrangement for ecclesiastical convenience, but it might be swept away at any moment, not without much inconvenience, yet without any injury to the Church in its essential constitution.

It is stated further, that 'disputes must necessarily arise 'without a single head,' and a page or two before, Mr. Wilberforce speaks of the 'obvious evil, that the Episcopate had certain inde-'pendent heads who were *as likely* to differ as the worldly leaders 'of different countries.' What! This body of which Mr. Wilberforce has such exalted views that he regards the Holy Ghost as dwelling in it in the same sense as He dwelt in our Lord Himself (p. 52)?—this collective Episcopate which he holds to have been endowed with that *grace and truth* with which the Only-begotten of the Father was full (p. 56)? Were the heads of this body, bound thus together by the internal cohesion of the

spirit of love, *as likely* to differ as the heads of different countries? Could not that 'collective body of Bishops, in which the authority of the Church resides, as inheriting that gift of spiritual discernment which had dwelt originally in the person of our Lord, and had been bestowed upon the Apostles—bestowed in common and exercised by each as the representative of all'—could not such a body as this fail to quarrel unless prevented by external coercion? Mr. Wilberforce must either give up his lofty views of the nature of the Church, or he must cease to speak of any such form of constitution as monarchy being *necessary* for the preservation of its harmony. *A priori* assumptions of necessity, frequently as they appear in his pages, are wholly out of place on such a subject.

It is stated lastly, that without 'relation to a single head,' 'the various parts were *wholly independent.*' They were not wholly independent; they were bound together by that spirit of love which Mr. Wilberforce recognises as dwelling in the Church. They were bound together by that 'one Episcopate which is extended through the accordant multiplicity of many Bishops[1] (p. 72), that '*Episcopatus unus, cujus a singulis in solidum pars tenetur*[2] (*Ibid*); by that system of Metropolitans, Primates, Exarchs, Patriarchs, which Mr. Wilberforce has just declared himself to believe was instituted by the Apostles; and lastly, by their dependence upon the one and only true Head of the Church, the Lord JESUS CHRIST.

We thus find in the compass of fourteen lines one mistranslation, four misstatements, one conjecture asserted as a fact, one assumption, one exaggeration, and finally a grave omission of counterbalancing facts and statements. This is not the way for a theologian to gain the confidence of his readers. And we must say here, that before we have done, we shall have other mistranslations, misstatements, conjectures, assumptions, exaggerations, and omissions to point out. We now return to the first of these misstatements, for the purpose of showing that Mr. Wilberforce was not justified in declaring that S. Cyprian teaches, that 'a certain prerogative was bestowed upon S. Peter with a view to *maintaining* the oneness of the body of Christ' (p. 103). This assertion he founds on the passage with which 'S. Cyprian opens his treatise on the Unity of the Church.'

'St. Cyprian opens his treatise on the Unity of the Church by reference to a certain prerogative, which he supposes to have been bestowed upon St. Peter, with a view of maintaining the oneness of the body of Christ. "The Lord saith unto Peter, I say unto thee (saith He) that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it. And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of

[1] S. Cyprian, Ep. 55, 20. [2] S. Cyp. De Unitate, p. 107. Ed. Fell.

Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound also in Heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth, shall be loosed in Heaven." To him again, after His resurrection, He says, "Feed My sheep." *Upon [him being] one He builds His Church; and though He gives to all the Apostles an equal power*, and says, as my Father sent me, even so send I you; receive ye the Holy Ghost: whosesoever sins ye remit, they shall be remitted to him, and whosesoever sins ye retain, they shall be retained;" *yet in order to manifest unity, He [has] by His own authority so placed the source of the same authority [unity] as to begin from one. Certainly the other Apostles also were what Peter was, endued with an equal fellowship both of power and honour; but a commencement is made from unity, that the Church may be set before us as one;* which one Church in the Song of Songs, doth the Holy Spirit design and name in the person of our Lord. My dove, my spotless one, is but one; she is the only one of her mother-elect of her that bare her. He who holds not this unity of the Church, does he think that he holds the faith?'—P. 103.

Now, in this passage, supposing even that it were rightly translated, which is not the case,[1] we are unable to see one word about *maintaining* unity. We see two things stated very plainly: 1. That all the other Apostles had equality of power and of honour with S. Peter, so that they were what Peter was; whence it follows that, in the writer's view, S. Peter had no special prerogatives whatever, and no peculiar commission, but all the Apostles were alike that which S. Peter was, all partners with equal shares in respect to power and to honour, *hoc erant ceteri quod fuit Petrus, pari consortio præditi et honoris et potestatis.* And we see it stated, 2. That for the purpose of *manifesting* the Church's unity, in order that the Church *might be set before us, or exhibited, as being one Church*,[2] Christ built the Church upon one, and that he established the origin of unity from one. But to do something for the purpose of showing forth the excellence, and give a lesson, of unity, is one thing—to institute an office for maintaining unity is another thing. The first is what S. Cyprian held; the second is what Mr. Wilberforce attributes to him. Our Lord *manifests and sets before* us humility in washing his disciples' feet: he does not institute the office of feet-washing for the purpose of *maintaining and securing* humility.

The truth is that S. Cyprian, with every other doctor of the Catholic Church, before the Decretals of Isidore were forged and the Church was rent, teaches as plainly as words can teach, that all the Apostles received whatever S. Peter received, and that all Bishops have alike inherited from them. If the Church

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[1] Instead of 'Upon *him being* one He builds His Church' it ought to be 'Upon one He builds His Church.' The idea is changed by the two words gratuitously introduced. And, instead of '*He has* by His own authority *so placed the source of the same authority* as to begin from one,' it ought to be '*He established* by His authority *the origin of the same unity*, beginning from one.' The meaning of 'Doth the Holy Spirit design and name in the person of our Lord' is 'the Holy Spirit speaking in the person of our Lord, designates, and says.'—*See Appendix.*

[2] Ut Ecclesia una monstretur.

was built on one, it was built on all; if the keys were given to one, they were given to all. This doctrine being held as an axiom, they further proceeded to inquire, what might have been the reason why it was to *one* especially that our Lord first promised a gift, which promise was to be fulfilled by His bestowing it upon *all* alike. Reverently musing on the subject, they very generally came to the conclusion, that this was done in order to give a lesson that those powers which were delivered to them in common should yet be exercised in unity. This is a subject on which the great African teachers loved to dwell; and S. Augustine, who never passes by the slightest event recorded in Scripture without seeking to find its meaning, brings this point forward again and again. 'When Christ speaks to one, unity is commended;'[1] (that is, Christ speaks to one to show the excellence of unity,) is the thought again and again repeated by him. S. Cyprian's is the same idea, and from S. Cyprian no doubt S. Augustine inherited it. Our own Hammond has a thought very similar, though not identical:—

'The applying the words particularly to S. Peter hath one special energy in it, and concludes that the ecclesiastical power of economy or stewardship in Christ's house, of which the keys are the token, belongs to single persons, such as S. Peter was, and not only to consistories or assemblies; that whatsoever S. Peter acted by virtue of Christ's power then promised, he should be fully able to act himself, without the conjunction of any other; and that what he then did *clave non errante*, no one or more men on earth could rescind without him, which is a just ground for placing the power ecclesiastical in single persons, and not in communities—in the Prelate of each Church, and not in the Presbyters."[2]

Thus, in this circumstance, Hammond sees inculcated the authority of the power of the single Bishop; SS. Cyprian and Augustine see the unity of the Episcopate, and of the Church, commended. Both lessons may, we doubt not, be profitably drawn from it, but we cannot find, nor did S. Cyprian teach, that any 'prerogative was bestowed on S. Peter for maintaining the oneness of the body of Christ.'

Having founded his theory upon the passage which has been quoted and considered, Mr. Wilberforce confirms it from S. Cyprian's other writings; and also adduces the passages on which he establishes his two next misstatements, viz. that the Bishops of Rome, according to S. Cyprian, inherited that Primacy by which the cooperation of Bishops was secured, and that the Church of Rome is called by him 'the root and mother of all the rest.'

'This general statement respecting the office of St. Peter, is borne out by the repeated assertions which St. Cyprian makes in his letters, both that St. Peter possessed such a preeminence, and that it had been bestowed upon

[1] S. Aug. tom. v. 1196. Ed. Migne. [2] On Schism, p. 243. Oxf. 1849.

him for the purpose of preserving the Church's unity. "For to Peter, on whom He built His Church, and from whom He caused the principle of unity to take shape and form, did our Lord first give that power, that what was bound [loosed] on earth should be bound [loosed] in heaven." It was Peter, then, "on whom the Church was built by our Lord." He it was "whom our Lord chose as first, and on whom He built His Church," and who "had the Primacy." In another letter he complains that certain malcontents from Africa "dare to sail to the see of Peter, and to the principal Church, whence sacerdotal unity has arisen." But they forget, he adds, that the parties whom they designed to mislead, "were those Romans whose faith was praised by the Apostle, to whom perfidy (*i.e.* faithlessness in doctrine) cannot make its approach." For the Bishop of Rome, according to him, was St. Peter's successor; Cornelius, he says, was chosen to be Pope at a time when "the place of Fabianus, that is, the place of Peter, and the rank of the sacerdotal chair was vacant." He speaks of the Church of Rome as "the root and mother of the Catholic Church," and says that to communicate with its Bishop was "the same thing as to communicate with the Catholic Church." For, "there is one Church, which was founded by Christ our Lord upon Peter, on the principle, and by the law of unity." And during the vacancy of the see of Rome, he appears to recognise the claim to superintendence which was set up by its presbyters, because they say, "it is incumbent upon us, who appear to be put in authority, to guard the flock in place of its pastor." Neither does his correspondent, Firmilian, though exhibiting the utmost hostility against St. Stephen, the existing Bishop of Rome, deny what he states to be St. Stephen's assertion, that "he holds the succession of Peter, on whom was laid the foundations of the Church;" and again, that "he has, by succession, the chair of Peter."'—P. 104.

We have already seen that it is necessary to watch Mr. Wilberforce's extracts with jealousy. This will appear more evident when we have examined the present passage. The first extract is taken from the 73rd Epistle of S. Cyprian. We give the passage at greater length, and with greater accuracy:—

'For to Peter, *in the first place*, on whom he built the Church, and from whom he appointed and shewed forth the origin of unity, the Lord gave that power that whatsoever *he should loose* on earth should be loosed in heaven. *And He speaks to the Apostles* after the resurrection also, saying, As my Father, &c. *Whence we learn*'—what? that S. Peter was the centre of unity? No, but—'that they only who are set over the Church, and are appointed by the law of the Gospel and the ordinance of the Lord, may lawfully baptize and give remission of sins . . . . . that no one can usurp to himself against Bishops and Priests what is not in his own right and power."[1]

Then S. Cyprian did see an exclusive prerogative granted by the words of our Lord; but was it the prerogative of S. Peter? No, it was the prerogative which was received in common by the one Episcopate and priesthood, of which S. Peter was at a particular moment the symbol.

The words of the second extract are repeated in the third,—

'They say that herein they follow ancient custom . . . but we must not

[1] S. Cyp. Ep. 73, 7, p. 201.

frame a prescription from custom, but prevail by reason. For neither did Peter, whom the Lord chose *first*, and on whom he built his Church, when Paul *afterwards* disputed with him about circumcision, claim or assume anything insolently or arrogantly to himself; so as to say that he held *the Primacy*, and should rather be obeyed of *those late and newly come* . . . giving us a lesson of concord and patience, not to love our own opinions obstinately, but rather to count as our own the useful and wholesome suggestions of our brethren and colleagues, if they are true and legitimate."[1]

We have not the smallest objection to admitting a Primacy in S. Peter. We believe him to have been *primus inter pares* amongst the Apostles. What we object to is the doctrine that he held a Primacy which made him the centre of unity, as being the special representative of our Lord. This passage, however, has probably nothing to do with Primacy of place at all. It seems to refer only to priority of time. In page 130 the passage is again quoted, with the same application. In like manner, we have not the least objection to acknowledging the Church of Rome to have been 'the principal Church.' The Second and Fourth Œcumenical Councils tell us that it was, and why it was, viz. because Rome was the imperial city; but from the use which Tertullian and the translator of S. Irenæus make of the word *principalis*, we know that it probably means 'early-founded.'[2] That S. Cyprian held the Romans to be infallible, as seems to be darkly hinted, because he used the expression, 'to whom faithlessness in doctrine cannot approach,' cannot unfortunately be the case, unless we believe that he intended to assert that Rom. i. 8, 'I thank my God through Jesus Christ 'for you all, that your faith is spoken of throughout the whole 'world,' conveys a grant of infallibility from that time forward to the Romans: for it is to that text which he refers when he speaks of 'their faith being praised by the Apostle.' That the Bishop of Rome was considered by S. Cyprian to have succeeded S. Peter in his episcopate of Rome, which we have next paraded, is an undoubted fact. In like manner he considered the Bishop of Alexandria to have succeeded S. Mark in the episcopate of Alexandria, and we consider Archbishop Sumner to have succeeded S. Augustine in the episcopate of Canterbury. But what does it prove? Mr. Wilberforce says, that S. Cyprian, therefore, supposed that the Primacy—the Vicarial Primacy, as we may term it—which made S. Peter the centre of unity, was inherited by the Bishops of Rome. Now, he never once speaks of the Bishop of Rome succeeding even to *that* Primacy of S.

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[1] S. Cyp. Ep. 71, 3, p. 194.

[2] S. Cyp. Ep. 59, 19, p. 136. See Tertullian, De Præsc. Hæret. c. 31. 'Ad *principalitatem* veritati et *posteritatem* mendacitati deputandam.' And S. Irenæus, lib. iii. c. 3. § 2. 'propter potentiorem principalitatem'—seemingly a translation of διὰ τὴν ἱκανωτέραν ἀρχαιότητα.

Peter which he *did* perhaps acknowledge, but only to his episcopate of the Roman see.[1]

We next come to the declaration that S. Cyprian 'speaks of the Church of Rome as "the root and mother of the Catholic Church,"' *Ecclesiæ Catholicæ radicem et matricem;* which is given as 'root and mother of all the rest,' in the next page. Here we have three things to consider: 1, the meaning of *matrix;* 2, the meaning of *Ecclesiæ Catholicæ matrix;* 3, whether or no it is true that it is the Church of Rome to which S. Cyprian applies that expression. 1. The meaning of the word *matrix* is 'womb;' in a derivative sense it is applied to the 'parent-stem' of a plant, as distinct from suckers; to the 'breeding-mothers' of animals; and by a further extension of the derivative sense, it may mean 'source,' or 'origin.' Tertullian uses the word. He is speaking of the Churches founded by the Apostles, such as Corinth, Ephesus, Antioch, Philippi, &c.; and he calls them the '*matrices et originales fidei.*'[2] Mr. Wilberfore quotes this passage, in p. 94, and translates the word correctly, 'Such Churches which the 'Apostles themselves founded were considered to be the *wombs* 'and originals of the faith.' There, where *matrix* was applied to several Churches, Mr. Wilberforce translates it *womb:* here, where he represents it to be applied to the Church of Rome, he translates it *mother.* There must be a reason for this difference. Is it because there is an idea of authority conveyed in the title, *mother,* which is not found in the word *matrix?* Or is it that it was desirable to have S. Cyprian's authority for a title which Rome has assumed to herself, although common sense, history, and the canons of the Church, apply it, when it is applied in any special manner at all, to the Church of Jerusalem? As a second step towards assimilating S. Cyprian's expression to the modern assumption, 'mother of the Catholic Church' is changed into 'mother of all the rest.' *i. e.* of all Churches. 2. What is the meaning of *Ecclesiæ Catholicæ* matrix? Does it mean the womb from which the Catholic Church issued, or the womb of the Catholic Church, in which Christians are formed? Assuredly the latter. We will take the other metaphor; '*Ecclesiæ Catholicæ radix,*' does not mean the root on which the Catholic Church grew, but the root of the Catholic Church on which Christians grow. 3. Does S. Cyprian then say, that it is the Church of Rome which is the root and womb of the Catholic Church?—No, he says nothing of the kind. The case is this:

[1] 'Cornelius was made *Bishop* by the judgment of God and His Christ . . . When there had been no one made before him, and the place of Fabian, that is, the place of Peter, and the rank of the episcopal *(sacerdotalis)* chair was vacant.' Ep. 55, 7, p. 104.

[2] Tertull. De Præsc. Hæret. c. 21.

There was the Novatian Schism breaking out in Rome, and S. Cyprian found it necessary to take every measure for the preservation of the unity of the Church. For this purpose he sent messengers and wrote letters to Rome, urging the Romans to acknowledge Cornelius as their true Bishop, and cease to follow the Novatian schism. 'With every exhortation we can,' he writes to the Roman Confessors, 'we beg and beseech you to return to the Church your mother, and to our brotherhood' (Ep. 46). He tells Cornelius that he had written to them to urge them 'to return to their mother, that is, the Catholic Church' (Ep. 47). And then he assures Cornelius, that he had desired every one who sailed from Africa to Italy to 'acknowledge and hold fast to *the root and womb of the Catholic Church*' (Ep. 48). Is it not clear that 'the root and womb of the Catholic Church' in Ep. 48 is the same thing as 'their mother, that is, the Catholic Church,' in Ep. 47? S. Cyprian warns his countrymen, when they sail to Italy, to avoid the Novatian heretics, and hold fast to the Catholic Church, which is the root on which all orthodox Christians grow, and the womb in which they are formed. And this Mr. Wilberforce transforms into, 'He 'speaks of the Church of Rome as "the root and mother of the 'Catholic Church—the root and mother of all the rest."' The same exhortation might be given by the Bishop of London to men sailing to the Cape of Good Hope.

We then find that 'He says that to communicate with the 'Bishop of the Church of Rome, was the same thing as to com- 'municate with the Catholic Church.' We deeply regret that Mr. Wilberforce should have written and published that sentence. The Epistle referred to is the 55th, written to Antonianus, who was living in Rome. At the time that S. Cyprian wrote, there were existing in Rome the two parties to which we have made allusion; the orthodox, or Catholic party, headed by Cornelius; the heretical and schismatical party, headed by Novatian. Cornelius had been duly consecrated 'by sixteen fellow Bishops;' and yet Novatian was 'endeavouring by intrigue, to be made 'an adulterous and strange Bishop.' 'And whereas there is 'one Church, from Christ throughout the whole world, divided 'into many members, and one Episcopate diffused throughout 'an harmonious multitude of many Bishops, he, notwithstanding 'the unity of the Catholic Church, everywhere compacted and 'joined together, attempts to make a human Church, and sends 'his new Apostles through very many cities, that he may 'establish certain recent foundations of his own institution: 'and whereas there have been already ordained through all the 'provinces, and through every city, Bishops, in age venerable, 'in faith sound, in trials proved, in persecution banished, he

'dares to create other false Bishops over them.'[1] Thus, we see that there were two parties in Rome; the Catholic Church presided over by Cornelius, and a schismatical body presided over by Novatian. Under these circumstances, S. Cyprian writes his letter to Antonianus.

'Cyprian to Antonianus, his brother, greeting. I received your first letter, dearest brother, firmly upholding the concord of the sacerdotal [*i. e.* episcopal] college, and cleaving to the Catholic Church; wherein you signified that you did not communicate with Novatian, but followed my advice, and held one consent with Cornelius our brother-bishop. You wrote also that I should transmit a copy of the same letter to our colleague Cornelius, in order that he might now lay aside all anxiety, and be sure *that you held communion with him, that is, with the Catholic Church.* But there has since arrived your second letter, sent by Quintus, our brother presbyter, by which I see that your mind has been influenced by a letter of Novatian, and has begun to waver.'—Ep. 55, p. 101.

Now what would be more natural than for Cardinal Wiseman to write to a friend in New York, and say, 'If you communicate 'with Archbishop Hughes, you will hold communion with the 'Catholic Church?' Would that imply that Cardinal Wiseman regarded Archbishop Hughes as the divinely-appointed centre of Christendom? Or again, what more natural than for Bishop Potter to write to a friend in England, and say, 'Avoid the 'novel *pseudepiscopi* and the schismatical congregations, insti-'tuted by Cardinal Wiseman. By communicating with the 'Bishop of London you communicate with the Catholic Church?' Would he thereby mean that communion with the Bishops of London, past, present, and future, was a necessary condition of Catholic communion? It must be a weak case and a bad cause that requires such forced wrenchings of simple words as this.

The next passage, from Ep. 70, 3, *una Ecclesia à Christo Domino super Petrum origine unitatis et ratione fundata,* repeats the view, that a lesson of unity is taught by our Lord's having addressed himself especially to one of the Apostles. There remains only one more passage of S. Cyprian to be considered, selected from Ep. 8. 1. The facts connected with it are as follows:—Fabian, Bishop of Rome, was dead, and S. Cyprian had retired from his see in time of persecution. During this vacancy the Roman presbyters write to the Carthaginian presbyters reflecting invidiously upon S. Cyprian for having withdrawn himself from danger, and saying, among other things, 'that it is incumbent upon us,' (*i. e.* on the presbyters in Rome and Carthage respectively,) 'who appear to be put in authority, to guard the flock in place of its pastor' (*i. e.* instead of Fabian

[1] S. Cyp. p. 131. Oxf. Tr. p. 112. Ed. Fell.

in one case, and of Cyprian in the other.)[1] They then proceed to give their brother presbyters some advice as to the lapsed. This letter was forwarded to S. Cyprian, in his place of retreat, by the Carthaginian clergy, and was at once sent back by him to the Roman presbyters, with a note, saying that he could not believe that they had written it, on account, apparently, of the unkindly tone toward himself which pervaded it. But, as the presbyters took the same side with S. Cyprian in the dispute about the lapsed, and those times of persecution and division were not days for ceremony, he afterwards wrote and explained why he had withdrawn from death, recounting the measures which he had taken during his exile, with regard to the lapsed, and concluding as follows:—

'Whereas it seemed right that honour should be shown to the martyrs, and yet the violence of those who desired to throw everything into confusion be checked; and, moreover, having read your letter lately sent to my clergy through Crementius the sub-deacon, to the effect that help should be extended to such as were seized with sickness after having lapsed, and penitently desired communion, I thought it right to abide by that which was also your opinion, lest our conduct, which ought to be united, and agree in all things, should in some respect differ. As to the case of the rest, notwithstanding they have received letters from the martyrs, I ordered them to be entirely deferred, and to be reserved until my return; that so, when the Lord shall have vouchsafed us peace, and several of us who hold rule shall have met together, we may, after communicating our counsels with you too, set in order and restore everything.'—Ep. 20, p. 43.

Here we see an example of Catholic intercommunion, and joint care for the things of Christ, in the two Churches of Italy and Africa, but where is there any 'claim to superintendence' made by the Roman presbyters, or any 'recognition' of such claims by S. Cyprian? If the Roman superintendence is thus proved, how much more must the Carthaginian superintendence be proved by 'the most blessed and most glorious Pope' S. Cyprian himself (so the Roman presbyters call him, Ep. 30), sending to Rome both letters (Ep. 46, 47) and messengers (Ep. 45,) 'to endeavour to bring back the members of the 'divided body to the unity of the Catholic Church, and to knit

[1] When we get fifty pages further, this same quotation appears in a strengthened form. In p. 155 it is translated 'because it is incumbent on us *who seem to be put* '*in the chief place*, (the word is *præpositi*) to guard the flock in the absence of the 'shepherd;' and on the warranty of this sentence it is asserted, that 'they speak of 'themselves as exercising a trust which embraced other countries.' Supposing that the *us* did mean only the Roman Presbyters, and not the Carthaginian Presbyters as well, the argument would still be utterly inconclusive. When the President of a college dies, the Vice-President might speak of himself in a letter to a Fellow of another college as feeling that it was incumbent upon him, since he held a position of authority, to guard the college in place of the Head. Would he thereby speak of himself as exercising a trust which embraced other colleges?

'the bond of Christian love!' Had Cornelius done this to Cyprian, instead of Cyprian to Cornelius, it would no doubt be brought forward as an act done in virtue of his Primacy; for it was an act of interference in the diocese and city of Rome itself, and it was performed for the purpose of securing the unity of the Church.

We will now supply two statements of S. Cyprian, to counterbalance those which Mr. Wilberforce has extracted; the first to show, *ex abundanti*, what S. Cyprian understood by the promise to S. Peter, and the second to point out his view of the real bond of unity in the Church.

'Our Lord, whose precepts and warnings we ought to observe, determining the honour of a Bishop, and the ordering of His own Church, speaks in the Gospel, and says to Peter, "I say unto thee," &c. *Thence* the ordination of Bishops and the ordering of the Church come down along the course of time and line of succession, so that the Church is settled upon her Bishops, and every act of the Church is regulated by these same Prelates.'—*Ep.* 33, p. 75, *Oxf. Tr.*; p. 66, *Ed. Fell.*

Then what S. Cyprian understood by S. Matt. xvi. 16—19 was nothing else than this, that the Church was founded upon the one Episcopate.

Again, in the 66th Epistle, he defines the Church as follows:—'They are the Church, who are a people united to the 'Bishop (*sacerdoti,*) and a flock adhering to their own shepherd. 'Whence you ought to know that the Bishop is in the Church, 'and the Church in the Bishop.' Each diocese was a type of the whole; and what was the bond of unity to the whole? 'It is,' he says, 'in truth connected and joined together by the 'cement of bishops (*sacerdotum,*) mutually cleaving to each 'other.'[1] Then the unity of Bishops in godly love is, in S. Cyprian's view, the bond of the Church, not any prerogative of S. Peter, nor any authority vested in the Bishop of Rome. In Dr. Pusey's words, 'S. Cyprian's idea of the Episcopate is manifoldness in unity; many shepherds feeding one 'flock; yet therefore many, that they might act in unity 'against any who would waste it: a large body, but cemented 'by the glue of mutual concord and bond of unity; many rays, 'streams, branches, to diffuse everywhere light, fertility, nourishment, yet the connected issues from One Source.'[2] And again, 'Unity being an effluence from the Unity of God, a 'fruit of the indwelling of His Spirit, His bond, knitting and 'joining together His own, typified in the Sacraments and itself 'a Sacrament, faith in love; its maintenance was not the main-

[1] Ep. 66, p. 207, Oxf. Tr.; p. 168. Ed. Fell. [2] Pref. Oxf. Tr. p. xviii.

'tenance of anything outward, but the development of an in-'ward grace—as being a grace, it must emanate from within."[1]

The best commentary on S. Cyprian's statements is S. Cyprian's conduct. Do we, then, find him recognising obedience to the Bishop of Rome, as the instrument for securing unity? On the contrary, the course which he adopts is totally incompatible with such an hypothesis. This appears in two instances—the controversy on Rebaptism, and the dispute about the Spanish Bishops, Basilides and Martial. The former was a serious question of discipline involving doctrine: S. Cyprian, Alexandria, and the East, took one side; S. Stephen, and the rest of the West, the other; and the latter cut off from himself by excommunication all that did not agree with him. Now did S. Cyprian acknowledge the authority of S. Peter's successor to heal this breach of unity? On the contrary, in Dean Milman's words, 'He condemns the perverseness, obstinacy, 'contumacy of Stephen. He promulgates in Latin a letter of 'Firmilian, Bishop of the Cappadocian Cæsarea, still more 'unmeasured in its censures. Firmilian denounces the audacity, 'the violence of Stephen, scoffs at his boasted descent from 'S. Peter: declares that by his sin he has excommunicated 'himself: he is the schismatic, the apostate from the unity of 'the Church. A solemn council of eighty-seven Bishops, 'assembled at Carthage, under Cyprian, asserted the inde-'pendent judgment of the African Churches, repudiated the 'assumption of the title Bishop of Bishops, or the arbitrary 'dictation of one Bishop to Christendom.'[2] The words of this African Council (distinctly approved afterwards by S. Augustine) are as follows:—

'It remains for us each to deliver our sentiments on this matter, judging no one, nor removing any one, if he be of a different opinion, from the right of communion. For no one of us sets himself up to be a Bishop of Bishops, or by force of his tyranny compels his colleagues to the necessity of obedience; since every Bishop, according to his recognized liberty and power, possesses a free choice, and can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge another: but let us all await the judgment of our Lord Jesus Christ, who singly and alone has the power both of setting us up in the government of His Church, and of judging our proceedings.'—*Op. S. Cyp.* p. 329, *Ed. Baluz.*

In like manner, when the Spanish Bishops, Basilides and Martial, lapsed in the Decian persecution, and were accordingly deprived of their Bishoprics, Felix and Sabinus being consecrated in their place,—

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[1] Pref. p. xiii.

[2] Latin Christianity, vol. i p. 53.

'Basilides found his way to Rome, and imposed by his arts on the unsuspecting Stephen, who commanded his reinstatement in his high office. Appeal was made to Carthage against Rome. Cyprian would strengthen his own authority by that of a synod. At the head of his thirty-five Bishops, Cyprian approves the acts of the presbyters of Leon and Astorga in rejecting such unworthy Bishops; treats with a kind of respectful compassion the weakness of Stephen of Rome, who had been so easily abused; and exhorts the Spaniards to adhere to their rightful Prelates, Felix and Sabinus.'—*Milman*, p. 54. *S. Cyp. Ep.* lxvii. p. 173.

Could S. Cyprian have so acted, had he regarded the authority of the Bishop of Rome over the whole Church as the divinely appointed means of securing the unity of that Church? Could S. Firmilian, twice appealed to by Mr. Wilberforce, have held the same theory, when he speaks of Stephen's 'inhumanitas,' 'audacia,' 'insolentia,' 'res ab eo improbe gestæ,' 'manifesta stultitia,' 'imperitia,' 'contumacis furor discordiæ,' because he took a step by which, had S. Firmilian accepted the theory now thrust upon him, he must have acknowledged that the Bishop of Rome was simply fulfilling the duties of his station, and to which he was bound to pay unhesitating obedience? Could he have said that he was 'betraying and deserting unity?' Could he have turned upon him and cried, 'Nay, but thou 'art worse than every heretic? What struggles and dis-'sension are you spreading through the Churches of all the 'world! How great a sin have you heaped upon yourself 'when you cut yourself off from so many flocks! For you 'have cut *yourself* off. Don't be mistaken. Since he is the 'true schismatic who makes himself an apostate from the com-'munion of the unity of the Church. For while you are 'thinking that every one can be separated off from you, you 'have separated yourself off from every one. And not even 'the Apostle's precepts (Eph. iv. i.) can fashion you to the 'rule of Truth and Peace!'[1] All this because Stephen did what S. Firmilian knew that he was bound to do by Christ's command, *if he held the theory* which Mr. Wilberforce attributes to him.

We have now gone through all the passages adduced by Mr. Wilberforce in proof of S. Cyprian's holding the views which he fathers upon him, with the exception of two which are reserved for a note attached to his first extract. We will examine the note too.

'Several other sentences occur in the Benedictine edition, but have not been introduced into the text, because their authenticity is disputed. And it will be seen that statements equivalent to them occur in St. Cyprian's letters, *e. g.* "Primacy is given to Peter, that the Church of Christ may be set forth as one, and the see (cathedra) as one. And they all are shepherds, yet the flock is one, such as to be fed by all the Apostles with unanimous

[1] S. Firm. Ep. ad S. Cyp. cxvii.

agreement." And again: "He who deserts the see of Peter, on whom the Church is founded, is he assured that he is in the Church?"'—*De Unit.* 3, 4.—P. 103.

Now on this we have two remarks to make. First, that Mr. Wilberforce has so arranged his words as to give the impression—an impression which we believe ninety-nine out of every hundred readers would have,—that these are the extracts which come from the genuine Epistles, and are 'equivalent to' the 'disputed' passages which he has omitted; whereas, in spite of the way in which the *e. g.* is introduced, they are the very 'disputed' passages themselves. And secondly, that 'disputed authenticity' is not the term which ought to have been applied to them. Their history is as follows, and it is the more necessary to notice it, as Dean Milman has been deceived by the authority of the Benedictine text into quoting them as genuine, and founding his estimate of S. Cyprian's regard for the Roman Bishop upon them.[1] We quote part of a note attached to the Treatise on Unity in the Oxford translation of S. Cyprian's works:—

'The additions contained in the Benedictine reading are not found in the first editions of S. Cyprian, (representing probably very ancient and independent MSS.,) between A. D. 1471—1563: viz. one at Rome in 1471; one at Venice in the same year; one without date and place; one at Paris, 1512, (according to the Benedictines a very accurate edition, and agreeing with the MSS. when other editions had changed for the worse;) that of Erasmus, Basle, 1520; one at Cologne, 1520; of Gravius (a very learned Dominican,) at Cologne, 1544 (in which fresh MSS. were consulted;) Antwerp, 1541 and 1542; Venice, 1547; and in which list reprints are not included. Nor are the additions found in two extant MSS., each more than a thousand years old. Nor are they found in eight of the Vatican MSS.; and Baluzius numbered up twenty-seven which he had seen in which they were wanting. Bishop Fell mentions nine English MSS., and one of Beneventum, which are without the additions. The passage is quoted without them by Pope Calixtus II. in the twelfth century; by the meeting of Cardinals at Liburnum in the fifteenth; and by the Roman Correctors after Manutius had inserted it in his edition. They appear, moreover, to have been unknown in the German MSS. in the age of Venericus (A. D. 1080.) For these reasons Baluzius omitted them in his edition of S. Cyprian's works in the beginning of the eighteenth century; but on his dying suddenly, while the work was passing through the press, the Benedictines into whose hands it came, retaining his note in which he gave his reasons against them, cancelled the leaf, and restored them, giving as their reason that the additions had been preserved in all the editions which had appeared in France for the 150 years before their time. . . . Baluzius also, it would seem, spoke more strongly against them than his words now stand; the Benedictines confessing that they were obliged to "alter not a few things in his notes, and that they would have altered more if they could conveniently."'—P. 151.

[1] Latin Christianity, p. 52.

Mr. Wilberforce must not use a tone of generosity, on the ground that he makes use only in a note of passages whose 'authenticity' is *thus* 'disputed.'

We have now examined all the passages which Mr. Wilberforce has adduced from S. Cyprian. We must recollect that he has claimed this especial Father from all the Fathers of the Church, in order to find in him the theory which he requires, and that he professes to find taught in these extracts two leading truths, 1. That S. Peter received a special prerogative from Christ for maintaining (p. 103), preserving (p. 104), securing (p. 105), providing for (p. 119), giving (p. 164), unity, as being himself 'that centre of unity who bore the keys of office in the midst of 'his brethren' (p. 119). 2. That this office and authority, by means of which unity was to be secured, was inherited by the Roman Bishops. We have seen that no such doctrines were held by S. Cyprian, but that, on the contrary, he declares (1) that both in power and in honour all the other Apostles were equal to S. Peter—that he never speaks of his maintaining, preserving, securing, providing for his brethren's unity, or being the centre of unity to them; but he conceives that Christ intending to teach the lesson that the Church was one, and the Episcopate one, and that it was a good and joyful thing to dwell together in unity, addressed himself for that reason especially to one.[1] And we have seen (2) that he is the energetic and vehement defender of national, of provincial, and of diocesan independence; that by word and deed, he and S. Firmilian alike reject every particle of control on the part of the Roman Bishops; that he never, in any place, asserts that the Bishop of Rome succeeded to any office of S. Peter, except that of presiding over the Roman diocese; that he holds the true Head of the Church to be the Lord JESUS CHRIST (De Unit. 3); and the bond of unity, to be the mutual cleaving of the Bishops to each other by the spirit of love (Ep. lxvi. 7). Mr. Wilberforce's theory is one thing, S. Cyprian's is another. To identify them is impossible.

Having laid his foundation under the shadow of S. Cyprian's name, Mr. Wilberforce returns from the middle of the third century to the Gospels, the Acts, and the Epistles, to see if his theory can be made to agree with them. He says that 'a 'primacy is assigned to St. Peter in the Gospels, and recog-'nised in the Acts and the Epistles.' It is unfortunate to have

[1] So his follower, S. Pacian, 'The Lord spake a little above to Peter (He spake to one, that from one He might lay the foundation of Unity;) afterwards, delivering the very same command in common to all, He still begins in the same terms as to Peter.—Ep. iii. 26, p. 348, Oxf. Tr.

to deal with ambiguous expressions. Primacy may signify primacy in place, or primacy in time: and again, primacy in place may mean primacy of power, or primacy of honour; and still again, primacy of power may mean fifty different things, according as the degree of power is greater or less. The head-master of a school holds a primacy, the head boy of the school holds a primacy, the head boy in each class holds a primacy, the best cricketer holds a primacy, the best verse-maker holds a primacy, but all in different senses. We must recollect, then, what sort of primacy it is that Mr. Wilberforce has to prove for S. Peter out of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles. It is a primacy which makes S. Peter 'the especial representative of His Master' (p. 111), 'associated by peculiar copartnership in one of the 'functions of His Master, and become by grace that which 'Christ was by nature' (p. 112), which 'especially identifies him 'with his master' (p. 115), which makes him have 'individually 'the trust which his brethren received collectively' (p. 116), which 'makes provision for their unity of action' (p. 119), which constitutes him 'that centre of unity who bore the keys of office in the midst of his brethren' (p. 119). Any passages, therefore, which can be fully accounted for on the theory that S. Peter was *primus inter pares*, the most prominent and first among his equal brethren, is irrelevant to Mr. Wilberforce's purpose, and must be put aside accordingly. Such a primacy as this will not satisfy the necessities of Mr. Wilberforce's argument, which requires what we have called a Vicarial Primacy.

Six points are adduced from the Gospels: 1. That S. Peter's name stands at the beginning of the list of the Apostles' names. Would this be the case were S. Peter simply *primus inter pares?* Yes. Then it proves nothing, and goes towards proving nothing for Mr. Wilberforce's Vicarial Primacy.

2. 'S. Matthew terms him, the first Apostle' (p. 135), and 'the Primacy is attributed to him by the Evangelist' (p. 108). Do our readers recollect where? It is in S. Matt. x. 2. 'Now 'the names of the Twelve Apostles are these: the first, Simon, 'who is called Peter, and Andrew his brother,' &c. If, in giving a list of the English Bishops, we should say, 'The first, Dr. Blomfield, Bishop of London, Dr. Sumner, Bishop of Winchester,' &c., would it be correct to say, that we had, 'attributed the Primacy' to Dr. Blomfield? Would the words of the Evangelist be naturally accounted for by the supposition that S. Peter was *primus inter pares?* Yes; we should use the same expression with regard to the Bishop of London, but yet we should not mean that he was the centre of unity to his brother Bishops. Then S. Matthew's expression is valueless for Mr. Wilberforce's purpose.

3. 'S. Peter, and S. Peter only, received a new name when 'he was admitted into the number of the Apostles. Our Lord 'bestowed the epithet of Sons of Thunder on the two next of 'his Apostles; but it was an epithet only by which their 'original names were not superseded' (p. 109). First for the fact. The name of Simon was not superseded. The very last time that our Lord addressed him He called him Simon, son of Jonah, and, according to the interpretation of Origen, S. Augustin, and others, the name Peter is an epithet, meaning 'a rock-man,' and derived from πέτρα, just as a 'Christian' is derived from Χριστός. Further, there is not the smallest difference in the account given by S. Mark of the imposition of the name on S. Peter and on SS. James and John; 'And Simon He *surnamed* 'Peter, and James the son of Zebedee, and John the brother of 'James; and He *surnamed* them Boanerges, which is, the Sons 'of Thunder' (Mark, iii. 16, 17). As to 'the name conveying 'an especial authority to represent Himself,' owing to its 'deri-'vation from Himself,' the name *Christian* is equally derived from Him, and would, by the same argument, convey the same authority. And so Origen tells us distinctly that Peter, or Rockman, does mean no more than Christian, and that all true Christians are Peters, one title being derived from one name of our Lord, and the other from the other. 'All the followers of 'Christ derive their name from the Rock. . . . Being members of 'Christ, by derivation of name they are called Christians, and 'by derivation from Rock (πέτρα) they are called Rockmen '(πέτροι). And, on the same principle, you will say that those 'who are called righteous, derive their names from the righte-'ousness of Christ, and the wise from the wisdom of Christ, and 'so from all the other appellations you will make derivative 'names for the saints; and, to all who are such, the words of 'our Saviour will be addressed: "Thou art Peter," &c., down 'to "shall not prevail against it."'[1] This name, then, did not convey anything in S. Peter, beyond what was conveyed to the converts of Antioch by the name Christian.

4. and 5. S. Matt. xvi. 18, ('Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church') *directly*, and S. Matt. xvi. 19, ('And I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of Heaven'), *indirectly* declare that S. Peter 'should be asso-'ciated by peculiar copartnership in one of the functions of 'his Master, and become by grace that which Christ was by 'nature' (p. 112). These are very tremendous words. If they are true, we can see little reason why S. Peter should not have been associated with S. Mary in the ceremony of December 8th. But what is the connexion between these two texts

[1] Origen, in S. Matt. xvi. 18, vol. iii. p. 526.—Ed. Delarue.

and these words? Mr. Wilberforce finds the following. The name Peter is derived from our Lord's title *petra;* therefore, the imposition of the name Peter implies that Simon was 'associated with' (p. 112), 'especially identified with' (p. 115), 'made the especial representative of' (p. 112)—had Mr. Wilberforce been a little bolder he would have said—'made the one 'Vicar of Christ.' Exactly on the same reasoning, the name Christian is derived from our Lord's title, *Christus.* Does, then, the imposition of the name Christian imply that every one so called is especially associated and identified with Christ, and made his peculiar representative and vicar? Either it does, or it does not. If it does not, neither does the name Peter imply it; if it does, Peter has, on this showing, no *special* prerogative beyond that which any Christian has.

The argument founded on the other text is still more extraordinary. 'It is Christ who hath the key of the house of David,' therefore this text indicates the transference from Him to Peter of 'His office—His function of bearing the keys' (p. 112). Now it is almost certain that a mystical expression, applied to Eliakim, the son of Hilkiah, by Isaiah, and to our Lord in the Book of Revelations, has nothing whatever to do with this text. But be that as it may, it is quite certain, by the testimony of all writers of the early ages of the Church, which Mr. Wilberforce is bound on his own principles to accept before an interpretation devised by himself, that no power of the keys was granted to S. Peter in Matt. xvi. 18, which was not granted to all the Apostles in Matt. xviii. 18, and John xx. 22, 23. Accordingly, either all the Apostles have 'become by grace that which Christ was by nature,' or S. Peter has not. For the Patristic expositions of these texts, we must refer our readers to 'Papal Supremacy, tested by Antiquity," pp. 37, 48. The words of S. Augustine, S. Cyril of Alexandria, S. Chrysostom, Origen, S. Basil the Great, Theodoret, S. Hilary, S. Gregory the Great, and Ælfric, are all there quoted, and show that the general view of these Fathers and Doctors is, that Christ as confessed by Peter was the Rock of the Church, and that S. Peter was the representative, not of his Master, as Mr. Wilberforce would have it, but of the other Apostles, and therein of the Bishops their successors, and of the Church at large. Many more names of early writers might be added to these, and there is not a single passage in antiquity which bears out Mr. Wilberforce's interpretation. The passages which he quotes from Origen, S. Leo, S. Augustine, S. Jerome, S. Ambrose, S. Chrysostom, Tertullian, and Hippolytus, are either irrelevant or dead against his view. He acknowledges 'that the word Rock is employed by the ancient 'writers for two persons and two things—Christ and Peter; the 'objective faith taught by the Lord, the subjective faith taught

'by and entertained by his disciples' (p. 112). This admission in itself would be quite sufficient to overthrow his theory. If these texts meant what he asserts, there *must* have been a perfect knowledge of it in the early Church; they could not have been ignorant of the bearing of words of such importance to themselves and the Church at large; there must have been a universal tradition to that effect. But there was no *consensus* at all. Mr. Wilberforce acknowledges four different lines of interpretation, and no one of them is his own. For what Mr. Wilberforce requires is, that they should regard the Church as built upon Peter as the vicar and representative of his Master. On the contrary, *all* those writers who regard the Church as built upon Peter at all, consider it built upon him as the representative of his fellow Apostles, upon whom it was equally built, in accordance with Eph. ii. 20, and Rev. xxi. 14, 27.

But Mr. Wilberforce triumphantly asserts, that 'every ante-'Nicene writer who refers to the passage, supposes that reference 'is made to the *person* of S. Peter' (p. 113). 'Every ante-Nicene writer' sounds authoritative. It calls up in our minds the thought of Clement, Ignatius, Polycarp, Irenæus, Tatian, Theophilus, Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius, Arnobius, Dionysius of Alexandria, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and other well-known names. Are these the authorities to which Mr. Wilberforce refers? No, not one of them. The persons whom he means are Tertullian, Hippolytus, S. Cyprian, Stephen, S. Firmilian, and Origen. These are all he claims in the above high-sounding sentence, and not one of them favours his view. Tertullian thus explains what *he* meant by 'supposing that reference was made to the *person* of S. Peter':— 'On him the Church is built, that is, by his means: he is the 'first to use the key: and you see what key he used: "Ye men 'of Israel, hear these words: Jesus of Nazareth, a man approved 'of God among you," &c. Acts ii. 22.'[1] Then Tertullian understood by the text under discussion, that S. Peter should preach the first sermon, and so make the first converts. Is that of any use to Mr. Wilberforce?

Hippolytus is speaking of the Holy Spirit: 'This is the Spirit 'who at first moved upon the face of the waters . . . who ener-'gized in the Prophets, who descended by flight upon Christ. 'This is the Spirit that was given to the Apostles in the appear-'ance of fiery tongues. By this Spirit Peter spoke those 'blessed words, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living 'God." By this Spirit the Rock of the Church was made firm. 'This is that Paraclete,' &c. The original of the last sentence is Διὰ τούτου τοῦ Πνεύματος ἐστερεώθη ἡ Πέτρα τῆς Ἐκκλησίας: and

[1] Tertull. de Pudic. c. 21, Op. p. 807. Parisiis, 1646.

in Latin, 'Per hunc Spiritum firmata Ecclesiæ Petra est.[1] Mr. Wilberforce says, that in this passage 'Hippolytus calls 'S. Peter "the Rock of the Church."' It is possible that he might have meant S. Peter by 'the Rock of the Church,' but he might equally well have meant something else. The interpretation 'By this Spirit the Church's Rock was made firm, '*i. e.* the Church was made firm as a Rock,' is perhaps the better of the two; but if he does mean S. Peter, he evidently, as we see from the previous sentence, would regard him as the Rock, not as representing, but as confessing Christ.

S. Cyprian, we have already shown to hold that every bishop is as much a successor of S. Peter as the Bishop of Rome, and that S. Peter received nothing—neither power nor honour—which the other Apostles did not receive.

Of Stephen's opinion we know nothing, except what we learn from the following extract from S. Firmilian, who is himself likewise cited as a witness. We give his testimony:—

'What sort of error this man [Stephen, Bishop of Rome] is guilty of, and how great is his blindness in saying that remission of sin can be given in the assemblies of heretics, and in not standing firm on the foundation of the one Church which once has been compacted by Christ upon a rock, may be understood from hence, that Christ said to Peter only, "Whatever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven;" and in the Gospel Christ breathed on the Apostles only, and said, "Receive the Holy Ghost; whose sins ye remit, they are remitted to them; and whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained;" *therefore* power of remitting sin was given to *the Apostles*, and to *the Churches* which they, being sent by Christ, established, and to *the Bishops* who have succeeded them one after another by ordination in their place *(vicariâ ordinatione)*. But the enemies of the one Catholic Church to which we belong, the adversaries of us who have succeeded to the Apostles, while they claim to themselves unlawful priesthoods against us, and erect profane altars, what are they else than Korahs, Dathans, and Abirams, equally wicked and sacrilegious, and to be punished like them, together with their abettors, even as at that time all who took part with those men, and favoured them, perished just as they did? And I do well to be angry with this so open and manifest folly of Stephen, that a man who boasts, as he does, about the place of his Bishopric, and contends that he holds the succession of Peter, upon whom the foundations of the Church were laid, is introducing many other rocks, and new edifices of many Churches, by giving his authority to the possibility of baptisms being performed in them. For those who are baptized make up, without doubt, the numbers of the Church; and he who approves of their baptism declares that there too there is a Church of the baptized. And he does not see that the true Christian rock *(Christianæ petræ veritatem)* is obscured, and in a way utterly destroyed, by him, in thus betraying and deserting unity.'—*S. Firm. Ep. ad S. Cyp. c.* xii.

Here S. Firmilian asserts the direct contrary to the two things which Mr. Wilberforce requires. He says that the Bishop

[1] Hippolytus in Theophan. 9. Gallandi, vol. ii. 494.

of Rome was not the head and centre of unity, but, on the contrary, that he was betraying and deserting unity by leaving the one real Rock of the Church. Could he have said that, if he had taught that the Bishop of Rome was himself the Rock of the Church, and that to be in unity with him was to be in unity with the Church? He gives the reason, too, why, as he believed, Christ spoke to Peter alone in one place, and to the Apostles alone in the other. Does he say, then, that it was for the purpose of making S. Peter His special Vicar? On the contrary, he supposes that the intention was to show that the power of remitting sins was not given to heretics and schismatics, but only to *the Apostles*, to *the Bishops* their successors, and to *the Churches* established by them. Not an atom of authority or dignity does he see bestowed on S. Peter.

The other ante-Nicene authority is Origen. He calls S. Peter 'that great foundation of the Church, and most solid Rock on 'which Christ has founded His Church.' He does: and he likewise says—

'*If we confess like Peter* (flesh and blood not having revealed it to us, but light from our Father which is in heaven having shone into our hearts,) *we too become that which Peter was*, and we equally receive the title of "blessed" with him, because the reason why he was called "blessed" exists in our case too, viz. that flesh and blood has not revealed to us about Jesus being the Christ, the Son of the living God, but our Father which is in heaven, from heaven itself, that we may have our conversation in heaven. . . . And if we too become Peter after having spoken like Peter, "Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God," (flesh and blood not having revealed it to us, but light from our Father which is in heaven having shone into our hearts,) to us also there will be said by the Word, "Thou art Peter," &c. for every disciple of Christ is a rock. . . . But if you think that upon *that* one Peter only the whole Church was built by God, what will you say about John the son of thunder, and every one of the Apostles?' &c.—*Hom. in Matt.* xvi. 18. vol. iii. p. 524.

So Origen counts the Church to be built upon every sound Churchman as much as upon S. Peter.

But perhaps the method of dealing with S. Augustine is more disingenuous still. Every one knows that the doctrine of S. Augustine, enforced again and again throughout his works, is, that Christ Himself is the Rock, and that upon Him Peter, the representative of the Church, is built. S. Augustine saw four terms, as it were—the Rock: the Church: our Lord: Peter. Our Lord is Himself the Rock, and upon Him Peter—*i. e.* all members of the Church, are built. His doctrine with regard to the keys is the same. We will give one specimen:—

'Peter in many places of Scripture evidently represents the Church, especially in the place where it is said, "I will give to you the keys of the kingdom of heaven," &c. Did Peter receive these keys, and Paul not receive them? Did Peter receive them, and John and James, and the rest of the Apostles, not receive them? Or are not these keys in the Church,

where sins are daily remitted? But since what was meant was that Peter was representing the Church, what was given to him only was given to the Church.'—*Serm.* 149, tom. v. p. 802. *Ed. Migne.*

S. Augustine in this, and numberless other passages, regards S. Peter as the representative, sometimes of Christians in their several capacities, sometimes of the collective body of Christians—*i. e.* the Church: 'that He might be the Head, and the other represent the body, that is, the Church.' (Serm. 46, 30.) But Mr. Wilberforce's argument requires that he should not represent the body, but the head. How is S. Augustine to be made to say what he ought? First his words are forced into meaning that the Church is 'in its chief Bishop,' a sense no more conveyed by S. Augustine's words than Christ's being in Moses is asserted, when it is said that Moses represented Christ, or the Gentiles being in Cornelius is asserted, when it is said that he was the representative of the Gentiles. But this does not go far enough,—it is a step, because 'represented by' has become converted into 'included in;' but yet it is only a step. So one 'Hilary the deacon as it seems,' is brought in to bridge over the abyss. 'Hilary the deacon as it seems,' says that 'as 'the Apostles were all included in our Saviour by virtue of his 'office, so after our Saviour they are all included in Peter' (p. 115). Now, let us count up the steps. S. Augustine teaches that S. Peter, as representing others, was to be built upon Christ Himself (Serm. 761),—that S. Peter represented the Church which was to be built upon Him, the Rock. If S. Peter represented the Church, says Mr. Wilberforce, the Church was included in him, and 'Hilary the deacon as it seems,' says that the Church was included in Christ: then S. Peter was in this respect like Christ, viz.: that the Church was included in both of them; then Peter was the representative of Christ. *Q. E. D.* Mr. Wilberforce stops there. It follows, likewise, by necessary consequence, that Peter had to be built upon himself, and was both the foundation and superstructure of the Church. But who is this 'Hilary the deacon as it seems?' We know who Hilary the deacon was. He was a contemporary of Bishop Damasus. But who is 'Hilary the deacon *as it seems?*' (p. 115),—'Hilary the deacon *apparently?*' (p. 116). The Benedictine editors tell us. The authority to which Mr. Wilberforce has thus referred, is the writer of a book entitled 'Questions out of the Old and New Testaments,' which had become inserted amongst the works of S. Augustine, and was rejected by the Benedictines as spurious. The author, they say, denied original sin, held Melchizedek to be the Holy Ghost, was a Pelagian, and an Arian. The matter, and manner, and style of his teaching, they assert to be, altogether 'abhorrent to the holy Doctor's mind 'and faith; and, in fine, there are very few questions in the book

'which, one way or another, are not contradictory to S. Augus-
'tine's doctrine.' This is the authority which Mr. Wilberforce calls in to reconcile S. Augustine's theory with his theory.

There is yet another misrepresentation in connexion with S. Augustine:—

'The pointedness of our Lord's words were diminished by their transfusion *(sic)* from his own Syriac into the Greek idiom . . . . . In Syriac it appears from the present Peschito version, the term in each member of the sentence is identical. Had St. Augustine, for instance, known that our Lord's words were—Thou art Cepho, and on this Cepho I will build my Church, he would not have employed the argument which he does in his Retractations. For after stating that he had *often* applied the passage to the person of Peter, as he had learned to do from a hymn of St. Ambrose, he adds, as a second interpretation which *might* be given, that "the rock was Christ." And so Peter, named from this rock, would represent the person of the Church, which is founded on this rock, and has received the keys of the kingdom of heaven. And then he proceeds on the reasons for giving such an interpretation. "For it was not said to him, Thou art Petra, but, Thou art Petrus." Now, of this distinction between the masculine and feminine words, the original Syriac affords no trace . . . . He has no objections to make against the interpretation which he had traditionally received, save one which arises from the imperfect manner in which the Greek language expresses our Lord's words.'—Pp. 113—115.

Now, what does S. Augustine say?

'I said in a certain place about the Apostle Peter, that the Church was founded upon him as upon a rock, a meaning which is also chanted by many voices in some verses of blessed Ambrose, where he says about the cock—"On its crowing, the very rock of the Church washed away his guilt." But I know that I have *very often* afterwards expounded our Lord's words as signifying that the Church was founded upon Him whom Peter confessed, saying, "Thou art Christ, the Son of the living God;" and thus that Peter (rockman), having received his appellation from this Petra (rock), would represent the Church, which is built upon this Petra (rock), and which has received the keys of the kingdom of Heaven. For it is not said to him, Thou art Petra (a rock), but, Thou art Petrus (a rockman); but Christ was the Rock, and when Simon confessed Him, just as the whole Church confesses Him, he was called Peter (a rockman). Let the reader choose whichever of these two opinions is most probable.'—*S. Augustine, Retract.* 1. 21. 1, tom. i. p. 618.

After the specimens which we have had of Mr. Wilberforce's inaccuracies in his quotations, it is scarcely worth while to pause for the purpose of pointing out that it is not true, as here he asserts, that S. Augustine says that he had '*often* applied the 'passage to the person of Peter,' and that 'he adds as a second 'interpretation which *might be given*, that the Rock was Christ.' He distinctly says, that he *only once* so applied the passage, and *that* once he now places in his Retractations. And the other interpretation he does not introduce as one which *might be given*, but one which he had *very often* given'—in fact, in every passage except in this one early-written letter against Donatus, which

has now perished;[1] nor is it 'the interpretation that he had traditionally received' to which he 'objects,' but an interpretation founded on a poetical expression in one of S. Ambrose's hymns, whereas elsewhere S. Ambrose explains that '*the rock* is Christ, and that every Christian may become *a rock* by faith, for 'faith is the foundation of the Church; and not of the 'flesh but of the faith of Peter, was it said, The gates of hell 'shall not prevail against it; his Confession conquered hell.'[2] But suppose that S. Augustine had used both interpretations commonly, does not the very declaration that the adoption of one or the other is indifferent, show that he did not lay any stress upon the personal reference to S. Peter as involving doctrine? Whereas Mr. Wilberforce sees in it 'an elementary portion of the Gospel revelation,' and compares it in that respect to the doctrine to the Holy Trinity (p. 105).

The argument from the Syriac Mr. Wilberforce brings forward as boldly as though it had never before been advanced and refuted. We repeat the refutation of a repeated misstatement:—

'To evade the force of the words, *Upon this rock*, the Papists, Bellarmine Maldonate, Petrus de Bollo, and others, object it was not the Greek, but the Syriac language, wherein our Saviour spoke these words to Peter; in which language כיפא signifies both Peter and a stone, without any change of gender. To which I answer—1. It is true our Saviour spoke these words, not in the Greek but Syriac language; but, howsoever, S. Matthew wrote them not in Syriac, but in Greek, and therefore it is the Greek that is the original, not the Syriac. But, 2, *it is plainly false* that כיפא signifies both Peter and a stone, *without the change of the gender*, or in the same gender, for that כיפא, as it denotes Peter, is of the masculine gender, I hope they will not deny . . . . . whereas כיפא, for a stone or rock, is always of the feminine, as "Jacob accepit Cepha et erexit *eam*."—(Gen. xxxi. 45.) So "Cepha probat*a* angularis pretios*a*" (Is. xxviii. 16;) "Cepha magn*a* erat" (Mar. xvi. 4;) and so elsewhere. Nay, 3, *in this very place* to כי פא, when spoken of Peter, whose name it was, is of the masculine, but when used for a rock or stone is of the feminine gender: סכלא הדן כיפא "et supe *hanc* Cepha," not "*hunc*:" for thus it should have been הדן not הדן, which is a pronoun of the feminine gender. And therefore it is in vain to seek any illusion of the place from the Syriac, that being as plain against them as the Greek; for as in the Greek *πέτρος* and *πέτρα* are of different genders, so are the first and second כיפא in Syriac of different genders too.'—*Beveridge on Art.* XXXVII., vol. vii. p. 582, Oxf., 1845.

Before leaving this text we will in a few words sum up the interpretations which have been given to it. By some the Rock is supposed to mean Christ; this is the interpretation of S. Augustine, S. Ambrose, S. Gregory, S. Jerome, Bede, &c.

[1] Serm. 76, c. i. tom. 5, p. 479; Serm. 295, c. i. p. 1348; Serm. 244, § i. p. 1147; Serm. 270, § 2, p. 1239; Serm. 149, p. 802; are all selected from one volume of Abbé Migne's edition of S. Augustine, in Papal Supremacy, &c. p. 46.

[2] S. Ambr. tom. iv. p. 143, and tom. vi. p. 494.

According to some it means the Faith and consequent Confession of S. Peter: this is the view of S. Chrysostom, S. Cyril of Alexandria, S. Hilary, S. Gregory Nyssen, S. Ambrose,[1] S. Gregory the Great, Theodoret, Theophylact, Ælfric,[2] &c. Some take it to mean S. Peter, as representing the other Apostles: this is the interpretation of S. Basil, S. Cyprian, S. Firmilian, S. Jerome, &c. Some hold that it means S. Peter as representing all sound Churchmen: this is Origen's explanation. Some consider S. Peter to be meant as having been the first and great instrument of converting the Jews to Christianity on the day of Pentecost, opening the door to the Gentiles in the person of Cornelius, and teaching the mysteries of the faith; this is the view of Tertullian, Epiphanius, &c., and is supported by Mr. Alford in his Commentary. Every one of these views is tenable, and finds support among the writers and Fathers of the Church. Mr. Wilberforce's view, on the other hand, that S. Peter is the Rock, as especially representing Christ (*i. e.* as His special vicar) is untenable, and is not supported by a single Father, or a single early writer, unless a sentence may perhaps be so construed, which is found in the writings of a Pelagian and Arian heretic, 'Hilary the deacon as it seems.'

5. and 6. The fifth proof may be passed over very summarily, for Mr. Wilberforce does not bring forward a single authority for his interpretation of Luke xxii. 31, 'Simon, Simon, Satan hath desired,' &c. except his friend 'Hilary the deacon apparently.' We prefer the consentient exposition of antiquity, which teaches that the meaning of the text is, that our Lord prayed that Peter might not fall away from the grace of God in the trials which were coming upon him. In the sixth we desiderate Bellarmine's notable explanation of ποίμαινε μοῦ τὰ πρόβατα—'Rule as king over Jews, Gentiles, and Bishops,' and find two passages, one from S. Chrysostom, that 'Jesus putteth into his hands the chief authority [προστασία, first place] among the brethren,' and one from *Saint* Optatus. With regard to the first, had Mr. Wilberforce looked on a few verses further, he would have found that, according to S. Chrysostom, the world was entrusted just as much to S. John as to S. Peter—and had he looked in

[1] It will be seen that sometimes the same Fathers give in different places different interpretations. Not considering that any special doctrine was involved, they naturally drew as many edifying lessons as they were able from the words.

[2] 'A Trans-Atlantic contemporary, in an able article on 'The Question of the Papacy,' states that 'Thirty-five of the ancient Fathers are reckoned as holding the opinion, that S. Peter's confession is the Rock. To these must be added at least six of the early Popes; while the exposition is also recognised in a prayer in the Missal of the Roman Church, in the Mass for the Vigil of S. Peter and S. Paul, which, referring to this text, has the expression, "the rock of the apostolical confession."'—Church Review, New Haven, Conn., Oct. 1854, p. 888.

the previous volume of S. Chrysostom's works, he would have seen, that so far from regarding the words, 'Feed my sheep,' as addressed in any special manner to S. Peter, the saint says, 'This is addressed not only to priests, but to every one of us: 'each one of us has a sheep to conduct to its right pasturage.'[1]

With regard to *Saint* Optatus, first, we have to say that he is not a *saint*, and secondly, that the passage which Mr. Wilberforce has quoted is most likely a forgery. The method by which Optatus became sainted is the following:—When Baronius was drawing up his edition of the Roman Martyrology, he found that Peter Natalis had made a confusion between Optatus, Bishop of Antissiodorus, and Optatus, Bishop of Milevis; and whereas it was Optatus of Antissiodorus' festival, which fell upon August 31, Peter Natalis had substituted Optatus of Milevis. Baronius rectified the mistake: but what was he to do with the Bishop of Milevis? After he had once been admitted to the catalogue, it was hard to dismiss him so rudely, and his writings (being largely interpolated) were useful for strengthening the Papal claims: so Baronius kindly found him a place on June 4, and thus Optatus became a saint. The passage quoted by Mr. Wilberforce is taken from the seventh book of Optatus' work against the Donatists, the whole of which book is generally considered supposititious. S. Jerome says that Optatus wrote only six books. Optatus says that he was only going to write six books: the seventh very often contradicts the six others, and its style is totally different.

Such are Mr. Wilberforce's 'proofs' from the Gospels. We shall not occupy our space in dwelling on the counter-balancing statements, such as S. John's, and S. James's, and S. Paul's, special privileges, which might be counted up in the same manner as S. Peter's; the equality of the twelve thrones in S. Matt. xix. 27; the request of Zebedee's children in S. Matt. xx. 20; the unmonarchial character of his kingdom in S. Mark x. 42; the disputing among the disciples for superiority in S. Luke xxii. 24; the special words of reproof as well as of honour addressed to S. Peter, and the rest of the passages which might be referred to. We are not careful to linger over this point, for we are persuaded that Englishmen, who have all their lives been accustomed to the Scriptures, will never be induced to believe that any special vicariate of S. Peter is taught in them, unless they find that there is a universal consensus of the Doctors of the early Church to the effect that certain texts are to be interpreted as testimony of that vicariate. We have shown that there is a universal consensus against that interpretation.

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[1] Tom. vii. p. 785, Ed. Bened., 1727. Papal Supremacy, &c. p. 44.

In the Acts and Epistles we have six more points brought forward. These will not detain us long. 1. '*In the first portion* '*of the book* which describes the actions of all the Apostles, 'S. Peter is so entirely prominent that his position *might almost* 'be compared with that which our Lord Himself while upon 'earth occupied towards his disciples' (p. 122). We reply, '*In the latter portion of the book* S. Paul is so entirely prominent that his position might equally well be compared with that of our Lord's.' 2. It is Peter who works the miracles of healing the lame man; it is Peter who condemns Simon Magus, Ananias and Sapphira; it is Peter who admits the Gentiles. We reply, it is Paul who raises Eutychus; it is Paul who condemns Elymas, and casts out the spirit of divination; it was Paul who had the Apostleship of the Gentiles; and it was the Church in Synod assembled which sanctioned their admission. 3. 'At the Council of Jerusalem the ancient writers see no sign 'that S. Peter was wanting in authority' (p. 125). In proof several passages of S. Chrysostom are quoted. (1) 'Great 'effrontery this of the Pharisees, that even after faith they set up 'the law and will not obey *the Apostles*.'[1] What has this to do with S. Peter? (2) 'Observe he first permits the question 'to be moved in the Church, and then speaks.' (Ibid.) On which Mr. Wilberforce comments, 'He refers especially to 'S. Peter as having *allowed* the discussion to have its course, 'and having then *stepped in with authority*.' Mr. Wilberforce represents it an act of condescension. S. Chrysostom is speaking of it as an act which showed his wisdom—he let the complainants speak first: then, and not till then, he replied, and 'advanced gradually' to the point which he wished to prove—there is nothing whatever about stepping in with special authority. (3) 'Our Lord putteth into S. Peter's hands the chief 'authority (position) *among* his brethren,' *i. e.* he was *primus inter pares* except in the district specially appointed to one—a thing which we do not dispute. (4) 'He asks the question, '"How then did James receive the chair at Jerusalem?" His 'answer is, that Christ "appointed Peter teacher not of the chair 'but of the world."' (p. 126). Was it fair in Mr. Wilberforce to quote this comment on John xxi. 19, without adding that on John xxi. 23, S. Chrysostom says that S. John was 'to receive 'the charge of the world' equally with S. Peter? And that elsewhere he speaks of S. Paul as 'an Apostle of the world,—'charged with the care of cities, and peoples, and nations, nay, 'of the whole world,—the planter of the Church,—the tongue 'of the world, the light of the Churches, the foundation of the 'faith, the pillar and ground of the truth'—who 'excelled all

[1] S. Chrys. Hom. in Act. xxxii. 2.

'men who have been since men first were?'[1] (5) Mr. Wilberforce says, that according to Chrysostom, the reason why S. James closes the discussion is, that he was Bishop of Jerusalem, but that there is nothing in this circumstance which implies him to have been superior to S. Peter. Would it not have been well to have given S. Chrysostom's words here as well as in all the other passages? They are as follow:—'James restrains himself and 'does not leap up; for it was he that was invested with the chief 'rule (*τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐγκεχειρισμένος*). No word speaks John here, 'no word the other Apostles, but hold their peace; and they 'think it no hardship, so clean was their soul from the love of 'glory . . . *Peter, indeed, spoke at the beginning more strongly, but 'James speaks more mildly, for thus it behoves one in high autho-'rity—(ἐν μεγάλῃ δυναστείᾳ) to leave what is unpleasant for others to 'say, while he himself appears in the milder part.*'[2]

4. 'In the Epistle to the Corinthians, where S. Paul often 'mentions S. Peter's name, the order observed *always* points out 'his priority' (p. 126). We might answer, 'In the Epistle to the Galatians, where S. Paul mentions S. Peter's name, the order observed points out no priority, for it is placed between James and John.' We might also answer, that in two out of the four places in the Epistle to the Corinthians in which it is used, it does not naturally point out any priority; and we might further add, that a position of priority would be what we should expect on the hypothesis of S. Peter being *primus inter pares:* this, then, is nothing in favour of Mr. Wilberforce.

5. 'When S. Paul speaks of going up "to see Peter," they 'all understand this to be a mark of respect, paid by one whom 'our Lord had added to their number by immediate appoint-'ment, to the chief of the Apostles' (p. 187). Those quoted are Tertullian, Marius Victorinus, Hilary the Deacon, S. Jerome, S. Chrysostom, and Theodoret. The quotation from Tertullian is irrelevant, and its apparent application rests on the misunderstanding of one of the words.[3] Hilary the Deacon (this is not 'Hilary the Deacon, *as it seems*,' though it is still doubtful whether it is the genuine Hilary) does not represent S. Paul as being in an analogous position towards the Churches of the Gentiles, as S. Peter towards the whole Church, according to Mr. Wilberforce's statement, and he is only made to appear to

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[1] S. Chrys. in Ep. 1. ad Cor. ix. 2. In Ep. 2. ad Cor. xi. 28. Hom. de Fil. Zeb. Or. 1, in Rom. xvi. 3. De Laud. S. Pauli, Or. 2. We have taken the five references from Mr. Scudamore's 'England and Rome,' p. 151, an able, useful, and learned book, written calmly, and, what is of great price, fairly.

[2] S. Chrys. Hom. in Act. Apost. xxxiii. Op., tom. ix. p. 255.

[3] 'Ascendit Hierosolymam, cognoscendi Petri causâ, ex officio et jure scilicet ejusdem fidei et prædicationis.' De præscript. c. xxiv. *Ex officio* cannot mean 'as a matter of duty' towards S. Peter.

do so by half-sentences being quoted. Had the whole passage been given, it would have been seen that he places S. Paul upon an exact equality with S. Peter, the latter holding the Primacy amongst the Apostles of the circumcision, and the former holding the Primacy amongst the Apostles of the uncircumcision. 'So, however, that Peter might preach to the Gentiles if there 'were cause, and Paul to the Jews: for they are both found to 'have done so. But still in preaching to the Jews full authority 'is distinguished as given to Peter, and the authority of Paul 'in preaching to the Gentiles is found perfect.' And again: 'that he (Paul) should be thought worthy to have the Primacy 'in preaching to the Gentiles, as Peter had in preaching to the 'circumcision.' The 'Apostles,' amongst whom S. Peter has the primacy are only *Apostoli circumcisionis*, and S. Paul holds the same position amongst the *Apostoli gentium*. If anything, a higher station is assigned to S. Paul than to S. Peter, for he says: 'Each of them received his dispensation in proportion to 'his strength; for it was more difficult to attract to the faith 'and convince those who were far away from God, than those 'who were very near.' [1] These are words which Mr. Wilberforce not only fails to quote, but he omits them, although making part of the passage from which he has extracted certain portions of two sentences.

The other authorities, while they show themselves irreconcileably opposed to Bellarmine's dictum, that S. Paul, and all the other Apostles, received their jurisdiction, mission, and ordination from S. Peter, do not go beyond what we should expect them to say, on the hypothesis that S. Peter was *primus inter pares*. Mr. Wilberforce, having made his extracts from them, concludes thus: 'These writers, then, attributed to S. Paul an immediate 'and independent commission from our Lord, such as he be-'stowed on all the Apostles; but they represent him to have 'recognised *that priority of S. Peter, which was designed to secure* '*the unity of the Apostolic body.*' We repeat, that that priority 'which was designed to secure the unity of the Apostolic body,' is a thing totally different in kind from that priority which made S. Peter first amidst his brethren. The latter, S. Chrysostom and others did recognise; the former, is wholly unknown to them.

6. When S. Peter was rebuked by S. Paul, Mr. Wilberforce thinks that the latter's act was that of an inferior. We leave that point to our readers' judgment.

Again, we shall not linger over the counterbalancing statements. They are well known: the appointment of S. Matthias; the appointment of the deacons; S. Peter and S. John being

[1] App. in S. Ambr. tom. ii. p. 216.

sent by the Apostles; S. James presiding and giving sentence in the Council of Jerusalem; S. Peter recognising S. Paul's apostolate of the Gentiles, and withdrawing himself into the ministration of the Gospel of the circumcision; the reproof of S. Peter by S. Paul; S. Paul's vindication of his independent and equal authority; S. Paul's declaration that on him came 'daily the care of all the Churches'—a form of speech assumed to themselves in later times by the Bishops of Rome, and which would doubtless have been brought forward as an irrefragable proof of the Supremacy, if only S. Peter had used it instead of S. Paul—the expressions employed by S. Peter himself in his Epistles; the exact equality, according to measurement, of the twelve foundations of the 'great city, the holy Jerusalem,' 'the bride, the Lamb's wife,' which had 'on them the names of the twelve Apostles of the Lamb:' these are some of the special passages bearing on the point; but the great proof is the spirit and tone which pervades the whole of the Sacred Writings.

We submit that Mr. Wilberforce has not made out his first point; he has not shown that S. Peter was head and centre of unity to the Apostles, as our Lord's representative after His departure hence; that he has vainly attempted to fasten that doctrine upon S. Cyprian, S. Augustine, and other great Doctors of the Church; that he has vainly attempted to find it in Scripture, and can get no early writer to agree with him at all, except one Arian and Pelagian heretic, who thought Melchizedek was the Holy Ghost, and even from him he derives but a very partial support. On the contrary, we maintain that the powers and the commissions of all the Apostles were exactly equal; that this is witnessed to by Scripture, and held universally in the early Church; that there is not one early writer, with the exception possibly of Optatus and S. Jerome (whose words we shall presently examine), who supposed that S. Peter had any peculiar office of securing unity; that there is not one, except the Arian heretic above mentioned, who regarded him as a special representative of his Master; and that there is, in truth, no *special* 'Vicar of Christ on Earth,'[1] except the Holy Ghost, the Comforter, whom Christ promised to send in His own place, (John, xiv. 16.) and who is the Bond of Unity to His Church.[2]

[1] Mr. Wilberforce acknowledges (p. 99), that the principle of the *Ancient* Church was, that *every* Bishop 'represented the person of Christ, and was Christ's Vicar, the Father of the people (*papa*);' which would necessarily exclude the later Papal notion. Mr. Wilberforce incorrectly quotes the words, 'Christ's Vicar,' as though they were S. Ambrose's; they are Hilary the Deacon's, who says that a Bishop, like a Judge, is *Vicarius Domini*, the Vicar or Representative of his Lord.—App. S. Ambr. ii. 148.

[2] So Tertullian, De Præscript. Hæret. c. xxviii. 'Spiritus Sanctus, ad hoc missus à Christo, ad hoc postulatus de Patre, ut esset doctor veritatis ... *Dei Villicus*,

II. We proceed to the second point. The Bishop of Rome was not the head and centre of unity to the early Church.

We have seen that the main argument of Mr. Wilberforce heretofore has rested on the ambiguity of the word 'Primacy.' Sometimes S. Peter's 'primacy' is a certain 'superiority' (p. 142), 'his prominence' (p. 124), 'a certain primacy *in* the college of the Apostles' (p. 110), he is 'the first Apostle' (p. 116), 'the chief Apostle' (p. 121). Now, substitute Bishop for Apostle, and it will be seen that we might give all those titles to the Bishop of London. Such a primacy as that we are ready to admit; the earliest ecclesiastical historian says that he did 'take the lead of the rest,' and he tells us the reason, 'on account of his courage;'[1] and such a primacy as that is admitted by many, not by all—it was an indifferent matter—of the early Christian writers. But by-and-by this harmless preeminence designated by the word 'Primacy,' becomes a very different thing. Now it is the 'peculiar and characteristic commission given to S. Peter by our Lord' (p. 117), 'it is the peculiar provision made for securing the unity of the Apostles' (p. 118), it makes S. Peter 'the centre of unity' (p. 119), it gives him a peculiar 'office' (p. 138), it 'associates him to our Lord's own office' (p. 140), it 'asso-'ciates him, by peculiar copartnership, in one of the functions of 'his Master, and makes him become, by grace, that which Christ 'was by nature' (p. 112), it makes him 'the especial representative (vicar) of Christ' (p. 112), and the Fathers who have allowed the first-described 'Primacy' are cited as having acknowledged the last (p. 128).

The next step is likewise grounded on an ambiguity. Are the Bishops of Rome S. Peter's successors? Yes; S. Irenæus says that they are successors of SS. Peter and Paul (p. 134), S. Cyprian says that they succeeded S. Peter (p. 136), Tertullian says that Clement was appointed by S. Peter (p. 136), S. Augustine asserts that from Linus to Anastasius they all suc-

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Christi Vicarius.' Thus too, Bishop Andrewes: 'Belong ye then to your Roman Catholic Church, a thing not found in the Creed, and we to that in which we believe,—a Church which is simply Catholic, not restricted to Rome, but such as we profess in the Creed—a Church which is orthodox; which does not bow down to or worship any image (Exod. xx. 4); which does not worship it knows not what (John iv. 2); which bids all drink from Christ's cup (Matt. xxvii. 27); which prays in the spirit, and prays with the understanding likewise (1 Cor. xiv. 15); which does not call on them on whom it believes not (Rom. x. 4); in which *Christ is the Head of the Faith, and the Holy Spirit His Vicar* (John, xvi. 7). To this we belong, and profess to belong: and you, since you have many of the doctrines of the Catholic Faith still remaining among you, though in part corrupted, we are able to call members of the Catholic Church, but not sound members.'—Tortura Torti, p. 495. In the same manner, King James I. '*Christus Ecclesiæ suæ monarcha est, Christique vices explet, quem venturum promiserat, Spiritus Sanctus.*'—Præf. Mon. in Apol. pro Jur. Fidel.

[1] Τὸν καρτερὸν καὶ μέγαν τῶν ἀποστόλων, τὸν ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα τῶν λοιπῶν ἁπάντων προηγόρου, Πέτρον.—Euseb. ii. 14.

ceeded S. Peter (p. 141). But how did they succeed? Of course as Bishops of Rome, just as Annianus and Avilius succeeded as Bishops of Alexandria, Evodius and Ignatius as Bishops of Antioch, and Symeon and Justus as Bishops of Jerusalem. But this succession *in the Roman episcopate* is wholly irrelevant: the question is, as Mr. Wilberforce fairly states it, had he any successors *in the Primacy*? Now, there is not a single one of these writers who have been quoted as witnesses 'that the Bishop of Rome is S. Peter's successor,' who gives the slightest hint that he meant that the Bishops of Rome succeeded S. Peter in any other capacity than as Bishops of Rome. They mention an historical fact, which may also be found in every historian from Eusebius to Dean Milman. But, says Mr. Wilberforce, 'Since the Church of Rome was spoken 'of in ancient times as the see of S. Peter, though S. Paul also 'was one of its founders, the commission transmitted by the 'other Apostle *(sic)* must surely have been characteristic and 'peculiar. For why should this Church have been so especially 'associated with the name of S. Peter, unless there was 'something specific in the commission which he transmitted' (p. 137)? So the proof of S. Peter's being succeeded by the Bishops of Rome in his (supposed) vicarial Primacy is, that the see of Rome came to be called the see of S. Peter instead of the see of S. Peter and S. Paul!—a slender thread on which to hang the weight of the Papacy. If it were true, would it not be fully accounted for by the very simple fact, that 'the see of 'S. Peter and S. Paul' is a lengthy expression, which would naturally have become shortened into the 'see of S. Peter?' It is not, however, universally true, for the Bishops of Rome are very often spoken of as successors to both the Apostles, and Eusebius places the name of S. Paul before that of S. Peter,[1] a fact which would more than counterbalance 'Dionysius of 'Corinth putting S. Peter first, as one of the two who had 'planted the Church at Corinth, and thereby associated it 'with Rome' (p. 137), if it were true that Dionysius had done so. But he has not. He says, 'You, too, by means 'of this admonition, have again united that which was planted 'by Peter and Paul *at Rome* and Corinth. For both of them 'having come to our Corinth and planted us, taught us alike, 'and having in like manner taught in Italy, they suffered 'martyrdom about the same time.'[2] Whether Dionysius places the name of Peter before that of Paul, or of Paul before that of Peter, is about as unimportant a thing as could well be; but it is evident that he is there speaking not only of their preaching at Corinth, but, as he says, at Rome.

[1] Euseb. ii. 25; iii. 21.

[2] Euseb ii. 25.

Mr. Wilberforce has another argument. He says that 'it 'may be objected,' that it was only the general Apostolic commission, not the peculiar Primatial commission, which was bestowed upon the Roman Bishops. This 'objection' he meets as follows:—

'It proceeds upon the supposition that St. Peter's power consisted of two portions, one of which expired with himself, while he handed on the other. Either, then, we ought to find some ancient statement that his functions were understood to be thus divided; or such an arrangement, though not expressed in words, must have been implied in the manner in which his office was dealt with. But neither of these suppositions is maintainable. Our Lord's promise of His continual presence, the conduct of the Apostles themselves, and the belief of their first disciples, had led the ancient Christians to the conclusion, that the commission bestowed upon the Twelve was given for the permanent guidance and administration of the Church. But nothing indicates that the commission of the other eleven was supposed to be more durable than his whom St. Matthew terms the First Apostle. No ancient Church-writer attempts to discriminate between his powers, and to show that the one part of them was merely personal, the other transferable.'—P. 135.

Mr. Wilberforce *does* himself hold this distinction of powers and functions in S. Peter—the general commission given him as an Apostle, and the peculiar commission given to him by our Lord (p. 117)—the Apostolic and the Primatial authority (p. 135)—his ordinary commission as an Apostle, and his office of Primate (p. 138). Starting with this assumption, he here argues that unless ancient Church writers discriminate between these *powers*, and show that one part of them was merely personal, the other transferable, it is reasonable to suppose that they believed them to be both transferable, and that they were accordingly transferred. But there is one good reason, we think, why ancient Church writers should not have done so; and that is, that they none of them recognised or believed in 'this peculiar commission,' this 'Primatial *authority*,' this '*office* of Primate.' They all regarded S. Peter as having received the same commission, authority, and office with the rest of the Apostles, and none other: as S. Cyprian says, '*the other Apostles were that which Peter was; 'endowed with an equal fellowship* (pari consortio) *both of honour 'and power.*'[1] The primacy which some of them admitted was no *power* or *office* at all, but a *prominence*. As, therefore, they did not hold that S. Peter had peculiar powers, it is not likely that they would have gone out of their way to say that those peculiar powers, of which they were totally unaware, were not transferred to Linus. Yet, says Mr. Wilberforce, unless they do so, we ought in reason to believe that it was. He

[1] De Unitat. i. Such passages might be multiplied *ad libitum*. See Scudamore's England and Rome, p. 140.

acknowledges that it was only '*in later times*' that 'it has been '*found convenient* to discriminate the several ideas which were 'involved in S. Peter's office, and to point out what was peculiar 'to himself, what common to his brethren .... That which is 'common to all Bishops has *since* been called the power of 'Order, and Mission has been the name given to that authority 'which arranges when, how, and where the power of Order 'shall be used' (p. 135). He does not tell us *when* it was thus 'found convenient to discriminate' these several ideas. Mr. Allies supplies the deficiency.

'But when this fraud (the Decretals) was discovered, the defenders of the Pope's unlimited power, the great school of S. Ignatius Loyola, set themselves with unexampled energy, skill, and unity of purpose, to build up the breach. Theirs are *those very clever but arbitrary divisions* which Mr. Thompson assumes to be the "Catholic faith," *i. e.* the separation of the Bishop's power into that of orders, and that of jurisdiction, allowing that all Bishops are equal as to the first, but restricting the last to the Pope; the asserting that S. Peter's power was ordinary, but that of the Apostles extraordinary; that S. Peter had a successor to all his power, but the Apostles none to theirs; that the Bishops are successors of the Apostles only as to orders, not as to jurisdiction; that the Pope's jurisdiction comes from Christ immediately, but that of other Bishops from the Pope; that the Apostles were equal to each other in all points but one, viz. that the exercise of all their powers depended upon union with Peter, which totally destroyed their equality. These and such-like are very clever, but wholly arbitrary, and, moreover, *ex post facto* defences of the plenitude of Papal power, which was really introduced by the belief of Western Europe in the authenticity of the false Decretals.'—Pref. p. xiv.

So we are to believe that the Early Fathers taught that an authority was transferred to Linus and his successors which did not exist, which they did not believe to exist, which they incidentally deny to have existed, and the clever arguments for the existence of which the Jesuits first invented in the sixteenth century, *because* they do not in so many words declare that such authority was *not* transferred. It might as reasonably be inferred that our forefathers were acquainted with the power of steam on the grounds that they have not written treatises to deny it.

It has been taught, and rightly taught, that all Bishops are successors of S. Peter equally with the Bishop of Rome, and it has been represented, and rightly represented, that this is S. Cyprian's doctrine.[1] Mr. Wilberforce sets himself to grapple with both these statements. 'Another expedient has been devised 'for neutralizing any peculiar claim which the Bishops of Rome 'might derive from S. Peter's commission—the assertion, namely, 'that all Bishops are equally his successors. The notion men-'tioned above was, that his successors at Rome inherited nothing 'but his ordinary commission as an Apostle: this would imply

[1] By the editors of the 'Library of the Fathers.'

'that his office of Primate was bequeathed to the whole Episco-'pate' (p. 138). It would imply no such thing, nor did those to whom Mr. Wilberforce attributes the 'devising' of 'the expe-'dient' ever say so. They acknowledged no *office* of Primate; no *peculiar* commission to S. Peter. They regarded S. Peter as at one moment representing his brother Apostles exactly as Cornelius at one moment represented his brother Gentiles. All the successors of the Apostles, therefore, may be said to have succeeded to S. Peter, not in his 'Primatial office,' but in the episcopate, which they inherit from the Apostles, of whom S. Peter was then the representative. In opposition to this view, Mr. Wilberforce cites S. Cyprian's statement, that the foundations were laid in one 'to *manifest* unity'—'that the 'Church might be *set before us as* one.' This Mr. Wilberforce says must mean 'to *maintain* unity,' and that 'some *method*' was instituted 'by which the Apostles themselves might *be exempted* from division.' We have already pointed out this confusion of *manifesting* and *maintaining*, whereby a *lesson* is changed into an *instrument;* we therefore need no longer dwell upon it. But, continues Mr. Wilberforce, 'the other 'interpretation does not accord with the language of other 'writers who carried on S. Cyprian's argument.' Who are these 'other writers'? [S.] Optatus and S. Jerome. Can anything be purer eclecticism than to choose one noted passage of Optatus, and half of a passage of S. Jerome, and make them specimens of 'other writers,' whereas they are not specimens of others, when too the rest of the sentence in S. Jerome gives an entirely different complexion to his words, and internal evidence shows the passage from Optatus to be spurious? Why were not S. Augustine and S. Pacian cited? They were the real inheritors of Cyprianism, and we have already shown that their teaching does accord with the interpretation of 'manifest' which we require; viz. that it means 'manifest,' and not something else. 'In vain' says Mr. Allies, 'does Mr. Thompson 'try to torture a passage or two of S. Cyprian into his view: 'in vain by resting exclusively on one or two expressions of '[S.] Optatus and others, and putting out of sight all that on 'the other side the Church did and spoke, does he try to give 'it the witness of antiquity' (Pref. p. xiii).

We have already shown how Optatus attained his name of *Saint*, and pointed out that Mr. Wilberforce has quoted a passage, from the seventh book, as though it had been genuine. This passage, which he now brings forward, or at least a part of it, is likewise spurious; for in it Optatus is made to speak of Siricius as being Bishop of Rome, whereas Siricius did not become Pope till the year 384, and Optatus wrote in the year 370. We will, however, examine it, as though it were not

spurious. Optatus then, or the person who has borrowed his name, was writing against the Donatists. The Donatists had become schismatical, mainly from dwelling with overstrained earnestness upon one of the attributes of the Church. The Church they argued is holy: where, therefore, holiness is not, that cannot be the Church. Their adversaries, as was natural and right, dwelt upon the other two chief attributes of the Church—Unity and Catholicity. On the latter of these they used the same arguments against the Donatists which we are able to bring with so much force against the exclusiveness of the Roman portion of the Church now. Many of the arguments of Bishop Andrewes against Romanists are almost identical with those of Optatus against Donatists. On the former, they were led by their circumstances to look about them, to see if they could not find some tangible test by which with one argument they might close the mouths of their opponents. To persons in such a state of mind there might well have occurred the thought, that union with the great Western Patriarch would serve as such a test. He was on their side, and had earned the character of orthodoxy, and they could not then contemplate that the war for Truth's sake would ever turn against him who was now their champion. So they were disposed to urge the authority of the Bishop of Rome, and to magnify his office by magnifying that of S. Peter. This was not done by the great and far-seeing minds of such as S. Augustine; but with lesser minds it is always a temptation to grasp at an argument which gives a momentary advantage over an adversary, without probing its truth to the quick, or looking to its consequences. There seems to be a tendency in that direction in this book against the Donatists. In the passage before us the writer is counting up the prerogatives of the orthodox Church in reply to his Donatist friend. 'There are,' he says, besides the Church's 'limbs and bowels, which are without doubt in the sacraments and in the names of the Trinity' (ii. 10), five 'endowments,' *dotes*, which Mr. Wilberforce calls 'tokens.' These are (1) a chair, (2) an angel (or a ring), (3) the Spirit, (4) a fountain, (5) a seal. A sixth had been added; viz. (6) a navel; but this he denies to be one of the endowments. He then explains the chair:—

'You cannot deny that in the city of Rome on Peter first an episcopal chair was bestowed, in which sat Peter the head of all the Apostles, *whence also he was called Cephas;* in which one chair unity might be preserved by all, that the rest of the Apostles might not each maintain individual chairs, but that he might be at once schismatical and a sinner who set up another against this one chair. In the one chair, then, which is the first of the endowments, (not 'the first of tokens,') sat Peter first, to whom succeeded Linus, &c.; and to Damasus, Siricius, who is now our colleague, together with whom the whole world is joined with us in one fellowship of communion by the interchange of Letters of Communion. And now give an account

of the origin of your chair, you who wish to claim the holy Church to yourselves.'—*S. Opt.* ii. 2.

This is the one passage in all antiquity which comes nearest to what Mr. Wilberforce requires. We have to remark upon it, 1. that the writer is, as may be seen, very mystical, and his meaning is not easy to discover. 2. That he is also far from a learned man, for he derives *Cephas* from κεφαλή, or *caput*, (a derivation which Dupin justly calls 'of little solidity,' and Mr. Wilberforce, in quoting the passage p. 164, wisely omits, without, however, marking that he has done so). 3. That it is but a clumsy forgery, Siricius being fourteen years after the date of Optatus. 4. That the writer does not give a hint that he conceived S. Peter to be the special representative of his Master, and *in that sense* the centre of unity. But he does seem to consider that S. Peter had an office for the sake of preserving unity among the Apostles. And he and S. Jerome (as quoted below) were the only writers of antiquity that held even that.

S. Jerome is comparing the excellences of S. Peter and S. John—

'But as you say that upon Peter the Church was founded, *though that same thing was done in another place upon all the Apostles*, and *all of them* receive the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and the strength of the Church is founded *upon them equally with him;* still, one is therefore chosen among the twelve, that by the appointment of a head occasion of schism may be taken away. But why was not John chosen, who was a virgin? Deference was paid to age, because Peter was the elder. Peter was an Apostle, and John was an Apostle, the first married, the second a virgin. But Peter was nothing else than an Apostle *(Apostolus tantum)*; John was both an Apostle, and an Evangelist, and a Prophet,' &c.—*Adv. Jov.* i. p. 168.

There were, then, two writers in antiquity, Optatus (supposing that only a part, and not the whole, of the passage given above is spurious) and S. Jerome, who apparently believed not only that S. Peter was prominent or chief *amongst* the Apostles, which is a very general view, but also that S. Peter had the office of head of the college for the sake of preserving unity among the Apostles. Grotius has maintained the same view, showing that it does not imply any very lofty idea of S. Peter's prerogative. But while Optatus and S. Jerome used this language, the first nowhere says, and the second distinctly denies, that he held this office as special representative of his Lord. Therefore their testimony is valueless to Mr. Wilberforce. It is this circumstance which would raise him to the position which none but his Master ought to fill, and where the Church of Rome and Mr. Wilberforce would fain place him.[1]

[1] S. Jerome is also quoted by Mr. Wilberforce, in p. 99, as 'noticing' that 'S. Peter's temporary occupation of the See of Antioch,' was 'the ground of its

But further, 'S. Cyprian applies the term, *the place of Peter*, especially to the see of Rome.' (p. 129.) Doubtless. Constantine was Emperor of the Romans, consequently all after Emperors of the Romans were his successors: but Constantine might, if we chose, be looked upon as the symbol of Christian princes in general, then all Christian princes would be his successors. So S. Cyprian regarded Cornelius as the successor of S. Peter in one sense, and all Bishops as his successors in another.

The chapter that speaks of the Bishops of Rome as being S. Peter's successors, ends with two quotations from S. Augustine. In these quotations S. Augustine distinctly affirms, that the Roman Bishop contemporary with himself was S. Peter's successor. But did he mean in the local episcopate of Rome, or in the Primacy? If he meant the first, the passages are wholly irrelevant to the question in hand, and should not have been made use of. Did he, then, mean the Primacy—this vicarial Primacy, by virtue of which the Primate is the peculiar representative of Christ, and the instrument of securing unity to the Church? The words almost immediately following the passage extracted are as follows: 'But suppose that some '*traditor* had during this time crept into the line of Bishops 'which is drawn from Peter himself to Anastasius who now 'holds the same chair, yet no harm could have been done to the 'Church, and innocent Christians, whom the Lord has cared for 'by saying about bad rulers, "Do what they say, but do not 'what they do, for they say and do not:" that the hope of the 'faithful may be sure, which by being placed not in man but in 'the Lord can never be dissipated by the storm of impious 'schism."[1] But if he had believed each one of these Bishops to be the peculiar representative of Christ, with whom to be in unity was to be in unity with Christ, he must have conceived that considerable harm would have come to the Church by his being a *traditor*. Look at the different way in which the supporters of the Papacy speak now: 'Christianity rests entirely upon the sovereign pontiff.' 'The sovereign pontiff is the necessary, only, and exclusive foundation of Christianity. To him belong the promises, with him disappears unity, that is, the Church,' is the doctrine of De Maistre. S. Augustine is enumerating in both passages those who succeeded in the local see of Rome as Bishops: there is not a hint of Primacy of any kind. In the last passage *commendavit* is not *committed*, and *episcopatum* is not *pontiff*.

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superiority.' The passage to which he gives a reference as his authority for this statement, is the following: 'Finally we have received that Peter was the first Bishop of the Church of Antioch, and was thence translated to Rome; which Luke has altogether omitted.'—Vol. iv. p. 244.

[1] S. Aug. Ep. liii. 3.

Mr. Wilberforce has brought himself into a difficulty, by trying to grasp at the same time the advantages of two theories, that of development, and that of a direct commission establishing S. Peter and his successors Primates of the Church. A bold theorist might plausibly account for the insignificance of the early Bishops of Rome on the first of these theories, arguing that the Papacy had not yet grown up. Accordingly, Mr. Wilberforce has recourse to this theory (pp. 144—147). But it is irreconcileable with the other theory of a direct commission; for had that commission been really granted, the early Church must have known it, and must have regarded the Bishop of Rome accordingly; whereas, Mr. Wilberforce is driven to the theory of development to account for the fact that they did *not* do so. 'The Church,' he says, 'was as yet like a 'human body in its infant state; it had received its organiza-'tion, in which powers lay dormant which at a later period 'were to awaken into life. As it would be unreasonable, then, 'to doubt that a child possesses the capacity of reason because 'it does not as yet give utterance to its thoughts, so the Church 'may have had a centre of unity, though as yet there was 'nothing to call out its services, and manifest its effect' (p. 144). Of course it is open to a controversialist to argue thus: but if he does so, he must give up the theory of a direct commission. The Church could not, like the infant, have been unconscious of its centre of unity, had Christ instituted that centre of unity in Matt. xvi. 16.

We should but be wasting our space were we to follow Mr. Wilberforce in his 'historical evidence' for the existence of this centre of unity in early times. He refers to the twice-told tales of S. Polycarp and Anicetus, of Polycrates and Victor, of S. Cyprian and Stephen, S. Dionysius of Alexandria and his namesake of Rome, Paul of Samosata and the Emperor Aurelian. It is simply wearisome to go over these cases again: they have been shown so often and so incontrovertibly to be not only incapable of supporting Mr. Wilberforce's view of the Primacy, but to be irreconcileable with it. No new light is thrown upon them: they are simply reproduced, one side of them being held up to view, while the other is thrown into the shade. We are told that S. Polycarp came to Rome to discuss the question of Easter with Anicetus. We are not told that the interview exhibits perfect equality of power and honour in the two Bishops. We are told that 'S. Irenæus *entreated* Victor that he *would* not take any harsh step,' &c. Eusebius says that he *gave him advice*, παραινεῖ, and that he was one of those πλητικώτερον καθαπτομένοι τοῦ Βίκτορος, desiring him to be at peace and unity, and in love with his neighbours, while 'he

'was trying (πειρᾶται,) to cut off the Asiatic dioceses from the 'common unity,'—an attempt in which he signally failed.

S. Cyprian's words and acts in the question of Re-baptism, as well as S. Firmilian's, we have already seen. In spite of them, Mr. Wilberforce says, 'It is remarkable that neither 'Dionysius,[1] Cyprian, nor Firmilian, assert that S. Stephen had 'no right to interfere, though, by Firmilian especially, he is 'spoken of with great harshness' (p. 153). If Mr. Wilberforce means, that they did not make use of the words, 'You have no right to interfere,' his assertion is perfectly true, but if he means to say, that they did not deny his right of interference, it is equally untrue. It was his interference that called forth from S. Firmilian the 'harsh' expressions which we have given above; and we have seen S. Cyprian at the head of his council, vindicating the independence of Bishops, with especial regard to the Bishop of Rome, in 'steady and disdainful repudiation of 'his authority.'[2]

'The presbyters of S. Dionysius of Alexandria having com- 'plained of his doctrine to S. Dionysius of Rome,' is no more an indication of the peculiar right of interference which lay in the Pope of Rome (p. 159), than 'the references made 'by Novatian to Alexandria, in his opposition to Cornelius, 'Bishop of Rome' (p. 96,) bear an indication of the peculiar right of interference which lay in the Pope of Alexandria. And it is contrary to historical testimony, to say that Rome alone thus interfered. We have seen that S. Cyprian interfered in Spain, to the extent of cancelling the previous interferences of the Roman Patriarch, *and in Rome itself, for the purpose of preserving the unity of the Church.* Mr. Wilberforce himself tells us (when trying to show the necessity of a Supremacy), that 'in the year 403, Theophilus, Bishop 'of Alexandria, goes to Constantinople with a number of 'Egyptian bishops, holds a synod in a church in the suburbs, 'and deposes S. Chrysostom, the Patriarch of that city' (p. 101), that 'the Oriental Bishops complain that S. Athanasius, on 'his way back from his exile at Treves, overthrew the Church's 'order through his whole journey, and restored condemned 'Bishops' (*Ibid.*), that 'S. Chrysostom deposed thirteen Bishops, 'and appointed new ones, where he seems to have had no 'regular jurisdiction' (*Ibid.*). Then it is idle to assert, 'that

[1] The passage in S. Dionysius' letter to Sixtus II., which Mr. Wilberforce translates, 'I wrote to him (Stephen), making intercession for all these men,' is, περὶ τούτων αὐτοῦ πάντων δεόμενος; *i.e* probably, requesting him about all these things.' It is possible that it may mean, 'about all these persons;' but that δεόμενος περὶ should mean 'making intercession for,' is impossible; the 'request' conveyed is, that Stephen would behave with greater moderation and Christian forbearance.—Euseb. vii. 5.

[2] Milman, vol. i. p. 84.

'whereas in every other case affairs were settled in the pro-'vince where they arose, there was *one* Church and *one* line of 'Bishops, which interfered or was consulted, respecting every 'matter of internal disagreement which arose during the first 'three centuries' (p. 156). The truth is, that all the great sees had an undefined right of interfering one with the other when occasion called.

With regard to Paul of Samosata, which shows the greatest spiritual power; to depose a Patriarch, which was what the Eastern Bishops did without any communication with Rome; or to be appointed, as the Bishop of Rome was, by a heathen Emperor, as one of a board, consisting of the Bishops of both the districts of Italy, to settle whether the deposed Patriarch should keep a see-house or not?

'Other circumstances might be added,' continues Mr. Wilberforce, 'as showing how completely this See formed the middle point of communication to the Church Catholic. The Montanists, from Phrygia, came to Rome to gain the countenance of its Bishop; Praxeas, from Africa, attempted the like, and for a while was successful. Meantime the Churches of Gaul felt especial interest in the Montanist movement in Asia Minor, and therefore "send an embassy to Eleutherus, the then Bishop of Rome, about the peace of the Churches" (Euseb. v. 3.) About the same time, Soter, Bishop of Rome, sends alms, according to the custom of his Church, to the Churches throughout the empire, and in the words of Eusebius, "affectionately exhorted them who came to Rome as a father his children." One of the charges made by Hippolytus against Callistus is, that the laxity which had been originally introduced by him, enabled Bishops who had been guilty of deadly sin to escape deposition; and about thirty years afterwards, Basilides, who had been deposed from his Bishopric in Spain, goes to Rome to procure his restoration from S. Stephen.'—P. 159.

Four points are here noticed, on each of which we have a few remarks to make. 1. The Montanists came to Rome. This may be paralleled by Achilli's coming to London; but what does it prove? Having mentioned their presence, Mr. Wilberforce should not have failed to inform us likewise that they made a convert for a time of Pope Eleutherus. 2. Praxeas came to Rome. Yes: and he bewildered Pope Victor, threw Pope Zephyrinus into a sea of theological difficulties, out of which he never emerged, and converted Pope Callistus to a heresy for which he was excommunicated by S. Hippolytus. 3. 'The Churches of Gaul "send an embassy to Eleutherus, 'the then Bishop of Rome, about the peace of the Churches" '(Euseb. v. 3).' This is a mistranslation and a misstatement. Eusebius's words are, 'There being a difference of opinion on 'this point' (the alleged prophetical powers of the Montanists), 'the brethren in Gaul give their own pious and most orthodox 'judgment about it, and also publish several letters of the 'martyrs who had been perfected amongst them, which *letters* '*they' (the martyrs)* '*had written while they were still in bonds to*

'*the brethren in Asia and Phrygia, and also to Eleutherus, the* '*then Bishop of Rome, treating* (πρεσβεύοντες) *about the peace of* '*the Churches.*' Therefore Eusebius does not say that any embassy was sent; it was the martyrs, not the Churches, who, he tells us, wrote the letters: and they were sent to the Asiatics and Phrygians, as well as to Rome: indeed, as Valesius has pointed out, a probable reason for writing specially to Eleutherus was, that he had himself become a Montanist, and in Tertullian's words, 'acknowledged the prophecies of Montanus, Prisca, and 'Maximilla, and in consequence of that acknowledgment, of-'fered peace to the Churches of Asia and Phrygia.'

4. 'Soter sends alms, and affectionately exhorts them who came to Rome, as a father his children.' A liberal and a gentle-hearted Bishop! What then? 5. 'One of the charges 'made by Hippolytus against Callistus is, that the laxity which 'had been originally introduced by him enabled Bishops who 'had been guilty of deadly sin to escape deposition.' And what if he did charge that wicked man with setting an example of iniquity which was likely to destroy good morals and good discipline? What follows? And why should this one 'charge' be selected, while no notice is taken of the other charges which S. Hippolytus brings against him, such as his being an heresiarch? 6. 'Basilides, who had been deposed from his Bishopric 'in Spain, goes to Rome to procure his restoration from S. 'Stephen.' And this is all that Mr. Wilberforce has to say of Basilides! Not one word to inform us that Stephen did attempt his restoration, and that his interference was ignominiously rejected, and the Roman Patriarch's authority superseded by that of the Primate of Africa.

These cases, apposite as we have seen them to be, from Anicetus down to Stephen, are literally all that Mr. Wilberforce has to bring forward in proof of that Primacy which made the Bishop of Rome to be, by Divine commission, the representative of Christ, and the centre of unity to the Church. Let it be steadily kept in mind that *that* is the Primacy which Mr. Wilberforce's argument requires, and not a mere prominence; and it is clear at once that he has nothing to support him. That there is a certain prominence in the Bishops of Rome, is true; and how could it be otherwise, when they were seated in the heart and centre of Christendom, 'the middle point of communication to the world,' upon the rock of the ancient Capitol? Mr. Wilberforce seems to feel that this is a perfectly adequate cause for such preeminence as they enjoyed:—

'It is a more plausible notion that the temporal greatness of the metropolis gradually gave an ascendancy to its spiritual ruler; and, that the Bishops of Rome are not the successors of Peter but the heirs of the Cæsars. Such an idea naturally finds acceptance with them who suppose

that the Church is a mere human institution, and that it owes its organization to worldly policy. And this seems to be the real point on which the question turns. If men suppose that the complicated arrangements of the Hierarchy, which rose up during the first three centuries after Christ, were a mere scheme of human contrivance; if they attribute them to the ambition of priests, and the ignorance of the people, or even to the sagacious combination of worldly men, no doubt they will assign the same origin to that central power in which they culminated.'—P. 160.

And again:

'It is natural that those who suppose, like Hobbes, that the Christian scheme was one of worldly policy, should imagine that the authority of the Bishops of Rome was deduced merely from the influence of their city. Such, however, was not the belief of Christians in early times.'—P. 164.

Are the Second and Fourth Œcumenical Councils 'like Hobbes?' Did they count 'the Church a mere human organization?' Did they 'attribute the arrangements of the hierarchy to the ambition of priests, &c. &c.?' Or, are they the exponents of 'the belief of Christians in early times?' We believe that Mr. Wilberforce will acknowledge them to be the latter, and not the former. But it is these very Second and Fourth Œcumenical Councils which tell us distinctly, and in so many words, that it *was* because Rome was the imperial city that it had its ecclesiastical privileges. The Twenty-eighth Canon of the Council of Chalcedon runs as follows:—

'We, following in all things the decision of the holy fathers, and acknowledging the canon of the one hundred and fifty most religious Bishops which has just been read, [*i. e.* the third Canon of the Council of Constantinople,] do also determine and decree the same thing respecting the prerogatives of the most holy city of Constantinople, New Rome. For the fathers properly have granted its prerogatives to the throne of the Elder Rome, because that was the imperial city.[1] And the one hundred and fifty most religious Bishops, being moved with the same intention, gave equal prerogatives to the most holy throne of New Rome, judging with reason, that the city which was honoured with the sovereignty and the senate, and which enjoyed equal prerogatives with the Elder royal Rome, should also be magnified like her in ecclesiastical matters, being the second city after her.'—*Papal Supremacy, &c.* pp. 24, 75.

It *was* then 'the belief of Christians in early times'—it is the recorded testimony of the Church Universal assembled in council—that Rome's position as the seat of empire was the cause of her ecclesiastical preeminence. It is idle, consequently, for Mr. Wilberforce to attempt to browbeat us by telling us that we are 'like Hobbes,' because we hold what the Primitive Church held. He insinuates that men must have reached a very low moral and spiritual state, before they can do that. Rather, he says, 'they will accept S. Cyprian's statement, that the see of Rome

[1] Translated by Mr. Wilberforce, 'because that city ruled.'—p. 191.

'is "the principal Church," "the root and mother of the Church 'Catholic," *because it is* "the seat of Peter, whence the unity of 'the priesthood had its origin"' (p. 164). That S. Cyprian ever did say that the Church of Rome was 'the root and mother of the Church Catholic,' we have already shown to be doubly untrue. But supposing that he had, still would it be of any use to continue to argue with an 'Inquirer' who takes two passages from two different letters of S. Cyprian, two passages which have nothing whatever to do with each other, and unites them with a *because*, so as to make the second the reason of the first, when the very point which he has to prove is, that the thing asserted in the first is the consequence of the second?

We submit that Mr. Wilberforce has not proved that any peculiar commission was transferred from S. Peter to the Bishops of Rome, whereby they became special representatives of Christ, and the head and centre of unity to the early Church; but that the statement that they held any such place, and occupied any such office, is a statement unfounded in history, and against which the voice of history protests.

III. The next thing is to bridge over the gulf from the Primacy to the Supremacy. The following is Mr. Wilberforce's attempt:—

'Admitting that the successor of S. Peter possessed a Primacy, how does this involve a Supremacy of the Pope? The Pope's Supremacy consists of three principal particulars, which either include or involve the most important rights which have been claimed by his supporters. 1st. The right of finally deciding ecclesiastical causes. 2ndly. The right of presiding over Councils. 3rdly. The right of interfering in ecclesiastical appointments. Are these rights inherent in the Primacy? For if this could be shown, the Supremacy would appear to be only another name for the Primacy, and the proof which has been given of the early existence of the one, would demonstrate the antiquity of the other.'—P. 168.

The test is not sufficient, and the test breaks down. It is not sufficient: for the right of finally deciding causes, of presiding over councils, and of interfering in ecclesiastical causes, might all exist in one person, and yet it need not follow that 'all authority resided' in him, 'and from him was derived to the rest;' which is Bellarmine's account of the constitution of the Church under the Supremacy;[1] nor need it follow that 'the Church was 'a pure monarchy, so much so, that if in an Œcumenical Council 'the greater part of the Fathers agreed with the Pope, all would 'be well, and settled by common consent; but if they disagreed, 'the Fathers' authority would have no force, because in sepa-'rating from their head they cannot represent the Church,' which is the declaration of the Canonists.[2] And, moreover, we might

[1] De Pont. Rom. 4, 24.
[2] Devoti. Inst. Canon. Prol. c. ii. Papal Supremacy, &c. p. 4.

ask by what rule of eclecticism it was, that, whereas the Canon Law orders equally, 'First, that Councils should be called by 'the Roman pontiff; and, secondly, that he should preside over 'them;'[1] the former requisite should be omitted, and the latter only retained.

But let us suppose that the test was sufficient. Did the right, then, of finally deciding ecclesiastical causes *inhere in the Primacy? i.e.* had the Bishop of Rome the right of decision in a sense in which no other Patriarch had it, by virtue of his being 'Primate of the Church?'[2] On the contrary, S. Cyprian exercised the right with a higher hand. The only 'references' to the Patriarch of Rome which Mr. Wilberforce is able to enumerate before the time of Julius and the Council of Sardica, are 'the reference 'to S. Stephen against Marcian of Arles, and to S. Dionysius 'against his namesake at Alexandria' (p. 177); the first is more than paralleled by the reference to S. Cyprian against the same Marcian of Arles, and S. Cyprian's declaration, that it was therefore the business of *himself and* Stephen to remedy that which was complained of;[3] and the latter we can only compare with the discontented letters which sometimes find their way to England, complaining that some Colonial Bishop does or does not hold this or that doctrine.

Such complaints were made from everywhere to everywhere, when occasion arose. Casaubon, in his masterly explanation of this point, names the following who interfered in matters beyond their immediate jurisdiction for the sake of redressing evils: Eusebius of Samosata, in Syria; Lucifer of Cagliari, at Antioch; Hosius, Gregory Nyssen, Eusebius of Vercelli, Epiphanius of Salamina, in many provinces; S. Cyprian, at Rome, at Arles, in Spain; S. Hilary, at Milan; S. Athanasius, at Antioch; S. Cyril of Alexandria, at Constantinople; and he points out the principle on which these acts took place, viz. that every Bishop was bound to care for the whole Church, and all was done ἀγαπητικῶς.[4]

In the Council of Sardica, which Mr. Wilberforce acknowledges to have 'laid down a *new principle of appeal*,' A.D. 347, 'the appellate jurisdiction of the Pope,' we are told, 'received its first canonical expression' (p. 176). We give the canon in

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[1] Dev. Prol. 3, § 38.

[2] That it should be as Primate of the Church, and not as Patriarch or Bishop of Rome, that he had this right, is absolutely necessary for Mr. Wilberforce's argument. Anything which grew out of the office which the Bishop of Rome held in common with his brother Patriarchs, cannot arise from the peculiar and direct commission on which he rests the Papal power.

[3] 'Cui rei *nostrum* est consulere et subvenire, frater carissime,' &c. Ep. 67 ad Steph.

[4] See Casaubon's Treatise De Libertate Ecclesiasticâ, translated and published in Hickes' Treatises, vol. iii. p. 87. Ang. Cath. Lib.

its Greek and its Latin form, as it appears most likely that both were used at the Council.

'Bishop Hosius said: This too we must add, that no Bishop is to go across the borders from his own province to another where there are Bishops, unless he is called in by his brethren, that we may not seem to close the doors of charity. And this too in like manner we must provide, that if in any province one of the Bishops has a matter against his brother and fellow Bishop, neither of the two shall call in Bishops from another province as further judges. If a Bishop thinks that he has been condemned, and suppose that he has a good cause for the judgment to be renewed; *if it seem good to your charity*, let us honour the memory of the Apostle Peter, and let those who have given the decision, write to Julius, the Bishop of Rome, so that the court may be renewed, if proper, by the Bishops who are neighbouring to the province, and let him appoint other judges himself; but if it cannot be proved that his case is such as to require a second trial, let not that which has once been determined be changed, but let the sentence which has been passed stand good.'—*Mansi*, tom. iii. p. 8. *Papal Supremacy*, &c. p. 28.

The first part of the Latin canon is the same as the Greek; we, therefore, give only the latter part where it differs:—

'But if any one of the Bishops has been judged in any cause, and thinks that he has a good case for the council being renewed, *if it please you*, let us honour the memory of St. Peter the Apostle, that those who have tried the cause write to Julius, the Roman Bishop, and if he judges that the trial ought to be renewed, let it be renewed, and let him give judges. But if he determines that the cause is such, that what is done ought not to be retouched, what he has decreed shall be confirmed. Is this the opinion of all? The Synod replied, It is.'—*Mansi*, tom. iii. p. 23.

There is some difference, it will be seen, in these versions; they agree, however, in one clause—'*If it seems good to your charity*'—'*if it please you.*' It does not acknowledge any right whatever inhering in the Bishop of Rome, as Primate, to receive appeals: it makes a concession to the effect that the Bishops, for whom it was legislating (this was a purely Western Council), might by grant of the Council, if the Council willed, be allowed to appeal to Julius, Bishop of Rome, if they thought themselves wronged in a trial; and it grants to Julius, Bishop of Rome, the power of desiring that the cause may be reheard in the province where it arose, if there is sufficient reason. The words—*if it seems good to your charity—if it please you*—are clearly very important words. And they have been dwelt upon at great length by the whole school of Gallican divines, such as De Marca,[1] as well as by Casaubon and our own writers. How,

[1] 'The words of the canon prove that the institution of this right was new. *If it please you*, says Hosius, Bishop of Corduba, who presided, *let us honour the memory of the Apostle S. Peter.* He says not that the ancient tradition was to be confirmed, as was wont to be done in matters which only require the renewal or explanation of an ancient right.'—De Concord. vii. 3; Papal Supremacy, &c. p. 29.

then, does Mr. Wilberforce meet them? What explanation has he to give?—what does he do with them?—*He omits them!* Here is the canon in his version:—

'If a Bishop is judged in any cause, and thinks that he has reason for demanding a new trial, let us honour the memory of S. Peter the Apostle; let them who have examined the cause, write to Julius, the Bishop of Rome, and if he thinks that the trial ought to be repeated, let it be repeated, and let him assign judges.'—P. 176.

This is a simple way of meeting the difficulty; but why stop short with *omissions?*—why not invent a clause as well as leave one out?

With the Sardican decree Mr. Wilberforce is quite satisfied. 'Such was the manner in which the appellate jurisdiction of the Bishop of Rome received a legal shape' (p. 177). He does not tell us that the canon is irreconcileable with appeals having been made to Rome by Divine right, or by virtue of the Nicene canons, nor that the canon was reversed in the Œcumenical Council of Chalcedon. The appellate power which, for the West, but never for the East, became vested in the Bishops of Rome, arose, far more, from a decree of the Emperor Gratian in 378: it was increased by a decree of the Emperor Valentinian in 445 (those 'strong-handed associates (p. 277) who backed' the Roman Bishops, and it was finally confirmed by the false Decretals of Isidore, which were forged in the middle of the ninth century. Mr. Wilberforce does not quote one of the canons of the Œcumenical Councils on the subject of appeals; and yet there are many. For example, the sixth canon of the Council of Constantinople in 381, adopting the rule laid down by the Council of Antioch in 341, orders that a Bishop, against whom a charge is laid, shall be judged by his coprovincial Bishops, and that from them there should be an appeal to the Bishops of the 'Diocese'—*i. e.* of the country in which the province was situated, but that the appeal is to go no further. And if the Sardican canon 'legalizes the appellate jurisdiction' of the Bishop of Rome, what does the ninth canon of Chalcedon do for the Bishop of Constantinople?

'If a clergyman has a matter against his own or another Bishop, let him be judged by the synod of the province, but if a Bishop or Clergyman has a case against the metropolitan of the province, let him take either the Exarch of the "Diocese," or *the* [*episcopal*] *throne of royal Constantinople*, and be judged there.'[1]—*Papal Supremacy, &c.* p. 74.

[1] The *Exarch of a Diocese* was the same thing as a Patriarch or Primate. The *Dioceses* at this time were, as is rightly explained in 'Papal Supremacy,' p. 13, 'civil divisions or districts of the Roman empire, made up of several *provinces*.' Besides Rome and its neighbourhood there were thirteen *Dioceses*—Italy, Egypt, the East (*i.e.* the parts about Antioch), Asia, Pontus, Thrace, Macedonia, Dacia, Illyricum, Africa, Spain, Gaul, Britain, (*Ibid.* p. 76.) The chief Bishop in each

This canon of the fourth Œcumenical Council, which in matter of appeal appoints the Patriarch of Constantinople as Primate of the Church, is never once mentioned by Mr. Wilberforce. Dupin's account of the authority of the Sardican Council is as follows :—

'Those canons of Sardica have never been received in the East,[1] and only at a late date in the West. As to the East, it is well known that, at the very moment they were being passed, the Eastern Bishops established the very contrary; nor afterwards did they make mention of this right of revising judgments in the Councils of Constantinople, or Chalcedon, or in Trullo, and they there decreed that the decision of the provincial synod, or at farthest of the Patriarch, should be final in all causes. And in the West, after this synod was held, the Africans rejected the discipline sanctioned by it, the French rejected it, nay, even the Italians did not admit its authority.'—*Dupin, Diss. Eccles.* ii. p. 91.

In spite of this Western synod, and the more influential decrees of Gratian and Valentinian, Mr. Wilberforce acknowledges that the Roman Patriarch's 'appellate jurisdiction' was not 'fully admitted' till the time of Gregory the Great,—that is, for 600 years of the Church's life; nor was it admitted then. How *could* it have been, when it was allowed by the canons of Chalcedon for any Bishop in the Roman district to appeal to the Bishop of Constantinople, but it was not allowed for a Bishop in the Constantinopolitan district to appeal to the Bishop of Rome, or to any other than the Bishop of Constantinople?—when at that moment the Patriarch of Constantinople was attempting to set himself up as head and centre of the Church, putting forth those very claims which the successors of the Roman Patriarchs have since made their own?—when S. Gregory found it necessary to write his famous letters, broadly denouncing the assumption, by him or by any other, of the titles which embody the present Papal idea, because they were destructive of the Patriarchal system of the authority of Bishops, and of the Faith itself (Lib. 5. 43; 9, 68); because they were profane appellations, anticipatory of Antichrist (Lib. 7, 27, 33); because Christ alone is the Head of the Church, and the term Universal (then assumed by John of Constantinople) was an

province was called Metropolitan; the chief Bishop in each *Diocese* or district was called indifferently, Patriarch, Exarch, or Primate. The name Patriarch was, however, by custom confined to the Bishops of the *Dioceses* of Italy, Egypt, and the East, and the Bishops of Constantinople and Jerusalem. The chief Bishop in most of the other Dioceses was called Exarch, and in Africa had the name of Primate. The Bishops of one *Diocese* are strictly forbidden (Council of Constantinople, can. ii.) to intermeddle in the affairs of another *Diocese*. Thus Dioceses, ecclesiastically considered, were independent National Churches.

[1] This is true; for though admitted in the Council in Trullo, they were admitted only in company with other canons enacting the opposite principle of appeal for the East.

invasion of his rights, and an imitation of the devil; (Lib. 5, 18). Appeal to Rome was not acknowledged in Gregory's time. It was one of the things which grew out of Isidore's forgeries, according to Bishop De Marca's testimony.[1] And Fleury expresses himself on the subject as follows:—

'It is said in the false Decretals, that Bishops cannot be judged definitively safe by the Pope alone, and that principle is often repeated there. Nevertheless, you have seen a hundred examples to the contrary; to take one of the most illustrious, Paul of Samosata, Bishop of Antioch, the first See of S. Peter, and the third city of the Roman empire, was judged and deposed by the Bishops of the East and the neighbouring provinces, without the participation of the Pope, whom they contented themselves with informing of it after it was done, as is seen by their synodal letters, and the Pope does not complain of it. Nothing is more frequent in the first nine centuries (*i. e.* until the false Decretals were accepted), than the accusations and depositions of Bishops. But their trial took place in provincial councils, which were the ordinary tribunal for all ecclesiastical causes. One must be absolutely ignorant of the history of the Church, to imagine at any time, or in any country, it has ever been impossible to judge a Bishop without sending to Rome, or obtaining a commission from the Pope . . . . . One of the greatest wounds which the false Decretals have inflicted on the discipline of the Church, is the having infinitely extended appeals to the Pope. It appears that the forger had this point greatly at heart, by the care he has taken to diffuse through all his work the principle, that not only every Bishop, but every priest, and in general every person who finds himself harassed, may, on every occasion, appeal directly to the Pope. He has made as many as nine Popes speak on this subject, Anacletus, the first and second Sixtus, Fabian, Cornelius, Victor, Zephyrinus, Marcellus, and Julius . . . You have seen that all the Greek Bishops, and their Patriarchs even, were judged and often deposed in Councils; that permission was not asked of the Pope to assemble them, nor appeals made to him for their judgments. He was not applied to for the translation of Bishops or the founding of Bishoprics; the canons comprised in the ancient code of the Greek Church were followed. . . . . You will say, perhaps, that it is not surprising that the Greeks did not apply to the Pope, either for appeal or for the other matters, since, from the time of Photius, they ceased to recognise him as head of the Church. But did they apply to him before? And in the time when they were most united with the Roman Church, did they observe anything of that which I call the New Discipline? They were not so heedless as to do it, since the Latins themselves did it not, and this discipline was yet unknown to all the Church.'—*Fleury, Quatrième Discours.*

So much for the first part of Mr. Wilberforce's test. With the second he fares still worse.

'The second main particular in the Papal Supremacy, is the right of presiding in Councils. How comes this to belong to the Bishops of Rome?' —P. 182.

How, indeed? But perhaps we had better first ask, if it is the fact, before we inquire into the manner of accounting for it. Did the Bishops of Rome preside over the Early Œcume-

[1] De Concord. vii. 20. (See *Appendix.*)

nical Councils? As the elder Patriarchs of the Church, we should have expected that they would do so. But what says history? Did S. Peter preside at the Council of Jerusalem? No! Mr. Wilberforce maintains that he did (p. 125). Our readers have the Acts of the Apostles before them, and we leave the question to their judgment. Did the Bishop of Rome preside at Nicæa? No! It is almost certain that Hosius, Bishop of Cordova, the Emperor's favourite Bishop, presided. It is quite certain that the Roman Bishop's representatives did not, and that Hosius ranked above them, for he signs before them.[1]

Did the Bishop of Rome preside at Constantinople? No! The second Œcumenical Council, says Mr. Wilberforce, was 'merely an Eastern Synod.' .... It was 'presided over therefore by the Bishops of the city where it was held, and the first name subscribed is that of Nectarius of Constantinople' (p. 184). This is not correct. It was presided over by Meletius, Bishop of Antioch, a Patriarch unrecognised by the Patriarch of Rome, and probably at that moment out of communion with him; and it was only upon his death that S. Gregory Nazianzen, and Nectarius became successively presidents ('Papal Supremacy' p. 11). That it should have been 'merely an Eastern Synod,' where Rome was not represented, which fixed the shape of the Nicene Creed, ought, we should imagine, to be some obstacle to the theory of a 'Primacy which involves the Supremacy.'

Did the Bishop of Rome preside at the Council of Ephesus? No! S. Cyril of Alexandria was its president. Thus we see that Jerusalem, Antioch, Constantinople, and Alexandria, that is, all the other four Patriarchates had the honour of presiding at the Œcumenical Councils of the Church before the Patriarch of Rome, on whom that office devolved for the first time at the Council of Chalcedon.

But is it found that the Bishops of Rome presided at the non-Œcumenical Councils—those Councils whose canons were taken into the code of the Eastern Church by the Council in Trullo? Did he preside at Ancyra? at Neocæsarea? at Gangra? at Antioch? at Laodicea? at Sardica? at Carthage? No! not at any one of them. Did he preside at any single Council previous to the Council of Chalcedon, except such as were held in his own Diocese or Patriarchate? No! not at one. And yet, 'the right of presiding at Councils is inherent in the Primacy' (p. 168).

[1] In the Bishop of Rome being represented by presbyters at Nicæa, Mr. Wilberforce sees something which 'distinguished him from the other prelates:' 'the see of Rome, as being the seat of the Primate, had a privilege of her own, independent of anything belonging to the Episcopal office in general' (p. 185). Unfortunately for this theory, Eusebius and Socrates give us the real reason of the presence of the presbyters. 'The prelate of the royal city was away *on account o his age*, and his presbyters were present, and filled his place.'—Socr. i. 8.

Mr. Wilberforce will not, however, give up the Council of Ephesus. 'The president was the second Patriarch, S. Cyril, 'who acted professedly as the representative of the Primate S. 'Celestine' (p. 184). 'Not only did S. Cyril act as president 'by special delegation from Pope Celestine, but the Council 'refers to his direction as the ground of its proceeding' (p. 186). The meaning of the last part of this sentence is that 'the Synod wrote to the Emperor, saying, that they had 'deposed Nestorius on finding him guilty of heresy, and that 'they praised Celestine, Bishop of great Rome, who condemned 'Nestorius for his heretical doctrines before our sentence, and 'put out his sentence against him before us for the sake of the 'safety of the Church, and of the holy and saving Faith 'which has been handed down to us from the holy Apostles 'and Evangelists, and the holy Fathers.' To us, as to Bossuet, the reconsideration of a sentence passed by the Roman Patriarch (a similar sentence had been passed by the Alexandrian Patriarch), shows rather a want than an abundance of authority on his part. But it is with the presidency that we have now especially to deal. Mr. Wilberforce has added a very telling note:

'"Vicem nostram Cyrillo delegavimus," &c. Harduin, i. 1318, 1307, 1466.—The commission to S. Cyril himself is given, Harduin, i. 1323, and is referred to by the Egyptian Bishops, 1355, 1475.'—P. 186.

Unfortunate, that when we turn to Harduin, we find that 'the commission' referred to has nothing whatever to do with the Council of Ephesus, that the letter containing it was written on the 10th of August, A.D. 430, and that the act which S. Cyril is thereby authorized to perform is to be performed after the expiration of ten days, whereas the Council of Ephesus was not summoned till the 20th of December, that is, more than four months afterwards, and did not sit till the 22nd of June, 431. At the time that S. Celestine wrote his letter, the proposal of an Œcumenical Council was not broached. The facts are these. Nestorius and S. Cyril, the two great Patriarchs of the East, being locked in internecine strife, turned for help to the Patriarch of the West. They both wrote to S. Celestine. S. Celestine took the side of S. Cyril and orthodoxy, and followed his lead in the Nestorian controversy, just as Julius clung fast to S. Athanasius in the Arian disputes. A Roman Council was held, which resulted in the condemnation of Nestorius by the Roman Church. Upon this Celestine writes to S. Cyril, Aug. 10, 430, the letter which, according to Mr. Wilberforce, appoints him to 'act as president at the Council of Ephesus by especial delegation from Pope Celestine' (at a time when the Council of Ephesus had not yet been heard of),

and contains his 'commission' for that purpose. It runs as follows:—

'Join therefore the authority of our See to your own; use our stead; execute this sentence with strictness and vigour: let him either, within ten days from the day of this monition, condemn in writing his wicked teaching, and declare that he holds that faith about the nativity of Christ, our God, which is held both by the Roman Church and by your Holiness' Church, and by the whole of our religion; or if he does not do this, let your Holiness provide at once for his Church, and let him know that he must needs be cut off from our body, since he has been unwilling to receive the treatment of his physicians, and like a pestilent disease, has rushed violently to the destruction of himself and of all entrusted to him. We have written to the same effect to our holy brethren and brother Bishops, John (of Antioch;) Rufus (of Thessalonica); Juvenal (of Jerusalem); and Flavian (of Philippi), in order that our sentence, or rather the Divine sentence of Christ, may be known about him. Aug. 10, 430.'—*Harduin*, i. 1323.

S. Cyril, like S. Celestine, held his Council at Alexandria, and then despatched his celebrated letter of excommunication, written not only in his own name, but also, by authority of the above 'commission,' in that of S. Celestine. This excommunication was conveyed to Constantinople by four Bishops, and there published Dec. 6, A. D. 430. Nestorius met it with like anathemas against his opponents; and then, to allay the storm, Theodosius called the Council of Ephesus; the sentences of Celestine and Cyril, meantime, remaining without effect, as they awaited the superior authority of a General Council.

So much for the *Vicem nostram Cyrillo delegavimus*, and *the Commission to S. Cyril*, which, we repeat, was given for one thing, and is represented by Mr. Wilberforce to have been given for another. But we are told further, that 'it is referred to by the Egyptian Bishops.' The fact indicated by these words is, that the chief notary, who was Peter, an Alexandrian presbyter, read the list of the Bishops who were present at the opening of the Council; and the list begins thus:—'The most religious and pious Bishops, 'Cyril of Alexandria, who was *also* managing the part (διέπον-'τος καὶ τὸν τόπον) of Celestine, the most holy and pious Bishop 'of the Church of the Romans, and Juvenal of Jerusalem, and 'Memnon of Ephesus, and Flavian of Philippi, who was holding 'also the part of Rufus, the most pious Bishop of the Church of 'Thessalonica,' &c. This means that Cyril was armed with the authority of the Patriarch of Rome, as well as his own, and held his proxy just as Flavian held that of Rufus. But where is there anything about his presiding by Celestine's commission, and the Egyptian Bishops acknowledging it? Whether or no he presided simply in his own right, or by his own right, strengthened by the addition of the right of Celestine, is a question which we need not discuss. That he presided in his own right is indubitable, and the reason why S. Celestine's

name is recorded is, according to Richerius, that the orthodox body might have a majority of the Patriarchs on their side, whereas without him, they were divided two against two. Most justly Mr. Allies says, that S. Cyril sat as president in his own right; and Bossuet's words are sufficiently explicit: 'Although 'Cyril having been named the executor of the Pope's sentence, 'had executed it in the Council,' (he had executed it previously to the Council;) '*yet he had not been expressly delegated to the 'Council, of which Celestine had yet no thought when he trusted Cy-'ril to represent him.* But Arcadius, Projectus, and Philip, being 'expressly sent by Celestine to the Council, confirmed the acts 'of the Council in virtue of this special commission.'[1] After their arrival, which did not occur at the beginning, these three legates are the τοποτήρηται of Celestine and the Western Bishops, and accordingly Arcadius subscribes next after Cyril, who signs first simply in his own character, *i. e.* because he was Patriarch of Alexandria, and President of the Council. The difference between the commission to S. Cyril, previous to the time that the Council was thought of, and of the commission to Arcadius, Projectus, and Philip for the Council, is distinctly stated in the letter of the Synod to the Emperor.[2] And in the letter of the Synod to Celestine, relating the condemnation of S. Cyril and Memnon, by John of Antioch, the especial reason given why Celestine ought to be *personally* indignant at it, is, not that his 'representative' was condemned, but that the Synod had been insulted, in which sat Arcadius, Projectus, and Philip, τὴν σὴν ἡμῖν παρουσίαν δι' ἑαυτῶν χαριζόμενοι καὶ τῆς ἀποστολικῆς καθέδρας τὸν τόπον ἀναπληροῦντες.[3]

Richerius, the learned doctor of the Sorbonne, writes clearly and decidedly:—

'Bellarmine, and the other writers of the Roman Court, plead that Cyril presided because Celestine had made him his vicar. But since the Ephesine Council was held against Nestorius the Patriarch of Constantinople, the right of presiding belonged to Cyril of Alexandria, in the absence of the Roman Pontiff; without any commission from Celestine, he would have held that office in right of his own see, according to the Nicene canons. Why, it is evident from the second action, that Celestine sent Arcadius, Projectus, and Philip to take his place in the Council of Ephesus; the acts declare it in so many words, and yet Cyril signed before them in the sixth Action. *Nor should it be concealed that this letter in which Celestine commits his stead to Cyril, was written before he thought that a General Council was going to be held against Nestorius, and is restricted solely to the execution of his sentence against Nestorius, who he desired should be excommunicated and deposed, unless he repented within ten days after the sentence.* From hence it follows, that it is a vain attempt which is made to prove that Cyril presided over the Council of Ephesus as Celestine's vicar, since that office belonged to him by the prerogative of his own see.'—*Hist. Conc. Gen.* p. 150.

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[1] Boss. vii. 9, 13. [2] Hard. i. p. 1483. [3] Hard. i. p. 1510.

Before leaving the Council of Ephesus, we must notice the following translation: 'We have directed, according to our 'solicitude, our holy brethren and fellow priests, men of one 'mind with us, and well approved, the Bishops Arcadius 'and Projectus, and Philip our presbyter, that they may be 'present at those things which are done, and carry out that 'which we have previously appointed; *to which, we have no doubt,* '*your Holiness will yield assent, since what is done appears to be* '*decreed for the security of the whole Church*'[1] (p. 186). This ought to be translated thus: 'We have sent to you, as undertaking our 'solicitude, the holy brethren our fellow ministers, men proved 'to be of the same soul with ourselves, Bishops Arcadius and 'Projectus, and our presbyter Philip, who will be present at the 'proceedings, and carry out what was long ago settled upon by 'us. *We doubt not that your Holiness will accord with them, for* '*whatever conclusion ye shall arrive at would seem to be settled for* '*the sake of the security of all the Churches.*'[2] Mr. Wilberforce has followed the Latin instead of the Greek text, which was read and approved by the Fathers. There is another version, as follows: 'We have sent Arcadius, &c., who will be present, 'and will confirm afresh with their vote the things which are 'constituted by you. And we doubt not that your Holiness 'will admit them to the common harmony, and the giving of 'the sentence. And whatever ye shall determine, let that, for 'the sake of the tranquillity of all the Churches, be settled and 'defined.' Richerius argues at some length, that this is the genuine reading.[3] The fact of its existence should have been mentioned, and the Greek text ought to have been followed. Nor should it have been concealed that the main work of the Council was done, and the sentence pronounced, before that letter of S. Celestine arrived.

Next, for the Council of Chalcedon:—

'When we come to the Council itself, the four following things appear distinctly: 1st. The Council yields submission to the Pope, in regard to orders which he had previously given to his legates. 2ndly. The Council applies to the Pope to confirm its decisions, and that which is not confirmed by him falls to the ground. 3rdly, It rests the deference paid to the Pope on his claim to represent S. Peter. 4thly. It attributes to the Pope a

[1] Hard. i. p. 1741.

[2] Ἀπεστείλαμεν τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀναδεχομένους φρόντιδα, τοὺς ἁγίους ἀδελφοὺς καὶ συλλειτουργοὺς ἡμῶν, ὁμοψύχους ἡμῖν δεδοκιμασμένους Ἀρκάδιον καὶ Προῒκτον ἐπισκόπους, καὶ Φίλιππον τὸν ἡμέτερον πρεσβύτερον, οἳ τοῖς πραττομένοις παρέσονται καὶ τὰ παρ' ἡμῶν πάλαι ὁρισθέντα ἐκβιβάσουσιν· οἷς παρασχεθῆναι παρὰ τῆς ὑμετέρος ἁγιότητος οὐκ ἀμφιβάλλομεν συγκατάθεσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ὅπερ ἂν γνῶτε, δοκεῖ ὑπὲρ τῆς πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἀμεριμνίας κεκρίσθαι. There is another reading given in the margin, ἐὰν τὸ πρασσόμενον δοξῇ ὑπὲρ τῆς πασῶν τῶν ἐκκλησίων ἀσφαλείας; *i. e.* since that *which is being done* will have seemed to be decreed for the security of all the Churches; and still another, ὃπερ ἀνέγνωτε, δοκεῖ ὑπὲρ κ.τ.λ., *i.e.* that which ye have read, seems to be decreed, &c. Hard. i. p. 1472. There is evidently something corrupt.

[3] Rich. Hist. Conc. Gen. p. 155.

peculiar personal dignity, so that those who assault him are supposed in an especial manner to assault the Church.'—P. 188.

History asserts the very reverse of all these four propositions. The first is founded on three occurrences: (1.) the treatment of Dioscorus; (2.) the treatment of Leo's letter to Flavian; (3.) the restoration of Theodoret. *These are the very three occurrences which Bossuet brings forward to prove the exact contrary of Mr. Wilberforce's statement, and by which he does prove it triumphantly.* For a full refutation of Mr. Wilberforce, we must refer our readers to Bossuet's 'Defence of the Gallican Clergy,' book vii. chap. 15, 17. A translation of his arguments will be found in Mr. Allies' book, 'The Church of England cleared from the Charge of Schism,' p. 279. We cannot be sufficiently amazed that Mr. Wilberforce should have ventured on the statements which he has made with regard to the Council of Chalcedon. His account of what happened to Dioscorus is as follows:—

'At its first meeting, Dioscorus, Patriarch of Alexandria, who had presided at Ephesus two years before, took his place without hesitation as a Bishop. But Paschasinus, the reverend Bishop and vicar of the Apostolic See, said,—"We have the order of the blessed and apostolical Bishop of the city of Rome, the head of all the Churches, in which he has thought meet to order that Dioscorus should not sit in the Synod, but if he attempts to do so should be ejected. To this order we must keep." The reason is given by the other legate: Lucentius, the reverend Bishop who represented the Apostolical See, said, "He must give an account of his own judgment; for he presumed to judge when he had no right, and ventured to hold a Synod without the authority of the Apostolic See, which has never been done, nor ought to be done." Such was the language of the two Bishops who represented the see of Rome in the largest Council which has ever been held, wherein, however, among 520 Bishops, but two Western were present besides themselves. *And Dioscorus, though possessing the third Patriarchal See, was obliged to submit without opposition, and to abandon his place among the Bishops.*'—P. 188.

We must ask our readers to look back again to the passage which we have quoted. They will see there a fact stated, and a lesson drawn from it. The fact is the immediate dismissal of Dioscorus, the lesson the overpowering influence of Rome. Now we will place before them the very words to which Mr. Wilberforce refers for his fact and lesson. The first sentence is correct; we will not therefore repeat it, but merely observe that the 'we' who are 'ordered' means the Legates, not the Council.

'"This order we must keep; if therefore it seems good to your magnificence" (the magistrates) "*let him go out, or we will go out.*" The glorious magistrates and most illustrious senators said—"Why, what special charge is brought against the most pious Bishop Dioscorus?" The most pious Bishop Paschasinus, the legate of the Apostolic Throne, said—"It was necessary that he should be objected to on his entrance." The most noble magistrates and most illustrious senators said—"As we have already said, a special crime of which he is guilty must be exhibited."

The pious Bishop Lucentius, who held the place of the Apostolic Chair, said, "Let him give account of the judgment which he passed himself, for he grasped the character of judge when he had not obtained it, and he dared to hold a synod without the authority of the Apostolic Throne, which never has occurred, nor ought to occur." The most pious Bishop Paschasinus, legate of the Apostolic Throne, said—"We (the legates) cannot go against the commands of the most Blessed and Apostolic Bishop, who rules the Apostolic Throne, nor against the ecclesiastical canons and the traditions of the Fathers." The most glorious magistrates and most illustrious senators said—"It is fitting that you exhibit what special crime he has been guilty of." The most pious Bishop Lucentius, legate of the Apostolic Throne, said—"It is not endurable that such an insult should be offered to us and to you, as that he should sit here when he is brought forward to be judged." The most noble magistrates and most illustrious senators said—"If you hold the character of a judge, you ought not to plead like an accuser." *And Dioscorus, the most pious Bishop of Alexandria, by the command of the most glorious magistrates and of the sacred senate, sat down in the middle; and the most pious Roman Bishops sat down in their places and kept quiet;* and Eusebius, the most pious Bishop of Dorylæum, came forward and said, "Command my petition to be read, as has seemed good to the most pious Emperor. I am wronged by Dioscorus; the faith is wronged. Bishop Flavian has been murdered. He and I were unjustly condemned by him. Command my petition to be read." The most glorious magistrates and the magnificent senate said,—"Let his petition be read." And Eusebius, by the desire of every one, *sat down in the middle;* and Veronician, the sacred secretary of the divine Consistory, took his petition and read it.'—*Harduin*, ii. 67.

Thus, the statement that 'Dioscorus was obliged to submit without opposition, and to abandon his place among the Bishops,' is untrue, unless the words are intended to be understood in an equivocal sense—a thing which we cannot for a moment believe; and instead of 'submission being yielded' to the Archbishop of Rome, his demand is coolly and contemptuously put aside, and his representatives have to sit down and hold their tongues, after they had threatened to leave the Council if their request was not complied with. The same contemptuous disregard is shown impartially towards the Roman legates when they demand the dismissal of Dioscorus, and towards the Egyptian Bishops when they demand the dismissal of Theodoret. In both cases the magistrates overrule the objectors' petition, and the person clamoured against sits down in the middle of the assembly. So far from true is it, that the demand for Dioscorus's immediate ejection was complied with, that he sat throughout the whole of the Action, the account of which occupies from p. 67 to p. 274 in Harduin's closely-printed folio edition of the Councils: he took an active part in the debates: the acts of the Latrocinium and Flavian's Constantinopolitan Council were read: he was accused, and he defended himself. And at length the magistrates passed sentence on him thus:

'"Since it has been shown, by our inquiry into what was done and determined, and by the confession of the leaders of the late Synod (the Latrocinium), who acknowledge themselves to have been in error, and to

have deprived those who all the time were orthodox, that Flavian, of pious memory, and the most pious Bishop Eusebius, have been unjustly deposed, it seems to us, according to God's good pleasure, that it is just (if so it seem well to our most divine and pious Lord) that Dioscorus, the most religious Bishop of Alexandria, Juvenal, &c., who held authority, and were leaders in that Synod, should fall under the same punishment that they then inflicted, and should be deprived of their Episcopal dignity, by the sacred Synod, according to the canons, care being taken that everything which occurs is made known to our divine head (the Emperor)." The Easterns and the most pious Bishops with them said—"That is a just judgment!" The Illyrians and the most pious Bishops with them said—"We have all made a mistake! Let us all obtain pardon!" The Easterns and the most pious Bishops with them said—"Long life to the senate! God holy, holy and strong, holy and immortal, have mercy upon us! Long life to the Emperor! The impious man is ever put to flight! Christ has put down Dioscorus! God has put down the murderer! This is a just sentence! this is a just Synod! the senate is just! God hath avenged His martyrs!"'—*Harduin*, ii. 271.

It was after *this* sentence, and not till after this sentence, that Dioscorus was ejected from the Council.

The second Action was occupied with the discussion of the Faith. At the third the magistrates were not present, and the attention of the Council was again called to Dioscorus. Other enormities were charged against him. He was thrice summoned, and refused to appear; and then, one after the other, the Bishops declared their sentence against him. The Pope's legates *of course* spoke, or 'pronounced sentence' (p. 129), first, because they were presiding; then all the other Bishops; and afterwards they severally subscribed. Mr. Wilberforce quotes the latter part of the legates' sentence, but he omits the concluding words. They are as follows:—'Therefore this most holy and great 'Synod will pronounce sentence upon the afore-mentioned 'Dioscorus, in accordance with the canons.' And immediately Anatolius rises and says, 'I am in all things of the same mind 'with the Apostolic Throne, and I give my vote too for the 'deposition of Dioscorus, who has shown himself incapable of 'all priestly ministry, *because he has disobeyed the canons of the 'holy Fathers in everything, and has refused to obey when thrice 'canonically summoned.*' Each of the other Bishops gives his reasons for his vote; and it is remarkable, that *not one* of them expresses any deference towards Pope Leo of Rome, without in the same breath expressing *the same* deference to Pope Anatolius of Constantinople. That the sentence was 'founded' in any special manner 'on the celebrated letter which Leo had addressed to Flavianus' (p. 189), is again wholly untrue. That letter has not in it, and *could not* have in it, a single word directly referring to Dioscorus, or the causes of his deposition. It was written before the Latrocinium was held, whereas it was for his conduct at and after the Latrocinium that Dioscorus was sentenced; and it contained an exposition of the Faith

against Eutychianism, which was not laid to the charge of Dioscorus at Chalcedon. We believe that every sentence in this and the following pages of Mr. Wilberforce's book contains misstatements. We have not space to point them all out. For ample and incontrovertible proof that this celebrated letter was submitted to the judgment of the Council, as superior in authority to the writer, and that it was approved only because it was found on examination to be in accordance with the Councils of Nicæa, Constantinople, and Ephesus, we must refer our readers to the above-named works of Bossuet and Mr. Allies, and to 'Papal Supremacy,' p. 21, or better still, to Harduin, ii. 386.

Again, that 'Dioscorus was sentenced on the very ground 'that, with the aid of the Council over which he presided, he 'had ventured to pass judgment on the Pope' (p. 189), is in several ways incorrect. It was not Leo, but Flavian of Constantinople, and Eusebius of Dorylæum, on whom Dioscorus passed judgment at the Latrocinium. And this, as we have seen, was the reason which the magistrates gave for his own deposition. Other aggravating causes are added afterwards by the Roman legates and by the Synod, in a letter to the Emperors and to Leo, and amongst them, and placed upon the same level with his disobedience to the summons of the Council, is an attempt at excommunicating Leo; but this cannot be what Mr. Wilberforce refers to, as he did not do this 'by aid of the Council over which he presided' at Ephesus, which is clearly the Council referred to, nor by the aid of any Council at all. Baronius, it is true, says that he excommunicated Leo in Alexandria, at a Council of ten Bishops, in the year 449; but Pagi has shown this to be a mistake. It was in the year 451 that he issued the excommunication, holding no Council about it at all, but getting ten Bishops, friendly to himself, to sign the sentence; and the place at which he issued it was Nicæa, where the General Council was originally gathered, before it was transferred to Chalcedon.[1]

The case of Theodoret again teaches the very contrary lesson to that for which it is advanced. Although received to communion by Leo, he was brought forward in the Council, and required to anathematize Nestorius. On his hesitating to do so, he was denounced as a heretic: on his doing it, and not till then, he was restored to his Church by the decree of the Council.[2] 'So, then,' says Bossuet, 'the judgment put forth 'by Leo concerning his restoration to his see, would have pro-'fited Theodoret nothing, unless after the matter had been 'brought before the Council, he had both approved his faith

[1] Baronius ad an. 449, vol. viii. p. 47. Pagi ad an. 449, No. 23. Mansi, p. 510.
[2] Hard. ii. p. 499.

'to the Council, and the judgment of Leo had been confirmed 'by the same Council.'[1] If 'the power of acting in the interim, 'on which the ordinary government of the Church depends, is 'shown to be left to the Bishop of Rome' (p. 189), by his having been the first to acknowledge the orthodoxy of Theodoret, how much greater power is shown to be vested in the Bishop of Alexandria, by the measures by which S. Athanasius restored peace to Christendom after the Arian troubles!

The statement, then, that the Council of Chalcedon yields submission to the Pope, in regard to orders which he had previously given to his legates, in the case of Dioscorus, in respect to Leo's letter, or in the case of Theodoret, is not true.

'2dly. The Council applies to the Pope to confirm its deci- 'sion, and *that which is not confirmed by him falls to the ground.*' This is contrary to fact. The famous 28th Canon, granting to Constantinople coequal and coordinate rights and dignities with Rome, was passed, and 'failed to obtain Leo's confirmation,' but it did *not* 'fall to the ground.' On the contrary, ever since that time, Constantinople has ranked above Alexandria and Antioch, and next to Rome. The canon was again renewed in the Council in Trullo, as follows:— Canon xxxvi. 'Renewing the decrees of the hundred and 'fifty holy Fathers assembled in this heaven-protected royal 'city, and those of the six hundred and thirty Fathers assem- 'bled at Chalcedon, we decree that the See of Constantinople 'shall enjoy equal prerogatives with the See of Elder Rome, 'and be magnified, as that is, in ecclesiastical matters, being 'second after it; next to which, let the See of the great city 'of Alexandria rank, then that of Antioch, and then that of 'Jerusalem.' Mr. Allies' comment on this canon is noticeable. He says:—

'Here the famous 28th canon of Chalcedon is referred to as part of the decrees of that Council. By which, as well as by the whole of the intervening history, *we may see the utter untruthfulness of the assertion, that it was given up through the opposition of S. Leo.* And of course the utter incompatibility of this canon with the present Papal Idea is plain at once. It sets clearly before the eyes the enormous and world-wide difference between Primacy and Supremacy. It comes to us on the sanction of two Œcumenical Councils, and a third intended to be so, and which, though not so, has remained the living rule of one half of the Church for 1150 years. But further, we have S. Leo's own authority for saying, that the Roman Church in his day knew nothing of the canons of the second Œcumenical Council; so that from 381 to 451, the whole East was governed by canons never even carried to the Pope; and though S. Leo absolutely refused to receive, and did all he could to annul the 28th canon of Chalcedon, yet his legates at that very Council found Anatolius in full possession of the second place among the Patriarchs, did not attempt to disturb him in it, nay, made it a charge against Dioscorus that he had pushed Flavian of Constantinople down to the fifth place. In

[1] Boss. Def. Cler. Gall. vii. 18.

fact, from the Council of 381, the Patriarch of Constantinople is found acting as second Bishop of the Church; he was so at Chalcedon in 451, he was so at Constantinople in 553, and again in 681, and he was so *in spite* of all the Pope could do against him.'—P. 391.

'Leo withheld his approval on the one hand, and on the other the canon prevailed throughout the East, and the See of Constantinople has ever since been accepted there as the first See of the East.'—*Papal Supremacy*, p. 25.

'3dly. It rests the deference paid to the Pope on his claim 'to represent S. Peter.'

To prove the contrary of this statement, we have but to quote a part of this same 28th canon. 'The Fathers have, as was 'just and natural (εἰκότως), given its prerogatives to the throne of 'Elder Rome, because'—the Pope represents S. Peter? No! but because, 'that is the imperial city, and moved by the same 'purpose the 150 religious Bishops gave equal prerogatives to 'the most holy throne of New Rome, rightly judging that the 'city which is honoured with the Emperor and the Senate 'ought to enjoy equal prerogatives with the Elder royal Rome, 'and to be magnified in ecclesiastical matters as she is, being 'second after her.' That by these prerogatives are not meant the real prerogatives of Rome, but only 'the accidents of dignity' 'attached to them' (p. 191), is one of those 'clever but wholly arbitrary distinctions' which rest upon no foundation whatever, but which Bossuet terms 'inventions.'

'4thly. It attributes to the Pope a peculiar personal dignity, so 'that those who assault him are supposed in an especial manner 'to assault the Church.' 'When summing up the crimes of 'Dioscorus it is his attack upon the Bishop of Rome, *as being* '*fatal to the order and oneness of the Church*, which *forms the* '*climax* of their charge. And that not only in their letter to 'Leo himself, but also to the Emperors' (p. 192). The crimes of Dioscorus, which led to his deposition, are given (1) by the magistrates, (2) by the legates, (3) by Anatolius of Constantinople, (4) by the rest of the Bishops, (5) in the letter addressed to Dioscorus by the Synod, (6) in the letter addressed to the Alexandrian clergy, (7) in the letter addressed to the Emperors, (8) in the letter addressed to Leo. (1) The magistrates give only one reason; they say that it is because he deposed Flavian of Constantinople, and Eusebius of Dorylæum in the Latrocinium (Hard. ii. 271). (2) The legates give as the reasons, (α) that he had acted contrary to the canons and ecclesiastical discipline; (β) that he had re-admitted Eutyches to communion; (γ) that he had not allowed Leo's letter to be read at the Latrocinium. 'But he has 'overshot his former wickedness by fresh crimes;' viz. (δ) 'he 'has dared to dictate an excommunication against Leo the 'Archbishop of great Rome; (ε) many charges of iniquity have

'been brought before the holy Synod against him; (ζ) thrice 'summoned he has disobeyed; (η) he has received to com- 'munion men lawfully and synodically deposed' (Hard. ii. 345). (3) Anatolius gives as the reasons, (α) that he had been disobedient to the canons of the Fathers; (β) that he had disobeyed the threefold summons (Hard. ii. 345). Elsewhere he gives the reasons as, (α) the excommunication of Leo; (β) the disobedience to the summons (Hard. ii. 450). (4) The causes commonly given by the Bishops are, (α) that he has broken the canons, (β) that he has disobeyed the Council's summons; if they say anything about his conduct to Leo, they place his conduct to Anatolius on the same footing. Thus Patricius of Tyana finds him guilty of 'despising both the divine canons, 'and also the most holy Fathers and Archbishops, Leo of Old 'Rome, and Anatolius of New Rome, and all the holy and 'Œcumenical Council' (Hard. ii. 350). (5) The letter to Dioscorus himself gives as the reasons, (α) 'because thou hast 'despised the divine canons, and (β) hast been disobedient to 'this holy and Œcumenical Council, in that, in addition to 'your other crimes, in which thou hast been found out, thou 'hast been thrice summoned by this holy and great Council ac- 'cording to the divine canons, to answer to the charges laid 'against thee, and hast not come' (Hard. ii. 378). (6) The letter to the Alexandrian clergy gives the same two reasons. (7) The letter to the Emperors gives as the reasons, (α) that he had refused to allow Leo's letter to be read at the Latrocinium, (β) that he had readmitted Eutyches and others. 'And 'perhaps he might have obtained forgiveness for such and 'so great crimes, *if he would have asked for medicine from the 'Œcumenical Council by worthy repentance;* but since over and 'above his other wickednesses (γ) he has barked against the 'Apostolical See itself, and has endeavoured to issue letters of 'excommunication against the most holy and blessed Pope Leo, '*he has arrogantly persisted in his former iniquities;* and (ε) being 'insolent towards this holy Œcumenical and great Council, he 'has in utter contempt refused to answer to the different accu- 'sations against him; and though three times summoned accord- 'ing to the divine canons, has not deigned to appear.' (8) The letter to Leo himself gives as the reasons, (α) that he had deposed Flavian and Eusebius; (β) that he had readmitted Eutyches; 'and falling like a wild beast upon the Vine, he has torn 'up the best plant that he found there, and brought in that 'which had been thrown out as fruitless . . . . and in addi- 'tion to all this, (γ) he extended his madness against even 'the person who had been entrusted by the Saviour with 'the guardianship of the Vine—we mean your holiness,—and 'he practised excommunication against the man who had

'exerted himself to unite the body of the Church; and when 'he ought to repent of these things, and to ask with tears for 'mercy, he has rejoiced in them as excellent deeds, (δ) reject-'ing your Holiness's letter, and setting himself against all the 'doctrines of the truth;' (ε) 'and he refused to obey three 'summonses addressed to him.'

Thus the causes of Dioscorus' deposition are various, and his excommunication of Leo is never spoken of alone, as 'forming a climax,' but always together with his refusal to obey the summons of the Council, which Mr. Wilberforce does not mention at all; and when these two last are put together as specially aggravating his guilt, we are also told how they did so; viz., by showing that he was still obstinate, and refused to recant his errors. As to the magnificent titles with which Leo is addressed by the Council, we must recollect that this was an age of magnificent titles; that the Emperor is frequently called, Θεία κορυφή, Divine Head, by the presiding magistrates in the course of the Council; and that in this letter the Constantinopolitans were but making up with Eastern wordiness for the bitter potion of the 9th and 28th canons, which they forced against his will upon the Western Patriarch. They could spare a few compliments when they had enacted by canon the equality of the Pope of Constantinople with the Pope of Rome in ecclesiastical honour and privileges, and the superiority of the former to the latter in the substantial right of receiving appeals. But that they considered the Roman Bishop as the guardian of the Vine in any other sense but that in which they held themselves to be the same, is opposed to their every word and every act. To quote one out of innumerable passages, the Eastern prelates in the Fifth General Council when consciously regarding themselves as distinct from, and opposed to, the Roman prelate, express themselves as follows:—'We, therefore, to whom is committed the charge 'of ruling the Church of the Lord, fearing the malediction 'which hangs over those who do the work of the Lord negli-'gently, hasten to preserve the good seed of faith pure from 'the tares of impiety.' And individuals are spoken of in just the same manner. For example, S. Basil speaks of S. Athanasius as κορυφὴ τῶν ὅλων, 'the head of the whole;' and says, in writing to the same Father, 'There lies upon you as 'great a care and solicitude for all the Churches as for that 'which was peculiarly committed to your charge by our com-'mon Lord.' And again, 'Our Lord has constituted thee the 'physician of the infirmities of the Churches,' and S. Gregory Nazianzen says likewise of S. Athanasius, 'that he was en-'trusted with the mastership (ἐπιστασίαν) of the whole world.' In like manner, Lupus, *Bishop of Troyes*, is thus addressed by

Sidonius Apollinaris:—'Thou, a father of fathers, and Bishop 'of Bishops, and another S. James of thy age, dost, as from 'a certain watch-tower of charity, and not from the lower 'Jerusalem, oversee all the members of the Church of our God; 'worthy to comfort all the infirm, and to be deservedly con-'sulted of all.'[1]

However, it *is* true that the Bishop of Rome presided at Chalcedon, and so Mr. Wilberforce says, 'It seems needless to 'go further in Church history in proof that the Bishop of Rome 'was supposed *to possess the power of presiding in Councils;* for 'what can be more conclusive than that which has been adduced 'from the Council of Chalcedon?' (p. 193). Most true, that it is shown that the Bishop of Rome 'possessed the right of presiding in Councils,' *equally with the other great Bishops of the Church;* most false, that it is shown that he possessed any *exclusive* right, or any right *as Primate* in the sense in which Mr. Wilberforce requires us to understand Primate. The Council of Jerusalem equally proves that the Bishop of Jerusalem 'was supposed to possess the power of presiding in Councils;' the Council of Nicæa, that the Bishop of Cordova was supposed to possess the same power; the Council of Constantinople, that the Bishops of Antioch and Constantinople were supposed to possess the same power; and the two Councils of Ephesus, that the Bishop of Alexandria was supposed to possess the same power. 'What *can* be more conclusive'?

But though it is thus 'needless to go further in Church history,' 'yet one more Council shall be cited, as having been a sort 'of sequel and appendage to the Council of Chalcedon, viz. the 'Sixth General Council, which met to complete the work of its 'precursor by censuring the heresy of the Monothelites, which 'had grown out of that of Eutyches. It was held at Constan-'tinople, A.D 680' (p. 193). The Council of Chalcedon was, as every one knows, the *fourth* Œcumenical Council. Then why does Mr. Wilberforce leave out the *fifth*, and go on to the *sixth?* The reason is very simple. It is that *at the fifth, the Pope of Rome did not preside. He was present neither in person, (although he was in the very city where it was being held,) nor by his legates, and he was by implication, but designedly, anathematized by the Council as a supporter of heresy.* Now, what kind of dealing with an historical question is this? Mr. Wilberforce has a theory about Councils. To bend the facts connected with the earliest Councils is a sufficiently hard work, but he does at least attempt it. Presently he reaches the fifth General

[1] S. Basil, Ep. 69, ad Athan. Op. tom. iii. p. 161, 162. Ep. 82, p. 175. S. Greg. Naz. Orat. 21, § 7. Op. tom, i. p. 389. Sid. Ap. lib. vi. Ep. 1. ad Lup. Bib. Patr. Galland. tom. x. p. 513. See Casaubon's Treatise; Hickes, vol. iii. p. 190.

Council. This lies right athwart the very course of his argument, and no ingenuity can make it fit in with his hypothesis. How does he proceed? Does he deny the facts? No! that is impossible. Does he, then, give up his theory? No! Does he even acknowledge the difficulty? No! What else remains? A very simple expedient—he omits all notice of the fifth Council, and *skips* from the fourth to the sixth.

And when Mr. Wilberforce has thus reached the sixth Council, how does he deal with it? He professes to exhibit from it, 'the relation of the ancient Universal Councils to the successor of S. Peter' (p. 194). With such a profession as this in his mouth, is it fair, is it right, is it conceivable, that he should have concealed the fact that Pope Honorius was anathematized by name in this Council; and that the Council itself was not presided over by Pope Agatho's legates, who were present, but by the Emperor Constantine; and that he should have quoted as the genuine exponent of the mind of the Council a corrupted passage which does not appear in the Greek text, which was alone read to the Council? The lesson that Bossuet learns is something very different. He writes—

'As the third, fourth, and fifth Councils passed judgment on the decisions of Roman Pontiffs, and only approved of them after inquiry, so the sixth Council is known to have done; and that course is common to all Councils. . . . . They inquire into the decrees of the Roman Pontiffs, and after inquiry made, approve Agatho's decrees, condemn those of Honorius. . . . . This we find to be certain. Honorius duly questioned by three patriarchs *de fide*, gave the worst answer possible; was condemned with anathema by the sixth Council; was excused by Roman Pontiffs before the supreme sentence of the Council, and after that sentence was condemned with the same anathema."[1]—*Def. Cler. Gall.* vii. 21, 26.

Certainly if Mr. Wilberforce has represented history fairly, Bossuet has disgracefully misstated it. For example, Mr. Wilberforce's last remark on the subject of Councils is as follows, and it is put forth as though no one had ever denied or doubted it:—'The Council of Chalcedon rests its deference 'to Leo on the same grounds which were stated by S. Peter 'Chrysologus, just before it assembled, "Blessed Peter, who 'lives and presides in his own see, supplies truth of faith to

[1] The sentence on Honorius is as follows:—'Besides this, we order that Honorius, who was Pope of ancient Rome, be cast out of the holy Church of God and anathematized, because we find, by his writings to Sergius, that he has in all things followed his mind, and confirmed his impious dogmas.'—Hard. iii. 1599. Pope Leo II. writes—'We anathematize also Honorius, who did not illumine this apostolical Church with the doctrine of apostolical tradition, but by a foul betrayal attempted to subvert its spotless faith.'—Hard. iii. 1475. The seventh Council also refers to the excommunication, and Honorius' name is found among the anathematized in the Liber Diurnus Romanorum Pontificum.—Routh's Opusc. ii. 153.

'those who seek it"' (p. 195). Bossuet has written many pages demonstrating the contrary of this assertion, and there are few statements which admit of so ample and satisfactory a refutation, for all the Bishops, one after the other, give their reasons for accepting Leo's letter. Not one rests it upon the simple authority of the see of Rome. Almost every one says that he accepts it because it agrees with other received documents and professions of faith. Indeed, Leo's orthodoxy is tested by his agreement with Cyril: Alexandria is made the standard by which to try Rome.

All, then, that Mr. Wilberforce has proved about the Councils is this, that the Bishop of Rome presided at one, and only one, out of the six first General Councils, viz. at the Council of Chalcedon. *If*, then, 'the right of presiding at Councils inheres in the Primacy,' it is clear that the Bishop of Rome could not have held the Primacy, and that there could have been no such Primacy in the Church.

The third test by which the Supremacy is to be identified with the Primacy is, 'the right of interference in all ecclesias-'tical appointments.' 'This was, no doubt, the last of the three 'to receive legal form and expression' (p. 195). 'But it was 'not till long afterwards that the system of referring to the see 'of S. Peter received that settled form which gave stability to 'the mediæval Church: and the great agent through which 'this work was effected was not a Roman Bishop, but our 'countryman, S. Boniface, the Apostle of Germany' (p. 199). 'It 'was through the example and influence of this first of English 'missionaries, and through the glory of his martyrdom, that 'the system prevailed for which he offered up his life' (201). So the two offices of the Primacy and of the Supremacy are to be identified by their both exercising a function, which function was confessedly not exercised till the eighth century after Christ. This seems to us childish. Meantime, Mr. Wilberforce has not given us one of the innumerable testimonies of Councils Œcumenical and Provincial, of Bishops, of Doctors, of Martyrs, and of Fathers, that interference in one branch, or 'Diocese,' of the Church by any one Bishop not belonging to that 'Diocese,' was forbidden throughout the early ages by the whole authority of the Church Catholic, unless such interferences took place simply ἀγαπητικῶς, and then it belonged to all Bishops, one as much as another. If we were to quote all the passages on this subject in the writings of the Doctors of the Church, we should fill an octavo volume: simply to transcribe the canons of the Councils which were passed for the purpose of maintaining the independence of the Churches of the several 'Dioceses,' would fill many pages. We must refer our readers to the Council of Nicæa, canons v. vi.; to the Council of Constantinople, canons ii. iii. vi.; to the

Council of Ephesus, canons i. viii.; to the Council of Chalcedon, canons ix. xvii. xxviii. xxx. Almost all of these canons are given in the Greek, Latin, and English, in 'Papal Supremacy,' p. 69. We have here only room for part of the eighth Ephesine canon:—

'This same rule shall be kept also in the other "Dioceses" and the provinces throughout the world, that no one of the religious Bishops shall lay his hand upon another province which has not been under his, that is, his predecessors' control, originally and from the beginning; and if he has laid his hand upon it and forcibly reduced it under himself, he is to restore it; that the canons of the fathers be not transgressed, and the pride of worldly power be secretly introduced under the cover of the priestly function, and by little and little, without marking the steps by which it is lost, we be deprived of the liberty which our Lord Jesus Christ, the deliverer of all men, has given us by His own blood.'—P. 73.

We must add part of the second Constantinopolitan canon:—

'Bishops who are outside a "Diocese," are not to invade the Churches which are across the borders, nor to bring confusion into the Churches; but according to the canons, the Bishop of Alexandria must *alone* have the administration of the affairs of Egypt, and the Bishops of the East must administer the East only (the privileges which are assigned to the Church of Antioch by the canons made at Nicæa being preserved), and the Bishop of the Asian Diocese must administer the affairs of the Asian only, and those of the Pontic Diocese, the affairs of the Pontic only, and those of Thrace, the affairs of Thrace only. Moreover, Bishops are not without invitation to go beyond the bounds of their Diocese for the purpose of ordaining, *or any other ecclesiastical function.*'—P. 12.

If once the force of these two canons is appreciated, we may see in them, as in a mirror, the whole constitution of the Church at the time of the Council of Constantinople. We must again remind our readers that in reading of a 'Diocese,' they must put out of their thoughts what is now called by that name, but was then denominated a Parish, and they must recollect that something is meant very little, if at all different, from a National Church. That which was presided over by a Bishop was called *παροικία*, or Parish; that which was presided over by a Metropolitan was called an *ἐπαρχία*, or Province, and consisted of many *παροικίαι*; that which was presided over by a Patriarch, Exarch, or Primate (according as he had one or other of these three names) was called a Diocese. Now, this word Diocese is not originally an ecclesiastical term: it is the name of a civil division of the Empire, constituted by several provinces, and ruled by a præfect. There was then established in each of these Dioceses a Church containing a hierarchy, in which we may mark three steps,—the lowest, the Bishops, whose jurisdiction was confined to their *παροικίαι*; the next, the Metropolitans (two, three, or more in number, according as the Diocese was larger

or smaller), each of whom had jurisdiction over a province; and, lastly, a Primate, who had jurisdiction over the whole Church of the Diocese. There is nothing more clearly brought out by the ancient canons than that each of these Churches was a distinct and independent whole in itself, bound, it is true, to the other sister Churches by the tie of love and the bond of the Holy Spirit uniting them all to their one Head and to one another, but absolutely free from all authoritative control exercised by any Bishops whatever without the limits of that Church or Diocese. At the time of the second Council, the world was divided into thirteen such Dioceses, besides the city and neighbourhood of Rome, which constituted one Diocese by themselves; five of them are referred to in the above-quoted canons, —viz. Egypt, the East (*i. e.* the parts about Antioch), Asia, Pontus, Thrace. The eight others are—Italy, Macedonia, Dacia, Illyria, Africa, Spain, Gaul, Britain. As then there were fourteen Dioceses, the theory of the Church was, that there should be fourteen Diocesan Churches; and this theory was carried out, except so far as it was prevented from taking effect by the inhabitants of some of these Dioceses not having been Christianized. It is of these Dioceses that the canon speaks—'Bishops who are outside a *Diocese* must not invade 'the Churches which are across the borders, nor bring confusion 'into the Churches.'

So far the constitution of the Church is clear enough. It consisted theoretically of fourteen independent, federal, Diocesan Churches. But now there came in two cross principles; the first was, that the Primate of that Diocesan Church which contained the greatest cities should borrow dignity from the greatness of those cities; the second, that respect should be paid to those Churches which were founded by the Apostles. In accordance with the second of these principles, we have seen that Tertullian declares that those Churches ought to be held in special regard which were founded by S. Paul and by S. Peter, and thus an undefined reverence gathered around the names of Jerusalem, Antioch, Alexandria, and Rome, which caused certain prerogatives of honour to be attached to the holders of those sees, above the other Primates. This principle, however, had not nearly so much weight and influence as the other that has been mentioned. We have seen that the Councils of Constantinople, Chalcedon, and the Council in Trullo, give as the reason of the prerogatives assigned to Rome and Constantinople the presence of the imperial power in those cities. And even had they not so expressly declared it, we might have gathered that it must have been so, for otherwise the apostolic sees of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria, would never have allowed the unapostolic see of Constantinople to be preferred before themselves

without making complaint; and indeed, on any other principle than this, the order of the Diocesan Churches would have been, Jerusalem, Antioch, Rome, Alexandria, rather than Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, and on the Roman hypothesis of S. Peter's authority, still less could Alexandria have been placed before Antioch, had it not been that the Bishops ranked according to the greatness of their cities.

By virtue, then, of the first of these cross principles, the Bishops of Rome, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem were endued with a dignity which other Primates had not; by virtue of the second, the Patriarchs of Rome and Constantinople were raised above their brother Primates; so much so, that at the Council of Chalcedon a certain authority was given to the Patriarch of Constantinople over three Diocesan Churches, and appeals were allowed to him as much as to the appellant's own Patriarch from all parts of the Church. These were two points in which encroachments were made on the ancient constitution of the Church in favour of Constantinople; but yet it was done legitimately at an Œcumenical Council, and was of course capable of revision at any time. Rome never had any such power, except by assumption and usurpation; all that she could and did appeal to was the Provincial Council of Sardica, (the canons of which Pope after Pope attempted to pass off as those of Nicæa), and the decrees of the Western Emperors which backed her power. But still the Patriarch of Rome was Primate of a Diocese, Bishop of the imperial city, and possessor of an Apostolical see. There was no other Bishop who could claim all three of these advantages. For Constantinople was not founded by an Apostle, and Alexandria and Antioch were not imperial cities. Rome, therefore, was likely to push her power beyond its bounds, and it would seem that it was often with special regard to her that the Church passed its emphatic laws, forbidding the Bishop of one Diocese to interfere with the Bishops of another Diocese. In later times she did so 'interfere in ecclesiastical appointments,' though these laws remain to this day unrepealed, though she was never exempted from them as the see of Constantinople may seem partially to have been at Chalcedon; and the means by which she gained her right of interference in the West—*for she never had it in the East*—were mainly the false Decretals of Isidore, and the Decretum of Gratian founded upon them.

Were we drawing a picture of the ancient constitution of the Church, it would be necessary to dwell further on the different names of Patriarch, Exarch, and Primate, and on those Churches which had the privilege of *αὐτοκεφαλία*, *i. e.*, which were governed by Metropolitans alone, and had no Primate; but we have said enough to show how entirely contrary to the spirit of

the early Church it was, that the Patriarch of Rome should 'interfere in the ecclesiastical appointments' of any other Diocese except his own, and how entirely contrary to fact it is that he did so.

We conclude, then, that whereas Mr. Wilberforce has arbitrarily fixed a threefold test in itself insufficient, whereby to identify the Supremacy with the Primacy, the test breaks down in all its three branches; that he has not shown, nor can it be shown, that the right of finally deciding ecclesiastical causes was in the early Church vested in the Bishop of Rome any more than in the other great Bishops of Christendom; that he has not shown, nor can it be shown, that the right of presiding at Councils was vested in the Bishop of Rome any more than in the other great Bishops of Christendom; that he has not shown, nor can it be shown, that the right of interfering in all ecclesiastical appointments was vested in the Bishop of Rome any more than in the other great Bishops of Christendom.

If the case were one which required still further confirmation—if appeal to authority were still needed—such authority might easily be obtained. It is but within a few months that death has taken away from us the wisdom and learning of one who has so long held the position of the Patriarch of ecclesiastical learning in our elder University. The venerable head of the President of Magdalen College, white with the snows of near a hundred years, has been bowed to the grave which has so long spared him to us. For more than eighty years he lived amidst the Fathers of the Church. Chrysostom, Augustine, Basil, Ambrose, were to him as familiar friends, and their writings and maxims as household words. He has left to us his matured judgment on the question of the power of the Roman see in the primitive Church:

'Assuredly,' he writes, 'it is a thing contrary to the decision both of the Eastern and Western Churches in the first ages, that any power over the faith of the other Churches, or immunity from error, should be acknowledged in the Roman Church as granted by God to it. Whatever the rights and privileges of the first see now are, or ever have been, the Eastern Church at least declared that they rested on no other foundation except ancient custom and synodical constitution; nay, the whole world in the Nicene Council ascribes its rights to that see and to the other greater Churches on no other ground except as having arisen from ancient custom. And however much honour the Bishops of the City of Rome have gained to themselves from the greatness of the Apostles Peter and Paul, the founders of the Roman Church, yet it was "because that was the imperial city," as the General Council of Chalcedon has declared, "that the Fathers, as was right and natural, gave them their prerogatives." . . . The appeals to the Roman Bishop, which the Sardican Council allowed through partiality to him, and in honour to S. Peter (to the effect that some causes, although previously judged, might be reconsidered in the same province in which they arose, provided that the pontiff so ordered,) were far from being sanctioned by the

Universal Church. This is clearly proved by the sixth canon of the second General Council, and the ninth canon of the Council of Chalcedon. Nay, we know from a letter of the Roman pontiff, Nicholas I., to Photius, that the Council of Sardica itself was not acknowledged by the Greeks in the ninth century. I say nothing of the false Decretals in which these appeals appear, for they are now known by all to be forged commodities, and to have been foisted in a little before the time of Photius.'—*Scrip. Eccl. Opusc., Præf.* p. vi.

This famous forgery of the Decretal Letters, which had such an enormous influence on the Church, and deceived it for 700 years, Mr. Wilberforce dismisses in half a page, as having been rather detrimental than otherwise to the Papal power. That, on the contrary, this forgery is the main foundation of the Supremacy—the bridge by which the Roman prelates passed from being first Bishops *in* the Church, to being (in the West) Supreme Monarchs *over* the Church—is made clear by Fluery, 'Troisième et Quatrième Discours;' De Marca, 'De Concordiâ,' vii. 20; Van Espen, iii. 478; 'Papal Supremacy,' p. 52. 'That which 'the East and we have rejected,' says Mr. Allies, 'is not 'the Pope's Primacy, as it was understood and practised in 'the time of the seven Œcumenical Councils, but the uni-'versal Bishopric, of which Nicholas I. laid the foundations, 'Gregory VII. reared the structure, and Innocent III. com-'pleted the building.... Nicholas I. and the succeeding pontiffs 'made use of the False Decretals to build up their spiritual 'monarchy, and the new principles contained in them became the 'basis of Gratian's Decretum, and consequently of the Church's 'discipline in the West' (Pref. p. xiv.)

IV. We have lastly to show, that Mr. Wilberforce has not proved that in the sixteenth century the English Church rejected the divinely constituted head and centre of Christendom, and assumed the King or Queen of England as the head and centre of unity, but that this statement is a false statement.

There is something so extremely preposterous in this proposition, so entirely opposed to what we all know, feel, and understand, that we have scarcely patience to adduce grave arguments against it. There is, however, no appearance of anything but seriousness in Mr. Wilberforce's method of dealing with the subject, and we will, therefore, meet him in the same spirit.

Mr. Wilberforce's theory is stated as follows:—

'The purpose which the Crown's Supremacy was intended to effect, was exactly that which our Lord's promise to S. Peter was designed to secure. The operation of that promise, as we have seen, was to form the college of Apostles into a single body, and then to enable them to act together in the maintenance of truth. This is the precise object assigned to it by the early Fathers; and this is just that which Henry VIII. proposed to imitate by his Supremacy. Its purpose was to unite the clergy of the English Empire

into a single "*body spiritual.*" Thus was there a new principle of combination in place of that provided by our Lord.'—P. 232.

'It was the Royal Supremacy by which the English Bishops were first moulded into a body, and thereby were supposed to gain power to decide questions of doctrine.'—P. 233.

'That which qualified it for such functions, was the authority of the Sovereign, which made the Bishops of our two provinces into a body, just as the collective Bishops of Christendom had formerly been combined into the one body of Christ. This was the assertion of the 24th of Henry VIII. 12, and the ground on which the title, Head of the Church, was important. It implied that the Bishops who stood to Henry in the relation of subjects, were combined by that circumstance into a body, or spiritual entity, and had the same power, therefore, to grant mission, or determine doctrine, which had formerly been possessed by the Universal Church.'—P. 228.

'Now is it not clear that the function thus assumed by our Sovereign, is exactly that, which, according to the laws of the ancient Church, belonged to the chief Apostle? Its purpose is to constitute the Bishops into a *whole*, so that they may be able to make final settlement in questions of doctrine.' —P. 237.

'The separation between the Church of England and the rest of Christendom, has been shown to depend upon that spiritual headship which is claimed by our Sovereign, whereby the Bishops of this realm are constituted into a distinct body, and determine all articles of faith, as though they were the whole body of Christ'—P. 251.

'The new head by whom they were combined into an isolated body.'—P. 253.

'The Royal Supremacy consolidated them into a whole, and thus enabled them to speak with authority.'—P. 275.

'This circumstance (the Sovereign's being Head of the Church,) as has been seen, is alleged to give the English clergy that unity which forms them into a whole.'—P. 278.

We believe that there are persons who credit an unfounded assertion when it has been made eight times, simply because it has been made eight times. We, therefore, give Mr. Wilberforce the benefit to be derived from his repeated assertions. We have, however, several remarks to make upon them.

1. We beg our readers to remark how what was, in p. 121, a modest hypothetical resting upon one person's authority: '*If* '*Cyprian* has preserved the right interpretation of those events 'which are recorded in the Gospels, our Lord's reason for giving 'this especial commission to His chief Apostle,' (a thing, by the way, which Cyprian distinctly denies ever was given,) 'was to 'secure unity among the rest,' (a thing, by the way, which Cyprian never says,)—has grown into a categorical, and apparently universal proposition, in p. 232:—'This is the precise object assigned to it *by the early Fathers*,' and has become converted into a law, in p. 237:—'The function which, *according to the laws of the ancient Church*, belonged to the chief Apostle.'

2. We must also ask them to call to mind that this function of S. Peter, which our Sovereigns are represented as having stolen from the Popes, is a fiction, for which, out of all the

tomes of antiquity, no support can be found, except such as may be derived from a misinterpreted text of S. Cyprian, which, when rightly interpreted, means just the contrary; and from two passages taken out of the writings of S. Jerome and Optatus, which *do not* really support it, but which is incidentally, and sometimes formally, denied by all the great Doctors of the East, the West, and the South.

3. But with regard to this function of our Sovereigns itself—how and where did Mr. Wilberforce discover it? What facts does the thing rest on? What documents of the Church attest it? Clearly it must be openly professed, if it is the case. For let us think what it is—no less than that our Sovereigns hold towards the Anglican Church the same office which Mr. Wilberforce has been maintaining that S. Peter and his successors held towards the whole Church; *i. e.* that of being the special representative or Vicar of Christ in things spiritual—the centre of unity whereby they are combined into a spiritual whole. Does any one hold such a belief in England, Scotland, America, or the Colonies? We know no such person. Did any one ever hold it? We never heard of such a person. Has it been put forth in the writings of Anglican Divines? We have never seen it: and yet we have seen many arguments on the subject of the title, 'Supreme Head on earth of the Church of England,' which was adopted by a tyrannical Sovereign many years before the Reformation, borne by his son, and for a time, by his *Roman*-Catholic daughter, and finally repudiated by her and her *Anglo*-Catholic sister. Surely Mr. Wilberforce must have some authority for his statement from the authorized formularies of the Church. Do we then find in the Articles or Canons that the Sovereign is the head and centre of unity which combines the Bishops into a body? Nothing of the kind. All that Mr. Wilberforce appeals to as justifying his assertion, is the 24th Act of Henry VIII. c. 12, which he quotes as follows:—

'They decreed that "this realm of England is an empire, and so hath been accepted in the world," "the body spiritual whereof having power, when any cause of the law divine happened to come in question, or of spiritual learning, then it was declared interpreted, and showed by that part of the said body politic, called the Spirituality, now being usually called the English Church, which always hath been reputed, and also found of that sort, that both for knowledge, integrity, and sufficiency of number, it hath been always thought, and is also at this time, sufficient and meet of itself, without the intermeddling of any exterior person or persons, to declare and determine all such doubts, and to administer all such offices and duties as to their rooms spiritual doth appertain."'—P. 223.

Mr. Wilberforce says, 'that the assertion of' this '24th of 'Henry VIII. c. 12,' is that 'that, which qualified the English 'Church for such functions (as mission) was the authority of the

'Sovereign, which made the Bishops of our two provinces into a 'body, just as the collective Bishops of Christendom had formerly 'been combined into the one body of Christ.' We have been quite unable to find this in the above extract, or in any part of 24th Henry VIII. c. 12. We have already seen, that there were in the early Church as many 'spiritual bodies' as there were Dioceses, and that the Bishops in these Dioceses were 'reputed for knowledge, integrity, and sufficiency of 'numbers, sufficient and meet of themselves, without the 'intermeddling of any exterior person or persons, to declare 'and determine all such doubts, and to administer all such 'offices as to their rooms spiritual did appertain.' So says, in very similar words, the already-quoted second canon of the second Œcumenical Council, provided always (though the provision is not expressed either in the canon or in the law) that there lay a final appeal, in matters of faith, to a Council of the Universal Church, duly elected and congregated. Now, as the characteristic feature of an empire or kingdom is the power of the Sovereign which extends over it, so the characteristic feature of a Diocese was the power of the Præfect which extended over it. Would it, then, be just to say, that 'it was the authority of 'the Præfect which qualified the Diocesan Church for its 'functions, and which made the Bishops of the provinces in the 'Diocese into a body,'—'which combined them into a spiritual 'entity,' &c.? If not, neither is it just to say, that it is the authority of the King of England which makes the Bishops of the provinces of the kingdom into a body, combines them into a spiritual entity, &c.

The Act is, like other documents, misquoted. Mr. Wilberforce represents it as though the then Parliament '*decreed*' that 'England is an empire,' and suggests that the purpose of this decree was to draw an analogy between the empire of Rome and the kingdom of England, with a view to ecclesiastical things. Now, that Act of Parliament does not so 'decree,' and the purpose attributed to its framers in making such a decree is a pure figment resting upon no foundation whatever. The words that Mr. Wilberforce has extracted are not in the Act, but in the preamble to the Act. It begins as follows:—'Whereas by sundry 'old authentic histories and chronicles it is manifestly declared 'and expressed *that this realm of England is an empire*, and so 'hath been accepted in the world, governed by one supreme 'head or king,' &c. The description of the body spiritual, likewise, is not the 'decree' of the Act, but merely the preamble, creating nothing, and simply repeating an acknowleged fact; a fact recognised by the laws of Edward I., Edward III., Richard II., and Henry IV., against Papal intrusion (laws which are referred to in the same preamble), just as much as by this

Act. What is really enacted by the Bill is, 1. That causes about wills, marriages, &c. should be settled within the realm. 2. Appeals to any foreign potentate are forbidden. 3. That appeals should lie from the Archdeacon to the Bishop, from the Bishop to the Archbishop, 'there to be definitively and 'finally ordered, decreed, and adjusted according to justice, with-'out any appellation and provocation to any other person or 'persons, court or courts.' 4. That in cases touching the king appeals might be made—to himself? No. To the *Upper House of Convocation;* and 'whatsoever shall be . . . adjudged by the 'aforesaid prelates, abbots, and priors of the Upper House of the 'said Convocation, as is aforesaid, shall stand and be taken for 'a final decree and sentence . . and never after to come in ques-'tion and debate to be examined in any other court or courts.' This is the Act which, according to Mr. Wilberforce, 'asserts' that it is 'the authority of the Sovereign which qualifies the 'Church of England for its functions, and that it is the royal 'authority which combines the Bishops into a body.' And this Act is the only ground that he has brought forward for his oft-repeated theory.

We presume that any one who was desirous of learning the true position of the English Sovereign towards the Church, would inquire what statements the Church on the one side, and the Crown on the other, have made on the Royal Supremacy. These statements exist, though they are not quoted by Mr. Wilberforce. They are as follows:—

'We give . . . to our Princes . . . that only prerogative which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in Holy Scriptures, by God Himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and decrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be ecclesiastical or temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evil doers.'—*Article* xxxvii.

And Queen Elizabeth's explanation of her own authority is quite in accordance with the Church's statement:—

'Her Majesty neither doth nor will challenge any other authority than that was challenged, and lately used by King Henry VIII. and King Edward VI., which is, *and was of ancient time*, due to the imperial crown of this realm; that is, under God, to have the sovereignty and rule over all manner of persons born within these her realms, dominions, and countries, of what estate, either ecclesiastical or temporal, soever they be, so as no other foreign power, shall or ought to have any supremacy over them.'—*Wilkins, Concil.* vol. iv. p. 188.

Again, Mr. Wilberforce's statements with regard to the title, Supreme Head of the Church, are recklessly incorrect. He says:—

'The title of Supreme Head of the Church of England, still belongs to our Sovereigns by Act of Parliament. It was assigned to them by 25 Henry VIII. 21, s. 2, and by 37 Henry VIII. 17, s. 3, which were revived by the 1st of Elizabeth; and it was again bestowed in 2 and 3 Anne, 11.'—P. 229.

Now the truth is, that it was 26 Henry VIII. c. 1, which assigned the title to our Sovereigns. This was confirmed by 35 Henry VIII. c. 3, and it was declared to be high treason to deny it, by Edward VI. c. 12. All three of these Acts were repealed by 1 and 2 Philip and Mary, c. 8; and their repeal was *not reversed but confirmed* by 1 Elizabeth, c. i. 50, that they should 'stand, remain, and be repealed and void, in such 'like manner and form as they were before the making of this 'Act, anything herein contained to the contrary notwith-'standing!' Those Acts of Henry's which Mr. Wilberforce quotes, were *not* passed for the purpose of assigning this title to the Sovereign, but the first of them for repressing the pecuniary exactions of Rome, and the second for permitting the marriage of Doctors of Civil Law, and they only incidentally and parenthetically refer to the Supremacy at all. But Mr. Wilberforce says that the title of Supreme Head was again bestowed on our Sovereigns by 2 and 3 Anne, c. 11. Now who is there who would not suppose from these words, that 2 and 3 Anne, c. 11, was a Bill similar in nature to 26 Henry VIII. c. 1, or 35 Henry VIII. c. 3, enacting that the title, Supreme Head of the Church of England, should belong to the English Sovereigns? This is so far from being the case, that it is the Act which was passed for constituting Queen Anne's Bounty: and there is nothing in it from beginning to end about the title of the Sovereign, except that in the preamble there is the following parenthesis: 'Forasmuch as your Majesty taking into 'your princely and serious consideration the mean and insuf-'ficient maintenance belonging to the clergy in divers parts of 'this your kingdom, has been most graciously pleased out of 'your most religious and tender concern for the Church of Eng-'land, (*whereof your Majesty is the only Supreme Head on earth,*) 'and for the poor clergy thereof,' &c. A complimentary expression, contained in a parenthesis of a preamble of a Bill, and addressed to a particular Sovereign, cannot and does not 'bestow' 'the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England' upon 'our Sovereigns,' when that title had been deliberately, and in so many words, rejected by two Acts, which are still the law of the land. There is a very simple test by which we can learn whether or no this title does 'belong to our Sovereigns by Act of Parliament,' or no. In the *Rotuli Parliamenti* the name and titles of the Sovereign are prefixed to the statutes of each year. Is this title found among the rest? It is found from the year 1534 to the year 1553; *i. e.* from the year in which it was granted by 26 Henry VIII. c. 1, to the year before that in which it was abrogated by 1 Philip and Mary, c. 8. It is never found after that date. Does it not follow that the title in question did by Act of Parliament belong to our

Sovereigns from A.D. 1534 to A.D. 1553, and not before or afterwards?

Queen Elizabeth gave her reasons for refusing to revive it, and Bishop Jewel has handed them down to us; 'The Queen 'is not willing to be styled in speech or in writing the Head of 'the English Church; for she says forcibly that that dignity 'has been given to Christ alone, and is not suitable for any 'mortal: moreover, that those titles have been so foully defiled 'by Antichrist, that they cannot be piously employed by any 'one for the future.'[1] And in a like spirit King James I.: 'It 'is certain that the Apostles thought none worthy of this honour '(the title *Caput fidei*) but Christ; therefore this kind of title 'ought to have been abstained from, for whose dignity Christ 'alone is sufficient.'[2]

But offensive as the name is, we utterly deny that it ever bore, or was intended to bear, the signification which Mr. Wilberforce attaches to it. He says that 'the ground on which it was impor-'tant' was, that 'it implied that the Bishops, who stood to Henry 'in the relation of subjects, were combined *by that circumstance* 'into a body, or spiritual entity' (p. 228). Bishop Gardiner is an authority which Mr. Wilberforce ought to accept. He gives the reason for the title, the adoption of which he warmly advocated, thus: 'Since the Church of England is at this day composed of 'the same persons, as are signified under the word Kingdom, of 'whom the prince is the head, when they are termed the King-'dom of England, shall he not be the head of *the same persons* 'when they are called the Church of England?'[3] And Cranmer, as is well known, declared that Nero was Head of the Church in the same sense as Henry; 'for Nero was Head of 'the Church, that is, in worldly respects, of the temporal bodies 'of men of whom the Church consisteth.'[4] Mr. Wilberforce will scarcely say that Cranmer held that Nero combined SS. Peter and Paul and the other Roman disciples into a spiritual entity. The real meaning of the title, ill-chosen and offensive as it is, and indeed only accepted at all by the Church with a reservation which Mr. Wilberforce acknowledges to have made it nugatory, was no more (except perhaps in the tyrant Henry's own acceptation,) than Supreme Governor; and the meaning of that name has already been given in the words both of the Church and of the Crown.

The attempt to fasten on Bramhall the doctrine that 'the 'powers thus possessed by the Crown,' (*i. e.* the powers by which the Bishops were combined into a spiritual entity, &c.) 'were

[1] Ep. xiv. ad Bulling., May 22, 1559. Zurich Letters, First Series, Camb. 1842. England and Rome, p. 88.
[2] Apol. pro Jur. Fidelitatis.
[3] De Ver. Obed. foll. 9, 11. England and Rome, p. 84.
[4] Fox xi. vol. iii. p. 550, Ed. 1684. England and Rome, p. 87.

'transferred to it from the Papacy' (p. 229), is an act of daring which we think might have been spared. Mr. Wilberforce is able to bring forward half a sentence, which, when removed from its context, might be so understood. It is as follows:—

'Whatsoever power our laws did divest the Pope of, they invested the king with it.' [There Mr. Wilberforce stops. Bramhall does not: he says] —'They invested the king with it; *but they never invested the king with any spiritual power or jurisdiction; witness the injunctions of Elizabeth, witness the public articles of our Church, witness the professions of King James, witness all our statutes themselves*, wherein all the parts of papal power are enumerated which are taken away, his "encroachments," his "usurpations," his "oaths," his "collations, provisions, pensions, tenths, first-fruits, reservations, palls, unions, commendams, exemptions, dispensations of all kinds, confirmations, licences, faculties, suspensions, appeals," and God knoweth how many pecuniary artifices more—*but of them all there is not one that concerneth jurisdiction purely spiritual*, or which is an essential right of the power of the Keys; they are all branches of the external regiment of the Church; the greater part of them usurped from the Crown, sundry of them from Bishops, and some found out by the Popes themselves.'—*Schism Guarded*, vol. ii. p. 458. Oxf. 1842.

In truth, this whole matter about combining the Churches into a spiritual body is infinitely unreasonable. Who combined the Churches of Corinth, Thessalonica, Philippi, and the other Churches planted by S. Paul, into 'spiritual entities?' Who combined S. John and the Ephesian clergy into a body? Was it Linus? or had S. John no powers of mission, jurisdiction, and other functions, because the Ephesian Church had not 'crystallized' properly? How came the seven Churches of Asia to be bodies? What made the Patriarchate of Alexandria, Antioch, Constantinople, &c., into entities? What made the fourteen Diocesan Churches have powers to rule themselves? How came the second Œcumenical Council to be so ignorant of the true principles of ecclesiastical 'crystallization,' as to order that, 'according to the canons,' the Bishops of Egypt, the East, Asia, Pontus, and Thrace, should severally and independently manage each their own affairs? What made the African Church into a body, whose letter to Pope Celestine (in which its members are forbidden, on pain of excommunication, to appeal beyond the seas and out of the realm of Africa) is the very anticipation of 24 Henry VIII. c. 12? One answer alone can be given to these and similar questions. They are combined into spiritual entities by their union with their one Head, the Lord CHRIST. Neither the Catholic Church of the early ages, nor the Anglican Church of the sixteenth century, regarded either the Bishop of Rome or the king of a country as the centre of unity, and the means of combining Christians into bodies. They held that the Churches of great cities and districts were independent of each other, and yet

united to each other, by all depending alike upon the one Head, JESUS CHRIST; by being all bound together with the one bond of the Holy Spirit; by being all ruled by the one code of laws which found their expression in the canons of the Œcumenical Councils: but not cramped into the form of an ecclesiastical monarchy, under the rule of an earthly King-Bishop—not requiring, as of necessity, any organization superior to that of Bishops who are essentially equal in powers and in functions, whether they are situated 'at Rome or at Engubium.'

It would take us too long to follow Mr. Wilberforce through his discussion of the state of the early British Church, and the acts of the Reformation, and unwind the threads of accuracy and inaccuracy which are enfolded and entangled together. We shall but touch upon two more points; these are, Mr. Wilberforce's way of dealing with the Gorham case, and with the Greek Church. Into the merits of the first, we shall, of course, not here enter; we shall only compare two passages, to see if there is to be found that 'just balance' which has been declared to be God's 'delight.'

'"The Church hath authority in controversies of faith." "The Church hath power to decree rites and ceremonies." This view of the Church of England, as claiming authority over the consciences, was dissipated by the Gorham case. It then became manifest that neither the rulers of the English Church, nor the Church herself in her corporate capacity, exert any such power, or claim to act on any such principles. . . . And this decision resulted from the further fact, that the civil power had taken possession, with the Church's assent, of her spiritual organs; her courts professed themselves bound to affirm or deny according as the temporal Sovereignty ordered them; and cannot claim, therefore, to be the expression of that mind of the Spirit which utters its voice through the body mystical of the Son of God."—P. 217.

Such is the measure meted out to the Church of England. Now compare the following passage:—

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[1] 'The justice of the decision,' we are further told, 'has been called in question, indeed, by many individuals; *but that such questions are to be decided by the civil power, and not by the Church, seems to be acquiesced in on all hands as inevitable* (p. 218). How true this statement is appears from the Clergy Discipline Bill, discussed by the Houses of Convocation at their last sitting, Friday, Feb. 9, 1855. The Report of the Committee of the House of Bishops contains eighteen paragraphs, of which the 6th, 7th, 8th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th, are all on this subject. With scarcely a dissentient voice the Church in representation has declared 'that the present provision for hearing and deciding final appeals is not such as to give satisfaction;' that 'it is highly important that it should be corrected;' that there ought to be 'security that ecclesiastical questions shall be decided by persons qualified by office and by acquaintance with the course of law ecclesiastical to decide them;' that the law which assigned the hearing of such causes to the Queen in Council ought to be repealed; that the 'best solution of the difficulty would be . . . to enable her Majesty . . . to remit the cause for rehearing in the Archbishop's Court, to be finally decided by the judge of that court, and other ecclesiastical and common-law judges.' This is acquiescence—acquiescence on all hands!

'The Donatists, after having been heard by Melchiades, Bishop of Rome, A.D. 313, and again by the Council of Arles, A.D. 314, obtained a personal hearing, A.D. 316, from Constantine. He heard them unwillingly, and avowed that he had no proper jurisdiction, but as he only confirmed that which had been decided by the Church, no particular evil resulted from the proceeding.'—P. 174.

Now, let the Gorham case be as Mr. Wilberforce represents it, yet, so far as the reference to the civil power goes, what is the difference between the appeal to Constantine in 316, and to Victoria in 1850? That Constantine decided one way or another way matters not; the whole principle is involved in the cause having been carried to him at all. We are not justifying such a course; we think it equally wrong in the case of Emperor and Queen alike; but what we call attention to is this: that whereas in the one case Mr. Wilberforce sees all claim on the part of the Church to authority in controversies of faith dissipated, the civil power taking possession of the Church's organs, and the mind of the Sovereign substituted for the mind of the Spirit; in the other absolutely similar case he has nothing to say but, that 'no particular evil resulted.'

The Greek Church has always presented a formidable difficulty to the advocates of the Supremacy of the Pope.

'The orthodox Greek or Eastern Church contains a body of Christians reckoned at not less than eighty millions. It is governed by Patriarchs and Bishops, holding their sees in continuous descent from the Apostolic age. It has produced saints, martyrs, and fathers. Since its separation from the West, it has converted the Sclavonic race, and added to its body the great Russian Church. It has retained the ancient creed without the change of an iota. It has never gone through the trials and dangers of a Reformation. It has ever spoken, and speaks still, with the voice of unbroken tradition, and it has *never* admitted the Papal sway. It has constantly, in every age, held up its voice and its witness against that claim as Antichristian and blasphemous, which says that "the Pope is set over the whole Christian world; and possesses in its completeness and plenitude that power which Christ left on earth for the good of His Church."[1] It has denied this, and any like claim, not merely for 300 years, but from the time that it has been advanced.'—*Papal Supremacy*, p. 59.

Mr. Wilberforce feels the difficulty; and how does he meet it? He dismisses the whole question in a page and a half, with an *argumentum ad hominem* to the effect that the Anglican Church is not in communion with the Greek Church. Very true; but that was not the thing asserted, nor the thing which is needed for the argument. The controversial use, so to speak, which is made of the Greek Church by the Anglican Churchman is, to show in and by it that the Bishop of Rome is not the monarch of the Church, with whom to be in union is to hold

[1] Bellarmine, De Pont. Rom. lib. i. c. 9.

communion with the Catholic Church. What reply to this argument is it to say, 'Oh! but you are not in communion with the Greek Church?' It does not touch the question in hand. But there are some striking admissions in the page and a half devoted to the Greek Church.

'However effective may be its testimony against the Church of Rome, its witness on behalf of the Church of England amounts to nothing. So that though it may be an useful weapon for those who deny that any such thing exists as Church authority, it cannot be relied on by those who desire to construct any system of belief, or hope to see any positive opinions prevail among mankind. Such seems the natural result of the three following considerations:—1st. The main doctrinal opposition between the Greek Church and the Church of Rome, respects the procession of the Holy Ghost; now on this point the Church of England is committed to the self-same principles as the Church of Rome. . . . 2ndly. As the Church of England is opposed to Greece, in that particular in which Greece is most opposed to Rome, *so in all those points of doctrine in which she is opposed to Rome, she is equally opposed to Greece.* For there is hardly a tenet in which she has departed from the popular creed of the Western Church, in which the Eastern Church would not condemn her. How can we profess to be in communion then with the Eastern Church, when the Easterns agree with Rome respecting those very doctrines' [the Supremacy for instance?] 'which the Church of England has been disputing for the last three centuries? 3rdly. There is a Bishop resident in the East who is called the Bishop of the United Church of England and Ireland in Jerusalem. . . . How then can it be said that the Church of England is in communion with the Church of Greece any more than with that of Rome? So that whatever use may be made of the Greek Church as a weapon against an opponent, it is useless for the purpose of justifying ourselves. Those who believe that God has His Church in the world, and that its purpose is to teach truth, will not be satisfied with arguments which are simply destructive, and which result only in the overthrow of all authority.'—P. 271.

Why Mr. Wilberforce should have asserted that 'in all those 'points of doctrine in which the Church of England is opposed 'to Rome, she is equally opposed to Greece,' we cannot presume to guess. Every one knows that it is not the case. All our readers probably are aware that on the doctrine of Purgatory, on the doctrine of Indulgences, on the doctrine of Communion in one kind only, with respect to the Worship of Images, the Celibacy of the Clergy, the Free use of the Holy Scriptures, the employment of Church Services in a tongue 'not understanded of the people,' and on many other doctrines, among which is to be specially counted the doctrine of Roman or Papal Supremacy, the Greek and the Anglican Churches agree in testifying or protesting against the innovations of Rome.[1] But we pass by this point, and we

[1] The very last authoritative document of the Oriental Church, the Encyclical Letter put forth by the Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem, in the year 1848, declares that the Papacy is the *great heresy* of later times, as Arianism of earlier ages; having ceased to be 'purely guided by the doctrines of the Fathers, and to walk by the never-to-be-forgotten rules of the Scrip-

will say no more about the *ignoratio elenchi* exhibited throughout the reference to the Greek Church. What we say is this. Mr. Wilberforce declares that the authority of the Greek Church 'may be an useful weapon for those who deny that 'any such thing exists as Church authority: it cannot be 'relied upon by those who desire to construct *any system of* 'belief, or hope to see *any positive opinions* prevail among man-'kind,' that 'those who believe that God has His Church in the 'world, and that its purpose is to teach truth, will not be satis-'fied with arguments which are *simply destructive*, and which 'result only in *the overthrow of all authority.*' But Mr. Wilberforce is not merely arguing against the Church of England,—he is constructing *some system of belief;* he does believe in *some Church authority.* Then he ought manfully to have grappled with this fact which is 'simply destructive' of all authority, and not to have slurred it over as incapable of meeting it. But the fact is, that Mr. Wilberforce has here made an exaggeration. It is not *every* system of belief, nor *every* positive opinion, nor *all* authority, which is overthrown by the argument derived from the existence of the Greek Church. This is clear; for the Greek Church itself has a system of belief, and holds positive opinions, and maintains Church authority, and yet is not overthrown by its own existence. Rather it is one particular system of belief and set of positive opinions, one particular mode of Church authority—viz. that which energizes through the Papal power, which, indeed, Mr. Wilberforce has throughout the latter half of his volume been attempting to confuse with *all* Church authority—of which the argument derived from the existence of the Greek Church is 'simply destructive.' Thus limited, we accept and ratify the admission. The existence of the Oriental Church is, indeed, 'simply destructive' of the Papal theory, and the argument derived from it 'results in the overthrow of all authority,' as it is claimed by Rome. This being so, it is the part of 'those who believe that God has His

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tures.' 'What, then,' ask the Patriarchs of the East, 'must we conclude of those who pride and boast themselves only upon their succession to the supposed chair of S. Peter? .... It is easy to discern the emptiness and the weakness of the attempts by which the Bishop of Rome endeavours to maintain his despotic power. For if the Church of Christ had not been founded upon the indissoluble rock of the Confession of Peter, which was a common answer, as from each individual of the Apostles, to the question that was asked of all, "But whom do ye say that I am?" (as the godly Fathers both of the East and West interpret the place), it would have been built upon a frail foundation, and upon Cephas *personally*,—still, however, not in any sense on the Pope; and yet it is he who, moreover, appropriates to himself the Keys of the kingdom of Heaven; and what kind of use he has made of them is only too manifest from history.' Ἐγκύκλιος τῆς μιᾶς ἁγίας Καθολικῆς καὶ Ἀποστολικῆς Ἐκκλησίας Ἐπιστολή.—p. 19. Quoted in an excellent article in the first Number of the *Scottish Ecclesiastical Journal.*

'Church in the world,' and 'that any such thing exists as 'Church authority,' to adopt a theory which is not 'over-'thrown,' by facts, but will account for them. Such is the theory of Church authority maintained by the Anglican Church.

We shall conclude this point with an extract from the *resumé* of 'Papal Supremacy':—

'This doctrine of the Supremacy was unknown to—1. The ancient Councils of Nicæa, Constantinople, Ephesus, Chalcedon; which set before us another and distinct system of Church government, viz. the Diocesan or Patriarchal. 2. The ancient Liturgies, the depositories of Apostolic traditions; which also set before us the Patriarchal government of the Church. 3. The ancient Fathers; who neither in their interpretation of Scripture attribute a Supremacy to S. Peter, as modern Roman controversialists do, nor by their acts and writings acknowledge a Supremacy in the Bishop of Rome. S. Peter has with them the Primacy, the first place among the Apostles; but it is distinctly and repeatedly denied, that he had any authority over the other Apostles, or any peculiar gifts or commission above the rest. And the Bishop of Rome stands foremost amongst his equal brother-Patriarchs. 4. The growth of the modern Roman Supremacy may be distinctly traced. It grew up chiefly under the shadow of a vast system of forgeries, which imposed on the whole Western Church for 700 years. 5. The Eastern Church, with its four Patriarchates, never submitted to the Roman Supremacy, but has continued its unbroken witness against the usurpation to the present day. 6. Our fathers, maintaining the Canon of the Church, rejected the Supremacy of the Pope as a usurpation, and not of lawful right. We conclude, that the sin of schism cannot, and does not, rest with us who lawfully maintain the ancient Canon and discipline of the Church. The guilt must be theirs who require unlawful terms of obedience.'—P. 67.

There is one final point on which we must say a few words. How is it that men like him whose book we have been reviewing, —men of honoured and respected name, and of general candour and integrity—can allow themselves, as soon as they undertake to reconcile Antiquity and Papal Supremacy, to make use of such shifts as we have had to exhibit, to wrest and torture words in the way we have had to expose, and so to misrepresent antiquity (there is no other word for it), as we have seen in the case of S. Cyprian, S. Augustine, Hilary the Deacon, Eusebius, the Council of Sardica, the Council of Ephesus, and the Council of Chalcedon? The charitable hypothesis of second-hand quotations taken from manuals of Theology will not meet the case, for the writer has evidently an acquaintance with original works: nor can it be the deadening effect of Liguorian principles, for he has not been educated in them. The only manner of accounting for this phenomenon is that which has lucidly been expounded by one who has since acted in the way which he has himself described:—

'Now do I mean to accuse so serious and good a man as Bellarmine of wilful unfairness in this procedure? No. Yet it is difficult to enter into

the state of mind under which he was led into it. However we explain it, so much is clear, that the Fathers are only so far of use in the eyes of Romanists as they prove the Roman doctrines, and in no sense are allowed to interfere with the conclusion which their Church has adopted; that they are of authority when they seem to agree with Rome, of none if they differ. . . . A Romanist, then, cannot really argue in defence of the Roman doctrines; he has too firm a confidence in their truth, if he is sincere in his profession, to enable him critically to adjust the due weight to be given to this or that evidence. He assumes his Church's conclusion as true, and the facts or witnesses which he adduces are rather brought *to receive an interpretation* than *to furnish a proof*. . . . Let us then understand the position of the Romanists towards us; they do not really argue from the Fathers, though they seem to do so. They may affect to do so in our behalf, happy, if by an innocent stratagem they are able to convert us; but all the while, in their own feelings, they are taking a far higher position . . . . They claim and use all documents of antiquity as ministers and organs of that one Infallible Church, which once forsooth kept silence, but since has spoken; which by a Divine gift must ever be consistent with herself, and which bears with her her own evidence of Divinity.'—*Proph. Office*, p. 84.

When Mr. Wilberforce wrote his 'Inquiry into the Principles of Church Authority,' it is clear that he had already adopted this principle of interpreting antiquity by the authority of the modern Church, or, rather of one portion of the modern Church, instead of testing the modern Church by an appeal to antiquity. He was, therefore, unable to deal fairly by antiquity; and thus the individual is to a considerable degree exculpated, —at the expense, however, of his adopted system, which, in proportion as the individual is excused, is itself more deeply criminated.

APPENDIX.

MR. WILBERFORCE has published Seven Letters in answer to the above article. What he does say, and what he does not say, are alike remarkable, and require a brief notice at our hands. We shall follow the order of our own pages in the *Christian Remembrancer*, in replying to his remarks.

P. 377.—We have objected to Mr. Wilberforce's translation of a passage in S. Cyprian. Instead of 'Upon him, being one, 'He builds His Church,' (we have written) 'it ought to be, 'Upon one He builds His Church.' Mr. Wilberforce replies, (Letter V.) that we 'appear to have overlooked the word '*illum*.' We have not overlooked it, because it is not there. There are three readings. Some copies entirely omit the passage: some read *Super unum ædificat ecclesiam suam:* some read *Super illum unum ædificat ecclesiam suam et illi pascendas mandat oves.* The last of these readings is one of those additions to the text of S. Cyprian, the authority of which we have shown (P. 22.) to be quite valueless. The second is that adopted by Fell, who appends to it the following note: "*Sic Spir. Vet. innom. Remb. Erasm. Grav. Morel. Bod.* 1, 2, 3, 4. *Lam. Ebor. Voss.* 1. *NC.* 1. *Linc. Saris. Ben.* Super illum unum ædificat ecclesiam suam et illi pascendas mandat oves suas. *Pem. Voss.* 2, 3. *Nuperi Imp.* Meas. Et quamvis *Spir.*" Rigaltius says that the two most ancient copies have *Super unum*, and adds, *Præpositiones istæ (illum illi) argumenta sunt adulterinæ manûs quæ pro libidine suâ flagitium hic fecit.* Stephanus says that some of the ancient copies have *Super unum*, and continues *At nulli plane pronomen* (illum) *in quo vis tota restat: hoc enim deest in omnibus MSS. et editionibus antiquis.* Mr. C. Thornton, in his translation published at Oxford in 1839, has made the same mistake with Mr. Wilberforce, but he has not defended it when pointed out by appealing to *illum.*

In the same passage we noticed that Mr. Wilberforce had translated *unitatis ejusdem originem*, 'the origin of the same *authority*' instead of '*unity.*' We believe this to have been a simple lapse of the pen. Mr. Wilberforce, however, maintains, if we understand him right, (Letter V.) that it is the rendering of the Oxford translation, which is another mistake.

P. 382.—In place of the words, 'We deeply regret that Mr. Wilberforce should have written and published that sentence,' (p. 16) we originally wrote, 'We would sooner have made a directly false statement—a statement resting on no foundation whatever—than have written and published that sentence. Liguori himself would not justify it.' The words seemed calculated to give pain, and we have accordingly changed them, but we are obliged again to quote and refer to them, owing to the following sentence in Mr. Wilberforce's Third Letter. 'Mr. Meyrick 'has evidently vague notions about probable evidence: for when 'I had adduced a number of probabilities as amounting among

'them to a positive certainty, he makes the following most un-'warrantable remark: 'We would sooner have made a directly 'false statement,'' &c. There is nothing whatever about 'probable evidence,' or 'adducing probabilities' connected with the sentence in any manner. Mr. Wilberforce had declared that S. Cyprian 'said, that to communicate with the Bishop of the 'Church of Rome was "the same thing as to communicate with 'the Catholic Church."' This statement we showed to be untrue in the sense in which every reader would understand the words, and therefore we said that, for ourselves, we would rather have made a statement resting upon no foundation, than one that rested only upon a seeming foundation; but there is nothing about 'probable evidence,' or 'probabilities amounting to a certainty' in the whole matter.

P. 392.—Mr. Wilberforce says 'that he points out our manner of objecting,' thus: "I had stated that every 'Ante-'Nicene writer who refers to the passage, *On this rock I will* '*build My Church*, supposes that reference is made to the *per-*'*son* of S. Peter. . . . He mentions various Ante-Nicene wri-'ters by whom this passage is not referred to, and then asks tri-'umphantly, 'Are these the authorities to which Mr. Wilberforce 'refers? No, not one of them.' How does this derogate from 'my statement that my interpretation is borne out by every 'Ante-Nicene writer who refers to the passage? I have stated 'who these writers are, and that other Ante-Nicene writers 'exist, is nothing to the purpose.'—(Letter IV.) By referring to page 27, our readers will see that such was *not* our objection. Our argument was two-fold. 1. That Mr. Wilberforce's words did not include a number of authorities that they might seem to include. And, 2, *that those authorities to whom he did appeal by those words, did not bear out his view;* and this we proved, by patiently examining their testimonies one after the other.

P. 396.—Mr. Wilberforce has devoted a whole letter to proving that we 'are unfair in asserting Hilary the Deacon to 'be a heretic.'—(Letter III.) Mr. Wilberforce has lost his labour. We never asserted Hilary the Deacon to be a heretic. We said that a writer whom he quotes under the name of 'Hilary the Deacon, as it seems,' is a heretic. And if to be a Pelagian and an Arian, to deny original sin, and to maintain that Melchisedek was the Holy Ghost, if 'to be abhorrent to S. Augustine's mind and faith,' and to have written scarcely anything which is 'not contradictory to S. Augustine's doctrine,' is to be a heretic, then, according to the testimony of the Benedictines, this writer deserves the name. Mr. Wilberforce regards him as 'being in error about original sin,' 'savouring of Pelagianism,' 'speaking incorrectly concerning the Second Person in the 'Blessed Trinity,' holding 'a groundless opinion' that Melchise-

dek was the Holy Ghost, but no heretic. A word matters very little—the thing is acknowledged. Again he says, that we 'are evidently mistaken in supposing that Hilary, 'whose Commentaries are appended to S. Ambrose, is not the 'Hilary whose Questions are appended to S. Augustine. On 'the contrary, they have always been supposed to be one and 'the same person.' This is a mistake. They have not been always supposed the same. What better testimony could we have than the Benedictine Editors both of S. Augustine and of S. Ambrose? Both of them agree in thinking it most probable that neither the Commentaries or the Questions are by a single hand, but each of them by several different writers, owing to the number of contradictory statements contained in them. This was also Erasmus's opinion. Petavius considers the Commentaries to have been written, not by Hilary the Deacon, but by another unknown Hilary. But it is not necessary to do more than quote the words of the Benedictine Editors of S. Ambrose. Having stated that there are many agreements between the two works, they continue: 'But nothing can be gathered from this, 'except that these passages have been copied from one into the 'other. It is most probable however, that the author of the 'Questions, (if indeed there is any single author of them,) 'since he is the most lengthy, and has added many errors of 'his own to those of Ambrosiaster, was the one who borrowed 'from the latter.'

P. 398.—Mr. Wilberforce says, that what we have called a refutation of his argument from the Syriac, is not a refutation but 'a simple repetition of it' (Letter IV.) The refutation consists in this. Mr. Wilberforce had said, that 'in Syriac, the term in each member of the sentence is identical.' We showed in Bishop Beveridge's words, that whereas the first term 'Peter' is masculine, the second term 'this rock' is, and is expressed as, feminine. Therefore the Greek has rendered the passage with the utmost exactness, by using πέτρος in the first member of the sentence, and πέτρα in the second. The only difference between the Syriac and the Greek is, that the former expresses the feminine gender in the pronoun 'this,' and the latter, in the substantive 'rock.' The question is, whether the feminine is expressed, not whether it is expressed in the pronoun or the substantive, which everyone who is acquainted with more than one language, knows to be a pure accident depending upon the genius of a language.

P. 399.—Mr. Wilberforce's Second Letter is directed to proving that Optatus is a Saint, and that the writings which go under his name are genuine. He says that 'the attack on the 'authority of S. Optatus is based solely upon the fact, that, as 'Dupin mentions, "the year and day of S. Optatus's death are 'altogether uncertain." But why may not the day on which a

'Saint is remembered, be transferred like the Queen's birthday?' (Letter II.) The argument is unsound, because the statement on which it rests is incorrect. The reason why we have denied Optatus to be a Saint, is not that which Mr. Wilberforce adduces, but because, in the words of Dupin, 'His name is not to be found in any other Martyrology, except that of Peter de Natalibus, *who thought that Optatus, Bishop of Antissiodorus, whose day was kept on the 31st. of August, was the same person as Optatus of Milevis, and believed that the latter's memory was kept upon that day. Baronius, discovering his mistake,* restored Optatus of Antissiodorus, to the 31st. of August, but being scrupulous of altogether expunging our Optatus, since Peter de Natalibus had given him a place among the Saints in his Martyrology, he put him on the 4th of June.' Mr. Wilberforce professes to be greatly scandalized at our having said, that it was by Baronius's means that 'Optatus became a Saint,' and asks gravely whether we 'suppose that it is to the favour of Baronius 'that the noble army of Martyrs, from S. Stephen onwards, owes 'their palms?' With equal gravity we reply that we do not, but we should like to know, if Dupin's statement is true, to what else it is that Optatus owes his name of Saint, except it be the mistake of Peter de Natalibus, or the kindness of Baronius? Mr. Wilberforce says that Fulgentius calls him a Saint. He speaks of him, certainly, as *sanctus*, but this does not mean a canonized Saint, but a holy or good man, just as S. Augustine uses the same word in speaking, as it seems, of Hilary the Deacon, who yet has never been counted as a Saint. As to the genuineness of the seventh book, Cave denies it, and Dupin tells us that learned men considered it spurious, and that he himself had at one time held the same opinion, but had, on the whole, changed his mind. Mr. Wilberforce quoted from it without a word of notice that there was a doubt entertained on the subject. The passage containing the name of Siricius, sufficiently refutes itself.

P. 411.—Mr. Wilberforce writes, (Letter V.) 'Mr. Meyrick 'assigns different senses to the same expression, in a manner the 'most vague and uncertain: "the place of Peter" he takes 'arbitrarily for the see of Rome, or the Universal Episcopate, 'according as the passage implies pre-eminence or not.' This is a pure mistake. We never understood 'the place of Peter' as 'the Universal Episcopate.' Again, 'according to Mr. Meyrick, 'sacerdotal unity arose from S. Peter, because for a little moment 'he was invested with a supremacy of which he was subsequently 'deprived.' *(Ibid.)* This is likewise a pure mistake. A promise being made to one as symbol of the rest, does not invest that one with a superiority over the rest.

P. 415.—Mr. Wilberforce denies our assertion that he has made 'a mistranslation and a misstatement.' (Letter IV.) We

must, therefore, designate them more clearly. His mistranslation consists in having rendered πρεσβεύοντες 'send an embassy;' whereas in Eusebius' Greek it means simply 'treating about.' The misstatement consists in representing Eusebius to say that it was 'the Churches of Gaul' which 'sent an embassy to Eleutherus;' whereas what he does say is, that it was the martyrs of Gaul which wrote letters to the Asiatic and Phrygian brethren and to Eleutherus.

P. 419.—In Letter VI. Mr. Wilberforce complains at great length that we have entirely omitted all notice of the case of Marcian. 'Why does Mr. Meyrick, when referring at large to 'S. Cyprian's acts, pass over this act in perfect silence? . . . One 'of the most important circumstances of all he shuts his eyes 'to . . . He has no right to pass such a circumstance over in 'silence: it is fatal to his general principle . . . Mr. Meyrick's 'conduct in leaving this circumstance in S. Cyprian's life un-'noticed.' This is very perplexing, for we have *not* passed it by in silence. We have shown, on the contrary, that S. Cyprian declared it to be his business as well as Stephen's, to remedy what was amiss. "Cui rei *n ostrum* est consulere et subvenire, frater carissime" (p. 419), which entirely overthrows Mr. Wilberforce's argument, as well as the ground of his complaint.

P. 422.—The next charge against us is more perplexing still. We have written, 'Appeal to Rome was one of those things which grew out of Isidore's forgeries, according to Bishop De Marca's testimony;' and referred to the Archbishop's great work, De Concordiâ, vii. 20. On this Mr. Wilberforce writes, 'No doubt the title of De Marca's chapter has misled him. But 'had he taken the trouble to read it, he would have found that 'De Marca does not suppose such appeals to have been first 'introduced by Isidore, but only that the system which the 'Council of Sardica had introduced, had been put into shape and 'rendered absolute by the false Decretals. "*Quippe id in 'legem perpetuam versum est, quod anteà conditio tantum erat.*"' (Letter IV.)

In the chapter referred to, De Marca is giving an account of the changes introduced into the Ecclesiastial law of France by 'the new canon law' foisted in by the two collections of the Decretals of Isidore and the chapters of Pope Hadrian. 'First,' he says, 'it is here laid down, that no Bishop can be judged except in a synod assembled by the chief Pontiff. . . . This *new law* is opposed to the Canons of Nicæa, of Antioch, of Africa, *of Sardica*, and to the letters of Innocent, Leo, Gregory, and the other Roman pontiffs . . . But Hadrian's chapter was framed with the very intent of making the whole authority of deposing Bishops devolve on the Apostolic See, so that even the first hearing of the cause is to be appointed by the authority of the Pontiff, and that which really belongs, of ordinary right, to

Bishops, is only to be theirs by delegation of the Pontiff . . . Secondly, a vast *innovation* was attempted with regard to deposed Bishops appealing to the Apostolic See. For the twentieth chapter orders that they should be judged by the chief Pontiff: 'Let them be judged before the Pontiff of the 'Roman See.' And also in the 23rd it is written, 'What he 'thinks fit, is to be appointed,' which is repeated in the seventh book of the Capitularies, c. 234 and 235. But in that chapter a fraud has been committed, which is not to be despised, for a thing has been turned into a binding law which was before merely a matter of voluntary agreement, a colour for this novel institution being sought for from the Sardican Canon, the abstract of which, however, is alone quoted, and that entirely misrepresenting the meaning of the canon.'

We give the Latin words of the latter part:—

'*In eo autem capite facta est fraus non contemnenda.* Quippe id in legem perpetuam versum est quod antea conditio tantum erat; *hujus novæ institutionis colore quæsito ex canone Sardicensi, cujus tamen breviarium tantum refertur, et ipsum procul aberrans a mente canonis.*' It will be seen that Mr. Wilberforce's charge against ourselves is entirely unfounded, and that the rest of the sentence gives the exactly opposite sense to the words he has extracted to that in which he has quoted them. The *quippe* refers to *fraus*, and the Archbishop distinctly states that it was not the system of Sardica, but one *procul aberrans* from it which was introduced by the Chapters. In the same place he adds a third innovation bearing in the same direction foisted in by the same means.

P. 429.—Mr. Wilberforce has devoted his first letter to a consideration of the place held by Dioscorus at the first session of the Council of Chalcedon. At the opening of the Council, the holy gospels and the magistrates occupied the centre, the legates of Pope Leo, Pope Anatolius, and others, were on the left, and Dioscorus, Juvenal, and others, on the right. Before the proceedings began, the Roman legates demanded that Dioscorus should be dismissed from the meeting—ἐκβληθείη—ἐξέλθοι—saying that unless he was *sent out* they would go out themselves. The magistrates demanded that a special charge should be brought against him, and reproved the violence of the legates in the manner exhibited in the text at the page referred to. Then follow these words: Καὶ Διοσκόρου τοῦ εὐλαβεστάτου ἐπισκόπου Αλεξανδρείας, κατὰ κέλευσιν τῶν ἐνδοξοτάτων ἀρχόντων καὶ τῆς ἱερᾶς συγκλήτου καθεσθέντος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ, &c. These words we originally translated, 'And Dioscorus, the most pious Bishop of Alexandria, by the command of the most glorious magistrate, and of the sacred senate, *remained sitting among the others.*' And this, of course, is, as Mr. Wilberforce admits, the natural meaning of the words. Mr. Wilberforce's letter has, however, succeeded in

convincing us, that in the present instance the words mean *sat down in the middle of the assembly.* Accordingly we have exchanged the former rendering for the latter, and readily acknowledge that the ἐν τῷ μέσῳ here more probably means *in the middle of the room*, than, as usual, *among those by whom he was surrounded.* But what does Mr. Wilberforce gain by this alteration?

He professes to show, that the demand of the Archbishop of Rome was at once complied with. What was that demand? That Dioscorus should be ejected from the assembly, ἐκβληθείη—that he should be made to go out ἐξέλθοι. Did Dioscorus then go out according to the demand? No. He sat down in the middle of the room, and there he stayed for the whole day, and late into the night, taking free part in the debate. And the very same phrase καθεσθέντος ἐν τῷ μέσῳ is applied in the very same sentence to Eusebius of Dorylæum. Did then Eusebius of Dorylæum likewise 'abandon his place among the Bishops?' So, too, a few pages further on, the very same phrase καθεσθῆναι ἐν τῷ μέσῳ is applied to Theodoret. And yet it is of this very Theodoret that Mr. Wilberforce says, 'Leo is supported in deciding, previously to the meeting of the Council, that Theodoret should be restored,[1] and Dioscorus ejected from its ranks' (p. 189.) So here we see that there are three men sitting in the middle, Eusebius, Theodoret, Dioscorus, and the position in which they sat, according to Mr. Wilberforce, implies, with regard to the first, we presume, nothing; with regard to the second, that he was restored; with regard to the third, that he was ejected from the ranks of the Council. Certainly in one sense he was ejected from *the ranks* of the Council, but we should regret to think that Mr. Wilberforce would shelter himself under such an equivocation as that. But as we have said, the gist of the matter is this: Mr. Wilberforce represents the Council as 'yielding submission' to the demand that Dioscorus should be turned out of the assembly, and inasmuch as Dioscorus was not turned out of the assembly, it follows that such submission was not yielded. And it is to be regretted, that Mr. Wilberforce should have used phrases, 'Dioscorus was obliged to summit without opposition, and to abandon his place among the Bishops,' 'Leo is supported in deciding that Dioscorus should be ejected from the ranks of the Council,' which would give a reader, not minutely acquainted with the facts, the impression that he *was* dismissed from the assembly, according to the Legate's demand.

P. 433.—Mr. Wilberforce argues that it was not the position of Constantinople, relatively to Alexandria and Antioch, which

[1] Mr. Wilberforce's words are ambiguous, and it is not clear whether he means Theodoret's restoration to his Bishopric, or to a seat in the Council. If he means the former, we must refer the reader to *Ch. R.* p. 432.

was the purport of the 28th Constantinopolitan Canon. We refer him to Pope Leo's Letters.

P. 445.—Mr. Wilberforce says, that in arguing against the theory which he has put forth, that the King or Queen of England is the centre of unity by which Anglicans are combined into a spiritual whole, we have '*contented ourselves with appeal-*'*ing to the fact*, which I am far from denying, that the claim 'which this state of things implies in the Sovereign, is practi-'cally respected by no one. 'Does any one,' asks Mr. Meyrick, 'hold such a belief in England, Scotland, America, or the 'Colonies? We know of no such person.'' This is a mistake. Our argument is as follows: 1. No one holds such a belief. 2. No one ever held it. 3. It is in no writing of an Anglican Divine. 4. It is not in the Articles or Canons. 5. Mr. Wilberforce can find nothing except one Act of Parliament passed in the reign of Henry VIII. on which to found it. 6. That Act of Parliament implies nothing of the kind, but contradicts it. 7. The authoritative statement of the Church contradicts it. 8. The authoritative statement of the Crown contradicts it.

P. 448.—Mr. Wilberforce has made a similar mistake here. He had stated that the title of Supreme Head of the Church of England still belongs to our Sovereigns by Act of Parliament; and he represents our argument to the contrary as follows: 'I 'had cited three Acts of Parliament, which are still in force, 'in which this title is ascribed to the Crown. He enumerates 'three other Acts of Parliament which ascribed it to the Crown, 'and which are not in force. Is there any arguing with such a 'logician?' (Letter IV.) Instead of this, our argument was, that the three Acts enumerated by Mr. Wilberforce were not those which assigned the title to the Crown, (as stated by him, p. 229,) but that they were Acts passed respectively for constituting Queen Anne's Bounty, allowing Doctors of Civil Law to marry, and repressing the pecuniary exactions of Rome, only referring incidentally to the Sovereign's title; whereas, those other three Acts which did assign the said title to the Crown have been repealed. In truth, the title in question has belonged to the English Sovereigns for exactly twenty years, and no more; and during fourteen of those years the Sovereign has been either partially, or wholly, Roman Catholic. The title has been held by no Sovereign of England except Henry VIII., Edward VI., and Mary, and is accordingly never found in the Rotuli Parliamenti except from 1534 to 1553.

We have referred, we believe, to all Mr. Wilberforce's objections to our Review of his work, except such as are too impalpable and vague to confront. There is much in his Letters of which we might complain, especially his frequent general declarations that we have made mistakes, instead of the far more satisfactory course of pointing them out in detail. But we shall not

linger over this. We have only, in conclusion, to notice, that although he has published Seven Letters of reply, Mr. Wilberforce has, nevertheless, not attempted to explain how it was that the wording of his note (p. 387) became so arranged as to give his readers the idea that some spurious passages of S. Cyprian are genuine—how he failed to quote the passages in S. Chrysostom with regard to S. John, and S. Paul, and S. James, which counter-balance those which he has quoted with regard to S. Peter (p. 401)—how he led his readers to come to a false conclusion as to Ambrosiaster's opinion of the relation of SS. Peter and Paul to each other (p. 402)—how he came to omit an important clause in the famous Sardican Canon (p. 420)—how it was that he has made no mention of the Ninth Canon of Chalcedon (p. 421)—how he failed to state that Meletius was President of the Council of Constantinople (p. 429)—how he represented S. Cyril as delegated to sit at Ephesus by a 'commission' issued by Celestine, which 'commission' was issued by Celestine for a distinct object, and before he knew that there was to be a Council of Ephesus at all (p. 425)—how he was led to say that the sentence on Dioscorus was founded on Leo's Letter (p. 431)—how he came to omit the Fifth Council (p. 437)—how he failed to tell of the excommunication of Pope Honorius at the Sixth Council (p. 438)—how he came to confuse the preamble and enactments of 24 Henry VIII. c. 12, (p. 447) —how it was that he quoted only half of a sentence of Bramhall when the rest was not favourable to his views. (p. 450.) Perhaps we can scarcely wonder at the occurrence of some of these things when we regard the form into which Mr. Wilberforce has thrown his book. A work which appeals largely to authorities ought not to be composed, after the fashion of a mosaic, with one piece taken from here, and another piece taken from there, fitted violently and artistically together. When the Fathers are quoted, they should be quoted at some length, in order that the reader may see the context as well as certain isolated expressions. If Mr. Wilberforce would prefer the testimony of a Priest of his adopted Communion to our own, we can refer him, without fear, to the Abbé Prompsault's *Du Siége du Pouvoir ecclésiastique*, which has been placed upon the *Index*, for maintaining principles almost identical with our own, in opposition to the Ultramontane doctrines to which Rome is now committed, and Mr. Wilberforce has apparently given his adhesion.

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
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